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AFRICA IN TRANSITION

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PREFACE

Last year was the Bicentennial of the United States, and the Academy celebrated by having a special Bicentennial conference on the Constitution. We called that conference "The Revolution, the Constitution, and America's Third Century." In conformity with our alternating domestic and international themes for our annual meetings, this year we have taken as our topic "Africa in Transition."

Every society, all life, is in a state of transition. Nothing, or relatively little, is stable. We move from birth to death, from being young to old, and if there is any merit in accepting the theory that society has an organic parallelism to the human, there is a birth and decay of civilizations. There are changes, evolutions, and revolutions that occur.

It is true that all societies are in some state of transition, but we have used African transition as our theme because there are tremendously dramatic changes occurring in that massive continent. There is movement from colonialism to independence; there is movement of populations from rural to urban communities, civil societies, to civilization. There is a transition in almost all social institutions of humanity in Africa: the family, education, criminal justice systems, economic and political systems. Africa today represents more of a state of radical and dramatic transition than any other continent in the world. This is why we feel justified in speaking about African transition as our theme.

There is turbulence in the shifting of political systems; there are totalitarian and democratic regimes. There are monumental economic changes occurring with increasing productivity in some places and amazing excessive importation of goods in others. There are educational changes; there is uprooting of families; there is an increase in crime; there are transitions of the elites, the intelligentsia, and the workers. Tribal groups are being reformed as local political entities. Food and population distributions are significantly altered as previously colonial-ruled groups become self-determiners of their fate.

The blacks have emerged as a racial group, pure and mixed, as significant members of the human race in a world of men and the world of politics. Cuba, Russia, and China vie with Israel, the United States, and Western Europe for allegiances and alliances in that continent. Dominance is replaced by persuasion, political hegemony is substituted by economic bartering. Africa has said adieu to white supremacy and is now entering the arena of economic and political tradeoffs for its own advantage. No longer the home of the white hunter, the upper class safaris, Africa is black resurrection demanding to be recognized for its pluralism and its search for unification.

There have been many significant developments on many fronts in Africa. They are placed before us almost every day in the press. There are important comments commanding world attention that are being made

regularly by our representative to the United Nations. Referring recently t(Nigeria's effort to mediate between Zaire and Angola to resolve th(problem caused by the Katangan invasion, Mr. Andrew Young made ε dramatic statement: "I say, let the Africans settle it. Our best policy is tc encourage the Africans themselves to settle it."

It is clearly impossible for the Academy to cover all aspects of African transition. What we have done is to provide speakers and papers on a few important selected features. I hope the members and readers of this issue agree that our selection has been effective. We begin with population problems, move to agriculture, urban problems, crime, African unity, cultural transitions, and the role of China.

One of the more interesting comments about Africa appeared recently in the *New York Times* (April 6, 1977) by C. L. Sulzberger. "Today," he said,

> the whites govern 87 percent of that hugh land [South Africa]. The plan now is to reduce that proportion only by a patchwork quilt of black "homelands" incapable of surviving alone. The obvious goal to work for is a set of "defensible borders" for South Africa, which concentrate the white minority in a far smaller area and relinquish what remains to black rule.

Statements of this sort are dramatic, especially in contrast to what was being said officially only five or ten years ago. Thus it is that our annual meeting was particularly enhanced by having as our principal speaker an authority on the United States' relations to Southern Africa, Mr. William Schaufele, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

In 1964 the annual meeting of the Academy was devoted to the topic "Africa in Motion." For anyone who wishes to make a comparison between the July 1964 issue and this one, clear differences in the political, economic, and general social conditions in Africa can be observed. Africa today is not simply beginning to stir, it is truly changing its identity and its relations with the rest of the world.

MARVIN E. WOLFGANG

ANNALS, AAPSS, 432, July 1977

Trends and Prospects of Population in Tropical Africa

By ETIENNE VAN DE WALLE

ABSTRACT: Despite the uncertainty of the available statistics, it can be said that Tropical Africa remains the region of the world with the highest fertility and mortality. Population growth is substantial, and it often takes place in vulnerable ecosystems that are not suited to large populations. The Sahel and its problems of irregular rainfall illustrate the unsuitability of much of the continent for anything but bare survival. Relocation of population, some of it to cities, is inevitable; but intensified agriculture holds the key to the well-being of the increased number of people.

Etienne van de Walle is Director of the Population Studies Center and Chairman of the Graduate Group in Demography at the University of Pennsylvania. He has an LL.D. and a Ph.D. degree in demography from the University of Louvain. His work includes (with W. Brass et al.) The Demography of Tropical Africa, The Female Population of France in the 19th Century, *and articles on historical demography and the population of Africa.*

OUR knowledge of African populations remains full of uncertainties. Not only are the official statistics pitifully inadequate; the diversity of local and regional situations is so great that almost nothing significant can be said that would apply to "the population of Africa." The present remarks will be restricted to continental, Tropical Africa, excluding the North African region and the Republic of South Africa. Even after these exclusions, the contrasts are so large as to defy generalizations: contrasts between savannah and forest, plains and highlands, rich coastal regions and drought-stricken Sahel, rural and urban areas, and, within rural Africa, between cash crop areas, resettlement schemes and subsistence agriculture where the main resource may be in seasonal migration. Each of these categories encompasses fascinating differentials in population characteristics and trends, on which too little information exists. Superimposed on the natural and economic regions are the ethnic and linguistic groupings. And finally, the diversity of administrative traditions inherited from colonial systems results in statistical by-products of different types, which further complicates the task of the analyst.

It has often been said that colonial empires imposed national boundaries that made little sense. In demographic terms, the fragmentation of Africa is best illustrated by estimates of population size.[1] Even leaving out minuscule island territories, there were, in 1974, 8 countries with less than 1 million inhabitants and 17 more with less than 5 million. There were only 7 countries (out of 40) with more than 10 million inhabitants.

There remained, moreover, considerable doubt concerning the exact size of many countries' populations. It is not uncommon that a census will enumerate 20 or 30 percent more people than was expected—either because the previous estimate was grossly inaccurate or because the census itself was inflated. The three giants in Tropical Africa—Nigeria with its official 61 million, Ethiopia with 27, and Zaire with 24—may well actually have markedly different totals. The political interests at stake in determining regional populations for Nigeria were such that overenumeration appears to have resulted, and the cause of accurate measurement may be jeopardized for some time in that country. In Zaire, which witnessed rather considerable economic and political upheaval, the population is reputed to have almost doubled in 20 years—a rather unlikely result derived from administrative estimates with untrustworthy bases. Finally, a real census has never been taken in Ethiopia. And similar problems exist in smaller countries as well.

The uncertainty is not limited to population size or distribution. There is no vital registration system in the area under review that even remotely approaches completeness. Estimates of fertility, mortality, and population growth are based on a combination of more or less reliable surveys taken at different dates, on indirect procedures and analytical techniques based on census results, and on models. The complexities of measurement, the rich reality of situations which underlies the differentials, have made Africa into an interesting demographic laboratory—however frus-

1 These data for 1974 are taken from the United Nations' *Demographic Yearbook*, 1974.

trating at times for those in search of precise answers and accurate facts.

POPULATION GROWTH

If we must generalize, it is safe enough to say that sub-Saharan Africa is the world region with the highest and least rapidly changing levels of fertility and mortality. The death rate remains particularly high. With a few exceptions, the continent has not seen the spectacular progress of public health that has brought the expectation of life in many countries of Asia and Latin America close to the European and North American levels. Although the level of mortality is particularly difficult to evaluate in Africa, most estimates place expectation of life at birth at 40 years or less compared to 70 years or more in Western countries. National and international agencies have campaigned against certain of the infectious diseases and in some instances have achieved spectacular successes. Thus, smallpox seems very close to eradication. But the main killer, malaria, is still at large.

The diseases that account for a majority of all deaths (as they did in Europe prior to its public health revolution) are childhood diseases and intestinal and pulmonary complications, which depend in part on hygiene and diet and cannot be prevented without substantial changes in the way of life and the infrastructure. There are also some diseases, such as sleeping sickness and river blindness, which render large tracks of land unfit for human habitation. Morbidity contributes to poor physical performance, and the blessings of health and long life bring with them substantial economic benefits. This is fully acknowledged by all governments, and the death rate should continue to decrease in the future. It will require great efforts and cost to increase the capabilities of public health services, to train and equip medical personnel, to make the environment more hospitable and maintain peace and order, and, above all, to curb unhealthy practices and poor nutrition.

A paradox of public health is that substantial portions of Central Africa seem to be affected by pathologically low fertility—possibly because of venereal diseases—among populations that greatly value high reproduction. In Gabon, the Camerοons, in parts of Zaire, and elsewhere it is possible that health campaigns will result in higher fertility. Even so, the birth rate in Tropical Africa remains uncommonly high, typically in the high forties (births per 1,000 persons—as a reference, the birth rate in the United States is now close to 15 births per 1,000). Nowhere is fertility regulated to any large extent by the conscious desire of couples, although there are various social mechanisms, such as marriage customs and intercourse taboos, that tend to cause rather large differentials in fertility from one group to another. Family-planning programs have made little headway in general. There are well attended clinics here and there in the urban areas, and some governments have demonstrated interest in reducing the national rate of growth and alleviating the burden of multiple pregnancies and large families for the health of mothers and children. In general, however, family-planning programs are a subject of low priority. In a recent list of government positions on population growth and family planning, only four

Tropical African countries were said to have official policies to reduce the population growth rate: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Mauritius. Eleven other countries had expressed official support of family-planning activities "for other than demographic reasons," that is, mostly for reasons of health or as a human right. Some countries in this category were, nevertheless, basically pronatalist and in favor of population growth. The other countries in the region had no stated position or were prohibiting the dissemination of family-planning services and information.[2]

With the slowly declining mortality and the persistently high fertility, the prospects of population growth are considerable. States are committed to reducing the death rate, and even if they unqualifiedly had decided to strive to reduce the birth rate, the dynamics of population are such that African nations have no real policy choice concerning their growth in the near future. The rate of natural increase has been estimated at 2.8 percent by United Nations statisticians, and this is enough to double the population by the beginning of the next century. Many African politicians and social scientists claim that the continent is underpopulated. The test of this proposition is in the future, as the great increases in number will have to find their place either in the modernizing economies (where unemployment threatens) or in the over-burdened subsistence agriculture.

It is often assumed today that the pressure of numbers on limited resources leads inevitably to catastrophe. The Malthusian view is that human populations are adjusted to the fixed amount of resources available to them; imbalance resulting from natural increase is called overpopulation, and it soon leads to starvation and high mortality. I shall argue here that the reality is more complex. But recent events appear on the surface to have confirmed the views of the doomsday prophets. The drought in Sahelian Africa was seen by many as a typical Malthusian crisis brought about by increasing numbers and a forewarning of larger problems in the future. Large loss of life is represented as nature's mechanism for bringing the population back to the capacity of the land. A careful look at the Sahel's drought, however, leads to very different conclusions. What will follow is borrowed from the most thorough discussion of the drought and its demographic implications by the best specialist of African population, John C. Caldwell.[3] At the time of the drought, Caldwell devoted several research trips to the stricken area.

THE SAHEL DROUGHT

The term Sahel refers to a strip of dry grassland, some 200 miles wide, that provides a transition between the Sahara desert and the thicker vegetation cover toward the south. It is an area of fierce sunlight and spare rainfall, where man scrapes a living with exceptional difficulty even under normal climatic conditions. The main activity is nomadic pastoralism. In the early 1970s, the monsoon rains failed several years in a row; this culminated in a

2. Dorothy Nortman and Ellen Hofstatter, *Population and Family Planning Programs: A Factbook*. Reports on Population/Family Planning, The Population Council, 1976.

3. John C. Caldwell, *the Sahelian Drought and Its Demographic Implications*, Overseas Liaison Committee, American Council on Education, paper no. 8, December 1975.

massive disruption of living conditions in 1972 and 1973. Since then, rainfall seems to have returned to normal. The Sahel countries are Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad, although the largest part of the population of these countries lives outside of the Sahel proper. The zone affected by the drought was not limited to the Sahel, but distress was felt far and wide in a belt of shifting cultivation stretching to the south and to the east into the Sudan and Ethiopia, where the provinces of Wollo and Tigre were much affected.

Even when the rains come at their appointed time with the customary abundance (which in other parts of the world would be sparcity) the region sustains some of the lowest levels of living reached anywhere. Senegal and Mauritania, thanks respectively to good cash crops and mineral wealth, have raised incomes and enjoy reasonable prospects of economic development. But the landlocked countries on the verge of the desert have a per capita income under $100. The population is almost exclusively engaged in subsistence production. They live much as their ancestors did, and have little prospect of rapidly improving their lot, except by migrating to better climes and changing the traditional way of life. Through skillful adaptation to an extraordinarily difficult environment, survival has been possible, but not prosperity by our standards. Modern technology has no obvious solutions to substitute for the nomadic life of herdsmen who follow their cattle where the grass grows. The ecology of the region is fragile, so that overgrazing or shifting cultivation without sufficient fallow would lead to permanent damage to the land. Drought is a recurrent feature of the area, even though this generation seems to have benefited from a bountiful (by their standards) climatic spell. Oral traditions recount the far graver drought of 1913, with its appalling losses of human life and large-scale destruction of the herds.

Population growth in the area has probably been slow but sustained since at least the beginning of the century; there may have been an acceleration since the Second World War due to the decline of mortality. Caldwell estimates the expectation of life "in a normal year" at under 35 years, infant mortality under one year at above 250 deaths per 1,000 births, and the crude death rate at above 40 deaths per 1,000 persons. With a birth rate at 45 (births per 1,000 persons), this would leave one-half of a percent growth per year.[4] The Sahel is an area of very low overall population density, and the number of its inhabitants may reach 2.5 million. Of course many more people were affected by the drought as well. The Sahel countries number 25 million.

One of the most surprising features of the recent crisis is that it does not seem to have resulted in exceptional loss of life or even to greatly increased malnutrition. This may sound almost shocking to the readers of newspaper stories in the United States. It should be remembered, perhaps, that these stories—and the pictures that accompanied them—originated mostly in the refugee camps of the south rather than in the Sahel region itself. Refugee camps were collecting the most destitute of the nomads and were exposing them, often for the first time, to contagious diseases from which the low densities of their usual environment had protected

4. Ibid., p. 9.

them. Caldwell concludes that the available evidence indicates no measurable increase of mortality. The conclusion is partly due to the inadequacy of our instruments of measure, in the absence of a reliable statistical system. Normal mortality is already high, although impossible to evaluate with precision; for lack of a baseline, exceptional mortality cannot be estimated. "The figures in the newspaper headlines were figments of the imagination, and many apparently serious reports were little better."[5]

> The point should not be misunderstood. The drought was immensely distressing, it caused pain and sickness; it broke up households and herds; and it forced many to sell treasured articles. But it did not halt population growth. It is doubtful whether deaths in the Sahelian countries during the 1970–74 period numbered more than a quarter of a million above what would otherwise have occurred. This number would have been sufficient to have raised the death rate by 2½ points or perhaps to have lowered the rate of natural increase by one-sixth, from possibly 1½ to 1¼ percent per annum.[6]

To a demographer, it is hardly surprising that reliable statistics could not be collected on the demographic consequences of such an overwhelmingly visible cataclysm, because statistics are a luxury that only developed countries can afford. It comes as a surprise, however, that other disciplines were also unable to measure the extent of the phenomenon and its true human dimensions. Several nutritional and medical survey teams were at work in the Sahel in 1973, and their findings are so unexpected that they deserve to be quoted at length. These findings refer to both the nomadic and the sedentary population of the provinces in Upper Volta and Mali that were most affected by the drought in July and August of 1973, that is, during the period when the least food was available (even in normal times, these are the months of the "hungry season" just before the new crops become available).

> The British medical team in northern Upper Volta reported that the nutritional levels found there were similar to those found at different times and places elsewhere in tropical Africa [Seaman, Holt, Rivers and Murlis, 1973, p. 777], while the American group in Mali observed, "Villages visited in the Nioro and Nava area (both declared disaster areas by the Malian government) showed insignificant rates of undernutrition among the child population" [Center for Disease Control, 1973, p. 28].[7]

The tests for malnutrition were of the kind that can be rapidly administered to large numbers of people. For instance, the teams from the Atlanta Center for Disease Control examined 3,500 children and computed for each the ratio of weight to height—the so-called Stuart-Meredith Standard. They found on that basis that 7 percent of the sedentary children and 17 percent of the nomad children were severely malnourished. The corresponding results in Upper Volta, for sedentaries and nomads, were 9 and 10 percent, respectively. Such proportions, of course, would be appalling in the United States; but they are not remarkable in an area of constant hardship and abysmally low expectation of life. The outward signs of malnutrition are often the result of infectious diseases. Children are the most vulnerable group, and the symptoms

5. Ibid., p. 26.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. Ibid., p. 11.

were greatly reduced at older ages. In observing the phenomenon at first hand, Caldwell "became convinced that the drought publicity hid the vital truth. . . . The real lesson was not how easily man succumbed to the drought, but how tenacious he was in managing his survival."[8]

The affected area had periodically known such conditions for many millenia, and adaptive mechanisms are built into the mode of life. Pastoral nomadism itself is a technique designed to extract a living from the inhospitable environment. Edible plants and wild animals, including insects, are known for their food value, even though they are little used in normal times. The cattle themselves, around which the life of the nomads revolves, constitute a moving supply of food. Meat and dairy products normally serve as trade items to obtain cash, and they are exchanged for grain from the sedentary farmers. The coastal cities and the cash crop areas in the south, where cattle cannot thrive because of the sleeping sickness, get much of their meat from the Sahel nomads. In case of famine, however, they will eat their animals themselves. This is a last resort, because the old way of life must disappear if the survival of the herds is jeopardized.

Nomadism involves low densities, large territories, and constant movement. The normal adaptation to the drought was but an extension of the usual behavior of the nomads. The herd is constantly on the move, in search of grass. Even when the monsoon has failed overall, there is tremendous variability in local conditions. Local showers occur, and the cattle move on in search of microclimates where the rainfall has been better and the water holes have not dried up. In the process, the range of migration increases. The herds go further and further south, through areas which sleeping sickness usually renders unsafe for the cattle—but the tsetse fly itself cannot live without a certain humidity. The nomads push on, until they reach areas where the herd can graze. If most of the cattle had died and been eaten in the process, they continue until they reach the cities. "In late 1973, a large Malian Tuareg group of men, women and children arrived in Ibadan in Southern Nigeria and camped (and traded) around Mapo Hall on the top of Mapo Hill, the traditional center of the city."[9]

An additional factor differentiates the present from the past and alleviates the potential human losses to famine and malnutrition. This is the increased effectiveness of states and the reaction of the international community to human suffering. Outside relief arrived surprisingly late in places, because it had taken time to gain awareness of the emergency; but the reaction was vigorous after the world had been alerted to the drought. By 1973, the food was pouring in. Road systems, trucks, airlifts all played their part. This would have been utterly inconceivable during the drought of 1913 which, although more severe, was not heard of outside of the region. Famines, as always, are caused by a lack or a disruption of transportation, not by a shortage of food on the world market.

The refugee camps focused some of the horror of the existing conditions, and press agency photographers had a field day picturing pathetic children and emaciated mothers. But the camps were the centers where the relief was dis-

8. Ibid., p. 26.

9. Ibid., p. 27.

tributed. They attracted the most needy, and the most destitute migrants were left behind in the camps as the nomads moved on.

> Mostly they were the targets of migration chosen deliberately by nomads as offering the best option available. If they had not been established there would undoubtedly have been more death and greater misery, but the greater majority of those who chose to stay in the camps would otherwise have continued south. Indeed by the time they had reached the camps the harshest areas were already behind them. In many cases the men and older boys did continue south (or had already gone there) leaving the women, young children and people in the camps.[10]

As Caldwell puts it: "The major demographic response to the drought had not been death but migration."[11] Some of the moves were temporary, and their function was to provide an adjustment to recurrent problems. Some were durable, but inspired by an old logic, an old flexibility. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the men move out during the dry season and come back when the planting season starts. The purpose is double: to relieve food supplies at home by "eating away"; and to use the period of seasonal unemployment to secure cash and goods unavailable at home. In areas of shifting cultivation, too, the attachment to one home or one piece of land, which is such an important part of the cultural legacy of the West, does not elicit the same response. Most significant for the future, perhaps, is that migratory movements may become irreversible. Caldwell observes that many of the streams of migration that arose from the drought were increasingly directed toward the towns and that a large number of refugees were settling in a new life, perhaps permanently. "Nomads, like food gatherers and hunters in other parts of the world, are often happier, if forced, to take the leap from their kind of life to urban employment than to farming, which is a far more specialized way of life with a mystique all of its own."[12] Thus, for example, Tuaregs appeared on the employment market of the large coastal cities as an aftermath of the drought; they were appreciated as night watchmen because of their reputation as fierce warriors from the desert.

THE PROSPECTS

In the twentieth century, whether we like it or not, the prospects for nomadic pastoralism are not good. The ancestral way of life, at its best, afforded only the most primitive living conditions. Increases in the number of people and of heads of cattle, as a result of the gains of modern medicine and veterinary science, may have led to overgrazing and new encroachments of the desert on what used to be pastoral land. Despite efforts at irrigating and stabilizing agriculture, it is unlikely that the dry savannah lands of Africa will ever successfully accommodate large densities.

The lesson of the Sahel, however, is not that overpopulation threatens to cause a return to some Malthusian equilibrium through the death of the excessive numbers. Mortality is not a condition that is produced automatically by the unsatisfactory functioning of an economic or an ecological system. It is caused by exogenous accidents—by unfavorable climatic spells, the disorganization of trans-

10. Ibid., p. 28.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
12. Ibid., p. 29.

portation and civil services in warfare, the prevalence of disease. And it is relieved by external factors—organization and transportation, migration to more favorably endowed regions, the improvement of the medical delivery system.

Historically, economic development has always gone together with a great deal of population growth; overpopulation is a term that is largely synonymous with economic stagnation, and its cure is investment and intensive labor. The population of Tropical Africa is growing, and has been doing so for some time. The main question raised by this growth is not whether it will stop soon—the answer to that would be that the numbers will increase greatly before fertility declines and natural increase stabilizes. The main question is how the population will be accommodated and what the social costs of the changes brought about by growth will be.

Elsewhere in the world, development has implied vast relocations of people whose way of life, however idealized it has been by their descendants, was harsh and exhausting. Communication has broken the isolates open, and the competition of less severe, better-rewarded lifestyles led to the abandonment of rural areas where people had once led a rustic, self-reliant life. In Africa, too, a continent characterized by the severity of the physical environment and the isolation of cultures inherent in the enormous distances, the improvement of communications and the unequal development of certain regions is leading to enormous shifts of population. Africa is in the midst of an urban revolution; the expansion of the cities' population has been spectacular in recent years, in large part because of the pressure of population in the rural areas.

> Though social and economic developments in the towns have been considerable the revolution in urban growth has not been complemented by a comparable revolution in economic development. As a result economic and social resources are under pressure and an industrial revolution of sufficient proportions to be able to meet further increased demand on these resources is unlikely in the foreseeable future. There is an urgent need to at least reduce the rate of urban growth through some reduction in the rate and volume of movement from the rural areas.[13]

This implies rural development rather than the haphazard accumulation of population that has occurred on the land. Growth is not only destructive of former social relations and institutional arrangements, it is also a threat to the fragile ecosystems of the tropics. The old adaptations to the environment, based on long fallows and shifting land use and on labor saving, extensive methods of cultivation, were not designed for populations that double their numbers every 25 years. In spite of the low densities, the unmodified cultivation systems of many regions of Africa may be approaching the limit where land deteriorates and loss of fertility sets in. In the West, the economic take-off of the last two centuries was accompanied by a large demand for labor and massive rural depopulation. The challenge of population growth in Africa will have to be met, not by large-scale capital investment in industrial equipment and urban facilities along the Western model, but by smallholder agriculture.

13. R. Mansell Prothero, "Population Mobility and Rural-Urban Systems in Contemporary Africa," *working paper no. 30, African Population Mobility Project, 1976, p. 13.*

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: You concentrated on the nomadic tribes in the Sahel region, which are part of a chain of differentiated agriculture economies from nomadism to shifting cultivation, transhuman cultivation, and then the small and large holder agriculture. Would you make the same kinds of rough generalizations about the more settled, more densely populated agriculture regions of Africa? Is the same kind of adaptability to economic tragedy also evident in other areas?

A (van de Walle): The traditional adaptation mechanism to population in Africa has been shortening the fallow period. If the local cultivation system was such that fallow would last for 10 to 20 years before people came back to a piece of land, it obviously would be an enormous reservoir of available land. If you restrict the fallow period too much without supplementing the nutrition of the land by adding fertilizers, then there is the danger that the land is going to lose its texture and deteriorate. The mechanism that has often worked is using crops that were tolerant of poor land. One of these crops is casaba. It has been spreading over many parts of Africa. It is tolerant of very poor land, but once again there is a cost.

The hypothesis suggested by Esther Boserup, who wrote on the effects of population growth on the social system, is that the density of population will lead to a more intensive use of cultivation. This occurs at the cost of investing more human labor on the land. The African population has been very reluctant to lend itself to this kind of agriculture.

Q: Here in the United States, we are victims of chemical pollution in food. My ignorance about Africa gives me the feeling that those people are not victimized by manufacturers who seek a profit at the expense of the health of the people. Would you comment on that?

A (van de Walle): First of all I want to resist the temptation to believe that Africa is a vast green continent. As far as the pollution of food, I believe that the problems are different. The vast majority of the people do not have the luxury of the United States to worry about the quality of their food. I remember once when I was in one major African city, there was a DDT truck going through the streets, surrounded by an enormous white cloud. Of course, this was a direct threat to the health of these people, but the local support was so overwhelming for DDT and the elimination of flies and mosquitoes that there were hundreds of children running behind the truck cheering it on.

Q: Are we in the United States today consuming food which ought to be eaten by some of the people in Africa?

A (van de Walle): The answer to that is that there is very little trade in food occurring, at least in grain. Of course deficient food is hard to narrow down. If coffee is food, then we are importing food from Africa. There is some export of food to the coastal areas and the big cities, but in general it is not a very substantial amount. Most of the cultures can be supported at this time by their own agriculture.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 432, July 1977

Smallholder Agriculture in Africa Constraints and Potential

By K. G. V. KRISHNA

ABSTRACT: Peasant farming is the backbone of the African rural economy. In the predominantly agrarian societies of Africa, smallholder farming plays a major role in producing food for both rural and urban populations and in providing incomes, employment, and export earnings. However, these farmers have received a disproportionately small amount of available developmental resources. Few people in Africa live in wholly subsistence economies. Peasant farmers are steadily increasing their share of marketed output and, in the process have belied the myth that rural societies are stagnant. Extending effective support to widely dispersed farming populations requires financial and manpower resources on a scale which few African countries can afford. Few technical packages exist, extension services are scanty, and marketing and credit services are deficient. These are formidable problems the resolution of which will take much time, effort, and resources. But the potential for improvement is so considerable, and the social implications so immense, the national agricultural policies should articulate the needs of smallholders far better than they have so far. Given proven and comprehensible technical packages and advice, and attractive prices for their products, peasant farmers have shown a capacity to increase their contribution to the economy in a quick and efficient manner.

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SMALLHOLDER or peasant farming is the backbone of the African rural economy. It concerns the manner in which about 280 million people in sub-Saharan rural Africa, 50–55 million families, earn their living from year to year. The overwhelming majority of these people (about 85–90 percent of the total population of this area) are peasant farmers. Their activities—crop production and livestock herding—play a major role in feeding the rural and urban populations, acting as the main source of employment and earnings, and providing the principal basis of exports and often of government revenues as well. Because of the quiet and unobtrusive way in which these activities take place from year to year, the role of peasant farmers is seldom the focus of much attention and their activities are more or less taken for granted. What is even less apparent is that the very significant contribution of peasant farmers to the economy often takes place within a framework of primitive techniques, low levels of productivity, and much uncertainty concerning production levels attained from one crop season to the other. More than anything else, this situation reflects the fact that the majority of the rural population has tended to receive only a meager share of the resources available for development and that it has largely been ignored in the plans and programs which are periodically formulated in their capitals.

Contrary to popular belief, there are no wholly subsistence economies in Africa in the sense of people leading self-contained lives. In fact, living in a wholly subsistence economy has, for many years, been neither feasible nor practical in most countries since the breakdown of complete isolation and the steadily growing requirement to pay taxes. Having been forced initially to participate in the market economy at least to a small extent, peasant farmers have actively sought to enlarge their role both as consumers and producers, often encountering much frustration in the latter role. In fact, given the difficulties in participating actively in producing for the market, what is surprising is the extent of progress already achieved in this regard. In the few situations where governments actively sought to encourage smallholder production—either for political or socioeconomic reasons—through a combination of incentives and support services, there has been an amazing degree of responsiveness from the latter, thereby belying the myth that rural societies are stagnant and fatalistic or devoid of ambition and initiative. It has been a hard struggle, however, since there continues to be much skepticism, and some ignorance, among governmental authorities with regard to the potential role of smallholder agriculture.

PAST POLICIES

The colonial period

Past policies with regard to smallholder agriculture have tended to be influenced by the number of considerations depending on whether they were formulated within the framework of colonial governments or the independent governments which succeeded them. During the colonial period, policies tended to vary as between situations where there was an active attempt to introduce expatriate capital and enterprise to develop the economies and those where the focus was on promoting market-oriented production, but strictly within the framework of

traditional peasant agriculture. Policies varied further depending on whether overseas settler-farmers were to be encouraged and assisted in developing modern agriculture or whether overseas initiative would be limited to plantation companies. Where a settler element was involved, as in the highlands of Kenya, not only did it entail concessions and privileges to settlers out of proportion to their number, but it became apparent before long that there was a clear dichotomy between the role envisaged for the settlers and the potential role of traditional peasant agriculture.

This dichotomy is most vividly brought out in the experience of Kenya which had an active and influential settler community that, despite its small numbers, succeeded within a relatively short period in becoming the major source of market-oriented production, whether for exports or for the domestic market. During the period 1950-1960 for example, the large-farm sector, comprised of settler-farmers and the plantation companies, accounted for as much as 90 percent of the total marketed output. Not only were traditional farmers hopelessly ill-equipped to share in producing for the growing market, but also there were no government policies at the time which were consciously aimed at enlarging opportunities for the traditional sector comprised of millions of African peasant farmers. On the contrary, where some smallholders displayed initiative in producing cash crops —notably tea and coffee—which had been monopolized by settler-farmers, the latter put enough pressure on the government to seek a restriction of prohibition on such production, on the ground that the products of peasant farmers could not satisfy and maintain quality standards of the export and, on occasions, even the domestic markets. The imposition of such restrictions seriously jeopardized and delayed the development of smallholder production. It was not until the late 1950s that this policy was modified and an attempt was made to promote a policy for the advancement of African smallholders in cash crop production. This policy, which was elaborated in the "Plan for the Advancement of Africans in Cash Farming" (Swynnerton Plan), began in and became a widely known success story. The plan cleared the way for significant smallholder—African—participation in market-oriented production. The share of such production which was as low as 10 percent in 1950 rose to about 30 percent in 1962, the last year before the independence of Kenya.

In some African countries where there was no expatriate settler-farmer element, overseas-based plantation companies were quite prominent. These companies, which were drawn principally from the former metropolitan powers—France, Belgium, United Kingdom —created the first modernized agricultural sectors in these countries. Their production was based on a system of obtaining low-cost land from the governments, hiring low-cost labor which ostensibly was underemployed, and combining these with foreign investment and modern technology to produce crops principally, but not exclusively, for the export market. While these companies dominated the production of certain crops—rubber, tea, coffee, and palm oil—they were *not* generally averse to sharing production with smallholder farmers whom they, in fact, encouraged and assisted on occasions. Their role in

exemplifying market-oriented production was an important factor in stimulating smallholder participation in the market economy.

Post-independence period

Since attaining independence, many African governments have endeavored to encourage and assist large-scale participation by their nationals in all types of economic activity. As the largest sector of most African economies, agriculture has naturally been the focus of much attention and has received a substantial allocation of finance and manpower. The thrust of government policies has been twofold. In the first place, where African economies had for many years been dominated by foreign entrepreneurs, there was an understandable desire to Africanize or nationalize various enterprises as an initial step in promoting domestic enterprise. Since agriculture was in most cases—except where expatriate settler-farmers or overseas plantation companies played an important role—in the hands of native African farmers, the need here was not so much nationalization as giving an impetus to the sector so that it would begin to undergo a transformation with beneficial effects on yields and output. This was done through a combination of measures including improved and expanded extension, marketing and credit, and a better determination and improved delivery of suitable inputs. An important, although not spectacular, transformation has been achieved in the process.

Policies with regard to agricultural transformation or modernization have varied a lot among African countries. Three main types of policies may be identified in this regard. In the first place, there were those which were directed principally toward expanding the range and output of crops, but which did not reveal much preoccupation either with issues of a nationalistic nature or with considerations of equity. The main consideration behind this policy appears to have been to attain rapid progress in self-sufficiency in food or the expansion and diversification of export crops. Whether the enterprise which engineered progress was local or foreign or whether the government was actively involved or not was irrelevant for this policy.

The second policy emphasizes the importance of assigning a growing role to nationals but did not exclude a continuing role for foreign enterprise, particularly if it already existed and had performed an important role. The objective appears to have been the creation of conditions under which the participation of nationals would be phased in smoothly and in an orderly fashion while the role of non-nationals would be phased out in an equally smooth, nondisruptive manner. In both the above cases, there was no particular emphasis on expanding the role of smallholders, but only on helping them in whatever way was found feasible to participate in the market economy.

The third policy clearly aimed at the earliest possible assumption by nationals of responsibility for both food and cash crop production on the clear farther assumption that large companies, large individual entrepreneurs, absentee landlords, and others who were not directly involved in agricultural activities would be speedily replaced by peasant farmers who would be the government's principal target groups.

It is perhaps premature to determine which among the three poli-

cies noted above has been the most or least successful. Moreover, any determination which is based on physical measures of progress may not stand the test of social factors, particularly the aspects relating to equity and income distribution. It is difficult to dispute the claim of the Ivory Coast that it has created the basis of an efficient agricultural system or of Kenya and Malawi that they have speedily opened up opportunities for African participation in production directed both to the domestic and export markets. It is equally difficult to prove that, despite their declared concern for smallholders, Tanzania or Somalia have really improved their lot. But these are short-term perspectives, and the experiences of the countries to date cannot be regarded as conclusive proof that any given policy has been particularly successful in raising levels of productivity and maximizing opportunities for raising living standards of large numbers of people.

LARGE-SCALE FARMING AFTER INDEPENDENCE

While the existence of large-scale farming in the pre-independence period of some African countries can be seen in retrospect in the context of expatriate companies or individual farmers, there is little rational explanation for its continuation—particularly of individual large-scale farming—in the post-independence period. Typically, many of these post-independence large farmers have been drawn from the ranks of government officials, professional politicians, and senior executives from private or parastatal organizations. Few, if any, have any legitimate claims to own land. The motivation is one of social prestige and few have demonstrated their capability in farming. And yet, because of their influential position, they have managed to obtain for themselves a disproportionate share of the available resources, particularly credit and the agricultural services. However, because of their lack of direct involvement in agricultural operations (often resulting from their being absentee landlords), the productivity of land has suffered and has resulted in substantial economic waste, which is indefensible particularly in situations where the growing pressure of population on the soil has caused land hunger, shrinking opportunities in rural areas, and consequent exodus to the towns and cities.

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST LARGE FARMING

In recent years, the case for and against large-scale farming has again become the subject of vigorous debate, although it should be recognized in the African context that nowhere is large farming the dominant mode of agriculture at present, nor is it likely to become dominant in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, although large farming was either a straightforward adoption of an alien-inspired system which prevailed prior to independence or the result of the preeminent social and political position of the privileged few, some claims have been advanced in its favor. Among these are: (1) the responsiveness of large-scale farming to market opportunities, (2) its ability to keep up with, and take advantage of, improvements in farming technology, (3) the usual claims relating to economies of scale, (4) its ability to withstand fluctuations in prices, particularly of items destined for export markets, and (5) its ability

to provide leadership to smaller scale producers.

However, barring the role of large international companies, there is little evidence that large-scale private or individual farming has, in fact, met the above criteria or that it has at least a potentially critical role to play. On the contrary, and again excluding plantations companies, there is evidence that large-scale farming is wasteful in terms of capital investment and managerial skills, that because of its frequent dependence on mechanized farming it promotes a pattern of development which conflicts with the prevailing resource endowment—particularly the availability of labor—and that it acts as a drain often on scarce foreign exchange resources available to the governments. Each of these factors is of vital significance for many African countries in view of the acute scarcity of precisely those items which large farming demands in substantial quantities. Moreover, the development of farming which depends on varying degrees of mechanization would, if encouraged and actively assisted, hamper the growth of rural employment, thereby causing an urban drift. It makes demands on scarce capital and even scarcer foreign exchange and adds to the burden of growing recurrent expenditures, much of it in foreign exchange, for imports of spares, fuel, and technical services. The case for large-scale mechanized farming, which was already weak prior to the steep increase in fuel prices, has since become weaker still. Its continued encouragement would, therefore, be contrary to the overall economic interests of many African economies unless its advantages could be established clearly and conclusively.

PAST POLICY TOWARD SMALLHOLDER FARMING

Despite the many disadvantages of large farming and its unsuitability to the agro-social environment of Africa, this sector has continued to receive much encouragement, often at the cost of small farming. It is well known that when the production of crops is being undertaken in the large farming sector this very fact often militates against these crops being grown by smallholders on grounds such as scale economies or sophisticated management. But the point here is not that large farming has received too much attention, but that small farming has perhaps received too little. Given the fact that small farming is by far the dominant mode of farming in Africa and, hence, it is obviously important to improve its overall performance, why do agricultural policies in many countries fail to reflect an adequate concern for smallholders? And again, assuming that there is no lack of desire on the part of governments to assist smallholders, are there any major and indeed insuperable problems in assisting them? Has it been established beyond doubt that smallholders either cannot produce certain crops at all or only produce them at such high cost that it cannot be justified in terms of its benefits? And finally, has the actual performance of smallholder agriculture—with or without assistance from the governments—been such that only negative conclusions can be drawn from it, or are there cases where it has proved to be sufficiently imaginative and adaptable as to record significant achievements? These are important questions which should have an important bearing on the scope and thrust of future policies with regard

to smallholder farming in the years to come.

SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE—SOME FALLACIES

Lack of initiative

Among the most persistent fallacies pertaining to smallholder farming is the one that, by and large, these people are unwilling and often unable to take advantage of new technical packages, agricultural services, and innovation generally. Apart from the fact that this is without foundation, it has in it the dangerous implication—often evidenced in government policies—that assistance provided to small farmers has justification more socially and politically than strictly economically, and hence that it represents only a desirable transfer from the more to the less privileged classes. It also assumes that small farming cannot be depended upon in the realization of objectives such as greater food self-sufficiency and expansion and diversification of agricultural exports and, by implication, that large farming constitutes the main element not only of stability in agriculture, but also of its orderly growth.

Although, as noted above, much of the better publicized and documented modernization and growth of African agriculture has taken place in the organized, large-scale sector, including the private plantations, there is much (relatively much more in overall terms) that has taken place in the smallholder sector. One need only recall the role of peasant farmers who produce cocoa in Nigeria and Ghana, coffee and cotton in Uganda, and tobacco and cotton in Tanzania— just a few of the dozens of examples which may be drawn from all over Africa—to demonstrate how well and how much these people have responded to opportunities provided to them. It is to be noted, however, widespread participation by smallholders generally occurred in situations where either the governments felt, for political or socio-economic reasons, that the activities concerned should be spearheaded by small farmers or there was no initiative on the part of individual large farmers—either expatriate or local—to undertake these activities. The absence of large farmers was a significant factor insofar as the governments were not only not distracted by the belief that quick increases in production could be accomplished by encouraging large farmers or by pressures emanating from them, but also geared their policies toward assisting the smallholders in whatever way they could. The result was that smallholders responded very well to the opportunities which became available to them. In the process, production for the market was expanded, cash incomes grew, the domestic economies as a whole were strengthened, and government revenues became more firmly based.

There were, however, other situations where smallholder participation in production for the market had been artificially held back for various reasons, the principal reason being the pressure of large growers, including plantation companies, who did not relish the prospect of opening the floodgates of competition from peasant farmers. The example which most vividly brings home this point is smallholder tea production in Kenya. It was not until the mid-1950s that the Kenya government, with financial and tech-

nical assistance from the British government, established a scheme for enabling smallholders to cultivate tea. From small beginnings the scheme expanded rapidly, so that by 1963, when the country became independent, smallholder tea was already well established. Since then there has been considerable progress with the result that today over 100,000 peasant farmers grow tea, each with an average of less than one acre of tea. The scheme which is being implemented by the Kenya Tea Development Authority has been a major source of cash earnings for participants and has brought about a number of supplementary benefits, including a significant contribution to export earnings and some wage employment. The quality of smallholder tea compares favorably with that of the estates. In retrospect, there is no doubt that, in the absence of a special effort and appropriate institutional arrangements, smallholders would not have made a successful entry into tea cultivation. Given the needed encouragement, smallholders demonstrated both their responsiveness to economic opportunity and their willingness to allocate their land and labor to a new and untried activity.

High cost of servicing small farmers

It is often claimed that it is difficult to assist large numbers of smallholders because of their widely scattered location, limited numbers of government personnel, lack of suitable institutions, poor governmental organization, and the shortage of funds. These are, of course, real problems, but they are by no means overwhelming. The danger is that these problems are often used as an excuse for the rather limited efforts to assist the rural population in breaking away from their isolation and participating in the market economy, with the result that the situation is perpetuated. None of the problems noted above is insoluble in the long run if there is a firm commitment on the part of governments and remedial measures are being taken. The delay in assisting smallholders often stems not from a lack of the answers to the problems in this regard but from the elaborate solutions worked out which, in the end, exceed both the financial and manpower resources available to governments.

A further factor which often limits the efforts of governments with regard to smallholder farming is the feeling that programs designed to assist them may not be cost effective, particularly by comparison with large farming. While this may be true in some cases, failure to assist those who may now be difficult and expensive to serve would result in their always being less cost effective and hence possibly never being worthy of support. In that event, two situations could result. The first is that support to small farming may be motivated purely by political considerations, for example, by selecting an area which happens to be the constituency of an influential politician. The second is that, when schemes designed to assist smallholders are formulated, they may tend to be so overdesigned to make them foolproof that benefits accrue to only a small number of people. Some of the successful smallholder schemes are characterized by their rather limited impact in terms of the number of beneficiaries. While the success of these projects is no doubt commendable, it also serves as a reminder of the task yet to be under-

taken in assisting those who have still not enjoyed the fruits of development.

The spill-over effect

The argument is sometimes advanced that the interest of smallholders is better served not by explicitly recognizing them as a target group, but by enabling them to benefit indirectly from schemes directed at those—mainly large-scale farmers—able and willing to take advantage of new opportunities. It is claimed that, as the latter break new ground, take risks, and open up markets, some opportunities will accrue to smallholders who could then be introduced into market-oriented production in a manner which minimizes risks. There are two problems with this reasoning. The first is that it implies that small farmers would be unable to make any headway except under the protective cover of the government. The second is that it makes them dependent on a spill-over effect, which may not materialize for a long time and sometimes never at all. Any assumption either that a spill-over effect would automatically occur or that its impact would be sufficient when it materialized is over-simplistic and often unrealistic.

SMALL FARMING—SOME REAL CONSTRAINTS

While the case for maximizing assistance to smallholder farming is both strong and urgent in all African countries, it is also true that much patient effort is required to prepare the ground well for this assistance to both maximize its impact and make it a steady and orderly process. What is needed is not a single dramatic gesture, but a series of modest and well-considered initiatives which reflect a long-term comm ment on the part of authorities a which also recognize that the could well be initial setbacks. The is no doubt that programs aimed providing massive assistance smallholder agriculture face sor real constraints. Some of these a examined below.

Technical packages

Perhaps the most important ty of assistance to smallholders, b often not recognized as such, is t offer of technical packages whi actually work under the agronon and sociological conditions whi the farmer confronts. It is bc uneconomical and counterprodu tive to ask the farmer to use see fertilizers, or insecticides if the have not been previously teste The small farmer cannot afford to himself be used as a guinea pig. what is offered to farmers fails work, it will create a mistrust their part and will seriously jeopa ize programs intended to help the It is most important, therefore, tl the combination of inputs and ag nomic practices which are reco mended to him are proven in t specific areas where they are to introduced, that the small farme both comprehend the advantages using them and specifically agree do so, and that there is a prom follow-up which will ensure that t farmers could obtain guidance a assistance when needed. It is p ticularly important that the empha should be on the improvement what already exists rather than the introduction of systems, inpu and techniques which are who alien to the farmers. In any progra the fact should not be lost sight that the land and labor available smallholders is limited, that fo

production for their own needs constitutes an important claimant on land and labor, that most smallholders are without any kind of cushion which will enable them to take risks, and hence, that the groundwork be properly prepared before they are ushered into competitive production for the market.

Delivery systems

The second major constraint facing smallholder production in Africa is the absence or the existence only in a rudimentary form of systems to deliver support services for agriculture. For example, the benefits from the promotion of modern inputs in smallholder agriculture would be severely constrained if extension services are deficient. Moreover, the recommended inputs should be available at the right time and locations in order to foster a sustained interest in their use by smallholders. Similarly, the creation of efficient marketing is critical to ensure the prompt handling of marketable surpluses produced by farmers. There is nothing more damaging to the morale of small farmers than the failure on the part of authorities to ensure an efficient disposal of production increases. The provision of credit is the third vital link, extension and marketing being the other, in the process of rural transformation, and its absence seriously inhibits the participation of smallholders in market-oriented production. The improvement of the delivery system is therefore vital for the success of smallholder farming.

Government policies

The advancement of smallholder production is often handicapped either by the absence of government policies supportive of it or the existence of some policies which clearly militate against it. The most glaring example of the latter is the policy still pursued in many African countries with regard to the pricing of agricultural commodities, particularly food. In general, governments have tried to keep producer prices for food as low as possible, principally in order to safeguard urban consumers, who tend to be better organized and informed and hence carry more political weight. However, by pursuing a policy of paying low prices for rural products but, at the same time, not protecting the rural population against a steady increase in the prices of urban products, including those imported from abroad, governments are causing a deterioration in the terms of trade for the rural areas. It is becoming increasingly clear that small farmers not only resent this, but simply cannot afford to continue to participate in an exchange which is heavily weighted against them. The best evidence of this is the growing crisis in many countries over food supplies caused, among other factors, by the farmers' unwillingness either to produce marketable surpluses at prevailing official prices or to deliver surpluses to official agencies at these prices.

Accessibility of small farmers

Any major program which aims to assist peasant farmers should in the first place, be able to reach the intended groups effectively. This is largely but not exclusively a function of transport and communications. In many African countries, a significant proportion of the rural population simply cannot be reached through the existing transport links. Even routine administrative links are weak and undependable. Hence,

even where a commitment to support rural development programs exists, progress is limited since there is often a need to start from scratch. In the circumstances, rural roads, farmer training centers, and generally a more effective governmental presence should all be regarded as essential parts of agricultural development programs.

Widely scattered peasant populations seriously restrict the ability of governments to provide effective assistance not only in fields such as health and education, but even for agriculture. It is the concern that the existing situation may forever prevent governmental assistance to the isolated and less privileged rural people that prompted the Tanzania government to regroup its rural population into Ujamaa villages. The actual implementation of the Ujamaa program has not been without snags—including wrong siting of villages with regard to soil types and water and the coercive measures employed by overenthusiastic officials—but it is highly probable that the basic objectives would prove to be sound and wholly defensible in the long run.

SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE—THE FUTURE

Despite the very many problems and constraints inherent in smallholder agriculture, it is indisputable that it should receive far more attention and specific supportive measures than in the past. The case for this is not only social and political but, equally important, economic. Smallholder agriculture is so basic to the economies of African countries that failure to raise its productivity would constitute a grave deficiency in the resource allocation process. While the support to smallholder agriculture is justified on grounds of equity, this is not the only or even the main justification. There is a strong economic justification for this assistance which is to be seen in its appropriateness to the pattern of resource endowment in most African countries.

A major review of the policies toward smallholder agriculture is needed in most African countries. The main theme of such a policy should regard peasant farmers as the major source of production and the major object of support. In the long run, the efficient development of this type of farming would also tend to be the most economically advantageous one.

Experience with assisting smallholders has been limited, but it has proved encouraging. Peasant farmers have displayed initiative and responded well to opportunities which came their way. Active support to these people constitutes not only the most efficient method of accomplishing broad-based progress, but also the best hope of ensuring social and political stability in most African countries.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Last summer, I had the opportunity to spend about a week in Ghana, where I found a very serious food crisis. I was told that the chief reason for it was that there was such a large-scale migration of people, especially young people, to the city that they were simply not growing sufficient food. Yet Ghana was said to be fully capable of being self-

sufficient. As a consequence they were importing a large part of their food from abroad and food was very expensive. What could be done about a situation like this? Is it possible to establish government policy which would get people back to the farm?

A (Krishna): The point that you made about Ghana applies to a number of other countries as well. One of the reasons people tend to move away from rural areas is that the opportunities for productive employment are narrowing and there is a growing feeling that a rural environment does not offer an adequate and dependable livelihood. I suggest that the principal reason for this is the very heavy distortion in government policies, particularly in regard to prices. The center of power in most African countries lies in the urban area where the people are closest to those who govern the country. The remote farmer living where he cannot be reached is often completely left out of the calculations of the administrators and planners. Policies are formulated to serve the requirements of those close at hand.

For this reason, governments in many countries have for a long time been pursuing policies which are detrimental to the rural population, which is the majority of the country's population. Once the relation between effort and reward becomes so distorted, the rural population simply has no opportunity in the rural environment and has to move to urban areas. It is a very shortsighted policy to allow this because larger urban populations simply make it more difficult for the government to pursue more realistic policies in regard to prices, and there is no single factor more important in stabilizing and promoting agricultural development than producer prices.

Q: I have two questions. As you know there is one argument that the problem of hunger and malnutrition in Africa is to some extent caused by too much emphasis on cash crop agriculture. To what extent is the so-called integrated approach by the World Bank contributing to this trend or alleviating the problem? The second question has to do with the terms of trade. You made a point that trade terms seem to favor the urban population. There may be some exceptions to that. I am sure in your organization you have found some cases where trade terms favor the rural population. In those particular cases, what is the basic factor which explains this disparity?

A (Krishna): With regard to the first question, the main point I would like to make is that the problem is one of the major concerns of many governments and, through them, the institutions for which I work. The colonial regime stressed cash crops, particularly for the export market. Along with this production of cash crops occurred such developments as the build-up of a domestic transportation system. It is very obvious that the rather modest communications and transport networks that exist in these countries were intended originally to move exports from production centers to ports where they could be exported overseas.

Now it is also true that the emphasis on producing cash crops for exports has, to some extent, detracted from the need to provide adequate food for the domestic markets. This

s reflected in many countries having o rely on imports from year to year o meet the needs of the population, rincipally the requirements of ur-an population. If you look at im-orts on a year-to-year basis, the lomestic destinations for the im-orted food are all in the urban reas. This is inefficient and uneco-iomical, and, where it involves us-ng up the scarce foreign exchange esources, it is quite dangerous for conomic stability. There are, of ourse, bilateral auspices under vhich food is either provided free or it nominal cost. Our conviction is hat, in the majority of cases, the ood that is imported could have een produced at home with ade-quate incentives and perhaps at ven less cost. So we are working vith the governments to change the mphasis on food crops and cash rops not to minimize the impor-ance of export crops, but to achieve balance between food and cash rop production. If a country ex-ands cash crop production, replac-ng food production, and then has to mport food and pay for it in foreign xchange, the effective increase in xport earnings is immediately neu-ralized. So it is not a very meaning-ul way to expand cash crops.

Regarding the second question on he relative terms of trade, the best nanifestation of the terms of trade iaving moved in favor of the urban opulation is that urban consumers haracteristically pay a price for the asic necessities which does not re-lect the true economic cost, particu-arly in food items. In many of these ountries, the government fixes the roducer price, a government mar-keting organization buys it from the roducer at that price and then trans-ports it, warehouses it, and sells it o the urban consumer. So there are a number of points at which the true economic costs can be hidden so that the urban consumer price can be substantially less than it might have been in a completely free market.

The best way of understanding what the economic price might have been is to look at food which does not pass through official channels to reach the urban consumers. There are occasions when the cost of such food is two to three times higher than the official price. If the producer price is raised to a meaningful level and there is an increase in production, the necessity of having to import food and subsidize consumer prices in the urban areas could be at least minimized if not eliminated.

Q: One of the main problems of modernizing agriculture in Africa, especially in the Sahara region, is irrigation. Could you give your view on the organization that would be necessary to bring smallholders together and modernize irrigation? Is it better to actually collectivize agriculture or is it more profitable to leave it free?

A (Krishna): With regard to water, quite obviously very much depends upon the sources. There is not very much one can do in an area of low rainfall except use rainwater when it occurs, perhaps one or two months during the year. The most obvious thing one could do is by very simple technology to build pockets to collect the scarce rainfall. At the same time, one could supplement this by a very thorough probing of the ground water resources available. An important variation to the ground water development program is control or disciplined utilization of ground water.

In Ethiopia the government has two wells in areas used predominantly by nomadic people. There are mobile pumps, which pump out the ground water from the two wells. After a period of time, when cattle and human beings have used the water, they must move on and the well is locked up. This enables the well to be recharged for the next season and also protects overgrazing in the area. Anybody who wants to use the well must become a registered user, and one of the disciplines imposed on them is that they must move to another area later.

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Political Transition in Urban Africa

By SANDRA T. BARNES

ABSTRACT: Political change in Africa has not met the expectations of pre-independence analysts. Civil wars, military coups, and the demise of multi-party states weigh heavily on the performance of public authorities and the smooth functioning of the body politic. At the local level, political and demographic changes also exceed expectations. Administrators are unprepared to deal with the vast numbers of migrants who are attracted to the burgeoning cities. At the same time, agencies are constantly reorganized and bureaucratic continuity is minimal. The result is that residents are forced to meet political needs through their own efforts. To these ends there has been an increasing Africanization of the polity, as seen in the proliferation of traditional authority figures who adapt their roles as chiefs or patrons to the modern urban marketplace, and a proliferation of organizations and networks that serve as interest groups or dispute-settlement mechanisms in place of formal governmental institutions. Although unanticipated, these features can no longer be considered deviations from a prescribed norm. They are an organic part of the political process. Today they account for much of the stability and continuity that are to be found in Africa's urban political systems.

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POLITICAL change in Africa has not gone according to plan. Scholars who examined the new nations as they came into being assumed that subsequent political transitions would follow three directions. Political systems would Westernize; national loyalties would supplant ethnic loyalties; mass participation in national affairs would increase. But these predictions have not been borne out.

As is usually true with predictions, the past 20 years in Africa have seen untidy events which spoiled the tidy unfolding of the future put forth by the prognosticators. The rapidity with which change would take place was underestimated. Civil wars, military coups, and the demise of multi-party states were unanticipated. And, as I argue here, the weight of historical tradition in shaping the modern political arena was misjudged. It is now clear that beneath the tumultuous events of the past two decades there has been a movement of political systems away from the goals introduced by colonial powers and more toward modern African ideas of how a nation should be ordered.

For example, mass participation can no longer be measured in relation to national events such as elections or campaigns, nor is it found in national organizations such as political parties. To establish parameters for the African political scene we must look to small-scale interaction, that level which is indeed the lifeblood of a polity. Here the evidence is that African modes of interaction persist. An urban chief may be as effective an arbiter as a court judge. A mosque may double as an ethnic association and thereby act as an interest group on behalf of its worshiper-members.

At the local level, political and demographic changes also vary from expectations. The urbanization process is accelerating to the extent that rural productivity is in jeopardy. Through no fault of their own, administrators are unable to expand their services quickly enough to deal with the vast numbers of migrants who are attracted to the burgeoning cities. Not only are facilities and amenities stretched beyond their limits, but also the structures of urban governmental agencies are constantly reorganized and continuity in civil service personnel is minimal. One outcome of these circumstances is that residents are forced to meet political needs through their own grass-roots efforts. Their success can be measured by a growing body of evidence that competition for scarce urban resources continues unabated yet largely outside the formal political institutions.[1] The answer to how this is achieved can be found in the actual direction political change has taken and not in the plans for how it should have changed. In reversing the prescribed directions for political development, the public has found outlets for political needs and some measure of continuity and security.

The point I wish to emphasize is that by retaining African institutions, customs, and values, by retaining and manipulating ethnic group ties, and by diverting participation away from national affairs, ordinary citizens in all but the most totalitarian regimes still retain viable outlets for political activities despite what one observer sees as a "shrinking political arena."[2]

1. The term "formal" is here restricted to statutory political institutions.

2. Nelson Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

There are two ways this is accomplished. First, there is an increasing Africanization of the polity, as seen, for example, in the proliferation of traditional authority figures who adapt their roles as chiefs or patrons to the modern urban marketplace, assisting residents to fulfill personal and political needs. Second, there are a number of "invisible," or secondary, organizations and networks, such as landowner associations, secret societies, and even religious groups, that serve, among other things, as interest groups or dispute-settlement bodies and, therefore, must be considered a functioning part of the political process. The degree to which each complements rather than contradicts formal governmental institutions varies with each urban setting. Similarly, the degree to which polities are Africanized or to which invisible groups fulfill primary political needs varies markedly from place to place.

At this point, let me be clear about what I mean by the terms "politics" and "political process." Politics is the way in which individuals cooperate and compete for power in the form of resources—both human and material. It is largely a public affair and is concerned with decision-making that affects a community.[3] In urban centers, resources consist of jobs, housing, land, education, contracts, social services, prestige, status, and so on. Competition for these resources and decisions as to who is to receive, control, and distribute them together constitute the political process. Today, despite wholesale proscriptions on overt participation in some nations, the political process continues unabated. It takes place largely outside the formal political arena and is often subtly embedded within the ongoing encounters and exchanges of the daily social routine.

To support this position, I describe the inner-workings of Mushin—one of three suburban political communities within greater metropolitan Lagos, Nigeria.[4] Mushin is briefly compared to other urban centers where certain striking similarities are to be found. From this evidence it appears that the most important political transition taking place is that, while unique to each city, an identifiably African political culture is taking shape at the local level.

THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY OF MUSHIN

With the possible exception of Kinshasa, Lagos is now the largest metropolitan area of tropical Africa. It is the capital of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the overseer of the bulk of the nation's import and export trade, and the site of the largest industrial complex in West Africa. The influx of migrants seeking employment opportunities in these and other sectors has trebled in recent years, so that recent estimates place the population in excess of 3.5 million.[5] Thousands of newcomers who arrive each week must adjust to an environment that is more technologically and bureaucratically oriented than can be found elsewhere in Nigeria. The social transformations they undergo can be associated with Africa's industrial

3. See Paul Friedrich, "The Legitimacy of a Cacique," in *Local-Level Politics*, ed. Marc J. Swartz (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968), p. 243, for a discussion of this definition of politics.

4. The case study is based on field work carried out in Mushin by the author in 1971–72 and again in 1975.

5. *Business Times*, 11 January 1977, p. 1.

revolution. In view of these factors, Lagos presents an ideal setting for examining the contemporary political process.

Until 1976 metropolitan Lagos consisted of four separate political communities. The municipality of Lagos was administered by a city council, and three adjoining suburban districts were each administered by a town or district council. Each of the councils was overseen separately by the Lagos state government, and therefore there were no administrative connections between the political communities nor overlap in local officeholders or other authority figures. Local leaders zealously protected their political boundaries, perpetually engaging in activities to retain their community's autonomy and its political solidarity. The sense of community solidarity did not extend beyond politics, however. None of the four communities had a separate economic or social life. In other words, place of occupation, kinship ties, and social interaction did, and continue to, transcend political boundaries.

The suburb of Mushin officially came into being in 1955. An agricultural area before the Second World War, it has taken only three decades to become Lagos' most heavily populated sector. Mushin houses 1.5 million residents—it is largely a residential area—in contrast to the 1.2 million who live in the municipality of Lagos and the nearly 1 million who are divided between the other two suburbs.[6] The bulk of its residents are migrants, the leaders of whom have shaped it into a viable political community largely through their own efforts.

In the course of its development, Mushin has experienced a number of changes in its political system. It has gone from a decentralized to a centralized polity. Its administrative authority has undergone frequent and fundamental reorganizational shifts in its 21-year life-span. There has been little long-term continuity in civil service personnel administering the council. Finally, it has been shifted between jurisdictional authorities, the consequences of which are that Mushin is the least physically developed sector with the least desirable living conditions in Lagos.[7] To be fully appreciated, these changes must be elaborated.

Before colonization in 1861, and unlike its neighboring city-state of Lagos, the area now known as Mushin was not politically centralized nor were its villages tributaries of a larger centralized kingdom. During the colonial period, it was overseen by a district officer who, in accordance with the principles of indirect rule, should have had, but in this case did not have, a preexisting structure through which to administer his territory, save a few lineage elders who acted as headmen of the villages that dotted the region. Thus it was not until postwar urbanization that political centralization took place. As a first step, the village elders united to form village group councils which, in turn, chose representatives to act as emissaries between residents and the colonial government. The representatives were a farsighted group of migrant settlers who envisioned the day when their new homes would be an integral part of the metropolitan area. It was they who petitioned government to create Mushin by carving it out of a

6. Ibid, p. 1.

7. Akin L. Mabogunje, *Urbanization in Nigeria* (New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1968), pp. 300–9.

much larger rural district and to give it a separate governing council.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: 1955-1976

When Mushin came into being in 1955 it had two bodies: a policy-making board of elected councilors and a bureaucratic establishment of civil servants empowered to implement policy and administer local services. Elected councilors were, by and large, the same leaders who lobbied for the creation of the council. Each represented an emerging urban neighborhood that had been turned into an electoral ward, and each was to serve a three-year term. A senior civil servant was to oversee the establishment and provide administrative continuity. This council structure remained unchanged during its first five years.

Then a series of frequent shifts altered the representational character of the council. Dissatisfied with the performance of the council and perceiving an opportunity to turn it into a partisan stronghold, party politicians, who by 1960 dictated local government policy, dissolved the elected council and appointed committees of management whose primary attribute was party loyalty rather than representational skill. Thus began a new trend. During the tumultuous period from 1960 to 1965, when the dominant Western Region party, the Action Group, fragmented and was succeeded by various partisan coalitions, five appointed councils came and went in Mushin. Each new council represented a change in the balance of partisan power.

Other changes were instituted after the military coup of January 1966, again altering the basic structure of the council. For a three-and-one-half-year period, the council was run, not by a representational body, but by a sole administrator who served both as policy-maker and implementer. Sole administrators then ran the council for 6 other interim periods lasting from 1 to 18 months.

In its first 21 years, the council seesawed between elected boards, appointed boards, and a sole administratorship 16 times. There have been 10 policy-making boards. Three have been elected by residents, four have been appointed by the ministry of local government acting on the instructions of partisan leaders, and three have been appointed by military edict. Only two councils have served a full three-year term; the longevity of the others has been from one month to two years, with shorter periods being more the rule than the exception.

In 1976 another radical change was effected at the behest of the federal military government which toppled the Gowon regime in July of 1975. Mushin was divided into two new administrative authorities —Mushin East and Mushin West— each with an administrative establishment and a paid, elected representational board. Elections were held in December 1976 as part of Nigeria's nationwide reorganization of local government and its preparation for a return to civilian rule.[8]

During the same 20-year period, the bureaucratic arm of the council has been subject to frequent changes. There has been a lack of skilled civil service manpower and repeated personnel shifts, particularly at the highest levels. Turnover has been so great, in fact, that there is

8. Federal Republic of Nigeria, *Guidelines for Local Government Reform* (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1976).

little bureaucratic continuity and, therefore, little incentive to develop and follow through on administrative programs. Although the council has been upgraded and expanded from a district to a town council, its staff expansion has been minimal compared to that of the Lagos City council. For example, in 1974–75 there were about 6,250 employees in the Lagos city council compared to just under 500 in the Mushin town council, despite the latter's larger constituency.[9]

In its short life, Mushin has been removed from one jurisdictional authority and placed under another on several occasions. These changes have had profound effects on the development of the area. Notorious for being a shifting no man's land,[10] Mushin has often been neglected and ignored, for the reason that no higher authority has been willing to invest in an area that might at any time be removed from its control. The contrast between Mushin and Lagos City in annual local government expenditures is revealing in this regard. In 1967–68, for instance, the Lagos City council expended roughly $18 per inhabitant, against about $1.20 per inhabitant expended in Mushin.[11] By 1974–75, using latest population estimates, the Lagos City expenditure remained nearly the same, whereas the Mushin expenditure rose to about $3.50 per resident.[12] From its earliest years, neglect has been apparent in almost every respect: in economic, administrative, and judicial services; in town planning; and in the provision of amenities and police protection.

THE RISE OF URBAN CHIEFS

The most dramatic response to this neglect and to the resultant need for self-help has been the creation of a chieftaincy system. Just as squatter settlements are noted for organizing their own internal governmental services, Mushin, while not a community of this type, has responded to community needs by adapting an old political model to a new setting. The chieftaincy system consists of a hierarchy of chiefs and their advisory councils. Almost all of Mushin's leaders are in some way involved in the chieftaincy system as title holders, council members, or advisors. The basic criteria for participation is that a man or woman own real estate in Mushin or that a woman be a local market leader.

Real estate is the foundation upon which Mushin's political community rests. Real estate ownership in Mushin defines full political citizenship. It provides an entrée into the chieftaincy system and other local-level political groups including the Mushin town council. It affords economic security, in that virtually all housing is designed to produce rental income. It is a symbol of high status, and it attracts the respect of kinsmen, friends, and neighbors. Because political, economic, and even social power is derived from real estate, it is Mushin's

9. See Mushin Town Council, "Draft Estimates, 1975–76," pp. 5–26, and Lagos City Council, "Draft Estimates, 1975–76," pp 56–132, mimeograph.

10. Pius O. Sada, "The Metropolitan Region of Lagos: A Study of the Political Factor in Urban Geography" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1968), pp. 83–4.

11. Ishola Oluwa and S. I. Talabi, *Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Reorganization of Local Government Councils in Lagos State*, Minority Report (Lagos, 1970), p. 67.

12. Mushin Town Council, "Draft Estimates," p. 2, Lagos City Council, "Draft Estimates," p. vii.

most sought after resource, the acquisition and protection of which adds to the needs of owners for community solidarity. The vested interest landowners have in their property, and hence in Mushin, has been one of the more compelling forces in the establishment of the chieftaincy system.

Once again, it is necessary to examine the past for the origins of the chieftaincy element in Mushin's polity. The beginning of the chieftaincy system is to be found in the autonomous villages of pre-urbanized Mushin and in the headmen who kept order within them. Building on this example, settlers of new urban neighborhoods chose new headmen to provide leadership and social order. Settlers in the old but urbanizing villages retained existing headmen as their leaders. Within each expanding neighborhood, landowners, but not their tenants, served as an advisory council to the headman. These units were strengthened by government authorities who used headmen as tax collectors and their landowner councils as communication links to the public. They served as natural training grounds for the leaders who later emerged as Mushin's prominent politicians.

The creation of the Mushin district council added greater strength to the neighborhoods, 30 of which became electoral wards from which the first council was chosen. Once formalized, the neighborhood wards were easily politicized by partisan organizations. And once politicized, the role of headman grew in importance. Without governmental authorization, but with support of the public, the titles of headmen were elevated to that of chief, and the new chiefs began meeting together in divisional councils. At this point, the system began to form a hierarchy. Divisional councils selected one of their members to serve as a senior spokesman, and before a few months had passed these spokesmen were thought of as paramount chiefs, their councilmen as junior chiefs.

In time, the suburb of Mushin had seven paramount chiefs bearing the titles of *olú*, "king of the city," or *Bálẹ̀*, "chief of the town," and seven chieftaincy divisions. *Olú* were chosen either from the ranks of new landowning settlers or from those of the old village headmen. To date, the Mushin chieftaincy system has not centralized to the point that one of the seven *olú* has emerged as *ọba*, "crowned king." Although the *olú* were at one time encouraged to complete their hierarchy by naming one amọng themselves as king of Mushin, they have resisted, since there is no agreement as to who should be so honored.[13]

The rules and customs governing kingship in ancient Yoruba city-states have been adapted to the Mushin chieftaincy system. The new chiefs have taken it upon themselves to learn the necessary sacrifices and rituals of community renewal. They have exercised their roles by appointing sub-chiefs and by giving titles to local notables. They act as dispute settlers, as spokesmen for their publics to government authorities, and as ceremonial leaders in local markets and other public institutions. Because the chieftaincy system was a new, rather than an ancient body, colonial authorities refused to recog-

13. The official titles of Mushin's chiefs differ from their informal titles. Both in addressing and referring to paramount chiefs, residents prefer to use the most honored title, *oba*.

nize the chiefs or give the *olú* official roles in the Mushin district council as they did elsewhere in local government areas where traditional chiefs had preceded colonial rule.

Soon after Nigeria's 1960 independence, however, the seven *olú* were officially recognized by the government. Later they were constituted as an advisory board to the Mushin town council, and eventually they were given representation in the Lagos State House of Obas and Chiefs. In 1975 the titles extended by the seven *olú* to sub-chiefs and notables were officially recognized by the government, and in this way 81 new junior chieftaincy titles came into being in Mushin.

Institutionalization of the chieftaincy system was, in this case, a 20-year process. Within two decades, landowning settlers had created neighborhood councils, village headmen had become chiefs, and, finally, chiefs had become kings.

FLUCTUATING POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

Besides the chieftaincy system, there are or have been a number of other political outlets in Mushin. None have produced more conflict than the partisan organizations which dominated Mushin from the late 1950s to 1966, when they were outlawed by military authorities. Yet parties played an important role in the community, and I shall return to them later.

Following the military takeover, secret organizations, such as Freemasons, Ogboni, and Reformed Ogboni, known collectively as "secret courts," began to expand their membership and activities. Secret courts offer social and political outlets for members in the form of contacts and networks for solving problems, securing resources, or settling disputes. They also offer symbolic rewards in that some secret courts bestow chieftaincy titles on prominent members whose standing in political circles is thereby enhanced. Bonds between secret court members are reinforced through the fictive use of the kinship term "brother" and by initiation oaths that oblige members to assist one another in advancing their personal and public goals.

Also following the military coup, two community welfare organizations emerged. Each represented one of two factions that earlier had been embedded within the local Action Group organization (but not the splinter party, NNDP). Members included most of Mushin's prominent leaders from political and religious spheres and from labor unions and marketing associations.

Other voluntary associations have come and gone. There have been no national ethnic unions since 1966, when they were banned. But at a narrower level, associations whose members are recruited on the basis of family, clan, village, or district are abundant. Finally, a number of religious organizations—Islamic, Christian, and Independent—offer participatory outlets. Like the secret courts, some Islamic brotherhoods and Independent churches confer chieftaincy titles on prominent members. Within larger religious bodies, small societies are often found whose members share the same ethnic or hometown background. As such, they act in lieu of ethnic voluntary associations fulfilling personal and political needs of members.[14]

14. Sandra T. Barnes, "Voluntary Associations in a Metropolis The Case of Lagos,

Over time there has been a waxing and waning in the membership strength, in the intensity of activity, and even in the type of activity undertaken by these politically oriented groups. For instance, community welfare organizations became active during the three-and-one-half-year period the Mushin town council was overseen by a sole administrator. When a committee of management that included prominent local leaders replaced the sole administrator, the community welfare organizations lapsed into inactivity. Another example is that of the neighborhood landowner associations which fused into the Action Group party structure at the height of the political era, but which reemerged as apolitical neighborhood associations when partisan politics were banned. These are only two of many similar examples, the net effect of which has been a relatively constant shift in participatory emphasis. When one organization has been unable to function effectively for its members, another has supplanted it. Most shifts in participatory emphasis are a response to the external forces that impinge upon the local arena.

The picture of instability and impermanence that emerges from this institutionally oriented examination raises a central question. Given the rapidity of change, combined with the fragility of an organization's life-span or its effectiveness, how is it that Mushin is not simply a geographically delimited administrative unit, but a viable and cohesive political community? Elected representatives may have a power base in the Mushin town council for this month or this year, but not the next. Partisan organizations have a brief life-span. Bureaucrats circulate so quickly that there is no time to develop a clientele or a long-term administrative policy. Voluntary associations appear and disappear. How, in this fragile atmosphere, is continuity maintained? How is a sense of political community sustained?

THE CONTINUITY OF LEADERSHIP

The solutions are to be found not in political institutions but in political roles. The leader is the key to continuity and community in Mushin. He or she is to be found in each neighborhood. He assumes the role of patron (the person who is perceived as the source of the real or symbolic commodities he purveys), middleman or go-between (the person who purveys commodities that are not his own),[15] official (the director or guide of a local group or activity), arbiter (the judge, dispute settler, or witness), or adviser (the guide in personal, familial, even psychological matters). Above all, the political leader is a landowner, a member of his neighborhood landowner association, and in a few cases a leader of an indigenous landowning lineage. Typically—though not in every case—he is an independent entrepreneur, capable of managing his own time and bear-

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Nigeria," *African Studies Review*, vol. 18, no. 2 (1975), pp. 75–87, Sandra T Barnes and Margaret Peil, "Voluntary Association Membership in Five West African Cities," *Urban Anthropology*, vol. 6, no 1 (1977).

15. See Robert Paine, "A Theory of Patronage and Brokerage," in *Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic*, ed. Robert Paine (Newfoundland. Newfoundland Social and Economic Papers No. 2, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1971), p. 8, for a recent discussion of patrons and middlemen.

ing the financial burdens that leadership entails: hospitality, loans, contributions, and caring for a large number of dependents.

Throughout the early years, Mushin's leaders acted in the stead of town planners and in lieu of police by hiring nightguards to watch over their neighborhoods. Even today Mushin's leaders lobby government to secure the most basic amenities and services, such as trash removal. Leaders know how to secure licenses, sanitation permits, market stalls, or loans. They can settle land disputes, give educational advice, or preside at rites of passage or other ceremonies.

Mushin's leaders are basically of two types: neighborhood leaders whose sphere of operation is relatively restricted to localized interactions; and a few principal politicians whose sphere encompasses all of Mushin and beyond. To be effective at either neighborhood or community levels, leaders must cultivate a large number of contacts and networks. To the extent that their finances permit, they must participate in as many political groups and activities as possible and they must hold membership in chieftaincy councils, voluntary associations, or secret courts. By virtue of the contacts they are able to develop, lower-level leaders become clients of more highly placed leaders and so on up the ladder to a few principals who act as an axis around which most of Mushin's political life revolves. Through their wide-ranging networks, leaders manipulate public opinion so as to nurture a sense of political solidarity. Likewise, they guard the boundaries of Mushin against attempts of outside leaders to gain political followings within it.

An essential strategy for Mushin's principal politicians is, in a word, to be flexible. The role of politician is legitimate in and of itself and can exist outside any formal structure. Most politicians, however, take on as many offices as possible. Conditions permitting, a politician may serve as a representative on the Mushin town council at the same time he plays a role in the chieftaincy system, leads a market or transport association, holds a title in a religious group or secret court, and so on. Hence there is a redundancy in leadership positions, that is, a system of overlapping political offices.

Redundancy allows Mushin's leaders to absorb the impact of rapid change. As the balance of power tilts, or as one outlet is closed, the leaders shift the focus of their activities from one sphere to another. Because clients and followers are tied to individuals and not institutions, the burden of adjustment falls on a few individuals rather than the mass. In this way, continuity can be achieved despite institutional flux.

Another essential element in the political game, and here I return to a point raised at the beginning of this essay, is invisibility. The capacity to manipulate contacts and secure resources without visibility is a useful strategy for leaders in a climate of unpredictable and radical change. Thus, when virtually all other political outlets were closed to the leaders of Mushin in 1966, they turned to their contacts within the secret courts or to the two newly created community welfare organizations, both of which operated with manifestly nonpolitical goals but latent political intentions.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES WITHIN THE POLITY

Invisibility and flexibility are as important to groups as they are to individuals. When regimes change or conditions are otherwise inimical to the political process, interest groups, to survive, must be able to blend into a neutral background or to hide themselves behind protective screens. Secret courts are, by their very nature, able to cloak their political activities. Other, more open groups must adopt other strategies. The formation of ethnic voluntary associations under the protective umbrella of religious bodies is a case in point. A more vivid example of political survival in Mushin, however, is to be found in the chieftaincy system. As a result of its prominent role in partisan politics, the legitimacy of the chieftaincy system was eventually questioned by military government authorities and its continued existence threatened.[16] For two years, therefore, chiefs and their councils submerged their activities by meeting discretely and by operating under the organizational aegis of one, if not both, of the community welfare organizations. Later, in a more tranquil period, the chieftancy system was allowed to resume public activities on the understanding that in future it would not engage in partisan affairs.

Clearly there are weaknesses to be found in a system such as Mushin's. For example, a test of the community's viability came during the period between 1963 and 1965. At this time, Mushin's principal politicians were cut off from their conventional outlets and resources. Briefly, we must turn to national politics and the actions of political parties in Nigeria to understand what occurred. By 1963, as I have indicated, both the chieftaincy system and the Mushin district council were virtually undifferentiated from the Action Group to the extent that the latter resembled a political machine. This funneling of personnel and power through a single conduit was effective so long as Mushin's prominent politicians held government offices or otherwise had a role to play in the party itself. When regional power was transferred to the Nigerian National Democratic party (NNDP), in which Mushin leaders had no representation, the political process was blocked. The transition from Action Group to NNDP had been too rapid and bitter a process for adjustments to be made. As is well known, this blockage triggered extensive civil disorder in Mushin that, in combination with other regional and national events, brought about the 1966 military coup and the end of the partisan era.[17] Only a few weeks after the military takeover, Mushin's old guard appeared publicly to call for unity and order. New organizations emerged, but more importantly, access to government and the resumption of the political process were made possible by the appointment of old guard politicians to panels to advise the new regime on how to reorganize local and regional government. In short, still another outlet was instituted, a new order was planned, but the same key leaders were involved.

In this case, we see that stability

16. Sandra T. Barnes, "Becoming a Lagosian" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974), p. 208.

17. K. W. J. Post and Michael Vickers, *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960–66* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp 227–32.

rests upon the viability of a few individual powerbrokers and their ability to operate both inside and outside the formal governmental institutions. Moreover, it rests on the ability of interest groups to adapt what is often a blatantly fictive camouflage. So long as there are resources to tap and room to maneuver, the system can function relatively smoothly. Eliminate access to institutional resources and the ability of leaders to direct their clientele to sources of aid, and stability is undermined.

The Mushin system, on the other hand, has strengths which must not be overlooked. For example, upward mobility is possible so long as the tacit landowning requirements are met. Despite the continuing influence of established leaders, new talent is prepared to assert itself and can be trained. The existence of many institutions and networks ensures their steady recruitment, but first as clients of the leading politicians. For the population as a whole, the clientage system is able to absorb large numbers of residents from all walks of life. Above all, it provides residents with human links via which they can participate in the local political process. It provides them with personalized interaction in what may be an otherwise impersonal urban world.

Both clientage and chieftaincy provide participatory options that have historical and cultural continuity. The chieftaincy system is a modern version of a highly valued traditional institution. Hence Yoruba-speaking residents find in chieftaincy the type of satisfaction that is engendered when the ancient past legitimizes the present. In a constantly changing environment, chieftaincy is a secure political landmark. Clientage, too, offers all residents, no matter what their ethnic background, an opportunity to transact political business in the city in the familiar face-to-face mode of interaction to which they are socialized in their small communities of origin and on which relationships of trust are based.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, let me return to the themes with which this essay began. Those who believed that Western political institutions would inevitably replace the survivals of past political structures felt that because older systems were held together by personal loyalties they were incapable of achieving the kind of bureaucratic impersonality and efficiency necessary in a modern state.[18] In Mushin, however, chieftaincy is not a dysfunctional survival, but an integral part of a vigorous political community. Mushin is not alone in this respect. The role of urban chiefs elsewhere is well documented. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa from Freetown[19] to Dar-es-Salaam[20] to Ouagadougou,[21] urban chiefs are relied upon by residents and governments alike to serve as authority figures, primarily within their own ethnic groups. Almost universally, they act as the interpreters of old values and the synthesizers of what is new and different. For many urbanites, there-

18. See Lloyd A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 19–20.

19. Michael P. Banton, *West African City: A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown* (London: Oxford University Press for International African Institute, 1957).

20. J. A. K. Leslie, *Survey of Dar-es-Salaam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

21. Elliott P. Skinner, *African Urban Life: The Transformation of Ouagadougou* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).

›re, chiefs serve as orientation oints around which they can construct new lives.

Clientage, which is also firmly rooted in the political past, plays a ey role in the contemporary urban olity, be it in Umuahia,[22] in Kumasi,[23] or in Dakar.[24] Clientage is more broad-based than the institution of chieftaincy because patrons ften serve an ethnically heterogenous clientele rather than a specific thnic group. Much of the political articipation in urban Africa, as a ecent study stresses,[25] takes place utside the conventional political tructures and within the sphere of patron-client interaction. The same s true of Mushin. In my own survey in 1972, an overwhelming majority of residents stated that to chieve their goals in the city they vere, to varying degrees, dependent ipon patrons or middlemen. Preisely because it is not institutionally anchored, yet because it offers political outlets for a wide ector of the populace, clientage offers stability at the local level lespite the sweeping changes that occur at the national level.

Those who believed that ethnic dentities must be supplanted by national loyalties have been confronted with new arguments. Ethnic group solidarity is a two-sided isue. On the one hand, there is he position that tolerance of ethnically organized political groups eads to civil conflict, the result of which is to reinforce cultural cleavages and inhibit a national homogenizing process.[26] On the other hand, it has been shown that failure to tolerate ethnically organized outlets for populations that are unprepared to restructure their social interaction in terms of national loyalties, is a cause of, rather than a cure for, civil conflict.[27] In other words, ethnic associations organized on a local rather than national basis may offer positive participatory benefits that outweigh other, more negative, effects. Argued either way, the evidence is the same: openly or otherwise, many groups in African cities recruit members on the basis of shared ethnic identity and not on the basis of an overarching national identity. Institutions, such as mosques or churches, that veil the ethnic group solidarities within them demonstrate the hard fact that heterogeneous cities, with their heterogeneous work places, multicultural residential areas, and other forms of pluralistic social interaction, have yet to produce homogeneous polities.

Finally, scholars assumed that mass participation in nationally focused political affairs must increase because it was essential to political and economic development[28] or because, in evolutionary terms, it was an essential attribute of a large-

22. W. J. and J. L. Hanna, "The Integrative Role of Africa's Middleplaces and Middlemen," *Civilisations*, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 12–27.

23. Enid Schildkrout, "Strangers and Local Government in Kumasi," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1970), pp. 251–69.

24. Stephen Maack, personal communication, 1975.

25. Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena*, p. 5–14

26. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York. Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1973), p. 277.

27 Elliott P. Skinner, "Political Conflict and Revolution in an African Town," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 74, no. 5 (1972), p. 1216.

28 Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey," in *Communications and Political Development*, ed. Lucian W. Pye (Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 301.

scale society.[29] Today, on a national level, departicipation in partisan organizations, in campaigning, or in voting is the trend, and even the goal, of many regimes. The dramatic decrease in nationally oriented activities is well documented.[30] But this has been a misleading focus. Participation must be measured in different ways and on a different scale. The urban arena presents a different picture. In local-level politics we can see behind the struggles of national elites. We can see a broad cross-section of the citizenry competing for the more mundane resources of jobs, housing, or a secondary education. Despite the sweeping changes to which the masses are exposed in their public and private lives, the political process in all but the most totalitarian regimes continues in the neighborhoods and the suburban communities of Africa's teeming urban centers.

It must still be asked why these predictions for post-independence politics were so inaccurate. Aside from being unable to foresee the turbulence with which political change would take place, what was missing? For one, the opinions of African elites were improperly assessed. Recent writers point out that the elite preferred to discourage nationally oriented mass participation because it feared an unenlightened public might interfere with long-term development goals. "Benevolent elitism" it has been labeled.[31] A somewhat contradictory view is that earlier observers were too preoccupied with elite opinions and national politics and, therefore, failed to assess the vitality of local participation and the forms it could take.[32] As the Mushin case demonstrates, the rapidity of change reinforced in citizens the need for fixed reference points—patrons, middlemen, or chiefs—and for lasting relationships on which trust could be based. The fact that citizens unexpectedly chose reference points that symbolized a past political order indicated not only that there had been a scholarly inattention to local politics, but that there had also been an inattention to value systems of the common man and to the weight of historical precedent.

The political process is now and will be governed by African rules. It takes place beneath the surface in the quiet and unnoticed interactions of daily life. It is often veiled behind a screen of African tradition. If we are to understand today's political transition in urban Africa, we must accept the fact of political continuity.

29. Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 29 (1964), pp. 353–56.

30. Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena*, pp. 227–68.

31. Marc H. Ross, *Grass Roots in an African City Political Behavior in Nairobi* (Cambridge, Mass. The M.I.T Press, 1975), p. 127.

32. Margaret Peil, *Nigerian Politics. The People's View* (London: Cassell, 1976), pp. 3–4. Peil summarizes the preoccupation with elite politics, but notes one exception to the trend. Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 503–4.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: It is known that urbanization is taking place in Africa, more than anywhere else in the world. In your opinion, what is bad or good in the

rbanization process, and what are ie ways of correcting what is bad?

A (Barnes): I would say that the egative side of urbanization and uran development is the fact that r too many people have been ken away from rural areas. They e not producing enough food to pport the urban populations. nother perhaps negative side to banization is the fact that, unlike estern nations where the urbanizaon process went hand in glove ith the development of industrialition and more job opportunities banization throughout the Third orld is not developing at the same te as job opportunities. We have r too many people going to urban eas for the jobs available, which esents us with a massive unemoyment problem. I think it has a leterious effect on the psychologal feelings of these people. nother perhaps negative aspect of e urbanization process is that there ive been status aspirations enndered in the past, particularly iring the colonial era, wherein eople have been expected to full their economic goals in urban ther than rural areas. I think these atus aspirations are being dashed id I think urban areas are a crucible r disappointment.

On the positive side, there are erhaps better health care facilities urban areas. There are much etter educational facilities in urban eas, certainly in Nigeria. Much of igeria's development funds have one into the cities, so there are nenities and services there which e very desirable.

As to how we can correct the probms, why not start with farm subdies and raising prices for farm rops? I think equalizing the world conomy is the solution for urban problems, to a large extent. Certainly there are others, but that is my major solution.

Q: In a very enlightening presentation, you mention the word "authority" once. However, your description had to do with a considerable amount of authority—not necessarily governmental authority, but individualized authority in the chieftan. If the military governments continue and history reasserts itself, is it likely that governments in the countries to which you refer will be less than democratic?

A (Barnes): There are many subquestions embedded in that large question. Democratic in the sense that we know it, on the national level, perhaps not, but democracy has a much wider interpretation than we give it. One of the things that I was trying to say today was that democracy, at least the opportunity to participate, is certainly there, and I do not expect that to disappear except in the most extreme cases. We now see several of the most extreme cases, but I don't expect those to last long.

I think that one of the problems has been that we have viewed authority from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. This involves the question of legitimacy. Who do we recognize as legitimate? Quite obviously there are a number of authorities—both authorities who have statutory legitimacy and those who have historical legitimacy. I accept this diversified authority and expect it to either maintain itself or reassert itself in the foreseeable future.

Q: Did you find anything in Africa that is similar to our own so-called social security system, which is making the poor more poor and the rich more rich in the United States?

A (Barnes): You have a double question. There is a very strong social security system in Africa—the family. The family supports its members during their time of need. Secondly, is there a disparity between rich and poor? Yes, but it does not result from the social security system—the family—but from the economic system. A senior civil servant salary in government in many nations in West Africa is 30 times as great as that of the lowest level employee. In the United States, you might find the disparity is 15 to 1.

Crime and Development in Africa

By LAMIN SESAY

ABSTRACT: By itself, development seems to have nothing to do with crime. But when considered as a dynamic process of change, development and deviant behavior become inseparable. As the move away from traditional society gains momentum, the traditional institutions and way of life give way to new ideas of social organization, behavior, and authority, and many see this change as an opportunity to discard old values. The situation is further complicated by the rapidity of change which leaves little time to adjust to development problems. Industrialization accompanied by population redistribution, dissipation of traditional forms of social control, social mobility and technological changes, and improved mass communication are some of the factors of development which tend to increase opportunities for deviant behavior. Poor housing, disorientation of family life, unemployment, rapid population growth, and special labor needs of some enterprises also are conducive to crime and delinquincy. There is a need for a determined effort to correct or remove the socio-economic imbalances that are known to be detrimental to development through systematic planning and programming.

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THE purpose of this paper, as indicated by the title, is to out-ine some of the relationships exist-ng between crime and development n Africa. Taken by itself, develop-nent, as a concept, seems to have ıothing to do with crime. But when :onsidered as a dynamic process of :hange, development and deviant ›ehavior become inseparable. The nagnitude of crime in relation to the levelopment process will depend, o a large extent, on the complexity of changes in the lives of the people :oncerned.

TRADITIONAL AFRICA

Historically, the peoples of Africa ıad known and enjoyed a compara-ively tranquil and traditional exist-ence, devoid of the complex trap-›ings of modern society and all the ınxieties and restlessness involved n modern living. However, the emergence from a colonial/tradi-ional past has brought with it not ›nly a desire but an obligation to nodernize and to develop a capacity :o keep abreast of technological, scientific, economic, and ideological levelopments in other parts of the world, as a necessary condition for equal partnership in a highly com-›lex and competitive world com-nunity. The process of evolution in Africa has undergone many dramatic phases. For the majority of countries, :he change of political status—from lependent to independent—came with very little preparation for the enormous task of nation building.

The countries of Africa may have nany valuable and tangible assets ınd resources desirable and neces-sary for development, but lack the most precious of all, which is simply :ime. Planning for development is :ime-consuming and it is quite ıpparent that the rest of the world will not stand still to wait for Africa. The process of development may take one of two forms: (*a*) a process designed to cause certain measured improvements or changes in some already established aspects of a society, such as health, social security, or education; or (*b*) a process involving a radical change in the foundation of a society to create a new one.

Because of the time limitation and other factors, development in Africa, has invariably implied the creation of new societies. While conferring on people enormous material and other benefits, the new political, economic, and social systems have tended to generate many complex problems, which are exerting a profound impact on the ability of the new systems to maintain dynamism and sustain quality of growth.

As the move away from the traditional forms of society gathers momentum, the traditional institutional framework and the old concepts of life and behavior gradually give way to new ideas of social organization, behavior patterns, authority, and responses to stresses. Often, these new ideas and the corresponding opportunities created are grossly misunderstood and exaggerated, especially by the young. Many see in these new changes boundless opportunities to discard old values, social ties, and obligations to others, with the likelihood of succumbing to the temptation to satisfy needs and desires through illegitimate methods and means.

DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME

The problem of crime and development in Africa is not a recent concern of the international community. Notwithstanding the various theoretical contradictions

surrounding the issue of crime and development, the United Nations has paid considerable attention to this subject for many years. The concern of the United Nations is based on the conviction that (*a*) development that does not lead eventually to a more equitable distribution of benefits is a questionable endeavor; (*b*) the human factor in development is the essential basis of higher productivity; and (*c*) the ultimate objective of development must be a better life for all the people, with increases in production considered merely as a means toward this end.[1]

Therefore, the United Nations crime prevention program has directed attention to the consideration of the facts and problems confronting all the countries of Africa at various stages of development, to provide information on national policies and programs concerned with the prevention and control of crime and delinquency, and to examine conditions in society that could be criminogenic. The basic idea is to explore ways and means of planning for development that could contain crime prevention elements, which would lead to the establishment of more wholesome societies.

As is the case in many developing nations, the expectations generated by the new political, economic, and social systems in the African countries are, indeed, very high. However, the prospects for the timely and equitable fulfillment of the expectations and goals to be attained during a given time span are often not only remote but obscure. Experience has shown that many development plans are far too ambitious and their implementation often left to chance. Competing demands for the limited resources, particularly those relating to national security considerations, are a further setback to implementation. Implementation of development plans being partially or wholly based on external funding and expertise often causes such plans to remain on the drawing board indefinitely. The unpredictable nature of political changes also imposes its own constraints on the development process.

The situation is further complicated by the rapidity of change which leaves the countries with very little time to adjust to development problems such as those associated with rural/urban migration, shanty towns, unemployment, idle and poorly educated youth, demographic changes, and, last but not the least important, political instability. These are some of the inevitable side effects which may constitute major breeding conditions for crime and delinquency.

The drawbacks inherent in unbalanced economic and social development and their interrelationships with criminality have not remained unrecognized by the governments of the African countries. In its 1964–70 Development Plan, for example, the government of the Republic of Kenya observed:

> The maintenance of law and order is the very first task of the Government in promoting economic and social development and its importance cannot be overemphasized. The experience of developing nations all over the world has shown that regardless of other policies adopted, failure to maintain order within the country is sufficient to slow, if not completely half, development.[2]

1. See United Nations *International Review of Criminal Policy* No. ST/SDA/SER.M/25. Sales No. E.68.IV.7. This issue of the *Review* was devoted to the theme of the prevention of crime and delinquency in the context of national development.

2. Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1964–1970* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964), p. 117.

The Kenyan Plan for 1970–74 repeats this theme. It calls for

> . . . the maintenance of law and order, protection of life and property, prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of offenders and the enforcement of all laws and regulations [and explains that] all these functions have a direct bearing on economic and social development.[3]

The concern for orderly development that is clearly demonstrated in Kenya's development plans is also shown by other countries in the region, and references to crime in relation to economic and social development can be found in almost all development plans. However, the timely recognition of this phenomenon should not give rise to the impression that there is widespread criminality everywhere in Africa. It is true, to a degree, that there are still some countries in the African region where crime is not considered a serious development issue.

On the basis of available data and information on crime trends in Africa, it could be assumed that a relationship between crime and development does exist. Industrialization accompanied by population redistribution, dissipation of traditional forms of social control, social mobility and technological changes, and improved mass communication are some of the known factors in the dynamics of development which tend to increase the opportunities for deviant behavior.

Poor housing, disorientation of family life, unemployment, and underemployment are also factors considered to be conducive to crime and delinquency. Rapid population growth, whether from natural increase or massive immigration, also accentuates the pressures within the changing society. The anonymous and shifting characteristics of life in the large urban areas and temporary settlements near industrial centers also tend to breed a variety of criminal subcultures. Inevitably, the accompanying changing values in the society and the weakening of traditional forms of authority and behavior, the absence or inadequacy of family life, and the failure of large numbers of young people to reach certain prescribed standards of educational or vocational achievement create serious problems of juvenile delinquency and other forms of deviant behavior.

Also, the special labor needs of some industrial and commercial enterprises create new sets of problems, often difficult to resolve. The labor practices of some enterprises, mining companies in particular, usually exclude dependents from the temporary shelters provided for workers in their respective areas of operation. Consequently, large numbers of bread winners are separated indefinitely or for long periods of time from their families. This practice often leads to a situation where children growing up not knowing their fathers drift away to the large urban areas. Likewise, the fathers who quit the mines seldom return to their original hometowns and often drift to the cities in search of better jobs. It is also not unusual for the abandoned spouses to seek refuge in the cities where they will probably join the swelling ranks of street walkers.

In some of the African countries, successful attempts have been made to establish viable workers' communities around industrial and mining operations, through a series of partnerships and cost-sharing arrangements between governments and the companies for housing, educational, sanitation, and health facil-

3. Republic of Kenya, *Development Plan, 1970–1974* (Nairobi. Government Printer, 1969), p. 548.

ities. This gradual process of regrouping family units, both primary and secondary, seems to be producing some positive results.

To some extent, the selective hiring of workers from the same tribal groupings for particular industries or operations, with arrangements for sharing the same company residential facilities, provides an element of social security. It is not unusual for the group or its individual members to provide for others who have fallen on bad times. Similarly, the unemployed youth or new arrivals can count on the goodwill of the extended family until jobs are secured for them. Such well organized groups have often been used as the nucleus of government-sponsored social-security oriented local cooperatives.

An attempt has been made to outline in both specific and general terms the phenomenon of crime as it relates to development in Africa. Essentially, the crime problems associated with such development are rather different from those being experienced by the developed world. While being relatively free from the more violent types of crime, the countries of Africa are experiencing an unusual pressure from the crimes relating to property and public funds. The crimes which seem to prevail in Africa demonstrate a basic insecurity associated with underdevelopment.

TREND OF CRIME

Without oversimplification, the trend of crime in Africa can be predicted and the underlying factors discerned with relative simplicity, at given stages of development. The general low levels of economic development, designated by some as poverty, the exposure of people to modern consumerism and the attendant high prices, inequitable income distribution, high rates of urban unemployment, and chronic rural underemployment have given rise to a life of petty larceny and graft.

Many large urban areas in some African countries are known to be virtually under a state of siege, and residents are forced by thieves to impose on themselves what is tantamount to a curfew. Public property, supplies, and technical equipment, imported at very high costs for development purposes, are also not spared the attention of the thieves. For example, it is reported that one country had to abandon an important agricultural project because thieves persistently stole all the batteries and tires from tractors and other vehicles and equipment.

More seriously, graft and other corrupt practices have not only succeeded in holding back development in some countries, but have forced many other countries into a state of virtual bankruptcy. The effects of these crimes on revenue collection and capital formation are devastating. In addition to undermining the confidence of new investors, corrupt practices are known to have driven many existing companies out of business. It seems doubtful, therefore, that any real development can take place in Africa under these conditions of insecurity of person and property and what is now generally regarded as widespread dishonesty or corruption.

The direct and indirect costs of crime represent a substantial share of national resources, and in the budgets of some countries the allocations for the maintenance of law and order far exceed the combined allocation for health and education.

The fear of more crime, especially crime against property, has made people more receptive to the presence of more policemen than teachers and doctors.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, therefore, I should like to stress the need for a determined effort to correct or remove the socio-economic imbalances that are known to be detrimental to development. This could be achieved through systematic planning and programming derived from the social, economic, and cultural realities of the countries concerned. In that context, planning for crime prevention must also take place as an integral part of overall planning for social and economic development.

To ensure effective planning, proper provision must be made for the collection and utilization of comprehensive statistical and other data on trends. The universities and other specialized institutions should be given a special role in the areas of research and the training of personnel over the whole range of disciplines involved in crime prevention. Special efforts must also be made to create a greater awareness of crime and its relation to development among certain categories of officials whose functions are not directly related to activities in the social sector.

In that connection, I should like to mention briefly some of the technical assistance that the United Nations has been extending to the countries of the region, as a consequence of the concern of the organization about the deleterious effects of crime on development. Since the early sixties, the United Nations has given both material and substantive support to requesting governments to assist in the planning and implementation of crime prevention programs, in the context of national development objectives and priorities.

The type of assistance that the United Nations provides varies according to the particular circumstances and the nature of the problem, and may include short-term or long-term advisory services, ranging in duration from one month to three years. Technical assistance may also include a training component—fellowships—as well as books, documentation, and technical equipment.

In 1973, for example, the United Nations interregional advisers visited 38 African countries to render short-term advisory services to governments. This type of assistance is diagnostic and is intended to assist the requesting government in determining the nature and the scope of its problems. The expert, after considering all the elements of the problem, will usually render advice on appropriate remedial measures on the spot or recommend long-term United Nations assistance. Long-term advisory services normally involve the recruitment of a suitably qualified expert, in consultation with the government concerned, to render advisory services locally for a period of one to three years.

Additionally, the United Nations sponsors a series of interregional and regional seminars, symposia, conferences, and training courses designed to encourage and promote collaborative efforts in the planning of programs and policy formulation for crime prevention. Through these cross-cultural exchanges, the countries of Africa stand to benefit from the experiences and mistakes of other societies.

Specialized studies and investiga-

tion of selected aspects of crime in relation to development are also conducted by the major organs of the United Nations concerned with the problems of crime. The network of United Nations regional research and training institutes, as well as the central institute in Rome, provide additional technical support at both regional and local levels. The Cairo Regional Centre for Social and Criminological Research currently serves the needs of both the countries of Africa and the Middle East, until such a time when a regional institute for Africa, south of the Sahara, is established.

Finally, it could be reasonably assumed that with continued international cooperation, as exemplified by the United Nations, the battle against crime in developing Africa may someday be won or perhaps a lasting truce could be accomplished.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Traditional African societies have crime, but I cannot see how one can divorce the criminal situation from present urban conditions in Africa. Don't you think that we should address ourselves to the very close relationship between law and custom? If you look at post-colonial Africa today, our legal systems are exact replicas of Western legal structures. Since we have completely different customs, how could we expect these public and legal structures to work for us when they are not even working for most Western countries?

A (Sesay): My first reaction is that the United Nations is not blaming urbanization for all crimes. In fact, what I have tried to do is simply to show whether there is a relationship between development and crime. Our mandate simply states that we examine the development process to see what type of problems might predispose people to commit crimes. My statement lists a number of conditions considered factors in the creation of criminal behavior. I have not attempted to single out urbanization. Rather, we have been concerned with examination of conditions in the process of urbanization that might have a bearing on crime. To take the other point that you mentioned about colonial laws, we have a comprehensive study on that problem. In fact, we have a questionnaire on this particular issue that was sent to governments. It is our belief that the old laws have been creating more problems than they have been solving. What the old laws were supposed to do is not consistent with the present interests of the countries. But how do you change a law? To change a law you have ethnic and religious considerations, and the government itself has the problem of resolving all these difficulties. You find groups in all countries which are hanging onto the old colonial laws because it is the only protection they can get in the dynamics of change in Africa. As people throw away the colonial laws, they are finding that there is no law. We tell them: You handle it. When you decide that you want new laws, we can help you. We send experts to the governments who want to change the laws. But it is entirely up to them to change it.

Q: All of the information that we have had about the increase in crime has been in connection with urban development in Africa. Is there a concomitant rise in criminal behavior in the rural communities? They must also have a picture of new goals that they expect to meet. They are either operating under the old tribal laws or much more influenced by the old colonial laws. Does this make a difference?

A: (Sesay): In rural areas there is crime, but not as defined as in urban areas. As you rightly pointed out, the traditional forms of control of justice still operate in some areas. The level of tolerance for different types of crimes in the rural area is still much higher than in urban areas. In the rural areas, crime especially relating to property is not that significant, whereas in urban areas, most things taken for granted in rural areas have a cash value attached to them. For example, if somebody takes a chicken in the village, it is no crime. In the city, this is a crime. Of course, the problem of urbanization is serious. The lack of development or growth in the traditional African sector is forcing the people into the cities.

Secondly, there is the negative effect of education. When a school is established in a village, 90 percent of the children enrolled wind up in the city. They look for better opportunities. Now most of the educational institutions in Africa have matured. Where in the past the number of schools could be counted on one hand, now they are in the hundreds. When the young people start coming out of school, there are no jobs. So you have this bulge in the cities. The young people must have something to do. There has to be some connection between the growth of cities and the increase in crime.

Q: You also have to have a redefinition of what is crime in an urban area. If you steal a chicken in your community, you fight it out, but if you steal a chicken in the city, you have committed a crime. That must be making a very difficult problem too.

A (Sesay): That is a very important part of the problem. In fact, we have been trying to encourage governments to remove certain crimes from the book. But of course here, again, you have to maintain a balance between logic and human rights. If stealing the chicken was removed from the books, somebody could steal my chicken and go free. All of this would have to be taken into consideration.

Q: There are scholarly studies directly related to crime development, modernization, or organization, such as the work done by David Bailey, University of Denver. One proposition that he has come up with is that the type of crime we are talking about in Africa may actually be a system of redistribution. In capitalistic conditions that are developing, it is difficult for redistribution to filter to the bottom. Do you see a correlation between the mode of development adopted and crime? If that is the situation, are we not actually talking about developmental alternatives here that may lead to crime as opposed to crime as a problem in itself?

A (Sesay): I think the approach I will take here is the U.N. approach.

Development itself does not cause crime. It depends on the type of development. The Eastern block will say we don't have any crime, because nobody owns anything. It is only in the capitalistic system that you have crime. When you examine facts, you find that there is crime everywhere. The problem in dealing with crime today is first that of defining what is crime. Now in urban development all that the United Nations can do is conduct worldwide studies, get responses from governments, and then present it to the members. It is up to them to decide which one of those examples to take. We don't say which is successful, because each individual experiment's success depends on the interpretation that it is given by those who practice the experiment. Deciding which society produces more crime depends upon the systems that are operating—whether the society is tolerant of the crimes or not. If one society is more tolerant, that means it will have fewer crimes recorded, whereas another which is less tolerant will have more crimes.

Q: In three Asian countries—Vietnam, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent China—there has been a forced effort to move the people out of the city into the countryside. Are there any African countries that have gone about moving people from the cities to the rural areas in a very big way, particularly some of the more revolutionary ones like Mozambique or Tanzania?

A (Sesay): One thing that I should first make clear, what is happening in China, Cambodia, or Vietnam, cannot be equated with the experience in the African countries. In Malawi, for instance, we have a huge project that is designed to get people out of the cities. This project is jointly supplemented by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, UNESCO, and the Food and Agricultural Organization. What they have done, on the request of the government, is to create new communities to revitalize the countryside. The government has purposely created rural academies, and the conditions are that if you benefit from all the communities' services, you must stay there. To the government and those financing it, this is a necessary condition. In African countries, if the government gives you a scholarship, after your studies you must work for the government for a set number of years. With this project you are moved from the city and the government creates the facilities for employment. They are working to develop rural industries. All the needs of the human being are taken care of in this joint project, but if you move out you can never find a job or housing in the urban area. It is a deliberate movement but not compulsory in the sense that large numbers of people are moved out of the cities indiscriminately.

Q: It's been fashionable in academic circles recently to think about crime as criminal systems that are subsystems of larger social systems and develop with them. This was the case in the United States with immigration and the emergence of organized crime. Have there been similar patterns of development of crime in Africa? If there have not, what is the inhibiting factor?

A (Sesay): This question could be answered yes or no. So far, there is none of the type of organized criminal behavior one finds in the more developed countries. Perhaps one can attribute this to the present forms of social organization. The type of crimes being committed are generally petty crimes against property. The only organizational element in this is what one calls the fencing. This can be considered organized crime, but it is still at the elementary level.

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Organization of African Unity and Decolonization: Present and Future Trends

By GODFREY L. BINAISA

ABSTRACT: Although colonialism is now buried in most parts of Africa, its ghost still haunts us in the unnecessarily large number of states. The drive for independence in Africa was first propounded by blacks in America in the philosophies of Pan-Africanism, African personality, and négritude in the early part of this century. Africans derived moral support from the Atlantic Charter and the weakening by WW II of the 2 European empires. The demise of the Indian Empire was the final nail in the coffin of British Imperialism. The most important meeting leading to the formation of the OAU was the Conference of Independent African States in April 1958. In the same year, an East African group (PAFMECA) was formed, and by 1963 membership included 18 countries. Between 1960–62, 23 states achieved independence. On May 25, 1963, the OAU charter was signed, uniting 47 independent black and Arab nations to promote solidarity among member states. One of the most important objectives of the OAU has been decolonization of Africa, but even after this is achieved, the OAU will still be united in facing the numerous problems of political, economic, and social development in Africa.

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A CATALOGUE of political, economic, and social events from the colonial era to independence leading to the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would leave us with all text and no sermon. The ambit of this paper, therefore, will not entail the citation of all the Articles of the Charter of the OAU which can easily be found in many works on Africa. The Charter will, however, be referred to wherever the context permits; emphasis will be laid on the political events in Africa leading to independence of most of the African states in the 1960s and the eventual creation of the OAU in 1963. A survey of the achievements and failures, aspirations and hopes of the OAU will be attempted and conclusions will be drawn regarding the future.

The continent of Africa is in the shape of a big question mark, 4,700 miles at its widest point, 5,000 miles at its longest point, and 11,700,000 square miles in area. Its population is 300 million persons divided into 6,000 tribes and speaking well over 1,000 languages and dialects. Africa is more than three times the size of the United States.

COLONIZATION

Colonization of Africa dates back more than 10,000 years. Around 8000 B.C. migrations into Africa started by peoples of the Middle East and probably South West Asia. This wave of immigrants was later followed by Semitic peoples from the Sabean Kingdoms of Southern Arabia into East Africa around 1000 B.C.

The Phoenicians settled in North Africa around 850 B.C., to be followed by the Romans in 200 B.C., who were in turn followed by the Byzantine Empire builders. The Arabs entered Africa in a significant way between A.D. 639 and A.D. 1400. They were mainly interested in the slave trade and established trading posts for the collection of slaves and African gold and ivory.

It was not until the tenth century that the Europeans took interest in Africa when they sailed round the cape of South Africa on their way to India. This relationship with the Europeans has continued to the present day and provides the story of the colonization of Africa in the perspective of modern times. It is a saga punctuated by stories of brutal cruelties, romantic idealism, dedicated evangelism, and concepts of empire building by European powers.

The year 1884 is a landmark in the modern colonization of Africa, because during that year at the Conference of Berlin, presided over by Prince Otto von Bismarck, the Chancellor of Germany, the European powers carved up Africa amongst themselves. The United States was the only non-European power that was invited to attend, although she did not claim any part of Africa. The inhabitants of Africa did not participate at any level in the deliberations of the conference. For the sake of prestige, raw materials, ready markets for manufactured goods, and, to a certain extent, missionary zeal to convert Africans to Christianity, the European powers proceeded to divide Africa amongst themselves.

The emperor of Germany declared that he also wanted a place in the sun and was given present-day Tanzania, Cameroon, Togo, and South West Africa, known also as Namibia. King Leopold of the Belgians wound up with a million square miles of the Congo River basin, not as a colony of Belgium but as his own private estate. He kept it as such until 1908 when it

was taken over by Belgium as a colony. It is the present-day Democratic Republic of Zaire.

The Balkanization of the continent did not follow tribal or ethnic groupings of the inhabitants of the territories, their interests were not recognized and, in most cases, were completely ignored. This is why, today, we have so many independent African states, some of whom are hardly viable economic entities. With very few exceptions, many of these states cannot finance their development programs without some kind of artificial respiration in form of grants and credits of different kinds from their former colonial masters. This foreign fragmentation of Africa answers the usual criticism that Africa is not capable of uniting into one strong and unified country on the pattern of the United States or the USSR and Africans are prone to disunity and tribalism is stronger and more appealing to them than one strong nation. If the delegates to the Berlin Conference had addressed their minds to this problem, instead of acting like vultures over a carcass, they would not have used longitudes and latitudes as boundary lines among the African states they created.

Although colonialism as it was known in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century is now buried in most parts of Africa, with the exception of South Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), its ghost still haunts us in the unnecessarily large number of states which the OAU is trying to unite. The differences in the foreign cultures of the departed colonialists, added to the different indigenous cultures, only compounds the problem and frustrates the wishes of all African nationalists by making true unity a most tantalizing mirage.

CREATION OF THE OAU

Historical note

The drive for independence in Africa was first propounded by black people who were descendants of African slaves in the Americas, that is, the United States and the West-Indian islands. This movement was conceived in the philosophies of Pan-Africanism, the "African personality," and "négritude," and dates back to the early part of this century. Prominent personalities such as H. Sylvester Williams, a lawyer from Jamaica living in England, and Bishop Alexander Walters of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church convened the first Pan-African Congress, whose declared intention was to secure for all African races living in civilized countries their full rights and to promote their business interests. Later other movements in Europe and the United States were formed to promote the idea of Pan-Africanism. For example, Dr. W. E.B. DuBois, one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), articulated the concept of Negro rights in the NAACP journal, *Crisis*. Another prominent figure during this period was Marcus Garvey from Jamaica, who established a journal, *The Negro World*, and founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) to promote rights of Africans. The UNIA Declaration of Rights included the statement:

> We believe in the freedom of Africa for the Negro people of the world, and by the principle of Europe for the Europeans, and Asia for the Asiatics, we also demand Africa for the Africans at home and abroad.[1]

1. A. F. Addona, The Organization of African Unity, pp. 42–3.

Several Pan-African congresses were convened, but no African delegates from the continent of Africa participated in these congresses until control of Pan-Africanism was taken over by Africans from the continent. These Africans derived moral support from the Atlantic Charter which was signed in 1941 by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill declaring: ". . . the rights of people to seek self-determination had to be respected and that they wished to see these sovereign rights to self-government restored." This statement was interpreted by Africans as a promise to them of independence and self-government.

Another boost came by way of the weakening by World War II of the two European empires: the British and the French who had vast African empires upon which the sun never set and wages never rose. Inspired by all these events, the African nationalists held the sixth Pan-African Congress in Charlton Town Hall, Manchester, England, from October 13–21, 1945. About 200 delegates attended from all parts of the world. Jomo Kenyatta, president of Kenya, the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and George Padmore were among the delegates. The next step was to convert the emerging concept of political independence into reality.[2]

Immediately after World War II, Britain, under a labor government led by Clement Attlee, granted independence to the big subcontinent of India, to India and Pakistan. The demise of the Indian Empire was the final nail in the coffin of British Imperialism. The Indian Empire had always been the backbone of the British overseas empire, its passing away opened the floodgates of demands for self-government and independence by all subjects of Britain. The British West-African colony of the Gold Coast, now known as Ghana, under the able leadership of the late Kwana Nkoumah was the spearhead in this move and became the first black African former colony to become independent in March 1957. It was renamed Ghana after an ancient African Empire in the area. From now onward, the move to independence in black Africa was quick, and, by the late 1960s, most of the European colonies in black Africa were independent and had taken their seats in the U.N. as sovereign states.

The OAU

The most important meeting leading to the eventual formation of the OAU was the Conference of Independent African States held in Accra, Ghana, in April 1958. Only eight African states were independent. Ghana and Liberia were the only two black African states represented; the rest were Hamitic Semitic states: Ethiopia, UAR, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. The conference proclaimed the unity of purpose and the right to independence of all African states not yet independent and the desirability of an African bloc at the U.N. All those principles which had motivated the formation of the earlier Pan-African congresses were enunciated and given a new meaning and content at that conference. From now onward, the road to the eventual creation of the OAU was clear for everybody to see. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana realized the limitations of this conference because it was confined to independent states only. In December of the same year, he convened the

2. Ibid., p. 50.

first All-African People's Conference (AAPC) in Accra. This was a conference of all African nationalists from all dependent territories. It was attended by 300 delegates from 62 African nationalist organizations. The conference, among other things, passed resolutions calling for unity and independence and laid emphasis on the need to develop the concept of a United States of Africa.

In the same year, an East African regional group was formed known as Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), later to be modified to include (South Africa) Azania (PAFMECSA). By 1963 the membership included the governments and leaders of 18 countries. Kwame Nkrumah did not support PAFMECSA on the ground that such regional groupings divided Africa into blocs.

At about the same time, other meetings were being held with emphasis on economics—these culminated in the establishment of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Addis Ababa and the creation of the French Community. The purpose of the U.N. commission was to assist the emerging continent in economic, or functional, activities.

The French Community was an association of France and her six former African colonies on a cultural, economic, financial, and technical cooperation basis.

THE MERGER OF THE GROUPINGS

Between 1960 and 1962, 23 states achieved independence:

Brazzaville, Casablanca, and Monrovia. The Brazzaville—Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Upper Volta, Neger, Central African Republic (Empire), Gabon, Chad, Malagasy, Cameroon, Mauritania, Congo (Brazzaville)—created the Union of African and Malagasy States (UAM) in December 1960 under the doctrine of French heritage and assimilation; today known as Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache (OCAM), the family added Congo Kiushasa (Zaire) and Rwanda. This was the moderate group. Emphasis was on functional unity through an economic commission.

The radical groups used the Algerian War and the Congo crisis to convene a conference in Casablanca, Morocco, in January 1961. Among them was Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Morocco, the UAR, the provisional government of Algeria, Libya, and, strangely enough, Ceylon. This was the radicals' answer to the Brazzaville bloc. Due to the divergent interests of the members—with UAR being only interested in using the conference to attack Israel and Zionism, Libya to support Algeria in her war of independence, Morocco to register her disapproval of the creation of Mauritania on land she claimed—to Guinea it was a reaction to France's abrupt abandonment of Guinea. In spite of all this, the most significant result was the enactment of the African Charter of Casablanca, which called for an African Consultative Assembly made up of representatives from every African state to meet periodically. It was subsequently agreed to convene a conference to resolve the different viewpoints in the way of African unity.

In Monrovia, Liberia, the conference was sponsored jointly by Ghana and Guinea for the radical Casablanca group, Ivory Coast and Cameroon for the Brazzaville group, and Liberia and Nigeria for the rest. The conference was never convened because of objections from Ghana.

However, invitations were sent out to attend a conference in Monrovia, Liberia, to discuss African cooperation and solidarity. Leaders from 20 African states attended—these became known as the Monrovia bloc.

Another attempt at reconciliation was made at a conference in Lagos, Nigeria, but the Casablanca group refused to attend. A majority attended from 21 states in Lagos on January 25–30, 1962. Agreement, in principle, was reached to a charter to create an inter-African and Malagasy Advisory Organization containing, in substance, the principles discussed at the Monrovia conference. the charter included provisions for a representative assembly, a council of ministers, and a general secretariat. It later became the basic document on which the OAU was created.[3]

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

. . . [A] single African organization through which Africa's single voice may be heard, within which Africa's problems may be studied and resolved . . . which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures for common defense and programs for cooperation in the economic and social fields . . . to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe . . . [and whose decisions] will take full account of all vital African considerations.[4]

President Kennedy's message to the OAU's first conference in Addis Ababa, May 1963:

Africa's continuing march towards independence, unity, and freedom—principles revered by the American people since the earliest days of our own nationhood—is a vital part of man's historic struggle for human dignity and self-realisation. This unprecedented gathering of Heads of State in Addis Ababa clearly attests your dedication to these principles, and provides a dogmatic illustration of African prominence in world affairs.

As you seek to achieve the dignity and freedom of the human individual and the rights of men, we share your desire that these objectives may be realised and safe-guarded for men everywhere. From your actions other nations may draw renewed inspirations to combine their search for improved ways to understand each other and to cooperate in peace.[5]

The radical and moderate positions were presented in speeches by the African leaders. President Nkrumah of Ghana summed up the radical position:

African unity is, above all, a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political Kingdom, not the other way round.

The moderate position was embraced in a speech by the Nigerian Prime Minister Abubaker Tafawa Balewa:

Some of us have suggested that African unity should be achieved by political fusion of the different states in Africa; some of us feel that African unity could be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation and by trying first to get the Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union. My country stands for the practical approach to the unity of the continent.[6]

3. Ibid., p. 73 ff.

4. Emperor Haile Selassie I at OAU Founding Conference, Addis Ababa, May 1963.

5. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, vol. 1, sec. 2 (Addis Ababa, May 1963).

6. Ibid., pp. 104–5.

The OAU charter was signed by the heads of state and governments on May 25, 1963. Sixty-three years after the first Pan-African meeting, the OAU was born, and May 25 is celebrated throughout Africa as "African Liberation Day." Diallo Telli, former Guinean Ambassador to the U.N., was appointed administrative secretary general.

Purpose

The OAU represents 47 independent black and Arab nations of Africa. It was established on May 23, 1963, for the purpose of promoting unity and solidarity among the member states. Among the aims are the eradication of all forms of colonialism on the African continent, the organization of efforts to improve the living standards of the inhabitants of the continent and to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of all the member states. It is significant to note that all the African states that form the OAU resolved at the Summit Conference in 1964 to maintain the boundaries which were left by European colonial powers who had colonized Africa.

Organization

The Organization of African Unity has its headquarters in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. It is composed of an Assembly of Heads of State; a Council of Ministers; a General Secretariat; and a Secretary General who is elected by the Assembly of Heads of State—he is the chief executive for the administration and coordinator of all matters among member states and other international organizations; an arbitration commission, which seeks to settle disputes among members; and, in addition, there are several specialized commissions.

The policy of the organization is determined by the Assembly of Heads of State, which meets once a year. Although procedural questions are settled by a majority vote, policy resolutions require a two-thirds majority. Chairmanship of the Assembly of the Heads of State is rotated each year among the heads of state. By convention the chairmanship goes to the individual head of state who happens to be the host of the yearly Summit Conference. He keeps the post until the next Summit Conference. It has to be noted that this is merely an honorific title and has no executive functions attached to it. This is why President Idi Amin of Uganda held the position of chairman during the year Uganda played host to the Summit Conference in 1975–6.

Decolonization

The resolution on decolonization was one of the 10 important resolutions at the May 1963 Summit. The resolution suggested diplomatic action against colonial powers in Africa, such as Azania (South Africa), Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), and Portugal, by appropriate action in the U.N. and severance of diplomatic relations.

OAU, through the U.N., has forced Azania out of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the ILO—and even the Olympic games.

OAU has generated pressure on other countries to sever relations with Zimbabwe. A sanctions bureau has been established in the OAU to monitor implementation of economic boycott of Azania.

Liberation movements

Coordinating Committee—Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda—with headquarters in Dar es-Salaam to harmonize assistance to liberation movements and for managing the Special Fund. Added members are Zambia and Somalia.

The Committee of Eleven, or the African Liberation Committee (ALC), was criticized by some member states for lack of effectiveness and ran into difficulty in obtaining funds. The ALC does no fighting and consists of representatives of governments.

Relationship among member states

The relations among member states of the Organization of African Unity have not always been very happy, because some states have given refuge to individuals or groups of individuals who have fled their states because of disputes between them and the government, and almost invariably these groups or individuals have tended to try to organize the overthrow of their own state. At the same time, it has to be remembered that even the so-called liberation movement may be used against the existing leadership in a particular African country and not only against colonial rule. To this must be added differences in ideology wherever these exist. Concern has been expressed more than once by some states about the effects on their economy of some states if they were to carry out the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity against imperialism and colonialism in their letter and spirit. Such concern was highlighted at the OAU Summit Conference in Cairo in 1964 by Prime Minister Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi. He said:

> While I feel strongly against Imperialism and Colonialism in any form; while I am just as anxious as anyone in this conference to help our brothers and sisters still under colonial rule in neighboring territories, Malawi's power, my own power, to help is limited and circumscribed by geographical position. . . . I want to make it quite clear here at this conference that the geographical position of Malawi makes it impossible for me and my country to sever all ties, diplomatic, economic and cultural, with a certain power [Portugal] now still controlling great portions of our continent. I cannot promise here that I and my country will be in a position to carry out to the letter any resolution which demands total severance of all relations, diplomatic, economic, and cultural, with that power.[7]

Efforts to implement the OAU resolution on decolonization continue on moral, political, and economic levels as well.

Problems of OAU

Three major problems facing the OAU were:

1. apartheid;
2. European minority governments; and
3. relations between OAU and U.N., World Bank and similar institutions.

There were also problems of Africans against Africans. Issues tended to divide rather than unite—for example, subversion, refugees, regional groups, liberation movements, radical and moderate blocs. After the creation of OAU what would be the future of regional groupings in Africa?

7 Ibid., pp. 140–41.

Nkrumah and radicals criticized regional groupings as vehicles of division. At a meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal, in August 1963, there were sharp divisions. Radicals wanted the OAU as the primary political group in Africa, demanding that regional groups, such as moderate Union of African and Malagasy (UAM) states—the Brazzaville bloc—should surrender their authority to the OAU. The Brazzaville group, in adamant opposition, urged that regional groups strengthened, not weakened, the OAU. A compromise solution was adopted recommending that regional groups be in keeping with the charter of the OAU.

UAM was later dissolved as a formal organization and was substituted by the Union of African and Malagasy Economic Cooperation known by the French name, Union Africaine et Magache de Coopération Economique (UAMCE).

At a meeting in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in February 1965, former members of UAM formed a smaller OAU—Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache—with headquarters in Yaounde, Cameroon, for the purpose of cooperation and solidarity to repel subversion from Ghana.

Achievements

When one discusses unity in the world as we know it today, one is immediately faced with problems of unity not only in Africa but around the world as well. For instance, the unity of the once formidable United Kingdom is now in the balance, with tribalism in Scotland and Wales and sectarian disruption in Northern Ireland. The unity of Cyprus only recently crumbled, disengaging two strange bedfellows—the Turks on one hand, and the Greeks on the other. The unity of Canada is now seriously threatened by differences of language and culture between the English-speaking and the French-speaking Canadians. Spain has an almost endemic problem of Basque separatism. In Yugoslavia it remains to be seen whether Croatia, Serbia, and the rest will have an enduring unity after the demise of Marshall Tito. The European community is the most recent bold attempt to unite Western Europe, but it is also beset by the teething problems of a growing child.

Seen through the mirror of this wider spectrum, the fact that Africa, with something like 1,000 tribal languages and a similar number of cultures, upon which was superimposed the cultures and languages of the colonial powers, has managed to organize all these diverse peoples into one organization for the good of all is one of the greatest achievements in contemporary international politics. The most significant achievement of them all, however, has been the survival of the organization for more than 10 years in spite of external problems, internal tensions, and a myriad of other problems in the economic, social, and cultural areas.

In the international arena, the Organization of African Unity has achieved observer status as the Organization of American States and the Arab League as a coordinator for the United Nations on African affairs. It has to be remembered that the Organization of African Unity states at the United Nations are almost one-third of the total membership of that body. They, in addition, have two nonpermanent seats on the Security Council.

The other significant achievement

of the OAU has been to provide a forum for the leaders of Africa to come together, meet, and get to know one another—a thing that was denied them when they were all under various European colonial powers. It is well known that until now Africa has not been able to solve the important question of communications. If an African in Kenya in East Africa, wants to call a friend in Dakar, Senegal, on the West Coast, over the telephone, there is no direct telephone link between Nairobi and Dakar so the call has to go through London, relayed to Paris, and then to Dakar. This, therefore, brings into focus the desirability of the leaders meeting together once a year to talk and discuss matters of mutual interests.

Failures

As in all fields of human endeavor, the OAU has had its strains and stresses. The most glaring failure has been in the area of violations of human rights in member states of the organization. The OAU has failed as a body to stand up and be counted in defense of human rights among its members, while at the same time continuing to condemn the violations of the same human rights in the two European minority regimes of Zimbabwe and Azania. This kind of behavior has had a tendency to reduce the credibility of the OAU in the international community. Violations of human rights in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, or the Central African Empire (formerly Republic) are of no less viciousness because they are being committed by governments that are under black African dictators. The OAU must be in a position to condemn its own member states and pass moral judgments in all such cases.

The future of OAU

The Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, at the founding conference in May 1963, said:

> Today, we look to the future calmly, confidently and courageously. We look to the vision of an Africa not merely free but united. In facing this challenge, we can take comfort and encouragement from the lessons of the past. We know that there are differences among us. Africans enjoy different cultures, distinctive values, special attributes. But we also know that unity can be and has been attained among men of the most disparate origins, that differences of race, of religion, of culture, of tradition, are no insuperable obstacle to the coming together of peoples. History teaches us that unity is strength and cautions us to submerge and overcome our differences in the quest for common goals, to strive, with all our combined strength, for the path to true African brotherhood and unity.[8]

DECOLONIZATION

As has already been pointed out earlier in this paper, the decolonization of Africa was one of the most important resolutions at the first Summit Conference of the OAU which adopted the charter. It was the considered opinion of all member states that the independence of some states in Africa would be meaningless unless such independence was linked with the total independence of the entire African continent. The Portuguese African empire, having collapsed suddenly two years ago, thus resulted in the independence of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. In the case of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, power was transferred to the nationalist movements which had been

8. Ibid., p. 210.

waging a guerilla war of liberation for more than 10 years. In the case of Angola, however, there was no smooth handing over of power to a single nationalist movement. The country had three nationalist movements—that is to say FLN, led by Holden Roberto and supported by Zaire and the People's Republic of China and some Western powers; UNITA, led by Savimbi and supported by South Africa and the Western powers; and MPLA, led by Augustino Neto and supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba and a majority of African states.

Of the three former Portuguese colonies, Angola is the most important because of its richness in minerals, agricultural produce, oil, and many other products. At the same time, Angola is the cause of much concern to Western powers by having declared its intention to build a Marxist-Leninist state based on scientific socialism. Added to this is the presence of some 13,000 Cuban troops who assisted the MPLA to achieve victory in the short-lived civil war that ensued immediately after the Portuguese left.

In several cases in the past, the Soviet Union, due to her phenomenal ignorance and lack of experience in Africa, blundered wherever she tried to meddle in African affairs. Over the years, however, she seems to have learned a few lessons. In her intervention in the Angola civil war, she relied on Cuban troops who came from a tropical country with a population consisting of around 40 percent blacks. The Cubans speak Spanish, a language that has much in common with Portuguese. They mixed more easily and blended themselves in the Angolan society far better than any European would have done. Their success was, to many Africans, not a surprise.

What was a surprise to the majority of African countries was the unholy alliance which FLN and UNITA made with the minority white regime of South Africa. The acceptance of assistance from South Africa by the leaders of these two nationalist groups amounted to a kiss of death and left the independent African countries no room to argue about ideology. The invasion of Angola by white troops from South Africa, after Angola had achieved independence, was an unwarranted affront to the entire continent. It was regarded as the thin end of the wedge to the establishment by South Africa of another Bantustan where they, the white South Africans, would wind up as the bosses to exploit the economic resources of Angola and once again subjugate the Africans of that country to the same indignities meted out to the South African blacks. Nigeria, as the emerging African superpower, took the lead in going to the rescue of Augustino Neto and his MPLA.

PRESENT TREND

The OAU has miraculously overcome most of the problems which might have killed it in its infancy, as was clearly shown by the mood of jubilation among the member states at the tenth anniversary of its foundation in Addis Ababa in 1973. Members surely had something to congratulate themselves for. Here was an organization which had survived both external pressures and internal tensions. However, with the Portuguese African Empire having been relegated to the annals of history, there now remains only three territories in

Africa which have yet to celebrate their liberation: Rhodesia, named after the British Imperialist, Sir Cecil Rhodes and known to Africans as Zimbabwe; South West Africa, also known as Namibia, former colony of Germany, given to South Africa to administer as a mandated territory, at the end of World War I; and the biggest and the most intractable of them all, the Republic of South Africa. The trend today among all member states of the OAU is to see to it that these three territories attain their freedom by securing majority rule for the black Africans living in them. Let us now examine them one by one for the sake of clarity.

Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

Zimbabwe, with a population approaching 7 million Africans and 270,000 Europeans, is the last bastion of privilege to people of British stock outside the United Kingdom. Unlike the Republic of South Africa, the European population is essentially British. This is what prevented the British government from sending troops into Rhodesia to suppress the rebellion when the European minority government of that country unilaterally declared independence. The questions of "kith and kin" prevailed over an open act of rebellion, which, to all intents and purposes, amounted to treason. The other argument was that, in any event since 1923, Zimbabwe was independent in all respects but name, having been granted responsible self-government in that year and the European prime ministers of Rhodesia having been accepted as such by other prime ministers of the independent members of the British Commonwealth of nations.

There is no need to argue the point that that kind of reasoning cannot stand up to close scrutiny. It must be fully realized that, unlike what happened in many areas in Africa, European colonization of Zimbabwe was by conquest. The Europeans were aided in the process by their technology. They used rifles while their African adversaries had only spears. It was like fighting a modern war with rifles while your adversaries have rockets and nuclear weapons. Whatever peace prevailed after the European victory was an uneasy peace. The Europeans did not treat the Africans they defeated as gallant adversaries according to tenets of war, but proceeded to debase them and exploit them as being only fit for manual labor.

Today, with the availability of modern weapons to the Africans, the war started in earnest with the intention by the Africans to get back their own country. This explains the distinction between the struggle for civil rights in the United States by the black Americans and the situation in southern Africa. In the United States, the blacks are a minority, unlike the Africans of Zimbabwe, whose population exceeds that of the Europeans by 22 to 1. Further, in the United States the issues are centered on the demand by the blacks for the implementation of all civil rights statutes and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to their full force and effect. This is very different from the demands and claims of the people of Zimbabwe to be masters in their own house and take full responsibility of the destiny of their country. The European population of Zimbabwe are Europeans, and nothing will ever change that.

One has only to look at similar

incidents in history to be convinced that foreign occupation always remains foreign however long it may be prolonged. The occupied people never lose their inalienable right to reclaim their country from whoever has been occupying it. This happened in Britain, which the Romans occupied for about 400 years. It was repeated in the case of the occupation of Spain by the Moors. Again, the occupation of Greece and neighboring countries by the Ottoman Turks is a more recent example. In all these cases, the owners succeeded when the opportunity presented itself to drive out the intruders and assert their independence and self-determination. It is, therefore, submitted that the European occupation of Zimbabwe is indefensible in this day and age. Ian Smith, the prime minister of Zimbabwe, and members of his cabinet are just a bunch of dinosaurs from a bygone age who are incapable of understanding that the world around them has changed. In the final analysis, the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe is an extension of the earlier battles the people of Zimbabwe waged unsuccessfully against the European colonialists.

The present trend is that the OAU is fully committed to assist the guerrillas in their just struggle for independence. The front line African presidents, that is, the presidents of the countries nearest Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola, recently gave their full backing and support for the Patriotic Front, which is the alliance between Joshua Nkomo, the leader of Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), and Robert Mugabe, the leader of the militant wing of Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU). Ian Smith has reacted against this move by indicating that he is not prepared to talk peace with the Patriotic Front, but would go ahead and negotiate a settlement with moderate African political leaders inside Zimbabwe, like Bishop Mazorewa and some traditional African chiefs who are paid officials of the government.

Such a move, once again, highlights a complete lack of understanding on the part of the European colonialists of the situation as it stands today. The Africans who are fighting are the most courageous, determined, and committed people, who realize that it is only by taking up arms that they will achieve their ultimate objective. They are the ones who are fighting and dying; they ought to be the ones with whom to come to a settlement, as is the practice in all warfare. No war has ever ended by merely talking peace with people who never took part in the fighting. The only explanation that comes to mind is that Ian Smith does not yet accept the fact that Africans are as human as any other people and that they deserve to be treated in the same way as Ian Smith would have treated European soldiers if they had been fighting against him. European supremacy is all pervasive in Zimbabwe, and would forever prevent men like Ian Smith from reaching any kind of acceptable settlement. As long as the African is considered by the Europeans to be an inferior species of mankind, the hope of a peaceful accord will never be achieved. The OAU fully understands this and is therefore committed to an armed struggle as the only way still open to the Africans.

Azania (South Africa)

As already indicated above, Azania and Zimbabwe together with Na-

mibia (South West Africa) are the only countries still under European minority governments in Africa. The term "European" is being used advisedly, because that is what the European population in the region regard themselves to be.

The history of Azania is littered with violence ever since that country was conquered by Europeans. Violence is a golden thread that is always to be seen throughout the web of past and present Azania. Not a day passes without some kind of violence related to the unhappy political situation in that country. The calendar of the courts in Azania is heavily loaded with cases related to the statutorily imposed segregation of the races. The prisons are full of people convicted under the maze of those statutes.

As in Zimbabwe, the Europeans in Azania settled there as conquerors. They fought many wars, first against Africans and secondly among themselves, as was the case in the Boer War at the turn of the century. It is true that Europeans have been living in that country for 300 years, but it is submitted that, as in Zimbabwe, their having lived there as conquerors for 300 years did not take away the right of the Africans to get back what is their own. Everything the Europeans got out of Azania was obtained by force, therefore it stands to reason that it is by force that they will have to give it back.

The Europeans of South Africa have been known to argue that they are a "white tribe" of Africa and, as such, have no other country to go to if they were forced to leave Azania. This kind of argument suffers from more than one defect. First, if they were indeed a white African tribe as they claim to be, they would not have imposed segregation by statute on their fellow black brothers. Furthermore, they would not have elected to take for themselves more than 80 percent of all arable land in the country. They would not have, by force of law, relegated the Africans to a position of permanent slavery and regarded them as sojourners outside the so-called African homelands. They would not have created unbelievable differentials in salaries and wages between themselves and the Africans. In short, they would not have dehumanized and debased fellow Africans by reducing them to robots with a pair of hands and a pair of legs to serve the needs of the Europeans in the mines, factories, farms, and private homes.

The so-called homelands or Bantustans can be described as Sanatoria to take care of those persons who, because of age, are no longer fit to work for the Europeans. They are sent back to these undeveloped homelands to die in conditions of absolute squalor and poverty. They have no rights which the Europeans respect. They are forever destined only to render duties with no hope of ever securing corresponding rights. The entire body politic in South Africa pulsates on only one topic of race. No wonder that the Europeans in Azania suffer from one of the highest rates of suicides in the world and drug addiction.

It is against such background that the rise of the movement of Black Consciousness has to be seen. The black youth are in revolt. They have rejected once and for all the patience of their parents, because they have realized that to the Europeans they are chattle without rights or needs, but to serve the Europeans as slaves. They know that the only way to achieve their goal is to launch an attack on the entire system and dismantle it. This explains the causes

of the recent riots in Soweto township near Johannesburg and elsewhere in the republic.

THE FUTURE OF THE OAU

It is true that the existence of colonialism on the African continent is one of the strongest unifying factors cementing together peoples of different cultures to pursue the goal of eliminating colonialism from their continent. The question may be posed as to what would be the future of the OAU after colonialism is eradicated. It has already been pointed out in this paper that the member states of the OAU are in two groups: the radicals and the moderates. At every conference of either the heads of state or the council of ministers, these two groups have always manifested themselves. On several occasions the composition of the groups has changed, as, for instance, Nigeria which until a few years ago was regarded as a moderate state and is now a foremost leader of the radicals. The Peoples Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) is now among the radicals. However, states like Senegal and the Ivory Coast have remained moderate to this day.

It is submitted that the OAU will have a future even after the colonial era has passed, because it will have to face the numerous problems of development in all areas of human endeavor: political, economic, and social. The existence of colonialism is like a running sore sapping all the strength of the OAU, thereby preventing it from addressing its mind to the urgent problems of development. One only hopes that the colonial era will come to a quick end.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

There is no need to emphasize the fact that to the great majority of the American people, colonial rule is essentially oppressive and contrary to their tradition of freedom and equality which are the cornerstone of the founding of this great republic. The brutal query on the lips of the millions of oppressed people in southern Africa—Zimbabwe and Azania—is whether the United States can, as one of the world superpowers, influence events in that unhappy part of Africa and produce a situation that will grant independence and self-determination to the Africans before the Europeans in the area are faced with a long war which they will never win.

Time, technology, and numbers are all on the side of the Africans. In spite of the fact that immigration laws in both Zimbabwe and Azania favor European immigrants who want to live in privilege and believe in European supremacy, these laws will not deter Africans from fighting for what the entire international community regards as a just cause.

SUGGESTIONS

It is suggested that a new "Conference of Berlin" be called, this time not to partition Africa among the great powers but to liberate Africa. Such a conference must consist of the United States, the USSR, China, all those European powers that colonized Africa, the African Liberation Movement, and the emerging African superpower Nigeria. The usual accusation of the Soviet Union by the Western powers of interference in Africa will never be justified in the eyes of the African masses until the United States and her European allies demonstrate by deed that they wish to see colonialism brought to a quick end.

The recent events in Angola serve

as an example of the wrong approach by the United States to African affairs. The United States was very reluctant to permit Angola to take her seat in the U.N. and, in the end, allowed Angola into the U.N. by the negative tactic of abstaining from voting in the Security Council instead of positively supporting the application of Angola.

Secondly, and more importantly, the declaration by the United States that she would not establish diplomatic relations with Angola unless Cuban troops leave Angola smacks of unwarranted arrogance and intolerable patronage with serious overtones of racial discrimination. It is a well-known fact that after Angola had become independent, European troops of Azania invaded Angola on the flimsy pretext of protecting the giant hydroelectric dam on the Cunene River some 40 kilometers inside Angola. The dam was a joint venture between Azania and Portugal when the latter was still the colonial power in Angola. Angola requested and got Cuba to come to her rescue. As a result, the European troops from South Africa were repulsed after having nearly reached the Angolan capital of Luanda. Nigeria and other black African countries regarded the South African invasion as an affront, and all went to the assistance of Angola's MPLA government. They did not think about ideology; their priority was to deal a blow at South Africa. The two nationalist parties in Angola, UNITA and FLN had, by accepting assistance from South Africa, committed a "kiss of death" and found themselves without a single ally in Africa.

The United States has diplomatic relations with nearly all European Communist governments in Europe. Further, when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the United States disapproved of both invasions but did not sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or with Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Why then, the question may be asked, is the United States putting a condition to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the young republic of Angola, who has so far merely declared that its government shall follow Marxist-Leninist scientific socialism?

This kind of stance can be partly explained as yet another kind of racial discrimination. It is quite alright for the United States to have diplomatic relations with a Communist country as long as the country is European, but not when the country is African. The United States, without even waiting to see how Angola will interpret what she means by scientific socialism—which, by the way, is open to many interpretations—is refusing to extend to Angola a hand of friendship and goodwill. There is no need to overemphasize the desirability of having an effective U.S. diplomatic presence in Angola to let the Angolans have a choice and not shutting the door of the great Western superpower in their faces. It is ironic to see that it is U.S. corporations and not corporations from Cuba or the USSR who are exploiting the oil resources of Angola.

EDUCATION AND WELFARE

Many people agree that the pen is mightier than the sword. The United States could play a vital role in south Africa, Angola, and Mozambique by aid grants in the field of education to young Angolans and others to get higher education in American universities and colleges. The military hardware has its limits, but education has no limits. A whole

generation of the people of Angola and Mozambique would welcome such a program. It goes without saying that the implementation of such programs would go a long way in convincing Africans that the United States wishes them well. Africa is in need of an unequivocal U.S. commitment which in the long run will, without a doubt, be a blessing to the economic interests of the United States and at the same time enable Africa and the OAU to appreciate everything that is good in the U.S. system.

CONCLUSIONS

The OAU has survived the first decade of its foundation, but it must learn to condemn its member states for violations of human rights.

The OAU resolution on decolonization, passed at the first summit conference in May 1963, is still the chief driving force that pervades all its deliberations and actions. The present trend is ever-increasing pressure on the two remaining colonial powers in Africa, that is, Rhodesia and South Africa, to surrender to the wishes of the African majorities in those countries. A Conference of Berlin in reverse should be called before a general conflagration occurs in south Africa. The United States is duty bound to play a big role in all these developments and not leave everything to the USSR.

The future of the OAU is bright even after colonialism is dismantled throughout Africa, because there will always be a need for a unifying forum to process development programs and enhance the realization of the objectives of the charter of the OAU.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: You mentioned the dictatorships in Rhodesia and South Africa and spoke eloquently about their misdeeds. We know that there are approximately 40 states in Africa, and less than half are bona fide democracies. Of the others, Idi Amin's in Uganda is the worst, but not the only one. Since the speaker did not criticize Idi Amin at all, I am asking isn't this racism?

A (Anyanwu): I try the best I can to present the views of Mr. Binaisa, who did admit that the African organization fails to intervene when there are issues concerning national entities. The denial of human rights in Uganda has now become a major question of OAU, but from the day the organization was started, about 1963, the number-one business on the agenda was the decolonization of Africa. They still see Rhodesia, South Africa, and South West Africa as territories occupied by whites. It is not discrimination but a matter of principle that all African territories must be free. After that, I think that the Africans would begin to challenge themselves.

President Sadat is a member of the OAU. There is no discrimination against him. He is light in complexion, but he is African. The major problem is that many Europeans in South Africa or Rhodesia, do not accept themselves as Africans. They

call themselves Europeans and see themselves as superior to other Africans. Egypt does not see itself as superior to Africans.

Q: You made a strong plea against colonialism. Then you made a strong plea to the United States, for a superior power to come in and direct the affairs of developing nations. Isn't this in essence a contradiction?

A (Anyanwu): On one hand, if the Africans ask the United States to help, isn't it an invitation to colonialism? I would say no, it is a recognition that the United States has an interest in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are superpowers, and they can influence issues in the world system. For example, the Organization for African Unity would appreciate the United States reminding Europeans that time has come for these countries to give up their colonies. The United States speaks the language that South Africa and Rhodesia understand. For example, President Carter's repeal of the Byrd Amendment, is a step in the right direction. This is what the Organization of African Unity is asking the United States to do—to support the African movement openly and stop siding with the white minorities in South Africa, not to take over the activities of the African liberation movement.

Q: How do you reconcile the humbling ineffectiveness of the OAU to bring about some tangible results in the process of the liberation with the high-level rhetoric that has marked the language of the heads of African states or the organization itself since 1963?

A (Anyanwu): We tend to have some misconception of the role of or the power of OAU. OAU is not a superstate. It is a gentlemen's club of heads of state. If you follow protocol, there are certain things you don't talk about when heads of state meet. If OAU wanted to be effective in the way you want, it could have been an assembly of the people. It has not been so. Given the structure of OAU, I am not disappointed about what they have done.

My criticism is that the charter should be changed in a direction that would help OAU to be effective, but given the charter it doesn't have much power. It cannot do anything that any state does not want to discuss, and that is why it has not done very much.

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The Challenge of Cultural Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa

By VICTOR C. UCHENDU

ABSTRACT: It is the cultural content of the challenge posed by the new states of tropical Africa that is the subject of this paper. Post-colonial societies are transitional; they are making deliberate efforts to redefine their cultures. Cultural engineering, the deliberate political effort to channel behavior toward maximizing national objectives, particularly national integration, demands the notion of culture as an interventionist agent. Since independence, African politics has focused on the search for institutions and strategies to promote nation-building, economic development, and national and continental unity. African nations face the problem of how to select national, inspirational symbols that do not alienate their traditions. A related problem is the conflict between national cultural identity and growing cultural convergence. To be effective, cultural policy must be lived by the people who are the culture-builders. It cannot be achieved without cultural strain, and even among countries sharing a similar colonial experience, cultural policy may vary.

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THE death of European empires gave birth to many sovereignties—new nation-states—in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Ordinarily, new states constitute a problem in themselves. But the post-colonial states, which by accident of history must make conscious efforts to define and assert their cultural autonomy in a world characterized by increasing institutional convergence, pose a special challenge to the world and our age. Since institutions have their cultural basis, it is the cultural content of the challenge which the new states in tropical Africa pose that is the subject of this paper.

Students of African societies and cultures are increasingly becoming cautious in making generalizations about the African continent. This is particularly true of the sub-Saharan region, where a diversity of social arrangements and cultural patterns prevail. The imposition of European rule, which resulted in many contradictory colonial policies and cultural programs, further complicated the picture. We trust that we are not adding to the plethora of annoying stereotypes about Africa in the limited generalizations we think justified by the common experience of Africans in trying to forge post-colonial territories into modern nation-states.

Post-colonial states are forced to carry the cultural load of their departing imperial master, just as they must, at least initially, work with the institutional infrastructure created by colonial rule. Policies of new states—whether they aim at disengagement from or cooperation with the former colonial ruler or assert autonomy or seek diversification of dependency—have important cultural consequences. We will explore the cultural consequences of political action in three areas that practically every African state has identified as a challenge. These areas are: the task of nation-building; the challenge of economic development and modernization; and the problem of identity.

CULTURE AND TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES AS ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS

All important events take place within the setting of history and some culture. In fact, events and events-systems derive their significance from the cultural setting in which they occur. The notion of "cultural transition" embodies both the ideas of culture and processes of history which must be understood in the African context if our exploration is to prove fruitful.

Our understanding of the nature and dynamics of human society has led to an expanding view of the concept of culture. The traditional conception of culture in dualistic terms—culture people versus nature people—has been abandoned. Although culture is defined in many different ways, and each definition has its major emphasis, there is now common agreement that the term culture refers to man-made aspects of our social environment, including the ideas and symbols we use. Culture is more than just a heritage, an historical product; it is more than the expression of man's mode of living, something that individuals in each society must undergo as a kind of fate or rites de passage. In an age when man has taken political control of his social and cultural destiny, and technology facilitates the control and subjugation of the environment and forces of nature, culture must be seen as an instrumental agent, as another mode of

intervention in our social and economic life.

Cultural engineering,[1] a term Ali Mazrui uses to describe the deliberate political effort in Africa to channel behavior in the direction that maximizes national objectives, particularly that of national integration, demands the notion of culture as an interventionist rather than a passive agent. While technology has enabled modern man to tame and exploit the turbulent forces of nature, the notion of culture as an interventionist agent has led man to subsume the rules of nature within normative rules that are subject to cultural direction. Cultural rules are no longer sacred and do not have to be followed blindly. Elaborating on this theme, van Peursen reminds us that "every culture can be regarded as programmatic, a guided course of activities. . . . All culture may be regarded as man's way of imposing form upon the forces around him."[2] How African political leaders try to impose cultural form on many aspects of their transitional societies is not only interesting to explore but also challenging to understand. This raises the other conceptual problem—the notion of a transitional society.

Most typologies in social analysis, particularly in sociology and anthropology, tend to be dualistic or dichotomous. We have noted that the early notion of culture embodied a duality—culture versus nature peoples. It is in the concept of society that the notion of duality is most embedded. A few examples may be cited. Society is often conceived of as either civilized or uncivilized; folk or urban; cosmopolitan or local; sacred or secular; and Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft. The processes of socio-legal development have been viewed as unidirectional, usually from status to contract; and the level of cultural achievement and institutional elaboration has been characterized as embodying either a Great Tradition or a Little Tradition. Post-colonial societies do not fit these models. The many contrasts they present among themselves, on the one hand, and between them and Western societies, on the other, have raised serious questions about the utility of these dichotomies. The concept of the Third World is more than a political concession to the emergence of new states on the world stage. It represents, in my view, a recognition of our inability to capture and contain the major social processes and societal complexities of the new states within the bounds of these dualistic categories.

We assume that Third World societies are in transition. But we are still far away from a theory of transitional social systems. We tend to project our view and characteristics of transitional society from either our model of traditional society or from the empirical characteristics of contemporary, industrial Western society. By selective use of diagnostic cultural traits, we define or refer to the traditional society as pre-literate and backward in cultural achievements, pre-Newtonian in its notions of causality and in general attitude to the natural environment, and often voiceless in political issues which shape its destiny. Because we have learned to associate traditional society with resistance to change, we are likely

1. Ali A. Mazrui, *Cultural Engineering and Nation Building in East Africa* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1972)

2. C. A. van Peursen, *The Strategy of Culture* (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 11, 21.

to describe its attitude to innovation as one of stubborn tradition. Energy use, its source and amount, is often used to define traditional society. In this view, the traditional society is a low energy user, one that depends on human and animal sources of energy rather than on the inanimate sources of energy.

Working with the assumption that the transitional society lies between the traditional and the modern societies and that the direction of social change is unidirectional and practically irreversible—from traditional to modern patterns—it has become conventional to analyze the great political and cultural ferment of our times in terms of a confrontation between the two polar societies. According to Levine, this analytical model

> . . . has helped us cope with the diversity of world cultures, substituting an image of commonality for one of bewildering variety, and prodding us to ask again and yet again in what ways the modern Western world is different from all other worlds. . . . As understanding of non-Western societies has deepened and ideas have refined, the ideal type of polarity between traditionality and Westernism has degenerated into a stereotype. . . .[3]

Given the limitations of dualistic categories and ideal types in social analysis, attention has increasingly turned to triadic categories. Daniel Lerner has used the triadic typology with good effect. Working from the hypothesis that "high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and participant," Lerner projects traditional society as "non participant" and the transitional society as literally one in motion.[4] Sub-Saharan Africa is in motion in the sense that, with independence, it has taken the cultural destiny of its peoples in its hands. Its cultures are being defined and managed by its political leaders. This raises the question: What is the direction of cultural change in Africa?

THE CULTURALLY EMERGENT AFRICA

Since independence, the focus of African politics has been on the search for institutions and strategies which will promote nation-building, economic development, and the preservation of national and continental unity. Everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa, African governments have had to face a common problem: the political and cultural management of a plural society. African society is divided by ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious loyalties. It is a society in which unevenness in social and economic development is easily politicized because unevenness in the distribution of scarce resources and privileges of the new state are ethnically linked. It is a society in dire need of an overarching, shared symbol—a national ideology—but one which operates in a political environment that frowns upon or reluctantly accepts foreign symbols when regional symbols are politically difficult to nationalize.

The cultural agony of black Africa is deep-rooted. Africa is a continent whose cultural achievements were either ignored or attributed to foreign donors. It is the most thor-

3 Donald N. Levine, "The Flexibility of Traditional Culture," *The Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 24, no. 4 (1968), p. 129.

4. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 50, 94.

oughly colonized continent in recent history. Its leaders face what Barbara Ward calls "a double challenge" in their political effort to redirect and manage African cultural destiny: "They face an enormous challenge of change. But, in addition, they face an equally vast challenge of choice."[5]

THE CHALLENGE OF CHOICE

The very idea of culture implies change—adaptation and readaptation of forms, institutions, and ideas and their application to changing situations. Culture change, a dynamic process, implies among other things choice-making in society.[6] Choice-making involves individuals and groups as primary actors and the various alternatives provided by society. Choice-making is not an end in itself; it is simply instrumental. The type of choices which will help redirect African cultures are now politically directed. If you believe newspaper reports, it is not infrequent that the use of mini-skirts and foreign hairstyles, including wigs, by African women becomes the subject of presidential concern, if not court intervention. The content of African culture is largely an unchartered problem because choice-making, even in the area of culture, is no longer a simple affair for new nation-states.

Although politically managed cultural programs make choice-making problematical for individuals, the evidence suggests that every country in sub-Saharan Africa pursues what Lloyd Fallers calls a conscious policy of "cultural management."[7] The policies often vary and suffer from instability, but they are nevertheless designable. Some countries emphasize the continuity of African cultural systems, others recreate ancient abandoned institutions, and a few are highly selective, drawing from local and foreign cultural forms. McKim Marriott tells us why cultural policy is such an essential pillar of African post-colonial reconstruction: "No state, not even an infant one, is willing to appear before the world as a bare political frame. Each would be clothed in a cultural garb symbolic of its aims and ideal being."[8]

How do new African states want to be culturally clothed? And how are they, in reality, culturally clothed? The answer to the first question would require a documentation of ideological statements by African political leaders; and for the second question, the answer is an empirical one. It is reflected not by what leaders say, what Joseph Spengler calls "the contents of the mind of the elite who direct and of the men who man . . . underdeveloped society,"[9] but rather by the lifestyles and cultural responses of the individual members of African society.

5. Barbara Ward, *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 61.

6. V. C. Uchendu, "The Passing of Tribal Man: A West African Experience," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, vol. 5, nos. 1-2 (1970), p. 59.

7. Lloyd A. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 63 (1961), pp. 677-78.

8. McKim Marriott, "Cultural Policy in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 27.

9. Joseph J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development," in Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler, eds., *Tradition, Values, and Socio-economic Development* (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1961), p. 5.

CONTENT OF CULTURAL POLICY

The content of the cultural policy in modern African states is, in many ways, determined by the various colonial experiences and the indignity suffered by the black man in his recent history. McKim Marriott argues that

> . . . most of the new states of sub-Saharan Africa [must] struggle to compensate culturally for their lack of full participation in any recognized civilization. . . . in Africa expanding literacy and education create a void, while considerations of political dignity and national purpose require that the void be appropriately filled. If the Africans do not suffer from civilizational *embarras de richesse* that now typically confronts the Asians, they suffer instead from the dilemma of having either to relate themselves to some foreign great tradition or somehow to convert elements of their many indigenous . . . cultures into a new entity worthy of civilized respect.[10]

It is in the use of "inspirational" symbols and symbolism that cultural policies in post-colonial African societies are most explicit. The names of the most important precolonial states and kingdoms in western Africa have been adopted by new nation-states. Ghana, Mali, and Benin may be mentioned in this context. In central and southern Africa, new place names, drawn from Africa's glorious past, are being revived, as Zimbabwe makes clear; and new place names like Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Azania, and Zaire have been coined to replace colonially imposed place names. Africa is witnessing, in the post-independence decades, a cultural renaissance in dress. This is most pronounced in western Africa where cultural continuity seems strongest. The absence of a dominant, non-African, immigrant settler population probably explains this. Many west African societies did not have to use the small European ruling class as a reference status symbol in matters like dress, as is the case in Kenya, Zambia, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Besides dress, Zaire, under President Mobutu Sese Seko, is probably unique in its apparently successful campaign to devalue foreign names, which are essentially Christian names.

Despite the inconsistency in the cultural policies of many African countries, religion remains one important area of African cultural life that is marked by a consistent policy. Sub-Saharan African states are basically secular in orientation, and there is good political reason to expect them to remain so. Religious symbols are as divisive in a plural society as ethnic symbols. Since both the Christian and Islamic faiths that command the loyalty of most Africans are foreign to black Africa and, more important, are regionally centered, the symbols they provide do not and often cannot command national acceptability.

EXPRESSION OF CULTURAL POLICY

Cultural policy is not just proclaimed; to be effective, it must be lived by the people. It is the people, the culture-bearers, who are the culture-builders.

Nation-building is one important national activity that every African leader must face. In a fundamental way, nation-building is more than a political activity; it is essentially culture-building. Ali Mazrui[11] has

10. Marriott, "Cultural Policy in the New States," p. 48.

11. Mazrui, *Cultural Engineering and Nation Building*, p. 277.

identified five major processes of nation-building. First is the necessity to achieve a degree of cultural and normative consensus; second is the promotion of economic interpenetration among the different strata and actors of society; third is an effort at social integration through cross-cutting links, including marriage bonds; fourth, the building of effective conflict management institutions; and fifth, the accumulation of shared, national experience and the psychological empathy that this experience entails. In the African context, we must add a sixth factor: the diligent pursuit of even sociocultural and economic development—in short, a policy of equity and justice, not as abstract principles but as social realities.

The cultural implications of each of the above processes of nation-building are obvious. The pursuit of cultural autonomy is essentially a segmentary process. A plural society that resents cultural domination from foreigners faces a dilemma of appropriate symbols when it makes decisions about national symbols, those instruments of the Great Tradition that may alienate the regionally centered Little Traditions that already exist in the society. How to evolve national symbols without alienating local or regional symbols is a central problem for transitional societies.

Language policies, or lack of them in many African states, provide a case study of the political dilemma of African states. The question is not whether African states need or deserve a national language. They do. Africans do not need just any language; they need to agree on a language that will give cultural expression to the dignity they must have and get others to respect.

For Africans at this stage of their political and cultural developm a national language must be s as more than a vehicle of comm cation. As Berger reminds us, guage is words, and words

> . . . describe the realities of hu life. But words also have the powe create and shape realities. The w of the strong carry more weight the words of the weak. Indeed, often the weak describe themselve the words coined by the strong. (the last two centuries or more strong have been the technologi advanced nations of the West. As improved their military, political economic power over most of the w they also improved the power of t words.[12]

The political dignity of the i states demands that the coloni inherited official language, wl divides the elite from the mas be decolonized. But the polit realities, the problem of aliena one group or the other, forces guage policy to take an evolut ary rather than a revolutionary proach. The pronouncement African elite notwithstanding, only in Tanzania, among b African states, that a language po backed by an active language gram now exists.

In modern Africa, nation-buil is tied up with economic deve ment. Economic development, nation-building, requires polit guidance. It is the nature of a tra tional society, or the post-colo society, that the economy and society must be developed as a multaneous process. The reason partly in the strong linkage tween resource endowment population and partly in the rol

12. P. L. Berger, *Pyramids of Sacr Political Ethics and Social Change* (York: Anchor Books, 1976), p. 7.

the African state as a major entrepreneur in the economy, a responsibility that older industrialized states did not accept.

IDENTITY AND CULTURAL CONVERGENCE

Transitional societies are identity-builders. The most important instrument for building a national identity is an ideology. Ideology defines the boundaries of a cultural system as much as it gives it content. Fallers defines ideology as "the apologetic part of culture." In his view, ideology is "that part of culture which is actively and explicitly concerned with the establishment and defense of patterns of value and belief."[13]

Post-colonial societies which came into their own through protracted political struggles are more likely to cultivate and promote explicit ideologies than those that achieved independence through constitutional evolution. As societies mature, they tend to routinize their ideology through a general growth of political and value consensus. It should not be surprising, therefore, that ideological struggles are still going on in transitional societies. The ideology-moving political systems in black Africa are no less in transition than the political systems whose leaders have not been challenged sufficiently to formulate and promote explicit ideological goals.

The pursuit of national identity goals is in conflict with the notion of cultural convergence, another societal pattern which results from the fact that transitional societies are drawing from the same basic ideas of science, management theory, and technology in the solution of what appear to be common problems. The world may be divided by the harsh realities of social and economic inequality and the memory of past and, in places, continuing exploitation and injustice. Equally true, the world is more interdependent today than in any period in man's recent history. Cultural convergence is, therefore, in competition and sometimes in conflict with national cultural identity.

Given the pattern of choice-making in black Africa and the limited inventories for cultural engineering, the question has often been asked: Are African societies becoming like the West? This question is rooted in the relatively common effects of similar cultural choices which the history and the character of the transitional society impose upon its culture-bearers. It further reflects a convergence hypothesis which argues that, almost everywhere, common choices made under similar prevailing constraints, whether that of ideology or technology, tend to generate similar structural or cultural patterns. The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa suggests that while similar structural patterns are emerging in response to common constraints, their cultural content tends to be divergent.

Transitional societies in Africa have a common political value which they probably derived from the African past. They tend to view progress, cultural and economic, in purely political terms. Like all transitional societies, they have won their freedom through political action and, unlike the older, industrialized states, they have no ideological obstacle to intervening in various aspects of the people's welfare. Since politics in the transitional society is a major source of power, social mobility, and prestige, poli-

13. Fallers, "Ideology and Culture," pp. 677–78.

tics is practically coterminous with society rather than just a part of it. This development is probably unique. It cannot be said to be a cultural carry-over from the traditional society or from the recent colonial experience. Whatever its origin, the result is the same: the tendency to polity primacy. The dominance of every aspect of social and cultural life by politics, and particularly the extreme reliance on political solution for every problem in society, has tended to increase cultural strain. Cultural strain is multiplied by political competition, not just by politicians but by bureaucrats and other individuals who seek access to the privileges and scarce resources of society. Competitive politics in a society where government is the most important industry increases cultural strain.

SUMMARY

Post-colonial societies are transitional societies. They are societies that are making deliberate efforts to redefine their culture and guarantee its autonomy. They are also societies which must function in a contemporary world in which choice-making is complicated. One important challenge which cultural management faces in such societies is how to select and maintain national, inspirational symbols that do not alienate the Little Traditions that exist in the society. A related problem is the inherent conflict between national cultural identity on the one hand and growing cultural convergence on the other hand.

Culture-building is a guided process. In a society where politics is pervasive, it cannot be achieved without a large measure of cultural strain. The African experience shows that cultural policy, as a deliberate political exercise, may vary even among countries which shared a similar colonial experience. The difference between the cultural policy of Guinea and the Ivory Coast must be sought in the political styles and personal, political experiences of the presidents of these states rather than in the colonial experiences of the two countries.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: What measure of democracies do the tropical nations of Africa have? What kind of legislature do they have or could they originate?

A. (Uchendu): Americans have a folk view of democracy, but they have a very short memory of its history. If democracy really means going to the polls, not many African states have it. If it means participation in running one's own country, the Tanzanian government, for example, is democratic in the sense that people are given the opportunity for discussion before policy is formulated and representation before government takes action. Given the nature of the society, democracy is interpreted in different ways. American democracy is quite different from British democracy. This is true in other areas of the world, so there is no one pattern of democracy. There are different responses to democratic institutions.

Of course, in West Africa particularly, we have had a number of disappointments, where soldiers took over from or for elected officials and are in power. But these problems are not insoluble. Remember that black Africa has only been independent for the last 17 years. A child born 17 years ago cannot even vote in this country. What then about a country? You must look at the number of years that African countries have been independent and study the kind of institutions they inherited. We are dealing with two problems, not just the problem of democracy. We are also dealing with the problem of institutional development. Whether it would take a democratic character like the one you have in Washington, in Britain, or in Switzerland is something we are trying to find out. I think the essential ingredient in democracy is one that recognizes the right of everybody to live a dignified life. It doesn't matter whether soldiers, the boss, or parliament is running it. We are trying to find out what would be the appropriate institution. We haven't succeeded yet, but 17 years is not a long time for a nation.

The Developing States of Africa

By Ruth Schachter Morgenthau

ABSTRACT: The colonial era, with its monopoly of wealth by whites, is over. None of the withdrawing colonial powers were very good at preparing the African nations for independence. It took a decade for the invisible structures of empire to start giving way. Most African countries inherited insufficient administrative and economic infrastructures, borders that made little economic sense, and small markets. As a result, they were vulnerable, at independence, to fluctuating world prices and feast or famine conditions, making economic planning almost impossible. The economies of African states are governed by forces largely out of their control, and growth does not bring development for many because of lopsided distribution. There is, however, industrial potential, and manufacturing, though limited by low purchasing power, is growing. With the oil crisis, a few African states may hope to catch up soon with industrialized states in living standards, but meanwhile producing resources doesn't ensure equal distribution. Multinationals also weaken some African states by making them dependent. If they are to gain a sense of shared stake, they must cease to feel like horses driven by jockeys from the industrialized states.

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FEW people realize how great are the variations in wealth among, as well as within, the many African states. Indeed, African extremes between rich and poor are probably growing. However, they are no longer, since the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), quite the same extremes which provoked the Bandung meeting in the fifties and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meetings in the sixties, to speak of the fatal enlarging gap between rich and poor, superimposed upon the gap between developed and underdeveloped, white and black. Class cleavages in Africa are no longer superimposed upon white-black cleavages as much as in the past. Rich is no longer always white; poor is no longer always black. Since the rise of OPEC, the alignment has changed in Africa. There are policy implications well worth pondering.

THE END OF THE COLONIAL ERA[1]

The colonial era, with its monopoly of wealth in white hands, is over. It matters more what the African governments now do than what the colonial governments did. It matters less who the colonizer was than how deep a modernizing impact the colonizers made on African society. By that I mean what ports are there, what airports, roads, bridges, what hospitals, factories and mines, power plants and broadcasting stations? What kind of schools, who went, what did they learn, and how many Africans learned how to run shops and garages, hospitals, laboratories, plants and ports, commercial farms and fisheries? There were greater differences in the modernizing impact within the French empire, for example, between Algeria and Chad, than between the French and British impact on the Ivory Coast and Ghana, respectively. Depending on the modernizing impact, some new states did, others did not inherit viable economies, institutions, and governments staffed by trained people.

We can now look back and say, though the colonizers varied, they had much in common. A common feature of the colonial systems was to monopolize the top positions, administrative and economic, for the Europeans. All the European powers declined after World War II and pulled back from African commitments, usually less decently where there were European settlers and more gracefully where there were none. All went, not in a coordinated fashion, but one after the other, with Portugal last. The U.S. and USSR, though they intervened little in decolonization, in various ways contributed to making it necessary.

The African military balance changed also, as the European nations saw little sense in maintaining expensive African bases in an era of changing technology and refined techniques of long-range missiles, satellites, and supersonic aircraft. They searched for occasional tiny island bases, for refueling and retooling, but not for African installations on which to house many men trained to control large countries. And they sought to shrug off military responsibility. The withdrawal of the Europeans lifted the barriers against entry by the United States and the Soviet Union; both gradually, somewhat gingerly, proceeded to seek footholds. And on

1. See my "Old Cleavages among New West African States: The Heritage of French Rule," *Africa Today*, April 1971, for a fuller discussion.

occasion as in the Congo in the sixties and in the Horn in the seventies, they confronted each other. Meanwhile, some African countries, particularly Algeria, Nigeria, and Zaire, built up their own forces. So did white South Africa and Rhodesia.

None of the withdrawing colonial powers were terribly good at preparing the African nations for independence. Representative systems, if they existed at all, often were more apparent than real. Within a decade, many of the parliamentary institutions hastily planted by the withdrawing colonizers had disappeared, many elections became loyalty parades, multiparty systems became one party systems and then no party systems. Belgium and Portugal left so fast, once they decided to go, there was no time to plant any parliamentary institutions. There are, of course, some exceptions, and a few African party regimes do exist. For the most part, however, the leaders of the new African states, severely pressed by the realities of the multiple tasks they inherited, found many constraints and frequent crises. In more than half, the military took power.

Though the colonial empires had practically disappeared by the mid-sixties and only the Portuguese hung on, it took another decade for the invisible structures of empire to start giving way. Some English-speaking African leaders suspect those speaking French lacked "African personalities" and still followed orders from Paris. Informal and formal relations, financial, economic, educational, and social persist to some degree even to this day. There are common policy processes and mutually recognized obligations between former metropole and former colony. Strategic and intelligence information flows along the networks of the Commonwealth and between Paris and the French-speaking African states. Sometimes small issues are regulated in this invisible system-matters of health, scholarships, exchanges of diplomatic visits. A large number of expatriates from the former metropole work in the ex-colonies.

Some of the economic barriers left by the colonizers in Africa are coming down. One reason is that Britain joined the European Common Market. This altered the reaction of the English-speaking African Commonwealth members to associated status with the European Community. Whereas before associated status to the European six meant a need to cut with Britain, once Britain joined the Common Market there was no need to choose. Thus, the British European decision had a unifying effect in Africa. Another reason that the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states were able to join together with the European states in the Lomé Convention was that after the rise of OPEC the associated developing states had considerably more strength. Some were rich and expected to become richer. Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, and others knew their resources meant a great deal to the Europeans. By cooperating among themselves, they were in a position to obtain genuine advantages in Africa and Europe.

The Lomé Convention guarantees preferential treatment in Europe to the manufactured exports of the ACP states. Although these are, for the time being, quite limited, it is likely that they will grow. Some observers believe Africans might become offshore producers of consumer goods for the Europeans. The convention also sets up aid plans

and cooperative processes on trade, on a program stabilizing earnings from exported commodities (STABEX), on treatment of foreign companies, payments, and movements of capital.

The Lomé Convention represents a fresh departure, a structural change that reinforced, to some degree, both African and European cohesion. Lomé substitutes "Eurafrican" links for the earlier more fragmented imperial ones. To some degree, of course, the Lomé Convention was designed to discourage non-European industrial nations from trading or entry in the former colonies. But the African nations themselves have insisted on their right to open their doors to the highest bidders—be they from east, west, or middle east. Many United States enterprises, moreover, with branches in the European nations, find it convenient to enter the ACP states through their European affiliates.

The difference with past practice is that the Lomé agreements end the exclusive limits set around individual European empires and set up a single system embracing somewhat more than all of them put together.[2]

COLONIAL RESTRAINTS ON AFRICAN ECONOMIES

From colonial rule, most countries in Africa inherited insufficient administrative and economic infrastructure, borders that made little economic sense, and markets that are small. For example, "the typical West African country, with about four million inhabitants, has a demand for industrial products equivalent to that of a middle sized European provincial town."[3] Local manufacturing conflicted with the rules laid down by the colonial powers which confined trade largely to African raw material exports. As a result, at independence, most African economies were vulnerable to fluctuating world prices and subject to feast or famine conditions, which made economic planning almost impossible. In a few instances—Togo, Dahomey, Ruanda, and Burundi—the population was perhaps better off during and possibly even before the colonial era than after.[4]

In varying degrees, though the colonial powers were modernizers in tropical Africa, structural transformation of the African economies was confined to European needs. That is why the new countries had tremendous difficulties adjusting after independence. As the slave trade ended, roads and ports and railroads were built designed to facilitate the export of cash crops to Europe, such as palm oil, rubber, peanuts, cocoa, coffee, and bananas. The colonizers saw African colonies as private preserves, suppliers, and markets for the metropolitan factories.

Of course, there were variations in policy. The British, confident of their capacity to compete, were somewhat more flexible than the French, the Belgians, or the Portuguese, who followed mercantilist policies well into the twentieth century. The colonizers used large merchant companies, descendants in some cases of the great charter companies, to regulate mutual trade.

2. See Guy F. Erb, "Africa and the International Economy," mimeographed, February 1977.

3 Robert Smith, "West African Economic Cooperation—Problems and Prospects," *Foreign Service Journal*, April 1974.

4. Samir Amin is an eloquent exponent of this view. See his *Afrique de l' Ouest bloquée* (Paris: Minuit, 1971).

Though they encouraged regional mobility within their zones,[5] most colonial powers tried to prevent intra-African trade across their monetary zones.

Such export economies, in turn, imported manufactured goods. The factories were in Europe. Spare parts also came from Europe—the wheels, tires, nails, screwdrivers, gasoline, cars and trucks, even matches. Technological superiority helps explain the Europeans' success. Their technology did not spread evenly throughout African societies. Rather it remained in enclaves, in cities, where there were roads, in the fertile rain forests, where cash crops grew, and coexisted with iron-age agriculture, stone-age hunting and gathering, and nomad cattle raising.

There were many effects. Where the Europeans introduced palm oil, coffee, cocoa, rubber, peanuts, cotton, and sisal, they spread new wealth among Africans. Newly rich Africans, in turn, had access to the bicycles, refrigerators, cars, and other goods made in Europe that distinguished them from the rest of the African population. The result was an African middle class, including cash crop farmers, from among whom came many new leaders of African sovereign states. These escaped from the pattern of low skill, low wage-earning jobs which still blights the lives of most Africans in the towns. If it is true that the money economy was small in places like Ghana, for example, it was large enough to involve, in addition to a consuming middle class and political leadership, cash crop farmers and an African entrepreneurial class. What prevented their combination to support a program of local manufacturing?

One answer is it did not happen because it did not need to. Foreign firms grew with their markets. Only when a threat to an existing market occurred were overseas producing affiliates created by parent companies.[6] As long as the colonial system kept out the market threat and Africans were not strong enough to insist on their own manufacturing there was no need for foreign firms to manufacture locally. There were simply branches of European trading companies. Some were equal in size and impact to the colonial government bureaucracy. Not only did the trading companies face little competition, they excluded Africans from the ranks of management.[7] For a long period of time, the European trading houses did their best to crowd Africans out of even the export trade in African produce like palm oil, peanuts, coffee and cocoa, fruit and rubber. Without colonial rule, the big European trading houses, which became, for example, the United Africa Company (UAC), a subsidiary of Unilever, and the Société Commerciale Ouëst Africaine (SCOA), could probably not have taken over an estimated two-thirds to three-quarters of the overseas trade. The European companies relegated African traders to subordinate positions and reduced them to subsidiary retail trade.

This is not to imply that they were unimportant. African traders had a strong tradition in some parts of Africa. Nevertheless, be-

5. Akin Mabogunje, *Regional Mobility and Resource Development in West Africa* (Montreal: McGill, 1972).

6. See Mira Wilkin, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

7. Anthony G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 284–85.

tween the trading houses and the villages, there were also foreign intermediaries. In East Africa, Indian traders accompanied the Europeans and cut out Africans from much of the retail trade. In Zaire, Greeks, Pakistani, and Portuguese did it. In West Africa, although Lebanese, Syrians, and some Indians took over the wholesale circuit, African traders managed to stay in the retail trade. Indeed, they had almost a monopoly of the unofficial or clandestine trade.[8] A very high proportion of the active population was in trade in Ghana, a country considered to be predominately agricultural.[9]

African traders might have flowed naturally into the big time in trade and from there into investment. They were inhibited by the officially protected European trading companies. There were African trading families that trace their roots through centuries of economic and political upheaval. Examples are the associates of Baidy Guèye of Guinea, and of Kebe of Senegal. Many African trading families rejected the Europeans and European schools. Their sons were often not the best prepared to beat the Europeans at their own game. Those who carried on heretical traditions, religious as well as political, were forced to turn to commerce. For them, it was a livelihood; they had no alternative. It was not a matter of preference. Some of the most active builders of Islamic brotherhoods in West Africa belonged to such a heretic business tradition, illustrating that "heresy promotes the business spirit."[10]

The European trading companies stimulated long-distance trade but held Africans back. European colonialism created a limited infrastructure for its own rather than African national purposes. Until recently, most Africans invested their money in real estate, good living, and charity. Only slowly are some African traders becoming direct investors, as traders did in many industrializing countries. They, like the larger foreign-owned enterprises, are becoming a new force in parts of Africa and providing alternatives to exclusive dependence on government for income.

Many important African trading families were internationally minded, and few stopped their transactions at the borders of the new states; many were aliens, not born in the country where they lived. In the first independence decade of almost autarchic African nationalism, some new governments viewed multi-African connections as suspect. An anti-stranger reaction against Indians, Syrians, Lebanese, and Africans of foreign origins extended to Africans. Strangers, like the *Hausa* in Ghana, the *Dioula* in Ivory Coast, the Dahomeyans in many parts of West Africa, the Somali, the Burundi, and Southern Sudanese, were sometimes even expelled.[11]

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8. Ibid., Peter Bauer, *West African Trade* (Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, Pubs., 1954).

9. Peter Garlick, *African Traders and Economic Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

10. Spanish proverb cited in F. L. Nussbaum, *A History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe* (New York: F. S. Craft and Co., 1937), p. 138. A fascinating discussion of the interconnection between religious heresy and trade can be found in Lansine Kaba, *Evolution of Islam in West Africa. The Wahhabi Movement and Its Contribution to Political Development 1945–58* (Ph.D. diss. in history, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., January 1972).

11. See my "Strangers, Nationals and Multinationals in Africa," in *Strangers in Africa*, ed. William Shack and Elliot Skinner (Berkeley. University of California Press, forthcoming).

For about a decade, in most politically independent African countries, the economic legacy of colonial rule was little disturbed, although there were internal struggles for power. Many new African governments followed policies that postponed the emergence of a group of African entrepreneurs, even though some African traders have the contacts to link the economies of several states. Some such activity has occurred, illegally, in diamonds, foreign currency, cattle, fish, and cola nuts, linking, for example, Angola, Zaire, and West African states.

This was inhibited by the disparate tax, tariff, and currency barriers among French-, English-, and Portuguese-speaking African countries. There were no effective payment arrangements among the monetary zones. It could take a year to pay legally for cattle coming into Upper Volta from Ghana. Some countries like Ghana (1974) had an over-valued currency. It was worthwhile for its merchants to import at the official rate of exchange and export at the parallel market rate of the depreciated *cedi*. For political reasons, the Ghana government did not want to devalue. Clandestine trade thrived, including transit trade, in Dahomey and Togo or Gambia. Official statistics recorded that almost all West African states received no more than 5 percent of their imports from neighbors. Unofficially, however, Nigeria absorbed at least 75 percent of Niger's exports and provided at least 20 percent of her imports. Legal imports from Nigeria were subject to 30–50 percent tariff in the franc zone states. Officially, therefore, importing European goods was often cheaper. What would the inter-African trade figures be if all countries in Africa favored economic cooperation? If barriers were reduced and economic cooperation became the official goal in West Africa, a different economic pattern might well emerge than one oriented to export overseas.[12]

Who controls resources has been a hot political issue in Africa from way before the Europeans came. At independence, even the countries with the most active nationalist movements, such as Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Mali, did not easily acquire economic power. For a variety of reasons, African entrepreneurs were shouldered aside, often by African political leaders. Many new governments made their peace with chambers of commerce controlled by European businessmen. The exceptions were a few socialist states—Guinea, Mali under the Union Soudanaise, Tanzania, Moçambique, and Angola.

The first generation of new African leaders had little experience with economic matters. Since the Europeans kept economic controls in their own hands, at independence few African technocrats existed, and few of those had any special standing with the original national founding fathers. There were many conflicts among the political leaders, wage earners, and African managers of economic institutions, private or public, who often allied themselves with the military. In time, most founding fathers have stepped aside, while a new generation of African leaders reassessed their economic alternatives.

PRESENT CONDITIONS VARY

The economics of developing African states are governed by forces largely out of their control. For

12 Smith, "West African Economic Cooperation."

many, moreover, even growth does not bring development, since distribution remains sadly lopsided. The typical developing African nation has a sparse population, small internal markets, limited infrastructure, new and fragile borders, and economies vulnerable to fluctuating world prices. There remains a large near-subsistence sector in most African economies, which with a few exceptions are export economies that exchange in the international market African raw materials—animal, vegetable, or mineral—for manufactured goods. Some manufacturing has started, but outside of South Africa it is largely limited to import substitution, petroleum and nonferrous metals, and processing or semi-processing.

Nigeria, with perhaps 80 million, has by far the largest population. Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Zaire each have more than 20 million people. All the rest have fewer. Including the islands, some 33 countries have a population of under 5 million and approximately 18 have fewer than a million.[13] The majority of the population is under age, and the growth rate is very high. The continent, made up of more than 50 countries, is sparsely settled. Most Africans are vulnerable to famine and death, and it is not unusual for one child out of two to die under the age of five. While a few African nations are prosperous, most are not. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) figures show that of the world's 28 least developed countries, at least 18 are located in Africa; 28 of the 45 countries most seriously affected by recent rises in cost of fuel and food are also in Africa.[14]

There are, in contrast, the fortunate few. Even the petroleum-producing countries are only recently rich, with Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya heading a list that includes Angola, Egypt, and Gabon. The United States needs other mineral exports: columbium from Nigeria, manganese from Gabon and South Africa, cobalt from Zaire, chromium from South Africa and Rhodesia, gold and platinum, antimony and vanadium from South Africa. There is copper in Zaire and Zambia; uranium in Gabon, Niger, and South Africa; iron in Liberia and Mauritania; fluorite in Kenya; and Moçambique Guinea is estimated to have the world's largest reserves in bauxite.[15] Nigeria exported $3 billion worth of petroleum products to the United States in 1975, which was almost a billion more than the total value of South Africa's exports to the United States.

There is industrial potential. Of the world's known hydroelectric potential, 13 percent is in Zaire where the Inga project alone is expected to produce as much electricity as is presently used in the United Kingdom. African rivers—the Senegal, the Niger, the Zaire, the Nile, the Zambezi—have cheap power potential. Dams at Akosombo (Ghana), Kainji (Nigeria), Aswan

13. For figures, I have frequently relied on *Africa South of the Sahara 1976* (London: Europa Publications, 1976). Nigeria's figures, announced for the November 1973 census, 79.7 million, are widely disputed. See *Africa Confidential*, 17 May 1974. See, also, the statistical annexes in John W. Sewell, and the ODC Staff, *The United States and World Development, Agenda 1977* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

14. See Maurice J. Williams, Chairman, Development Assistance Committee, *Development Cooperation, 1976 Review*, (Paris: OECD, November 1976).

15. Sources: *Mineral and Materials*, a monthly survey, U.S. Bureau of Mines, (Washington, D.C., September 1976).

(Egypt), Gouina (Mali), Konkoure (Guinea), Kafue (Zambia), Rufuji (Tanzania), Inga (Zaire), Cabora Bassa (Moçambique), and Cunene (Angola) actually or potentially produce cheap power for industry. When oil prices quadrupled, these hydroelectric installations increased in value. Ambitious plans to expand ore processing are being laid in the rich mineral exporting states.

Manufacturing in the African developing states, though limited by low purchasing power, is growing. Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast export considerable manufactured goods; so do Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, Cameroon, and Kenya. If European wages continue to go up, prospects improve for African light industry. The European market for textiles and other clothing, leather goods, canned goods, and other consumer goods is likely to expand. Already slacks made in the Ivory Coast, leather goods and furs in Kenya, shoes in Dakar, and dresses in Morocco are shipped to European consumers.[16]

Like the United States a century or two ago, a number of states—Kenya, the Ivory Coast, for example—maintained respectable growth rates after independency by exporting agricultural products, some in a processed or partly processed state. The more fortunate states depend on several exports, the more vulnerable ones are subject to one product's price fluctuations, like Ghana with cocoa, Mauritius with sugar, Chad with cotton. Temporary world shortages—in cocoa, coffee, rubber, sisal—have created periods in which the African producers have been able to acquire substantial, if irregular, incomes. Higher costs of imported fertilizer, seed, energy, and containers have hit these agricultural countries hard.

Some of the poorest African countries subsist precariously on foreign remittances. This is true for many of the sahel states whose people migrate in search of income to the richer West Africa. Workers from Malawi, Moçambique, Lesotho, and other "frontline" states migrate to the farms and factories of South Africa.

While agricultural production has been rising in a number of countries, foodstuffs still constitute a disquieting proportion of African imports. Even larger food shortfalls are expected in the future.[17] Meanwhile, the poorest African states, for example, Niger, Mali, Chad, and Upper Volta, export dried fish and cattle to the coastal states in return for money that helps pay for the governments in the towns. But in the countryside, as during the drought of the early seventies, people may die or sicken from starvation.

Only a comprehensive international food plan for the poorest states can help bring about a variable balance. With such a plan, African agricultural production could rise dramatically and be sufficient both for home consumption and, in some states, for abundant exports.

Meanwhile, few official institutions of economic cooperation exist among African states, though there is considerable grass-roots interdependence. In a global sense, moreover, most African leaders struggle

16 See Andrew M. Kamarck, "Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's: An Economic Profile," in *Africa from Mystery to Maize*, ed. Helen Kitchen (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976).

17. See International Food Policy Research Institute, "Meeting Food Needs in the Developing World: The Location and Magnitude of the Task in the Next Decade," *Research Report #1*, February 1976, p. 37.

with the fact that they are unable to significantly affect the marketing or prices of exports and imports. No wonder that the call for commodity price agreements finds fertile soil in Africa. No wonder, also, that most developing African states, whether governed by socialists or conservatives, popular parties or military regimes, are following policies of economic nationalism at home and abroad.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND MULTINATIONAL ENTRY

Policies of Africanization in trade, commerce, and small enterprises are political in origin and motivation, a reaction against economic colonialism. There are few signs of Africanization in white-ruled Africa. Even in some black-ruled frontline states, like Malawi or Swaziland, it is hard to find an African business employing as many as 10 people. Moreover, the many African governments carrying out Africanization policies realized that these policies alone could not give them control over their economies nor assure them of an expanding economy in which the size of everyone's share might grow.

Many African governments which sought growth accepted the entry of foreign multinational enterprises or even sought them out. Insofar as international capital assistance became available to African states, it was mostly as loans or suppliers' credits. The problem for African developing states was often not so much one of credit, though certainly many had their balance of payments problems when they had to buy vital supplies at prices they could not afford; it was rather credibility—proving that they had the cadres, the technology, the market know-how to justify big investments. Foreign credit was more easily available to countries whose projects involved multinational enterprises.

Multinational investments have shown a remarkable capacity to survive instability or hostility. The largest foreign enterprises often survived intact from one kind of government to another without regard for ideological questions. The socialist government of Tanzania, though it nationalized banks and most medium-sized businesses, licensed offshore oil exploration to multinational oil companies. Despite shifts of economic policy by the Libyan government, some international oil companies have been able to reorganize and keep on working. Even in revolution, multinational affiliates are rarely destroyed. Gulf shored up the former Portuguese dictatorship in Angola, yet it survived a transfer of power from Portugal to Angola. Similarly many oil companies working in Nigeria have survived the shift from British to Nigerian nationalist rule despite a major civil war. Civil war in Zaire, genocide in Burundi, and a drought and a coup in Niger have not stopped operations by multinationals which develop copper in Zaire, oil in Nigeria, nickel in Burundi, and uranium in Niger. In the troubled Zaire countryside of Shaba (Katanga), U.S. based multinationals moved into openings left by departing Belgian rulers. In socialist Guinea, multinationals quickly filled the void left by the French and their sudden withdrawal. In spite of the Franco-Algerian war, multinationals quickly found new opportunities. Indeed, rival multinationals, many not European in origins, moved into openings that accompanied European decolonization, in the midst of social and political upheaval.

The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973–74 opened yet another phase. Indeed, the OPEC strategy is being tried by producers of other commodities. They realize that if the multinational oil companies had not been organized as a partial oligopoly, OPEC might not have been able to exercise as much global leverage. OPEC was the first clearly successful producer challenge to the prices paid by industrial consumers for raw materials originating in developing countries. Almost unanimously the new African states, whether oil importing or not, backed the OPEC struggle against the major oil companies. They identified with the economic nationalism of the oil producing countries in the Middle East even though at first they paid a high price.

Coups in Niger and Upper Volta and the army revolt in Ethiopia were related to the inflation that accompanied the rising prices of food- and oil-related imports. There were shortages of some packaging materials. Fewer long-term funds were available for investment from the developed world, less tourism, and a growing trade gap in many oil importing African countries. In some countries, food shortages worsened, as higher costs of transport, fertilizer, machinery, and manufactured goods led them to the edge of bankruptcy and to internal dissention. To them the effect of OPEC's rise to power has been demotion from the Third World to the Fourth. Many have had to reconsider their economic policies and to scrap plans for development.

A lucky few benefited immediately. Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, and Angola produce oil. Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Niger, and Zaire have active hopes. The new oil wealth raised them from poor to rich. Nigeria's GNP is expected to exceed that of South Africa in the near future. The new wealth in developing Africa flatly contradicts the old idea that the United States has the most at stake, economically, in southern Africa.

WEALTH AND ITS DISTRIBUTION

The changes accompanying the oil crises have made possible what African political leaders had never considered likely—that a few African states might soon catch up with the industrialized states in standard of living. Most serious students of industrialization in Africa, before OPEC, believed that with careful planning some African states might catch up with the 1950 standard of living of middle-range industrialized states by the twenty-first century. Some African economic nationalists, disillusioned by the post-independence reality, even espoused the cause of isolation and advised turning inward, cutting the links of dependency with the industrialized countries, and transforming African economies only from within.

Since oil producing countries succeeded in rearranging the international market in their favor, these lines of reasoning have lost their audience. Global economic interdependence bore fruit to the rich African states. African oil became precious, and so did its hydroelectric power, coal and iron, uranium, copper, and even rubber and vegetable oils. For the first time in many centuries, a few African leaders can shop the world for the best of what they need.

Meanwhile, producing resources says nothing about distribution. While international interdependence speeds up economic transac-

tions and gives African governments some economic strength, it adds new layers of inequality. Entry of multinational enterprises in mining, for example, can exaggerate the disparity between city and countryside; it affects the location of infrastructure. Long lead time, much capital, and machinery characterize most mining, while only a few Africans work for the mines even where there are ore-processing plants. Often, though enterprises prosper, people do not. New money stays in the enterprise or in the capital city. Even in the better organized new African mining states, the top broadens out only a little. The resulting syndrome can be growth without development, even in the rich states. A great deal depends on political leadership.

If African countries had better distribution of income, more diverse and larger sources of revenue, stronger and more effective institutions connecting leaders and the rest of the population, more avenues of social mobility—then the entry of multinational enterprises and international interdependence would not so exacerbate the extremes of power, health, and wealth. Multinationals weaken some African national governments by making them dependent and yet bolster these same governments up.

The international economy has quickened the transfer of world market highs and lows to Africa, together with the effects of shortages or gluts in food or fertilizer or of inflation. It can be said that the present system of interdependence sometimes vitiates policies of self-reliance, decreases the likelihood that serious attention be paid local African markets and local needs, and drains vital resources like food from the national to the international markets.

POLICY PERSPECTIVES

No one nation is singly responsible for the way the international economy affects the distribution of wealth in Africa. Yet it is fair to say that the industrialized nations as a whole, and the colonial powers in particular, share responsibility for the economic weaknesses in new African states, the comparatively weak level of African entrepreneurship, the relatively low wages of African wage earners, and the vulnerable state of most African economies.

Aid is a help, though not by any means the only or the most effective one. The Russians still do not give their share. Russian military aid, directly or through Cuba, is going up, but not economic aid. The Chinese have done one big job, the building of the Tan Zam railroad. The Western powers, individually and through multilateral agencies, committed \$3.9 billion in 1975. OPEC, through various donor organizations, committed \$4.1 billion the same year, of which roughly \$400 million went to African countries that are not members of the Arab League.[18]

More significant than aid are policies having to do with world commodity prices and markets, world trade, investment decisions, and allocation of financial and technical resources. The United States carries weight on these questions. Where do U.S. interests lie? Before replying, it is worth asking how important Africa is to the United States.

This question cannot be answered

18. See Gordon Bertolin, "U.S. Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade and Raw Materials," mimeographed, February 1977.

simply in economic terms. Africa is part of the American heritage. The ancestors of at least 10 percent of our people came from there. Its human and cultural riches add to our society; its troubles affect us. As a multiracial nation, we resonate whenever racial conflicts take place in Africa. We become involved when white oppresses black in southern Africa, for example. Therefore we need to take full responsibility for our economic engagements in that part of the world. To African leaders of the developing states, moreover, racial equality is a principal goal, one that unifies them in the Organization of African Unity. Racial equality and majority rule to southern Africa are human rights over which we cannot afford to compromise. U.S. good faith on this issue, in African eyes, is almost a prerequisite to the growth of fruitful and mutually beneficial foreign relations.

Africa is important to us for economic reasons. Though Africa is one of the world's poorest continents, there are a number of rich African nations—particularly the oil exporting ones. Nigeria is the richest. Its GNP is shortly expected to surpass the GNP of South Africa; the value of Nigeria's exports surpassed the value of South Africa's exports a year or so after OPEC successfully quadrupled world oil prices. Already Nigeria is the second largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States. In addition, there are perhaps 10 African states with whom the United States has substantial and growing economic relations, who sell more to us than they buy, who could therefore become yet better customers.

Africa is a continent where U.S. interests are sometimes in competition with the former European colonizers' for access to markets, investment opportunities, and raw materials. Though most African nations continue to sell most of their exports and to buy most of their imports in Europe, the picture is changing somewhat. Indeed, in the Lomé Convention the European Community made a number of real concessions to African economic demands, because they want to keep a big share of Africa's international economic transactions.

Nevertheless, Japan's share is growing, as is America's. To date, the African states are minor economic partners of the United States —with only 3 percent of our foreign investment and perhaps 6½ percent of our foreign trade. When it is remembered that until African independence from colonial rule, the United States and Japan were pretty well barred from access to Africa, the figures represent a considerable growth and can hardly be ignored. Since OPEC, the preponderance of trade lies with developing Africa, not the South.

Though the economies of the developing African states still remain more important to Europe than to the United States, the international economy is now so woven together that the United States is itself deeply affected by the prosperity or the lack of it in Europe. In this sense, African development becomes part of our growth, directly or indirectly. The fall of copper prices signals not only the decline in the economies and stability of Zambia, Zaire, and Chile, but also the decline in the automobile, communications, and the construction industries in the developed countries.

Africa is important, furthermore, because there are crises brewing that can threaten world peace. We might, if careless, find ourselves in

an East-West confrontation with the Russians in the Horn of Africa, or worse still, in southern Africa, in a racial confrontation in which we are on the wrong side. We cannot afford to leave the initiative to the Russians in southern Africa that they acquired almost unexpectedly through the Cuban intervention in Angola.

The African nations now constitute a full third of the membership of the United Nations. Though the U.N. was born without them in the forties, its agenda and priorities have been altered by the new members. There are almost 50 African members, and they are in a position to make themselves heard on the two prime issues: racial equality in southern Africa and economic equality among rich and poor nations in the world. If the U.S. government wants African allies in international institutions on issues dear to us—like peace in the Middle East, arms control, or an end to nuclear proliferation—we must of necessity find ways to become useful to them. We need to reach for a way to build partnerships with the developing African states.

What policies, then, should the United States advocate? To encourage African trade, in UNCTAD and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), we should announce concrete measures indicating sympathetic understanding of the marketing problems by African manufacturers, few though they still are.

Increased food production is vital even to the richer African states, which nevertheless have trouble feeding the people. We might even build new institutions—such as a Food Corps and an International Agricultural Foundation—through which techniques and support services for the interested African states could be made available. Special food assistance to the poorest nations could become available through these and other international structures that look beyond the limited horizon of relief and are dedicated to African food self-reliance. Food prices also relate directly to security. Food riots in Egypt preceded a call for more U.S. arms. Food riots in Ethiopia, Niger, Chad, Mali, Upper Volta, and elsewhere preceded military coups. Even Nigeria, though rich, was shaken by riots against the high price of grain.

It now appears that with the STABEX provisions of the Lomé Convention and OPEC support for a common fund and price stabilization of commodities, the idea is taking concrete shape. The United States has only the choice of joining in or standing apart. It is time that the United States joins within UNCTAD in negotiations on commodity agreements and a common fund.

We are used to thinking along these lines about domestic food policy, but have yet to demonstrate our knowledge of the relevance to foreign policy matters. Successful international control over international commodity highs and lows could significantly reduce the number of crises in Africa, hence the calls for economic aid, for emergency relief, or even for military assistance.

Other ways the United States could meet African development needs include educational assistance to speed the process of Africanization, encouragement of measures that favor inter-African trade, allowing African states to renegotiate their debts, and receiving emergency credit to tide them over unforeseen budgetary crises.

Such measures could meet African desires for an international economic system that works for them, gives them a sense of self-reliance, and removes blocks to more equal domestic and international distribution. Some of these suggested measures might be debated; a number might cost the United States some short-term advantages. In the long run, however, there would be gains in growth, security, and the creation of a stable world economic order.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been mostly about the changing circumstances in the developing African states, particularly social and economic, that accompanied first the imposition of colonial rule and then its withdrawal. It has been argued that many of the immediate economic by-products of separate colonial rule are indeed changing and that the European states are making a collective bid to maintain their primacy as the trading and economic partners of the new African states.

The majority ruled African states have development as a prime objective. It would benefit them, and the United States, if we found ways to respond to their expressed desires for more ways to become self-reliant even as they connect up with the international economy in which we play so large a part.

The extremes between rich and poor in Africa may well be growing, as they have been growing since before European colonization. Yet there are new departures. Since oil prices rose, rich is no longer white, as in the colonial era, and poor is no longer always black. The extraordinary decline of white rule in Africa since the end of World War II, of which the withdrawal of Portugal from Angola and Moçambique were the latest examples, suggest the probability that majority rule is not far away from Rhodesia and Namibia. Racial equality must come in South Africa as well.

The United States has every reason to keep matters moving in that direction. Our economic interests in the developing states are more important, presently, than in white ruled southern Africa. If we must choose to place at risk U.S. economic interests in southern Africa so as to bear witness to the steadfastness of U.S. devotion to human rights for black and white,[19] the risks are likely to be temporary. The capacity to survive political changes, by U.S. enterprises performing essential services in African states, has stood out in the recent economic history of the area. If the African states are to gain a sense of shared stake, then the leaders must cease to feel like horses driven by jockeys from the industrialized states. Evidence that the United States favors policies of both racial and economic equality should help Africans feel they also own horses in the international economy.

19 See my "Security and Conflict in Africa," produced for the 30 March 1977 meeting in Washington of the Council on Foreign Relations

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Do you think there is ever any possibility that UNCTAD and GATT could get together at least on some areas?

A (Morgenthau): If you are asking me if there is a chance that UNCTAD will not get deadlocked in a conflict between an industrialized and a developing country, as appears to have happened again in the most recent meeting, I think there is a possibility. I was trying to raise issues for redefining American interests, and reconsideration of the kind of position we take in international institutions, so that a real dialogue can start with developing countries. I think we are reaching a stage of understanding of our dependence on others which is a necessary preparatory stage for a reformulation of foreign policy. So I think there is hope that the level of dialogue in GATT and UNCTAD will change. Whether the change will be immediate I would hesitate to predict until I see the change.

Q: I was very struck by two particular points: your prophecy that Africa might well become a supplier of manufactured consumer goods to Europe and, secondly, that at present, the effective market in an average west African nation of about 4 to 5 million people is about the same as in an average European provincial town. What I wonder is where it leads, both for Africa and in terms of our present concern. Do you think there is any reason to suppose that the new form of international division of labor is going to be any more useful in the essential transition to development than the previous form of extroverted economies we all know about?

A (Morgenthau): I cannot really predict accurately beyond saying that there are leaps of change in the history of economic and social change. There are moments in which there is very great structural redistribution. We are living through one such period now. Look at what is happening to the price of consumer goods, in relation to income even in the industrialized countries. Becoming the supplier of consumer goods in 1970, 1980, and 1990 is a respectable position. Indeed, it is one that could lead to considerable or greater returns now than in 1950, given the relative claim on income of consumer goods now as opposed to where it was. By this I mean all of us are finding that our standard of living is declining, even if our salaries are going up, because of the price of consumer goods.

Q: The Sherman Anti-Trust Law states that all combinations in restraint of trade are illegal. I want to know how reducing trade would help economics.

A (Morgenthau): You are asking me whether the U.S. Anti-Trust laws have a bearing on the international economy. I would say not much. Look at the oil companies. Now the Anti-Trust laws keep the oil companies from publicly coordinating their policies and prices at home, but there is a remarkable uniformity in the range of prices. If you are asking me do the U.S. Anti-Trust laws affect what U.S. enterprises do internationally, I say not that I can perceive. The oil companies try to get the State Department's blessing before they publicly confer to combine their policy in negotiating with OPEC, but on the whole I don't think there is much effect.

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China's Role in Africa

By GEORGE T. YU

ABSTRACT: Over 2 decades have passed since China made its first formal presence in Africa in 1955, and since then China has become a major actor with vital interests in the continent. The greater part of Chinese-African interaction occurred from 1960–65—a high point of African decolonization and a time of Sino-Soviet conflict. From 1965–70 Chinese-African interaction coincided with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It was post-independence for most African nations and a time of Chinese retreat. Since 1970, China has reemerged as a major actor in Africa. There are 3 major components of China's role in Africa: the Chinese model, the superpowers, and China's Third World policy. The call to liberation struggles has long been a hallmark of Chinese policy. The Chinese model also relates to China's developmental experience. China has stressed struggle against the superpowers, the U.S. and Soviet Union, identifying with the Third World against them. There can be no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in Chinese foreign policy and the U.S. and Soviet Union were important factors in it. China can expect to retain its presence in Africa if it responds to Africa's changing situation.

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OVER two decades have passed since the People's Republic of China made its first formal presence in Africa. In this period, beginning from an almost "zero base" of attention to and interest in Africa, China has become a major actor with vital interests in the continent. Indeed, as with interaction with the Soviet Union and the United States, relations with Africa—both in terms of interaction with individual African nations and with the African nations collectively—have served a variety of important functions in China's total foreign policy and behavior. In examining China's role in Africa, we will focus upon these primary components: the Chinese model, the superpowers, and China's Third-World policy.

CHINESE-AFRICAN INTERACTION

Before examining China's role in Africa, we need to review the major stages of China's relations with Africa. The years between the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the end of the decade constituted the initial stage of Chinese-African interaction. Contacts between China and Africa were started, and China made a cautious attempt to win African recognition and support. The United Arab Republic (then Egypt), one of the six African states at the Bandung Conference, was the first African state to recognize China in 1956. By the end of the decade China had established a wide range of contacts, including recognition of the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria, participation in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, and the recognition of China by four African states. It should be mentioned that the initial period of Chinese-African interaction took place during the Sino-Soviet alliance. China's primary adversary was the United States. One Chinese goal of developing an African connection was to win new friends and seek new allies to break out of the American encirclement.

The greater part of Chinese-African interaction occurred from 1960 to 1965, the second stage of China's African policy. Two factors explained the high tide of Chinese activities. First, these years constituted a high point in the African decolonialization movement. Between January 1960 and December 1965, no less than 29 colonies won independence, with 16 African states gaining independence in 1960 alone. At the height of China's offensive—1964–1965—a major campaign which included visits to Africa by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi was undertaken to win African recognition and support. An indicator of the success of the drive was that, by the end of 1965, China had won recognition and support from an additional 15 African states. However, China's successes were balanced by disappointments. The second Afro-Asian conference which China had campaigned for was doomed by a coup d'état in Algeria, the site of the proposed meeting.

A second factor that explained the high level of Chinese activism in Africa was the Sino-Soviet conflict. Following the open break with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, China sought to challenge Soviet diplomatic influence and to subvert Soviet revolutionary credibility. Africa, therefore, became a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict, just as Africa had earlier become an arena in the Sino-American competition. An example of the Sino-Soviet battle was manifested in China's campaign to win African support to exclude Russian participation at the

abortive Afro-Asian conference of 1965.

The years 1965 to 1970 constituted the third stage of Chinese-African interaction, which coincided with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. In Africa, except for Angola, Mozambique, and a few other colonies, this was the post-independent era; the new African states turned their attention to the problems of nation building and survival. Without question, this was a stage of Chinese retreat. This could be seen in the number of African states that continued formal relations with China. Whereas 18 African states maintained formal diplomatic relations with China in 1964–1965, in 1969 only 13 did so. The reversal of China's campaign to win African recognition and support was due to a complex of factors, including China's own ineptitude and the instability of African politics. Certainly China's exclusive and rigid policies won it very few friends; but, on the other hand, the instability of African domestic politics bewildered the Chinese. Finally, China's militant posture, both actual and perceived, of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution constrained relations with certain African states.

The fourth and final stage to date of Chinese-African interaction, since 1970, has witnessed a reemergence of China as a major actor on the African continent, part of China's new drive in the Third World. China has restored relations with those African states with whom relations were suspended, such as Ghana, Tunisia; improved relations with states whom relations were at a low level of interaction, such as the United Arab Republic; and established new diplomatic relations with additional African states, such as Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zaire. However, China's reentry into Africa was not free from competition, especially from the Soviet Union. The Angola case represented an excellent example. American interest in the liberation politics of southern Africa also constituted a challenge to China. Since the death of Mao in 1976, the uncertainties associated with China's leadership transition was also a factor regarding China's African policy, though none had been manifested. Indeed, China's African campaign has continued unimpeded.

THE CHINESE MODEL

With this review of the stages of China's relations with Africa in mind, let us now turn to the three primary components of China's role in Africa: the Chinese Model, the superpowers, and China's Third World policy. It should be emphasized that these categories are closely interrelated. From an analytic viewpoint, however, there is much merit in considering them separately.

Since the coming to power of the Chinese Communist party and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, few issues have been subject to more discussion and controversy than the Chinese model. Two parts of the model deserve our special attention with respect to China's role in Africa. The most often discussed, and certainly one of the earliest, parts of the Chinese model has been the struggle to capture power. The people's-war formula is well-known. Its major elements include the commitment to a comprehensive ideology, that the struggle must be led by a Communist party, that the party must control the masses, that the strug-

gle must be basically self-reliant and headed by an indigenous leadership, and that the struggle should adopt a united front policy. Above all, the people's-war formula calls for the salvation of the exploited and the oppressed through armed struggle.

The summons to the peoples of Africa who were not yet independent to engage in liberation struggles has long been a hallmark of Chinese policy. In essense, China's constant reiteration of this theme has been to demonstrate the viability of the Chinese model to achieve liberation, to claim its universality, and to insist that the liberation struggle approach constituted the only route to victory. China has consistently expanded this feature of the model, including extension of specific support, both verbal and material, to those who seek their liberation, ranging from Algeria in the early 1960s to those in southern Africa in the 1970s.

There can be no doubt that China's own successful national liberation struggle and its support of the people's-war formula have caused others who sought liberation to look to China for support-material, moral, and otherwise. But it is equally important to point out that this feature of the Chinese model has its roots in the specific context of a given world unit. That is to say, though the people's-war formula has an appeal to those seeking liberation, what really determines their interest is not so much China's self-proclaimed leadership or even China's militant posture and support but the indigenous conditions in a given world unit and the goal of liberation.

Consider, for example, the case of the application of the people's-war formula in southern Africa. Here we are assuming that some form of the formula, however imperfect, has been fought in southern Africa since the 1960s. Prior to 1964, the vast majority of the African colonies were being given independence by the European colonial powers. Consequently, there was only limited interest—except in specific instances, such as Algeria—in the people's-war formula. Indeed, for the most part the concept was unrelated to the context. Beginning only in the 1960s, when it became evident that the white minority governments in southern Africa and the Portuguese were not going to follow the pattern of "Africa for the Africans," did we begin to hear the cry for a revolutionary armed liberation struggle. What subsequently took place has become history; southern Africa became one of the focal points for the revolutionary armed liberation struggle. It is to be noted that the changing situational context in large part determined the form of the final struggle. For many Africans, it was a case of either accepting the status quo or taking up arms, the liberation movements of southern Africa and those African states that actively support them felt increasingly forced to adopt methods more applicable to the situation. As one African leader has put it: "When every avenue of peaceful change is blocked, then the only way forward to positive change is by channeling and directing the people's fury—that is, by organized violence, by a people's war."[1]

The second part of the Chinese model relates to China's developmental experience. There were a number of components to China's developmental experience inherent in the Chinese model. First, there

1. *Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), 3 October 1969.

was the record of China's development, given the level of development at the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Second, the time factor has been of great importance. That is, the relatively short period during which China has been able to achieve a meaningful level of social and economic development. Third, China's successful bold experiments in specific social and economic sectors, such as education and public health. Fourth, the development of Chinese solutions to certain technical and organizational problems in line with Chinese requirements. Finally, there was the environmental-situational context of Chinese developmental experiences—China as a rural society amid the process of modernization. Through various appeals, similar to the people's-war formula, China has been equally quick to offer its experience, in this instance developmental, for other societies to follow.

The development feature of the Chinese model can best be understood from the viewpoint of those poor and small African countries seeking to develop their societies. It has been among those societies that China's experience has found the greatest appeal. A number of reasons account for this. First, many African countries have become increasingly dissatisfied with their own national developmental patterns, based upon the liberal Western model, which either was imposed upon them by their former European colonial masters or was self-imposed at an earlier date in an effort to achieve modernization. This has led many of them to search for alternative forms of development, from both East and West, capitalist and socialist societies. Second, the search for alternative approaches and solutions to nation building has led many African societies to a closer examination of successful social systems similar to their own in historical and environmental-situational background. Third, most African countries have been impatient with the pace of their own national development. Indeed, the sense of urgency has been very great; rapid national development has become the goal of most countries in Africa. Finally, a significance of the developmental feature of the Chinese model has been the psychological appeal: the concern of African countries with the achievement of equality with the advanced West.

We can best explain this appeal as follows: The West has long held sway over much of Africa with its technological and scientific advances. China, beginning as an underdeveloped society, technologically, scientifically, and otherwise in the Western sense, had within a relatively short period achieved a meaningful level of development in these and other select areas, bringing to an end her total dependence upon and domination by the West. China's overall industrial and nuclear developments were seen in this light. The developmental feature of the Chinese model, therefore, appealed to many African countries, not only in the narrow economic and social sense, but also in the broader context of equality with the West based on developmental achievements.

An example of the general appeal of China's developmental experience can be found in the case of Tanzania. First, Tanzania had been dissatisfied with its past developmental pattern, for the most part under British influence. Since its independence in 1961 and especially following the Arusha Declaration

of 1967, Tanzania has been seeking to create a new social system appropriate to its own historical and environmental-situational context. In building such a system, the Tanzanian elite had made it clear that there was no complete model for the nation to copy; Tanzania had to learn from both the East and the West, providing it was good for Tanzania. In short, the appeal of the developmental feature of the Chinese model has to be seen in the context of Tanzania's search for those aspects of a given model best suited to its needs. Second, Tanzania considered that it shared a common political experience and a common environmental-situational background with China. Therefore, China's developmental experience was pertinent to Tanzania's development. As President Nyerere put it: "The vast majority in both China and Tanzania earn their living from the land or in the rural areas. And both of us have only recently won freedom from that combination of exploitation and neglect which characterizes feudal and colonial societies. We have therefore much to learn from each other."[2]

Third, China's success and rapidity in nation building also constituted an appeal to Tanzania. Having rejected the Western model of development and searching for a new social system, Tanzania saw China as a successful model that could answer some of Tanzania's needs. Equally appealing to Tanzania has been China's rapid modernization in many sectors—that within a relatively short time period the living conditions and character of the Chinese people had been transformed. Tanzania was also in a hurry and wanted things to change quickly. Finally, there was the psychological appeal of China as a "truly big power," a consequence of its development from a "semi-feudal backward country" to a "powerful independent industrial based . . . self-sustaining socialist economy." China, a country that had been "for long oppressed and exploited," had through development become a big power.

How are the two features of development and liberation of the Chinese model related to China's role in Africa? There can be no question that through direct aid to African liberation movements and economic and technical assistance to select African countries, the Chinese model or select parts of it had been directly and indirectly promoted by China. This had included at least 2 billion dollars in Chinese economic aid to the African countries between 1954 and 1974.[3] However, the true meaning of the Chinese model lay not in Chinese substantive endeavors, though to be sure assistance to African liberation movements and African countries have assisted the respective causes. Indeed, measured against African needs, China did not possess the resources or capabilities to support fully the liberation movements and the developmental endeavors. Rather, China's role in Africa, seen in the context of the Chinese model, has to be understood largely in symbolic terms. The meaning of China's developmental experience lies in the hope it provided, because in general terms the goals were seen as within the reach of most African societies. In short, it held the promise that

2. Information Service Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism (The United Republic of Tanzania), press release, 18 February 1965.

3. The State Department, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, February 1976, table 4.

certain developmental goals could be attained, because it had been the case in China. The people's-war feature of the Chinese model served an equally important role. For those seeking liberation, the formula served as not just a means to an end but as a proven scheme. It mattered not whether the formula could be duplicated and executed; in the eyes of the beholder, the people's-war formula represented the symbol of liberation. China stood as an example of what was possible for all who sought liberation.

THE SUPERPOWERS

A second component of China's role in Africa has stressed the "struggle against the super-powers," the Soviet Union and the United States. Two interrelated features of this struggle deserve our attention: China's policy of opposing the Soviet Union and the United States and China's attempt to discredit the two superpowers in Africa. China's African policy must be understood within the context of China's interaction with the two superpowers.

Chinese foreign policy was formally born in 1949, in the midst of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. This had an important impact upon the initial course of Chinese foreign policy and behavior. The 1950 alliance with the Soviet Union placed China in the Communist bloc, while the Korean War put China in direct conflict with the United States, which after the war sought to contain China. During the 1950s, with its security guaranteed by the Soviet Union, China turned to confronting American power. One Chinese approach to meeting the problem was the attempt to win friends and seek allies to counter the United States. A major campaign was undertaken to win diplomatic recognition. China's participation in the 1955 Bandung conference was directed toward this end. Although the conference was chiefly an Asian affair, 6 of the 29 states represented were African.

China's interest in Africa continued in the 1960s. In addition to establishing new linkages, China sought hard to get the African states to accept China's worldview and major policy objectives. One such case was China's notions regarding imperialism. Anti-imperialism has long constituted a major theme in Chinese foreign policy. This has included the Marxist-Leninist ideas of the division of the world into imperialist and socialist camps, the struggle between the two camps, and the unfolding world revolutionary struggle against the imperialists. Africa constituted a stage in the world's unfolding revolutionary struggle against imperialism. However, anti-imperialism had also its more immediate aspects. In practice, it was a Chinese policy directed chiefly against the United States. China portrayed the United States as the foremost imperialist —the successor to the old European powers. In the context of China's African policy, anti-imperialism served the primary function of "exposing" the imperialist character of the U.S. policy.

American imperialist character, according to China, was fully brought forth in developments associated with Zaire's—then the Congo—independence in 1960 and with Rhodesia's independence in 1965. In the first case, Zaire in 1960 had been the object of United States imperialism. China considered the sending of a United Nations force to Zaire

as nothing more than a cover-up for U.S. armed intervention. The founding of Rhodesia in 1965 was regarded as another bridgehead, similar to South Africa, for use by the imperialists and friends "to commit aggression against and encroach upon" Africa. This the Chinese considered verified by Great Britain's refusal to use military force against Rhodesia and the support given to Great Britain by the United States.[4] Both instances were excellent examples of how the United States had sought to suppress the revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa. The United States as an imperialistic power had been exposed.

The United States constituted one Chinese problem; another has been the Soviet Union. Since the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet conflict has been a major factor in China's African policy. We need not repeat here the well-known facts regarding the reasons for the conflict; suffice to say that they included unfulfilled expectations and demands on both sides, including the course of China's domestic development, the Soviet Union's relations with the United States, and the question concerning the best strategy for revolution, especially in the Third World. Following the open break with the Soviet Union, China sought to challenge Soviet influence and to subvert Soviet revolutionary credibility. Africa became a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In the 1960s, China approached the Soviet problem on two primary levels. On the one hand, China sought to identify the Soviet Union with the United States; on the other, China campaigned to politically exclude the Soviet Union from Africa. China accused the Soviet Union of undertaking joint action with the United States, including voting with the United States in the U.N. to send troops to suppress the liberation movement in Zaire and supporting Great Britain and the United States against the use of military force in Rhodesia.[5] China also charged that the Soviet Union disapproved of national liberation wars. Meanwhile, China sought to exclude the Soviet Union from Africa. One of the most overt examples of attempts to achieve this objective was China's campaign to win African support to exclude Soviet participation at the abortive Afro-Asian conference of 1965. In sum, the Soviet Union was not a revolutionary force; it did not belong in Africa, and its policies were identical to those of the United States, an imperialist power.

China's policy of seeking to mobilize Africa as a battlefield on its behalf against the United States and the Soviet Union had slowly emerged; China's role of identifying Africa's enemies and assisting in their exclusion from Africa was also clear. The pattern of China's involvement in Africa became even more evident following China's reentry into the international arena in the late 1960s, upon the conclusion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This was greatly aided by developments in southern Africa, including the Soviet role in Angola and U.S. interest in the area as a result of the Soviet presence.

Events in southern Africa in the 1970s offered China new examples of superpower domination; U.S. imperialism and Soviet hegemonism were clearly the root cause of Africa's

4. See "A Chapter on African People's Anti-Imperialism," *Jen-min Jih-Pao*, 18 December 1965.

5. Ibid.

plight. According to China, while the Soviet Union had dispatched mercenary troops to Angola and started "a barbarous armed intervention," the United States was trying hard to hold on to its vested interests in southern Africa.[6] The two superpowers were engaged in competition for the control of Africa. But this was not all bad, the struggle had further awakened the African people to the true nature of the United States and the Soviet Union.

If the 1960s was the era during which the United States was the primary focus of China's international attacks, the 1970s must clearly belong to the Soviet Union. This has been due, in part, to the continued Sino-Soviet conflict, on the one hand, and the reduction in tensions between the United States and China, on the other. Indeed, the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the focus of China's attention as the foremost dominating world power. From Peking's viewpoint, while in the 1960s the world learned of the imperialistic nature of the United States, during the 1970s the world "began to know Soviet social-imperialism." This was especially true in Africa.

Let us look at Chinese charges against the Soviet Union in Africa.[7] First, Soviet interest in southern Africa has been part of Soviet plans for world domination and Soviet search for raw materials. According to China, Soviet social-imperialists sought to gain access to African natural wealth, including gold, diamonds, and uranium. The Soviet Union's interest in southern Africa also stemed from its design to control Europe. By controlling the South Atlantic sea route through which oil and other supplies to Europe were transported, the Soviet Union would then "encircle Europe in a roundabout way." Second, Soviet appeals to Africa on the basis of a common stand against racial discrimination "is pure humbug." Such appeals, according to China, constituted a method to infiltrate the African countries; they were also intended as "a smokescreen to cover up its own expansionist designs and to bring Africa into the Soviet orbit." Third, China also charged the Soviet Union with dividing the African states. This was achieved through Soviet division of the African states into two groups: reactionary and progressive. The Soviet intent, said China, was to foster a split among the African states, set Africans against Africans, thereby weakening Africa's struggle against external forces. Fourth, the Soviet Union had sought to dominate African states and organizations through a third party. Under the appearance of cooperation, the Soviet Union had forced others to act on its behalf, "to serve as its cannon-fodder and colonialist tool." China claimed that the Soviet Union utilized a third party or an organization of that country to occupy an African state. Such was the case of Angola. Fifth, Soviet aid, including military assistance, constituted yet another form of control; it also was a method whereby military bases were secured. Finally, Soviet behavior had necessitated an adjustment in U.S. policy toward Africa, thereby increasing the level of competition between the two superpowers in Africa. China put it thus: faced with the Soviet Union's African offensive,

6. For an example of China's views, see Hsin-hua News Agency, "Tempestuous Storm Sweeps African Continent," 27 December 1976.

7. See, Hsin-hua News Agency, "Intensified Soviet-U.S. Rivalry over Southern Africa," 23 September 1976.

the United States had been compelled to take measures to defend its interests and to check Soviet expansionism.

The Soviet Union was clearly on the march in Africa, at least in the view of Peking. This was part of the Soviet Union's attempt to dominate the world. Similar to interaction with the United States in Africa, China's relations with the Soviet Union have to be understood in the total context of China's struggle against the superpowers: that is, the linkage of the struggle in Africa—and elsewhere—to China's opposition to the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, this has been a key factor in China's African policy.

THE THIRD WORLD

As Teng Hsiao-ping made plain in a speech before the United Nations in 1974, China perceived the world separated into three major units: the superpowers, the Second World, and the Third World.[8] The new world struggle consisted of the latter two units against the first. While supporting the Second World's opposition to the domination of the United States and the Soviet Union, China identified with the Third World of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. China's role in Africa, therefore, can also be seen in the context of China's Third World policy.

The origins of China's interests in the Third World can be traced to the mid-1950s; then it was principally seen as one approach to meeting the American encirclement. The primary area of operation was Asia. The next important development of the Third World policy occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A series of situational-environmental factors combined to change China's international status; it also led to a reassessment of its foreign policy and behavior. Two major events that influenced China's Third World policy were the Sino-Soviet conflict and the emergence of the newly independent African states. China considered the latter event as an opportunity to secure recognition and support for its cause. A consequence of these and other developments led to China's search for the formulation of a new international strategy.

The new strategy contained two primary objectives: China's breaking out of the encirclement imposed by the United States and the Soviet Union and challenging their international domination and China's mobilization and organization of a new international force. In the 1960s China perceived the Third World, symbolized by developments in Africa, offering the greatest political developments. The old order was fast disintegrating, there was great sensitiveness by the new states toward the powers, there was a longing for economic and social development, and there was the promise of a new international force. China's new international strategy was formally announced in 1965; it called upon the Third World of Africa, Asia, and Latin America—"the rural areas of the world"—to challenge the domination of the powers, the "cities of the world of North America and Western Europe. Earlier, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi in late 1964 and early 1965, during their visits to Africa and Asia, sought to opera-

8. Mission to the United Nations, People's Republic of China, "Speech by Teng Hsiao-ping, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," press release, 10 April 1974.

tionalize China's policy. However, neither the formulation nor the operationalization of China's new Third World strategy succeeded. Many Third World states were indifferent to China's strategy, seeing it as serving China's interests alone, and China was subsequently to be preoccupied with internal events.

The full implementation of the Third World policy awaited China's reentry into the international arena following the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. China's redefinition of the world into three primary units and the increasing political and economic contradictions among the units also presented new opportunities. As then Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua repeated in 1975, China saw the world separated into three major units and China belonged to the Third World.[9] In the 1970s, after the two false starts of the 1950s and the 1960s plus the temporary interruption due to the Cultural Revolution, China's Third World policy was finally launched. The goals of opposing the superpowers; identification with Africa, Asia, and Latin America; and of creating new international structures were not operational.

China's Third World policy was manifested on a variety of levels in Africa. On the one hand, China sought to interact with most African states and liberation movements; China's diplomatic activism after the Cultural Revolution of cultivating and establishing formal relations with African states represented an example of this behavior. On the other hand, China also sought to build political ties in harmony with and in support of common interests generally with African states; this has been expressed in China's strong support of Africa's demand for the total liberation of Africa, a restructuring of the international economic order, African and Third World unity, and other issues.

The operationalization of China's Third World policy in Africa can be seen from China's relations with Tanzania.[10] Situated on the shores of the Indian Ocean in East Africa, Tanzania was one of the African states with which China developed a close connection, becoming a model of China's much repeated "international relations of a new type." Beginning with Tanganyika's independence in 1961 and Zanzibar's in 1963, China sought and received the friendship of these new African states. After the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, an increase in China's interaction with the new republic followed. From Tanzania's viewpoint, this was due to China's support of Tanzania's internal goal of economic and social development and external objective of Africa's total liberation and a just international order. The relationship was formalized with the conclusion of the Sino-Tanzanian Treaty of Friendship of 1965, signed during President Nyerere's first state visit to China. In the same year, Chou En-lai visited Tanzania.

China initiated an extensive economic, technical assistance, and military program to Tanzania; in 1974 Chinese aid (excluding mili-

9. Mission to the U.N., People's Republic of China, "Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, at the 30th Session of the U.N. General Assembly," press release, 26 September 1975.

10. For an account of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction, see George T. Yu, *China's African Policy. A Study of Tanzania* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975).

tary) totaled $331 million in grants and loans. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had neither an overly adverse political influence upon, nor caused a reduction in, the level of Chinese-Tanzanian interaction. Indeed, relations continued at a high level, marked by China's commitment to finance and construct the Tanzania-Zambia railway in 1967 and by President Nyerere's second state visit to China in 1968. Sino-Tanzanian relations continued to flourish in the 1970s, symbolized by President Nyerere's third state visit to China in 1974 and by Vice-President Jumbe's official visit to China in December 1976. To be sure, tensions have existed between the two actors, such as over different Tanzanian and Chinese policies toward Angola; possible tensions also existed over the level of Tanzanian-Soviet relations. Notwithstanding, through the mid-1970s relations with Tanzania constituted a model of China's Third World policy.

Through relations with Tanzania, China has established an important presence in Africa. The significance of Tanzania in China's Third World policy can be seen on four primary levels. First, there was the dimension of China's interstate relations which stressed China's common cause with the world's small and medium states, especially those in the Third World. In the words of *Jen-min Jih-pao*, "Both China and Africa belonged to the Third World. In the great struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, the Chinese people . . . will always stand on the side of the fraternal African people and firmly support their just struggle till final victory."[11] The Third World was singled out as playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. This was demonstrated at the Fifth Non-Aligned Conference held in 1976. According to China, the conference had restated the Third World countries' opposition to the superpowers.[12] China and Tanzania both belonged to the Third World. Thus, relations with Tanzania symbolized China's support for and relations with a small Third World state.

Second, there was China's support for national liberation, in terms of support for Africa's total liberation from colonial rule and white minority governments and support in the broader definition of opposition to imperialism and superpowerism. China contended that the United States and the Soviet Union had not only opposed Africa's liberation but had also sought to control, economically and otherwise, the independent African states. African opposition to such forces could only be achieved via African and Third World unity. As a leading member of Africa's frontline states, Tanzania fully supported Africa's total liberation; Tanzania was also an active participant in the Third-World non-alignment movement. Tanzania's friendship with China, therefore, was not only support and recognition of China's stand for Africa's total liberation, but also a united front, Africa and Third World, against the forces of imperialism and superpowerism.

Third, Tanzania's relations with China were seen in terms of China's developmental model and its contribution to Tanzania's economic and social growth. China, as we have mentioned earlier, had long cited

11. Editorial, "Strengthen Unity and March Onward," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 8 July 1976.

12. Editorial, "March Forward in the Struggle against Imperialism, Colonialism and Hegemonism . . . ," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 25 August 1976.

its developmental experience as a model for the Third World; one had emphasized the importance of agriculture. China had also stressed self-reliance. China had been aware of its economic and social achievements and the international implications should its developmental model, or specific features of it, be adopted by others, especially by those in the Third World. Tanzania was attracted to certain features of the Chinese developmental model, thus giving credence to China and its approach to development. Finally, Tanzania had been a major recipient of Chinese economic and technical aid, which constituted a new type of economic cooperation. This had included the famous Tanzania-Zambia railway, completed in 1975. According to China, Third World countries could only make true economic and social progress by supporting and closely cooperating with each other. Only thus could they shake "off dependence on the imperialists and hegemonists." Such Third World cooperation would eventually replace "the evil old international economic order" with a new one. Chinese-Tanzanian economic cooperation was a model of the future new economic order in the Third World.

China's relations with Tanzania was an important instance of China's role in Africa; it also represented an example of China's growing relationship with the Third World. From Peking's viewpoint, no doubt Africa was a vital international arena and world force; if Africa could be united with the rest of the Third World, an even greater new international force could be formed. We should not see China's Third World policy only in terms of its opposition to the superpowers; equally important was the development of a new Third World structure. The promotion of African, Asian, and Latin American unity, therefore, must be seen as a role of China in Africa.

CONCLUSION

What conclusions might one draw on the basis of this survey? Three points will be emphasized. First, one cannot single out a specific Chinese role in Africa. Similar to other major powers, Chinese foreign policy has neither been totally consistent nor sought a single objective. It should be also understood that China's African policy developed over a considerable time period and in response to a variety of factors. But whatever the reasons contributing to China's interest, there can be no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in Chinese foreign policy.

Second, there can be no question concerning the importance of the United States and the Soviet Union as a factor in China's African policy. Opposition to imperialism and social-imperialism have become hallmarks of China's policy in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, as we have demonstrated, the origins and development of China's African policy have been closely linked to China's interactions with the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the level of China's activism in Africa has often been directly related to the importance China assigned at a given time to its struggle with the United States and/or the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding, we cannot attribute in total to the United States and the Soviet Union the important place Africa has occupied in Chinese foreign policy. Nor can we assume that China foresaw Africa's world role in the early 1960s. Rather, one explanation for Africa's growing importance can be attributed to China's search for a new international strategy. This, of

course, must be seen in the context of China's Third World policy.

Finally, in the last analysis China's role in Africa has been determined as much by China as it has been by Africa and the Africans. By that I mean, while China's policies and behavior have been responsible for whatever successes that have been achieved, the African response to China's policies and behavior have been equally vital. China's successes have not been because China was China or China willed them; they have been due in large part either to the response to a specific need or to the capture of a common aspiration. Herein lies China's future role in Africa: China can be expected to retain its presence in Africa providing China responds to Africa's changing situation.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I am a little confused about the First World, Second World, and Third World. I had assumed the First World was the world of the Western industrialized countries headed by the United States and the Second World the Soviet Union heading up the industrialized countries. I thought you were talking about the First World as being the superpowers. Is there any usefulness in separating the Third World of the developing but potentially prosperous countries and the Fourth World where there is a state of predevelopment which will require considerable help?

A (Yu): As to what is the Third World, I am merely using the Chinese definition. The First World, in the Chinese view, consists of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the two superpowers that are the main forces in the world at this moment. The Second World includes the Western European industrial nations, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, as well as our neighbor to the north. Then everybody else is included in the Third World, which is primarily Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

As for a further differentiation among Third World nations, the Chinese recognize that some are more developed, advanced, or even affluent than others. One has to give different treatment. Insofar as the Chinese are concerned, the key consideration is the place of the members of the Second or Third World. The Chinese, at least in verbal statements, are seemingly optimistic about the future of the Third World. Among other things, they believe in numbers. Furthermore, there is a new assertiveness and awareness on the part of the Third World. The Chinese are trying to structure the Third World and maybe the Second World into a meaningful international force.

Q: Don't you think that the current Chinese interest in Africa is ideological—that the Africans really only get ideological resources for nation-building and not the material resources which they get from the former colonial powers.

A (Yu): I would certainly agree that the ideological or symbolic components are the major and most important parts. However, the Chinese have to supplement those symbolic, ideological components with some measure of substantive aid, though it is not very large.

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U.S. Relations in Southern Africa

By WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELE, JR.

ABSTRACT: U.S. policies in southern Africa are essentially founded on political interests, a significant ingredient of which is our concern for human rights. We believe the minority governments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia violate fundamental human rights. We cannot remain a spectator in the decolonization of Rhodesia and Namibia and the system of apartheid in South Africa. This administration's policy has been to try to ensure peaceful changes in these countries. Violence would cause untold human suffering and also create a climate for intervention by forces from outside Africa. We firmly believe African problems should be solved by Africans themselves. The situation in South Africa is different from that in Rhodesia and Namibia, since the whites have been there for 300 years and Africa is their home. Though we have demonstrated our opposition to the apartheid system, South Africa's problems should be resolved in Africa. There are examples on the African continent which give hope that political leaders can build a future in which blacks and whites can co-exist and prosper rather than have the future imposed on them.

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A FEW years ago, I would not have chosen this subject to provoke discussion among a distinguished group of academic scholars. The African continent in general, and the southern part of it in particular, excited sustained attention and debate only among a small band of specialists in academia, business circles, and the government except in time of crisis. This has also changed radically. Probably never in the history of American diplomacy has the governmental and public interest, even absorption, in one relatively small and remote area of the world increased at such a rapid pace from quasi-academic to substantial.

Our concern about southern Africa is quite unlike our interest in other parts of the world which are important to the United States, such as Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East. Our interest is not strategic. We have consistently made clear that the United States does not wish to play a military role anywhere in Africa. It is also not based on economic interests, although we do want to see that Western Europe as well as the United States retain access to the mineral wealth of southern Africa. Under the proper political circumstances, I can visualize a very substantial growth in two-way trade with that part of the continent. Our recent actions with respect to the Byrd Amendment should make clear that we are fully capable of subordinating our economic interests to other, more vital concerns.

HUMAN RIGHTS

U.S. policies in southern Africa are essentially founded on political interests. A significant ingredient of that interest is our concern for human rights and human dignity. Our policy toward southern Africa is guided by our ideals of liberty and equality and by our commitment to oppose racial and social injustice. We believe that the minority governments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia violate fundamental human rights as spelled out in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. We have spoken out on this subject forcefully and repeatedly so that there can be no mistaking our position. In conformity with our own fundamental principles as a nation, we have based our policies on the belief that the peaceful transfer of power to the black majority is not only necessary and desirable, but also possible.

The foreign policy of the United States, if it is to be successful, must be firmly grounded in our own fundamental beliefs. Lacking this vital element, it would not obtain the requisite backing from our people. It is self-evident, therefore, that the United States must be engaged in southern Africa if we want to remain true to ourselves. Given the dangers involved, we cannot remain an idle spectator while the decolonization process takes place in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Similarly, I believe that our history dictates that we have a role to play with respect to the system of apartheid in South Africa. It has been a long and frequently painful process for the black and white elements of our population to work out their relationship based on the ideals of the founding fathers.. Very substantial progress has been made in recent years in this respect, and more needs still to be done. But at least there is now hope where there once was only despair, and we are on the right road. Having come through this experience, we can, I believe, without resort to the zealotry of the converted, also contribute to the

resolution of the apartheid issue. Our history as a people of many races able to live together more or less in harmony can be, within limits, a guide and inspiration to others.

Apartheid, of course, simply means apartness. It enshrines the concept of separateness, without even the leavening thought of equality. The system of apartheid currently being practiced in South Africa is, therefore, still a considerable distance from the slightly more progressive concept finally struck down by our Supreme Court a quarter century ago. It is a measure of the distance South Africa must travel to overcome the burden of its racial heritage.

DECOLONIZATION

The rapid changes in Portugal brought about the decolonization of the Portuguese empire in Africa. This development of the last few years has, in turn, hastened the demise of the remaining two vestiges of the era of the empire, Rhodesia and Namibia.

The policy of this administration, and that of its predecessor, has been to try to ensure that the changes which we consider inevitable for both Rhodesia and Namibia take place in a peaceful manner. There are those who believe that the transition to majority rule can come about only by force of arms. These advocates of violence believe that Ian Smith's record of procrastination in Rhodesia and South Africa's continuing important role in Namibia preclude a peaceful settlement. I strongly disagree with that view. Progress has already been made, perhaps more than we had reason to hope for only a year ago. Ian Smith has agreed to the principle of turning over power to the black majority within two years. Although negotiations broke down in Geneva over the complex questions surrounding the modalities of the transition of majority rule, I hope that talks can again be started. I am convinced there is a reasonable chance for success.

Rhodesia

We believe that the United Kingdom should continue to take the lead on the Rhodesian question, since it is the sovereign power in Rhodesia. We have worked closely and well with them in the past; during February we had several intensive meetings with them in Washington to coordinate our policies. And Foreign Secretary David Owen is currently in southern Africa to assess further the situation on a trip planned in consultation with the United States. It is also a significant accomplishment that, in the course of working toward a peaceful settlement of southern African issues, we have strengthened our ties with the frontline states of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique. Ambassador Andrew Young, on his trip to Africa during the early days of the Carter administration, received valuable new insights into the thinking of the African leaders on those issues of mutual concern. I want to emphasize that the frontline states continue to support the view that a peaceful solution is desirable in Rhodesia and Namibia even as armed struggle goes on. We are working closely with them to that end.

The advantages of a peaceful transition to majority rule should be manifest to all of us. The transfer of power is going to be difficult under any circumstance, and some disruption of the economic processes may be inevitable. But both Rhodesia

and Namibia are potentially prosperous countries with existing structures upon which further sustained economic growth can be built. How much more desirable it would be for the black majority to inherit a country with a running economy than one so severely damaged or destroyed by prolonged strife that the immediate fruits of independence may be meager indeed.

Given the strength, on the one hand, of the Zimbabwe liberation forces, many of which are now in training camps in Mozambique and Tanzania, and the strength of the Rhodesian security forces on the other, we believe that a "solution" by combat of arms would inevitably be protracted. There would not be a quick knock-out by either side. Therefore such a solution would be bloody and involve untold human suffering and misery which we want to avoid if at all possible.

Prolonged violence would create a climate, moreover, conducive to intervention by forces from outside the African continent. The frontline states have thus far successfully resisted the counsel of those contending that only armed struggle can produce success in Zimbabwe and Namibia. We cannot be sure, however, that they will always see the situation this way. We firmly believe that African problems should be solved by the Africans themselves. Our policy has been guided by the principle that the big powers or their surrogates should not play a military role on the continent. We have seen how long it takes an outside power, once engaged in an African conflict, to withdraw its forces and the many undesirable consequences such involvement brings in its train in terms of African stability and unity.

Following rejection of the latest British proposals in January, Ian Smith has apparently decided to attempt what he euphemistically calls an "internal solution." This involves negotiations with certain black groups and individuals, some of whom were already members of the Smith regime, to bring about majority rule. We do not believe this will lead to a solution. It ignores not only the desires of the Zimbabwe guerrilla forces and important nationalist elements but also of the frontline states. In our view, this internal solution cannot last; to attempt it would inevitably lead to increased bloodshed and violence.

Finally, we believe that a peaceful solution in Rhodesia and Namibia would provide a useful stimulus to orderly change in South Africa itself. Conversely, the escalation of violence in the adjoining territories could well polarize opinion in South Africa and make more difficult the achievement of any progress in the direction of racial justice in that country.

We recognize, of course, that our dedication to a peaceful, rapid, and orderly transition to majority rule needs to be backed up with concrete measures. We worked hard for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment by the Congress, passed by a decisive margin in both houses and placing the United States in observance with pertinent U.N. resolutions. Repeal should convince Prime Minister Smith, if he still had doubts, that he cannot count on the United States to bail him out when his policies fail. We hope now that he will give real negotiations another chance.

We intend to ensure that the sanctions against Rhodesia are strictly enforced. We will be consulting with other nations to see what can be done about tightening compliance with sanctions. We are looking into additional measures that our government might undertake to

place additional pressure on Rhodesia and to convince it of the gravity of the situation.

We have provided economic assistance to the governments of Zambia and Mozambique, in recognition of the economic losses suffered by these two countries owing to the closure of their borders with Rhodesia and the interruption of the hitherto profitable transit traffic in Rhodesian goods.

I would like to make it clear that we have no solution that we wish to impose on the various elements of the Zimbabwean political scene. We have no favorites whom we support. We will not take sides, since we believe that the Africans want to work out African solutions to African problems. We will continue to counsel maximum flexibility and readiness to compromise, maximum unity among all of the nationalist liberation forces, and a maximum effort to create the kind of atmosphere that will allow the negotiations to succeed. Both sides should come to the conclusion that their objectives can be achieved more surely and effectively by negotiation than by resort to arms.

Namibia

While the contentious issue of Rhodesia tends to dominate the headlines, we have not been unmindful about the need for rapid progress on the Namibian issue as well. Our policy with respect to that territory has been consistent and clear. In 1966 we voted to terminate South Africa's mandate. We have supported the finding of the International Court of Justice that South Africa's occupation was illegal. We remain committed to the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 385 calling for free elections under U.N. auspices, South African withdrawal of its illegal administration, and the release of all Namibian political prisoners.

As in the case of Zimbabwe, we have cause for at least some optimism that the Namibian problem can be peacefully resolved. Some progress has been achieved. A target date of December 1978 has been set for independence, and the South Africans have fully endorsed the concept that Namibia should become independent on that date.

A major difficulty, as we see it, has been that the present efforts to establish an interim government for Namibia have excluded the Southwest African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), which is recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the U.N. as the sole Namibian nationalist movement. These efforts have centered on a meeting of Namibian groups in Windhoek seeking to establish an interim government to lead the country to independence. For its part, SWAPO has not wished to participate and insisted that independence could come about only as a result of direct negotiations between itself and the South African government. On this issue, also, we urge a spirit of compromise on both sides in the belief that what may be achievable in a peaceful manner would almost certainly be preferable to anything that can be won through the force of arms alone.

In the case of Namibia, too, it seems to us that, while the positions of some of the principal contenders are far apart, goodwill on both sides can produce agreement. We believe that all political groups in Namibia, specifically including SWAPO, have a role to play in the process leading to independence. We consider that the United Nations should have a

role to play in giving birth to an independent nation from a territory which the community of nations accepts as being under U.N. authority, at least in theory. We have proposed that an international conference on a Namibian settlement take place under U.N. aegis at a neutral site, with all the concerned parties.

In support of our policy, the United States has, since 1970, officially discouraged American investment in Namibia. The facilities of the Export-Import Bank are no longer available for trade with the territory. No future U.S. investments there, made on the basis of rights acquired from the South African government following termination of the mandate, would receive U.S. government protection against the claims of a future legitimate government in Namibia. We have urged American firms doing business in Namibia to assure that their employment practices are in conformity with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

South Africa

Our policy toward South Africa is necessarily different from our policy toward Rhodesia and Namibia. We have had diplomatic relations with South Africa since that country became independent. In addition to our embassy in Pretoria, we have three consulates general which keep us informed about what is going on in that country. South Africa is not a colonial remnant. Even the leaders of black Africa do not challenge the right of the white minority to live in South Africa. The white settlers began to cultivate the lands of South Africa 300 years ago. They are also Africans, and they have no other place to go. The problems of South Africa should therefore be solved in South Africa—not by outside powers.

Our maintenance of diplomatic relations with South Africa is by no means an indication that we accept that country's institution of apartheid. We have not minced our words in stating our unalterable opposition to apartheid and shall not do so in the future. This system is a clear violation of the fundamental human rights. Last summer the United States joined a consensus in the U.N. Security Council resolution strongly condemning the South African government for its role in the Soweto violence. On that occasion, the Acting U.S. Representative called on South Africa to "take these events as a warning" and "to abandon a system which is clearly not acceptable under any standard of human rights."

As elsewhere in southern Africa, we are dedicated to the proposition that peaceful change must succeed, if only because the alternative is so unacceptable. We have watched with dismay the escalation of violence in South Africa, beginning with the Soweto riots last year. We are deeply concerned that, unless the spiral of violence can be arrested and reversed, there will be such a polarization of forces within South Africa that peaceful change will become immeasurably more difficult than it is already. We shall employ all reasonable channels to get this message across to the South Africans and to facilitate this change to the maximum possible extent.

It is appropriate, however, to insert here a cautionary word. Of all people, we Americans should probably be chary about providing excessive and unsolicited advice to others about how they should solve their racial problems. True, we have made impressive progress within our own

country in removing the stain of injustice and discrimination based solely on race. But we must also admit that we have a considerable way to go before our achievements approach the ideals set forth in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution. But perhaps more important, our recent history provides testimony to the fact that change in the racial sphere came about gradually, unevenly, perhaps even grudgingly, not because outsiders or foreigners told us what was right, but because the realization finally dawned on our people that the status quo was wrong and had to be changed for our own good. This self-realization must be given an opportunity to do its creative work in South Africa also, although I will readily agree that the time for results is limited. It is in no one's interest if the South Africans move into an isolationist shell, closed against outside influences, there to defend themselves from all enemies, foreign and domestic. Such a development would have an effect opposite from the one we wish to achieve.

Our diplomacy toward South Africa must, therefore, be carried out with a good deal of finesse and skill. We shall have to weigh carefully the relative merits of speaking out and of restraint.

In the circumstances I have described, the United States is necessarily pursuing a nuanced policy vis-à-vis South Africa without compromising our principle. As I have already indicated, we have repeatedly made clear our opposition to a system under which an 18 percent minority limits the black majority economically, discriminates socially, and deprives the blacks of political rights.

As a corollary to this policy, the United States has opposed the South African government's policy of creating a series of "bantustans" or homelands. The Transkei was the first of these homelands to become independent, but others are expected to be given that status by South Africa. The United States has not recognized the Transkei, and, aside from South Africa, neither have other members of the United Nations. We have no intention of recognizing any of the other homelands that will be declared independent.

In fact, the creation of these so-called states is an extension of the apartheid policy. Stripped of all euphemisms and rationalizations, the concept of the homelands is unfair to the black majority. The effect of their creation is to deprive substantial elements of the black urban workforce of their civil rights in South Africa and to force many urban blacks to take on citizenship of a homeland they have never known. The homelands were established without counsulting the blacks. They are generally conglomerations of the remnants of tribal lands without contiguous borders, without the basis for economic viability, and without any basis for true political independence from South Africa.

It is worth noting that there have been some encouraging signs on the South African scene. Events of the past year have not been without their effect on the white community of South Africa. Many signs point to considerable soul-searching, even on the part of the Afrikaner community which forms the primary political base of the ruling party. A number of leading Afrikaner intellectuals have urged that the government reconsider important elements of its policy, such as present plans for the homelands, the denial of all

political rights to Africans outside the homelands, and various forms of economic discrimination.

South African businessmen, too, have begun to urge steps to improve the daily life of Africans in such areas as housing and training. In certain areas of activity which are not directly under government sponsorship, such as athletic and religious organizations, we detect some breakdown in previously rigid racial barriers. We have been encouraged by the actions of the Catholic church to permit some integration of its schools and by the tolerance of this decision displayed by the South African government. In terms of the daily life of an African in South Africa, these are small steps. But we believe they reflect that the faith of many South African whites in the possibility of maintaining indefinitely racial separation and white supremacy is being fundamentally reexamined.

The United States has adopted certain policies to demonstrate our opposition to the apartheid policy of South Africa. Since 1962 we have maintained a voluntary embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa. U.S. naval vessels do not call at South African ports except for emergencies, although they regularly make courtesy calls in some black African ports.

We have redoubled our efforts to intensify our contacts with blacks in the South African population. President Carter recently invited Gathsha Buthelezi, a prominent black moderate, to the White House, underlining the administration's interest in establishing better ties with black leadership in South Africa.

Along these same lines, we have intensified the informational activities of the U.S. Information Service in South Africa, especially among the black population. We have also expanded our exchange program under which a cross section of the South African population, mostly blacks, visits the United States for month-long stays. Our diplomatic and consular officers, including black foreign service officers, cultivate a wide range of contacts in South Africa.

The United States has also encouraged American firms doing business in South Africa to improve working conditions for their black employees. We believe this could be a significant American contribution to the principle of social justice and provide a vehicle for promoting economic and social progress. We have been encouraged by the progress that many American firms have demonstrated in working toward the principle of equal pay for equal work, adequate pensions, improved medical and insurance benefits, and expanded opportunities for advancement based entirely on merit rather than race. Although there is clearly room for improvement in the performance of their labor practices, South African-based American companies have shown considerable sensitivity in dealing with their black employees. By their example, they have already set in motion some of the kinds of change that are so desperately needed.

A recent step in the right direction was the March 1, 1977, announcement by 12 major U.S. corporations with business interests in South Africa expressing support for a set of principles designed to promote equal employment rights for blacks and nonwhite minority groups. These principles call for the nonsegregation of races in all dining facilities and places of work and the concept of equal pay for all em-

ployees doing equal and comparable work. We hope that these constructive steps will be emulated and expanded by other U.S. firms engaged in business in South Africa and perhaps even be adopted by the South African business community itself.

We fully recognize that American corporations genuinely wishing to institute social changes in their labor practices may fear contravening South African laws and traditional practices which discourage evolutionary changes. Moreover, many of the white unions are resistant to change. They will not countenance having a black supervisor over a white worker, and they restrict the movement of black workers into the ranks of the skilled workers despite the fact that South African industry desperately needs more skilled workers. There is no reason why American firms cannot enter into collective bargaining agreements with black unions. Unlike the white unions, these are not officially registered. However, they are not illegal, and companies can deal with them. Several weeks ago, the second largest supermarket chain in South Africa announced that it would recognize and negotiate with a black trade union. We hope this will encourage American corporations to follow suit where the existence of a black union makes this feasible.

There are those, of course, who argue that American corporations in effect have no business being in South Africa in the first place, that they are either an impediment to social change or have no real effect on change, and that their net result is to buttress the status quo elements that want apartheid to go on. Others have come forth with opposing arguments. They claim that U.S. investment assists the economic development of South Africa, which sets in motion certain powerful currents of change that will be too much to withstand. Increased investment, the argument goes, helps create more jobs for blacks, inevitably some upgrading of their job skills, and this process has already resulted in new and different perceptions and attitudes that have made themselves felt on the South African political scene.

The South African blacks seem to be divided in their views on this issue. Some favor foreign, including U.S., investment while others have opposed it. There is certainly no clear consensus on the question.

As a government, we have stayed neutral on this issue so far. We have neither encouraged nor discouraged American investment in South Africa. This is one of many facets of our policy toward southern Africa that is currently under review.

Potential American investors have been free to decide the issue on their own, although, if asked, we provide them with all the information we have available. We make certain they are aware of the controversy about such investment, explain our official neutrality, note the moral and social as well as economic and political problems of working in an apartheid society, and urge that if they do invest they give priority attention to the matter of fair employment practices.

We have, however, placed some restrictions on our bilateral economic relationship. For example, we restrict the Export-Import Bank facilities in South Africa. Export-Import Bank direct loans to South African importers of U.S. products are prohibited. However, the bank does guarantee privately financed loans as a service to U.S. exporters.

CONCLUSION

As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, there are a number of positive elements on the southern African scene. Perhaps the most promising aspect is the fact that unlike a number of African countries, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself have strong economic assets. Southern Africa is richly endowed with a generally favorable climate and with natural resources that the world needs. We have already announced that we stand ready to assist Zimbabwe and Namibia with training programs to promote further economic development when majority rule comes.

The rest of the African continent has, in a relatively short time, made tremendous progress from the colonial period to independence to collectively playing a major role on the world scene. The record has inevitably been an uneven one, but there are a number of African countries where Africans and Europeans cooperate in harmony for the betterment of all. I would not suggest that the situation in southern Africa is analogous. But I do suggest that there are examples on the African continent which give hope that political leaders can creatively build a future in which blacks and whites can co-exist and prosper in peace rather than have the future imposed on them.

For the sake of Africa, and for our sake, I hope that the leadership in southern Africa will choose wisely. For our part we wish them well, and we will remain committed to doing everything in our power to ensure that the outcome will be a happy one.

MEMBERS' FORUM

With this volume we are introducing a new section of the ANNALS. Its purpose is to encourage our members to exchange opinions on matters of major public concern. To introduce this feature, we have provided the following list of issues and questions which arose in the course of the Academy's Bicentennial Conference on the Constitution. The papers for that conference comprised the July 1976 issue of the ANNALS. The full text of the three-day discussion will be published in a few months as a separate monograph.

Elmer Staats, a member of our Board of Directors and Comptroller General of the United States, chaired the key sessions on the Constitution and the structure of our government. He has abstracted from that discussion the major issues which were raised concerning the suitability of our present governmental style for the next 200 years.

We invite our members to comment in writing on any of these fundamental issues. Over the course of the next year, we will publish brief excerpts from the most outstanding letters from our members in the hope of encouraging an informed dialogue on these vital topics. If you wish to participate, please send your letter to:

Richard D. Lambert
Editor of the *Annals*
American Academy of Political and Social Science
3937 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

So that we can acknowledge the source of the comment, please include your full name and any organizational designation you wish us to use in identifying you.

For members who are interested, reprints of the following are available in units of 10 for $6.00

ANNALS, AAPSS, 432, July 1977

The Bicentennial Conference on the United States Constitution The Shaping of Public Policy—Issues and Questions for Discussion

Abstracted by ELMER B. STAATS

I. What is the best way to select candidates for the American presidency?

A. Is the nominating process of primary importance in identifying and selecting the strongest candidates? In other words, are we likely to get stronger candidates simply by improving the selection process as such? Are we too greatly concerned about methodology or should our concern be to create an environment and an attitude toward government which will bring forth the best leadership in our society?

B. Has the direct presidential primary, which emerged in the early 1900s as an alternate to the party convention and which has sharply increased in the past 10 years, met the expectations of its founders that it would produce stronger candidates and provide increased grass-roots support for such candidates?

C. Is the selection of candidates by party conventions inconsistent with the basic principle of democracy as set forth in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence?

D. Does the presidential primary provide too much of an advantage to the winners in the early primaries by giving that candidate undue momentum and visibility, particularly where these involve special regional or state problems and possibly unrepresentative of the majority of other states? Does it give too great advantages to an individual like Governor Carter who was able to give full time to his candidacy as against other candidates who served in such capacities as a

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Elmer Staats became Comptroller General of the United States March 8, 1966, after 26 years' service in the federal government. Before his appointment as Comptroller General, he had served as Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Truman. He is a graduate of McPherson College, McPherson, Kansas, and has an M.A. from the University of Kansas and Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. He received the Rockefeller Public Service Award in 1961.

senator, congressman, governor, or mayor?

E. Now that approximately 30 states have presidential primaries, has it become too expensive and too wearing on the candidates? Is there a danger that the public will be saturated and "turned off"? Are we placing a burden on both candidate and voter beyond that expected or judged necessary by the majority of our citizens?

F. Would the regional primary alternative which has been suggested provide a better arrangement by reducing the amount of candidate and voter exposure and providing a regional test as against a state-by-state test? (The regional primary concept most frequently supported is an arrangement whereby all states in a given region desiring to hold primaries would be required to hold these primaries on the same day.)

G. Has the extensive use of the mass media, particularly television, been good or bad from the standpoint of political party leadership in the selection of candidates? Does the influence of the media make the political organization or the party machine more or less obsolete? Would the voting public any longer be willing to turn back the clock and place greater reliance on local, state, or regional conventions to select presidential candidates?

H. Is there a danger in the presidential primary system of selecting a candidate largely because of his charisma, a good TV personality, and a national figure because of his prominence in some field not necessarily related to political party support or his qualifications to make a good president?

I. Should we get away from the pledging of delegates and would "unpledging" still further weaken the role of the political party in the selection of presidential candidates?

J. Should we limit the amount of time and money devoted to primaries as is done in Great Britain?

II. What should be the role of the political party in the formulation of national policies and goals?

A. Would a parliamentary system which combines party responsibility and governmental responsibility be a better arrangement than the present system which divorces to a greater or lesser degree party activity from governmental activity and responsibility, and in which the voters do not necessarily make a direct linkage by frequently voting for the individual rather than the party? (The parliamentary system automatically vests control of the legislative branch and the executive in the same party.)

B. Does the fact that so few people vote in both primaries and in the final election arise from the belief that political parties and political party leaders exercise too great a control over policy formulation?

C. Is the concern about a monolithic party and a monolithic policy a real one in view of the fact that there are great divergencies in political philosophy in both the Republican and Democratic parties? For example, the Republican party includes liberals such as Senator Javits and Senator Mathias and conservatives such as Senator Helms, Senator Tower, and former Governor Reagan. Under these circumstances, should not the primary concern be that the party provide a forum for the reconciliation of views within a very broad spectrum? Or should

we deliberately encourage a multiple party system?

D. With campaign funding dependent on prior experience and vote-getting, are we now foreclosing the possibility of redesigning parties? Since a new coalition desiring to form a new party could not be funded under the federal funding system, have we curtailed greatly the possibility of such new formations?

E. Is so-called voter apathy due to the voters not liking any of the candidates? For voters that are not enamored of any of the candidates, perhaps there should be a box labeled "None of the above" so that they could express their views also. Why is the voter turnout so low? Is this a reflection of the failure of the political party and political party leadership, or are there more fundamental reasons for voter apathy?

F. Why does the political party play a stronger role in elections to Congress and for state and local offices than for the presidency? How do we reconcile this fact with the oft-repeated statement that voters do not trust political parties because of their reputation for bossism and the feeling that their primary concern is self-gain and self-perpetuation of political party leaders? What is the impact of party identification? Do people vote for a party when they do not know the candidates or are not sure how to vote on an individual? How important is this concept?

G. Have geographic boundaries for state and local government made parties unresponsive in many cases to special regional or local problems? For example, the New York City-Upstate New York schism or the differences in the concerns between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.

H. Is there any solution to the problems which arise when different political parties are in control of the legislative and executive branches of the government? (Former Senator William Fulbright once suggested that the president-elect resign under this circumstance and the majority party in the Congress select his successor.)

III. Is the constitutional provision for separation of powers and checks and balances between the president and the Congress suited for today's problems?

A. Has not the growth and the powers of the president, arising from the economic depression of the 1930s and the World War II period, weakened the role of Congress in a way which threatens the original concept of separation of powers? Should we take the risk that a future president might develop procedures which would render Congress a subservient body, lacking effective means to check the president?

B. Would some of the disadvantages of separation of powers be overcome with a creation of an "executive-legislative council" made up of the president's cabinet and congressional leaders which would share in the formulation of legislative proposals and in the consideration of major presidential decision making?

C. Would the role of Congress be strengthened vis-à-vis the president through reform of the legislative process itself by making Congress a more efficient and effective body?

D. Would the role of the House of Representatives be stronger with a 4-year term of office to coincide with that of the presidential term of office?

E. Does the separation of powers and the growth in the size and complexity of the federal government make it infeasible for Congress to participate effectively in the development of solutions to major national problems such as an energy policy, tax legislation, or foreign affairs? Would a rearrangement of committee structure to consolidate present committee with broader perspective help?

F. Is Congress too constituent-oriented, as in the case of its intervention and thwarting of the president's handling of the Cyprus crisis, to be able to effectively participate in foreign policy negotiations?

G. Should Congress establish specific procedures for long-range planning for the economy, natural resources development, environmental programs and so on, in order to be able to exercise greater initiative in these areas rather than awaiting a presidential initiative and then reacting, modifying or rejecting presidential proposals? Does not the present system result in delays, stalemates, and confusion as to why better planning is not achieved? Is there an alternative which would provide that Congress insist upon presidential initiatives in proposing longer range plans and establishing by statute better machinery in the executive branch to engage in long-range planning, providing the results to Congress for review, debate, and consideration of subsequent legislation?

H. Is the proposal to provide for "sunset legislation" viable and would it provide an improved means of oversight and evaluation of executive-agency performance? (Sunset legislation generally is defined as periodic mandatory detailed evaluation of major programs by Congress to determine whether they would be continued, modified, or discontinued.)

I. How detailed and in what way is it desirable and feasible for Congress to exercise its oversight responsibilities? Are there dangers in the growing practice of requiring approval of executive regulations or other actions by one house of the Congress or by oversight committees? Is there not a constitutional question with respect to such provisions when the full Congress does not participate and the president has no opportunity to exercise his constitutional powers of approval or disapproval of congressional actions? When does oversight become so detailed that it takes over the decision-making function of the executive agencies?

J. Would it be useful to delay the effective date of major new legislation in order to give Congress an opportunity to discuss and advise on implementing regulations as a way of assuring compliance with legislative intent?

K. To what extent does the growing independence of the bureaucracy, particularly regulatory agencies, undermine presidential responsibility? Are there dangers that career service employees will develop close ties with committees of Congress, thus bypassing executive branch channels in dealing with Congress? Does the civil service have an obligation to pass information and recommendations directly to committees of Congress where they feel the executive branch may be partisanly motivated or withholding important information?

IV. Are present constitutional and statutory provisions adequate to deal with the president who is

suspected of crimes, who is disabled, or who has lost the confidence of the Congress and the general public?

A. Should we move toward a system which makes it easier to remove a president? Was Watergate a real proof that "the system works" or was it more nearly the result of an accident? If the tapes had not been made or had been kept secret, would not the likely result have been that President Nixon would have filled out his term of office?

B. Should the Constitution be amended to provide an arrangement, prevalent in parliamentary governments, of votes of confidence in the president? If so, should the arrangement also give the president the right to dissolve the Congress and make them stand for reelection? Under a vote of confidence arrangement, should not Congress also have to stand for reelection, that is, put themselves on the line and incur the risk and the expense of reelection? What would be the consequence of a situation where the president of one party was pitted against a majority party which was instrumental in bringing about a vote of no confidence?

C. Did the framers of the Constitution deliberately make the removal of the president extremely difficult as a means of stabilizing or insulating the president from a "passion of the moment"?

D. If Congress had the power to vote no confidence in the president, would the likely result be that the president would take Congress in his confidence to a greater extent? Would he be more likely to consult with Congress to a greater extent before the fact rather than afterward, and would he be less likely to use executive privilege to deny Congress information to the same extent as he has in the past?

V. Have the courts increasingly been pushed in the direction of legislative decision-making?

A. Has the failure of Congress to legislate definitively resulted in having these issues passed to the courts? Have the courts been too willing to take jurisdiction on issues which are essentially non-judicial in nature, such as deciding on adequacy of environmental, health, or safety standards?

B. To what extent has the development of public interest groups been a factor in pushing the courts into decision making better suited for the executive branch or Congress?

C. Is there a feasible alternative to the regular court system to deal with issues involving the environment, safety, and health? Should we not consider the establishment of an administrative court or a science court with technical competence to make highly complex scientific and technical judgments and trade-off analyses, or should we equip the courts with scientific, technical, and other advisory panels to provide expert testimony in cases of this type?

D. In the area of civil rights, have the courts assumed the function of Congress in the shaping of policy and has this resulted in the courts now being willing to undertake decisions involving health, the environment, safety and in other areas traditionally reserved to Congress?

VI. How can we reconcile the need for developing national policies

with the need for local self-government?

A. Has the sovereignty of state ıd local governments been eroded ver the past 200 years with the rowing role of the federal government in delivering public services? iven the large array of public ınctions currently performed by ıe federal government and the reater interest shown by voters in ational elections as compared with tate and local elections, are state nd local governments still the ıyers of government closest to the eople?

B. To what extent have the folowing factors contributed to the hift in control in government to Vashington: (1) the unequal disibution of wealth and opportunity, 2) the perceived inability of local overnment to function efficiently nd effectively to meet citizen eeds, and (3) the outmoded and ıadequate structure of state governıents and boundaries?

C. Has the inadequate structure f state governments and state eographic boundaries been a major ıctor in the acceleration of the end toward centralization?

D. Is it feasible to develop adeuate theory and criteria to explain hy functions should be categorized s federal, state, or local? For xample, how did education and velfare become essentially state and ocal concerns and pollution control national concern? Can fixed crieria account for and allow changes n the relative roles of the different levels of government over time: or example, how could water and ewage treatment be transferred rom a state or local responsibility o a federal function?

E. To what extent have the federal government's own programs created problems at the state and local levels which then require the federal government to intervene? For example, urban dispersal because of the interstate highway system, subsidized power which encouraged the New England textile industry to move to the South, and so forth. Do we have an adequate system of national assessment or planning with respect to the intended or unintended impact of federal actions on state and local governments?

F. How far should the federal government go in intervening directly or indirectly in the establishment of state and local government machinery as a condition for receiving federal assistance or in providing financial or other incentives to restructure government at these levels? An example of intervention is the requirement that grants to state and local governments for certain programs be required to conform with the regional plan. Should we reconsider the early proposals associated with federal revenue sharing legislation that such revenues be available only after the development of regional plans for restructuring and consolidation of units of local government as advanced by Senator Humphrey of Minnesota and Congressman Henry Reuss of Wisconsin?

G. Is there a conflict between the need for more effective and efficient state and local management and service delivery and the need for expanded citizen participation in government decisions? What should be the federal government's role in encouraging citizen participation?

H. How far should the federal government go in using its taxing powers to redistribute wealth among states and regions? Should it inter-

vene when metropolitan areas suffer higher and higher taxes and rising public service needs as the result of migration from these areas to adjoining jurisdictions where the tax burden is lower? Should it intervene when metropolitan areas face increased service demands due to disproportionate influx of poor families and individuals?

I. Should we be concerned about the accountability of nonprofit and voluntary organizations which assume functions which are governmental or quasi-governmental in character? What should be the proper role of neighborhood advisory groups and organizations combined through community fund drives which may also receive financial assistance from federal, state, or local government sources?

J. Should the federal government have an obligation to intervene in financial crises such as New York City, Boston, Cleveland, or Detroit? And, if so, should this be done only through the state or states involved? Should there be a generic solution for all cities in fiscal distress or should each case be dealt with separately?

VII. How can we best organize at the state and local levels of government to most effectively meet governmental needs?

A. Are today's conditions so drastically different from the time that state boundaries were established as to require radical surgery and redrawing of state lines to meet the practical realities of governmental concerns, or is there enough flexibility under our Constitution to deal with problems which must be solved on an interstate basis?

B. Should high priority be given to strengthening the role of the state governments vis-à-vis local governments, or has the time passed when we can usefully or practically avoid having federal programs bypass state capitals? Is the old constitutional argument of states rights as implied in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution outmoded? Have not the courts always found enough flexibility to justify federal intervention in almost all areas previously considered to be reserved for state or local government? Should local or regional units of governments assume the legal sovereignty, rights, and responsibilities previously reserved for the states? On the other hand, should states insist on approval of all fiscal relationships between substate units and the federal government?

C. Have we fully utilized the interstate compact device to deal with regional problems, or is the interstate compact inherently limited by virtue of the fact that it requires approval of all states concerned? Are there any conditions under which the use of the interstate concept could be made more effective, such as giving the compact organization the right to levy taxes or to take regulatory actions without the approval of the state governments concerned? If this is not possible, are there incentives which the federal government could establish to encourage the use of interstate compacts?

D. To what extent can the federal government deal with regional problems by establishing a federal entity, such as the TVA, or creating regional groupings, such as the regional river basin planning commissions authorized by the Water Resources Planning Act? Could the federal government, for example, create a special federal entity—a Regional Development Commission—to deal

with the economic problems of the New York City area with powers to make loans, provide subsidies, and carry on economic development activities in cooperation with the states and localities involved?

E. Has adequate recognition been given to the role which the state governments have played or could play in serving as pilots or laboratories for programs which later can be used, in whole or in part, on a national basis? Examples can be cited in such areas as health, land use, education, and so forth. Should the federal government encourage this and through what means?

F. Should formulation of metropolitan-wide governments be encouraged by the federal government so that local areas can tap a larger resource base and deal more effectively with common problems? Does the development of metropolitan-wide governments imply less opportunity for citizen participation in decision making, as is sometimes claimed by proponents of "neighborhood government"?

G. Should land-use planning and zoning decisions in complex metropolitan areas remain matters of local concern, or should they be transferred to state or regional regulatory authorities? Should the federal government encourage certain patterns of regional land-use development to promote national objectives such as energy production or air pollution control?

H. How can the trend toward centralization of powers and functions be slowed down or reversed? Would it be possible for the national government to set out a long-term and systematic program to strengthen state and local governments through improving legislative procedures, salaries for state and local government officials, and improving the structure of state and local governments?

VIII. How can we improve the process of planning, goal making, and priority setting in a democratic society?

A. Is it possible to plan effectively in a democratic society without giving up the freedoms which were envisioned by the founders of the Republic? If the framers of the Constitution could have envisioned the complexity of present-day society, would they possibly have opted for something other than the concept of separation of powers and the division of responsibilities between the federal government and the state governments?

B. How do we reconcile freedom of individual action with the intervention of government which is involved in so many aspects of present-day life—the red tape and controls, for example, involved in protection of health, safety, and environment? How can we make these regulations and statutes flexible enough to meet varying conditions as among individuals and different localities and, at the same time, accomplish national objectives in a fair and impartial manner? Do the processes by which these regulations are developed take into account sufficiently the end impact on those being regulated? Should we contemplate a "paperwork impact statement" or a "regulatory impact statement" for each major bill or proposed regulation prior to its becoming effective?

C. Are planning and regulation necessarily synonymous? Is it not possible in a democratic society to accomplish national goals through means short of direct intervention? Can we use to a greater extent

targets, social indicators, and better fact-gathering in a manner which will make it possible to obtain a consensus as to goals, such as inflation rates, unemployment rates, and improvement of the environment?

D. Do we need a better mechanism to establish the data base and an accounting or data retrieval system which will make it possible to better judge progress against national goals and objectives? Have we too lightly dismissed the concept of planning, programming, and budgeting in a system which links these concepts in the public sector?

E. In the economic arena, should we not experiment to a greater degree with deregulation? Are those who are now being regulated developing a vested interest in the regulatory system to avoid competition and fixed prices? In a free enterprise system, shouldn't we perceive the "right to fail"—which we may be losing—in such regulated areas as the air and surface transportation system? To what extent does the assistance of the regulatory type of organization contribute to the difficulties of administering regulation and deregulation? Would it not be better to have such regulations issued by a single-headed agency which is responsible politically to the president and Congress?

F. While the president is accountable to the electorate for setting national goals and objectives, are his hands too frequently tied by an unresponsive bureaucracy? Should the president have greater freedom to appoint to positions now protected by the civil service system? Does the high turnover (average 18 months) of top officials in the executive branch mean that we suffer from relatively inexperienced people in these positions? Does this turnover undesirably strengthen the position of the bureaucracy and the civil service?

IX. How can we increase confidence in and responsiveness of governmental institutions?

A. How do we account for the fact that most public opinion polls reflect low confidence in governmental institutions, particularly at the federal government level? Is this due to the failure of political parties to effectively represent voter interests? Is it due primarily to growth in the size and complexity of government? Is it due to the growing centralization of governmental responsibilities at the federal level? Is it due to rising expectations of the role of government vis-à-vis nongovernmental organizations in society? Or is it a combination of several or all of these factors?

B. Voluntary organizations have always played an important role in American society, but how do we account for the rapid growth in recent years of public interest groups and citizen legal actions directed at requiring the government to act in the public interest? Is the public interest movement a temporary phenomenon or does it reflect something more basic in terms of the ability of citizens to obtain a redress of their grievances? Have these actions been too negative in character, designed to thwart initiatives by both Congress and the responsible executive agencies?

C. How far can we go in permitting public participation, granting of freedom-of-information requests, and opening up the courts for citizen action, compelling government action or restraining gov-

ernment action without immobilizing, delaying unduly, and generally weakening the ability of government agencies to exercise leadership in carrying out legislation enacted through the legislative process?

D. Does the creation of more mechanisms for citizen action add much if people are apathetic about voting? Does this mean that they are disillusioned with the electoral process? Or does it mean that the professional intervener or those with time and resources available are taking advantage of the widespread desire to have an open government? In other words, is it a case of the squeaky wheel getting the grease?

E. Have the public interest groups themselves—like Common Cause—become undemocratic when they do not permit members to participate in decisions as to what positions will be taken by these organizations or have any part to play in what matters the organizations will address themselves to? In other words, how do members of these organizations hold their officers accountable? Who is to decide, for example, issues of public morality and other value systems in society? Is it sufficient simply to have members free to join or not join such an organization if there is an undue level of financial support coming from large contributors? What about the accountability of the public interest law firm which has large resources at its disposal?

F. How do public interest groups differ from the more traditional trade and industry associations, labor unions, and such organizations as the League of Women Voters, councils on foreign relations, chambers of commerce, and so forth? Are the public interest groups endowed with the ability to represent "all of the people" or "the public interest" in contrast to groups having special interests? Should public interest groups be required to register as lobbyists? Why are these public interest groups apparently a peculiarly American phenomena?

G. Are not many of the issues facing government today too complex to expect wide public understanding without the aid of special groups who can undertake research and public education activities in such areas as pollution control, tax policy, capital formation, nuclear proliferation, and so forth? Can these issues be resolved best through working directly with elected representatives and advisory groups established by executive agencies, by those directly affected, or is it necessary to have special groups in society represent the common good and the public interest? How does one define common good and public interest separate and apart from the self-interest of labor organizations, business organizations, professional societies, and other groups that are directly affected by governmental regulatory and other actions?

H. Why has not the formal ombudsman arrangement been more popular in the United States? Can the elected representative, in fact, serve this purpose or do we need a special mechanism, such as that which has been developed in some cities in the United States and in several foreign governments, to act on citizen complaints with respect to governmental action?

I. It has been argued that the federal government and the state governments are less responsive to citizens' needs and less accountable than local government, but is this true? Do the cities, such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles,

provide for any more direct citizen involvement than the federal government? Are not special interest groups, criminal organizations, and so forth, equally effective—or perhaps more so—at the local level than at the federal government level? Is not the media—TV, radio, and so forth—more effective in maintaining openness and integrity at the national government level than at the local level? How effective is citizen participation in matters of local taxation, allocation of budget resources, decisions on capital improvement, and so forth?

J. It has been argued that responsiveness of government to citizen needs cannot be improved except through greater participation by voters in the electoral process, but how can this be done? Would a postcard voter registration system serve to increase voter participation, or is the "get out the vote" function one which should be primarily that of interest groups, such as labor organizations, public interest groups, and so forth? Would a system of compulsory voting or penalties for not voting increase citizen interest? Would it be useful to follow the example of most other democratic nations in arranging for a universal registration of all citizens for voting purposes? Should we shift elections from the traditional Tuesday to Sunday? If a compulsory voting system is adopted, should not there be a place for protest or "none of the above" votes which would be counted and published along with votes for or against candidates or issues?

K. Would confidence in government be increased if the president were elected for a single 6-year term and the House of Representatives elected for 4-year terms with a limit on the number of terms which representatives serve? Would confidence be increased if maximum age restrictions were placed on individuals running for public office or, at least, restrict the ability to serve as a committee chairman to individuals below a certain age? Would a system of automatic rotation of committee chairmen serve a useful purpose in this regard?

L. To what extent is confidence in government lowered by the publicity given to unethical practices of public officials, the failure to disclose financial interests, and the close association of some elected representatives with special interest groups? Is public disclosure of financial and other relationships adequate, or should divestiture be required, as well? What is the line between the objectives of privacy on the one hand and the disclosure of assets and financial relationships on the other?

M. To what extent is confidence in the federal government lowered by the manner in which the vice-president is selected and the role which he plays? Should the vice-president be selected following the presidential election by having the president-elect submit one or more names to the Senate and the House for approval (as in the case of President Ford and Vice-President Rockefeller)? Would it be desirable for the vice-president to serve in an administrative capacity such as a cabinet post? Would it not be wise for the Senate to select its own presiding officer rather than have the presiding officer represent the president and vote his position in case of a tie?

Roster of Members and Delegates at the Eighty-first Annual Meeting

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Akuetteh, Mrs. Cynthia, Washington, DC	Action/Peace Corps/African Region
Alton, Col. Carlly, Carlisle Barracks, PA	U. S. Army War College
Alveranga, Mr. Glen, Haverford, PA	Haverford College
Andrews, Miss Roberta G., Philadelphia, PA	Children's Aid Society of Pennsylvania
Anyanwu, Dr. Rowland, Clayton, NJ	Glassboro State College
Appel, Prof. John, East Stroudsburg, PA	East Stroudsburg State College
Arnold, Mr. Kenneth L., Philadelphia, PA	The Association of American University Presses, Inc.
Arnott, Dr. Margaret L., Philadelphia, PA	Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science
Artz, Dr. Jefferson, Mississippi State, MS	Mississippi State University
Aviado, Dr. Domingo, Philadelphia, PA	Embassy of the Philippines to the United States
Badi, Mr. Solieman, New York, NY	Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Republic to the United Nations
Baker, Dr. Bettie J., Cleveland, OH	Cuyahoga Community College
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Capaci, Miss Diane, Glassboro, NJ	Glassboro State College

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Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of the American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1976

MEMBERSHIP

MEMBERSHIP AS OF DECEMBER 31

Year	*Number*
1966	21,043
1967	23,440
1968	25,158
1969	24,597
1970	24,544
1971	23,413
1972	21,963
1973	21,070
1974	19,473
1975	16,923
1976	15,516

FINANCES

Our bank balance at the end of 1976 was $46,582.58.

SIZE OF SECURITIES PORTFOLIO

MARKET VALUE AS OF DECEMBER 31

1966	$462,675
1967	481,123
1968	566,681
1969	539,083
1970	616,429
1971	612,046
1972	642,808
1973	533,024
1974	371,004
1975	440,450
1976	504,046

STATEMENT OF REVENUE, EXPENSE AND SURPLUS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1976

	1976	1975
REVENUES:		
Dues and subscriptions, net of agents' commissions and refunds	$218,511.59	$235,655.21
Sales of publications, net of discounts and refunds	47,426.27	35,435.67
Advertising, net of discounts	12,099.69	7,035.12
Royalty and reprint permissions	6,892.53	9,803.64
Annual meeting, net of refunds	7,193.09	7,224.76
List rental	2,253.90	2,000.00
Sale of review books	2,292.00	2,610.00
Miscellaneous	283.68	272.35
Total revenues	$296,952.75	$300,036.75
OPERATING EXPENSES:		
Annals printing, binding and mailing	$100,592.87	$ 96,866.45
Shipping and cost of publications sold	10,045.42	8,539.19
Salaries and related benefits	179,477.28	176,177.65
Annual meeting	8,328.43	9,505.08
Depreciation	591.85	564.00
Insurance	1,995.37	1,885.50
List rental and exchange	3,047.21	3,642.29
Postage	7,095.76	8,236.34
Printing, duplicating and stationery	21,155.46	15,951.61
Supplies	2,859.65	1,646.31
Telephone	1,438.21	1,495.24
Repairs, maintenance and utilities	7,274.43	8,511.63
Miscellaneous	8,010.94	7,707.24
Total operating expenses	$351,912.88	$340,728.53
LOSS BEFORE MONOGRAPH REVENUE	$ 54,960.13	$ 40,691.78
MONOGRAPH REVENUE, NET OF COSTS	429.94	1,728.31
OPERATING LOSS	$ 54,530.19	$ 38,963.47
OTHER REVENUE (EXPENSE):		
Dividends and interest	$ 25,188.60	$ 24,066.57
Investment fees	(2,254.64)	(964.52)
Gain on sale of investments	17,726.29	—
Bicentennial	17,361.96	11,122.00
Credit card income, net	1,075.73	—
Contributions	326.16	—
Total other revenue (expense)	$ 59,424.10	$ 34,224.05
EXCESS OF REVENUE OVER EXPENSE	$ 4,893.91	($ 4,739.42)
SURPLUS, BEGINNING OF YEAR	$342,156.50	$346,895.92
SURPLUS, END OF YEAR	$347,050.41	$342,156.50

PUBLICATIONS

NUMBER OF VOLUMES OF *The Annals* PRINTED (6 PER YEAR)	
1966	133,056
1967	134,788
1968	147,631
1969	154,153
1970	145,456
1971	139,450
1972	143,360
1973	132,709
1974	120,397
1975	104,049
1976	101,789

NUMBER OF VOLUMES OF *The Annals* SOLD (IN ADDITION TO MEMBERSHIPS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS)	
1966	18,063
1967	19,061
1968	13,072
1969	15,610
1970	14,143
1971	10,046
1972	16,721
1973	12,430
1974	13,153
1975	13,034
1976	12,235

MONOGRAPHS PUBLISHED

Date	*Subject*	*Number Printed*	*Number Sold*	*Complimentary Distribution*
1962	#1–Behavioralism	15,225	5,418	9,764
1963	2–Mathematics	30,725	2,565	28,162
1963	3–Public Service	17,230	1,142	16,105
1964	4–Leisure	37,488	3,646	33,844
1965	5–Functionalism	44,459	2,632	41,828
1966	6–Political Science	21,067	5,649	15,421
1967	7–Urban Society	22,578	1,507	21,073
1968	8–Public Administration	25,311	2,190	23,154
1969	9–Design for Sociology	16,191	3,754	12,540
1970	10–International Relations Research	10,055	1,347	5,823
1971	11–Technology	12,167	418	3,217
1971	12–International Studies	7,609	401	3,802
1972	13–Diplomacy	7,090	309	3,021
1972	14–Integration	8,096	391	7,000
1973	15–Public Interest	8,001	308	6,865
1973	16–Urban Administration	20,066	571	17,699
1973	17–Language Studies	5,109	573	837

During 1976, the six volumes of THE ANNALS dealt with the following subjects:

January — *Crime and Justice in America: 1776–1976*, edited by Graeme R. Newman, Professor at School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany.

March — *International Exchange of Persons: A Reassessment*, edited by Kenneth Holland, President Emeritus, Institute of International Education, U.N. Plaza, New York.

May — *Political Finance: Reform and Reality*, edited by Herbert E. Alexander, Director of Citizens' Research Foundation, Princeton, New Jersey.

July — *Bicentennial Conference on the Constitution. A Report to the Academy*, edited by Marvin E. Wolfgang, President of this Academy.

September *Role of the Mass Media in American Politics*, edited by L. John Martin, Professor of Journalism, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

November *The American Revolution Abroad*, edited by Richard L. Park, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The publication program for 1977 includes the following volumes:

January *The New Rural America*, edited by Frank Clemente, Senior Research Associate, Center for the Study of Environmental Policy, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania.

March *Nuclear Proliferation. Prospects, Problems, and Proposals*, edited by Joseph I. Coffey, Professor of Public & International Affairs, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

May *Industrial Democracy in International Perspective*, edited by John P. Windmuller, Professor at New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

July *Africa in Transition*, edited by Marvin E. Wolfgang, President of this Academy.

September *Ethnic Conflict in the World Today*, edited by Martin O. Heisler, Associate Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

November *Social Analysis and Social Policy*, edited by J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Professor of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin

The rotating summaries of social sciences disciplines, established in 1961, are being continued.

During 1976, the Book Department of THE ANNALS published 300 reviews. More than three-fourths of these reviews were written by professors, and the others by college or university presidents, members of private and university-sponsored organizations, government and public officials, military personnel, and business professionals. Most reviewers were residents of the United States, but some were residents of Great Britain, Canada, Scotland, Ireland, Ghana, Japan, Thailand and the West Indies. Over one thousand books were listed in the Other Books section.

One hundred and seventy-six requests were granted to reprint material from THE ANNALS. Most of these went to professors and other authors for use in books under preparation.

MEETINGS

The eightieth annual meeting, which was held in April 1976, had as its subject *Bicentennial Conference on the Constitution*, and continued the tradition of our gatherings with respect to the diversity of organizations represented by delegates, the size of the audiences and the interest displayed. Fourteen embassies sent official delegations, as did 7 United Nations missions and 7 states, cities and agencies of the federal government. Delegates were also sent by 127 American and foreign universities and colleges and 82 international, civic, scientific and commercial organizations. Nearly 600 persons attended one or more of the sessions. The average attendance for a session was 500.

The theme of the 81st annual meeting, held April 15 and 16, 1977, at the Benjamin Franklin Hotel, Philadelphia, was *Africa in Transition*. This volume of THE ANNALS contains the papers presented at the meeting.

OFFICERS AND STAFF

Members Elmer B. Staats, Richard D. Lambert and Rebecca J. Brownlee were reelected for another three-year term.

The Board also renewed the terms of its counsel, Henry W. Sawyer, III, and accepted the resignation of Walter M. Phillips. Three new Board Members were elected: Matina S. Horner, Thomas L. Hughes and Lloyd N. Cutler.

All of the Board officers were re-elected and both the Editor and Assistant Editor were reappointed.

Respectfully submitted,

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Norman D. Palmer
Howard C. Petersen
Elmer B. Staats
Marvin E. Wolfgang
Lee Benson
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
Richard D. Lambert
Rebecca Jean Brownlee
Covey T. Oliver
Thomas Lowe Hughes
Lloyd N. Cutler
Matina S. Horner

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
1 June 1977.

Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

WELDON A. BROWN. *Prelude to Disaster: The American Role in Vietnam, 1940–1963*. Pp. viii, 278. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975. $15.00.

I fail to see, completely, the author's reason for writing this book and the publisher's for publishing it. Mr. Brown does not bring any new material to bear in this topic: the U.S. role in Vietnamese politics, 1940–1963. Neither does he offer a novel or worthwhile interpretation of an already well covered area. The only new set of documents from which Mr. Brown could have extracted new insights on this period of history is the *Pentagon Papers*. Although these are listed in the bibliography, I did not see them once listed in any of the footnotes. On the contrary, the majority of the footnotes refer to secondary and generally outdated publications by Fall (1963), Trager (1967), H. V. Chi (1965), Shaplen (1966), Lancaster (1961). Some of these works are, furthermore, of doubtful historical value, as they were financially sponsored by U.S. governmental agencies and may be assumed to justify certain policies. Moreover, Mr. Brown relies excessively on his sources: long passages of this book are but summaries, paraphrases or analyses of portions of his sources. For example, in Chapter I, out of 39 footnotes, 16 refer to H. V. Chi's work. In Chapter 6, of 73 footnotes, 37 refer to Fall's *The Two Vietnams*. Why then, readers may well ask, should they rather read Mr. Brown than the sources he so closely follows?

The author's interpretation of the years 1940–1963 is in no way original and as little persuasive as earlier versions of the same outlook. His anti-communism leads him into constant contradictory statements. For example, Ho Chi Minh is labelled a traitor, a crook and, of course a communist. Whatever H. C. Minh does, whatever issues from him is evil. And yet, Mr. Brown recognizes, as would be hard for anyone not to, that "after 1946, the best disciplined, most dedicated and efficiently organized group in all Vietnam was communist" (p. 135), and that in 1945 "the only force capable of political leadership" in Vietnam was H. C. Minh's. Not surprisingly, Ho's communist group went on to lead the fight for independence from the French and to win it. In spite of Ho Chi Minh's military victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu, he was pressured at the Geneva Conference in 1954 by Big Powers both communist and non-communist, to claim less than his fair share of victory. He was made to yield the southern half of Vietnam to non-communist Vietnamese (those who had fought alongside the French up to Dien Bien Phu) on the understanding that the two Vietnams would, 2 years later, vote to select a single government of a united Vietnam. The Southern half, in the meanwhile, fell

into the hands of Ngo Dinh Diem, "our ally" according to Mr. Brown. The author sees no wrong in his ally's refusal to proceed with the elections in 1956. Elsewhere, he sees many faults in Ngo Dinh Diem. His government was an autocracy when it was meant to be a democracy; he abolished freedom rather than defend it. Finally he was very ineffective, because "our ally seemed more interested in graft, corruption and war profits than in fighting for his own national freedom" (p. 127). These admitted travesties of Saigon in no way invalidated the U.S. support of Diem's regime which the author deems essential to stop North Vietnam's "despotism." The U.S. could not stop despotism itself so it remained wedded to the Diem despot in order that he might stall the American-perceived despotism of the North. Money, arms and hopes notwithstanding, Diem did not achieve what the Americans wanted. Mr. Brown's reasoning runs as follows: "How could we effectively pressure an Oriental people, endlessly patient, impoverished, illiterate, concerned with personal survival, plagued by excessive heat and humidity, and unable to do almost anything energetically" (p. 171). Are Orientals all of the above? If so, Mr. Brown should remember that "their side" is also composed of Orientals, the same Orientals!

After a decade of unreserved support, Diem's government had finally to be dropped; fortunately, that is where Mr. Brown's book also meets its end. Concerning this last chapter, I would suggest to Mr. Brown that the *Pentagon Papers*, among other documents, contain a great deal of new information that would have made his chapter look a little bit better than mere pages of an old newspaper.

The author promises a sequence to this book. I would sincerely hope that Mr. Brown has found, in the meantime, some other more rewarding activity. If his next book is anything like this one, then I am afraid that he is wasting his time as well as that of would-be readers.

TRUONG BUU LAM
University of Hawaii
Honolulu

STEPHEN HESS. *Organizing the Presidency*. Pp. ix, 228. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. $10.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

Stephen Hess seeks to improve presidential decision-making and managerial effectiveness. His thesis is that recent presidents, using a bloated and unwieldy White House Office, have attempted to personally formulate major policies and oversee their implementation in all areas of government. But, according to Hess, the actual result has been to draw increasing numbers of no-win problems to the president; cut the time the president can devote to any one problem; require the president to spend more time managing his staff; and increase the number of people who can "misspeak in his name." After considering and rejecting the possibility of increased use of outside consultants as a solution, Hess concludes that presidents must turn back to department and agency heads for advice and administrative help. Many have argued that cabinet members are of only limited usefulness for these purposes because most of them are selected according to their group affiliations and are more loyal to those interests than to the president's. This view may have been valid in the past, but, says Hess, it no longer applies because changes in the political system (for example, new campaign techniques and election laws) permit an individual to reach the presidency without committing cabinet positions to particular interest groups. Hess then outlines a strategy by which presidents can mold their cabinets into aids instead of impediments.

This is the first book on the presidency that leaves one with the feeling that he has read a comprehensive treatment of the subject. The others seem to concentrate on fragments such as legalities of the office, the presidency's severe limitations, or its potential to befuddle its occupant's good sense. Hess encompasses all of these plus presidential management and decision-making styles, cabinet and White House staff recruitment, and presidential—White House staff—cabinet interaction. He ac-

complishes this using a massive array of sources including his own personal experience in the White House, which make this a much "bigger" book than its modest physical length would suggest.

Considering the broad scope of this study, each reader will probably disagree with some of Hess' observations. For example, it may be that ever greater numbers of problems are being drawn into the White House not because of White House staff growth but because of the increasingly complex nature of problems which more and more tend to cross departmental boundaries. And many will doubt that the political scene has changed sufficiently to permit the president to significantly expand the cabinet's role. But, despite such disagreements, few will fail to be challenged and enlightened by *Organizing the Presidency*. It will be, deservedly, the most widely discussed work in this field since Neustadt's innovative study.

CARL GRAFTON
Auburn University at Montgomery
Alabama

ROBERT JERVIS. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Pp. xii, 445. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $22.50.

This study of perception (and misperception) in international relations is an important book: a masterpiece of disaggregation and of synthesis. Professor Jervis has broken his subject down into the processes of perception—showing for example how decision-makers learn from history, and how their attitudes change; and into a section on common misperceptions ("overestimating one's importance as influence or target," "the influence of desires and fears on perceptions" "cognitive dissonance"). Then drawing on his mastery of the literature of diplomatic and military history, political science, psychology, and even anthropology, he has brought together the insights of the disparate fields as they bear on international politics. It is the first serious attempt to do this.

Often the insights seem obvious or even trivial: "experiments have . . . shown that people are less impressed and less likely to reciprocate favors if they believe that the other had no choice in helping them . . ." (p. 42). But the result is to systematize, in a loose way, the lessons of both experimental psychology and (in this case) diplomatic history, while bringing the former to bear on the latter.

Despite the ambition in an undertaking of this scope, the author is largely successful. This is in the final analysis due to the fact that he resists the fashionable impulse to build more sophisticated theory than the material of the study can bear or will allow. The loose, interrelated, "pre-theoretical" observations that underlie and inform the structure of the book are remarkably sophisticated conceptually, given the novelty of this terrain. The book is meticulously footnoted and, given the superb production by the publishers as well, worth its price.

Several quibbles are confined to the uses the author makes of his own models in looking at today's realities.

Jervis's advice is for the Prince, whom he sees, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as no less "rational, sophisticated, and motivated to understand [his] environment than are scientists" (p. 5). But how cognitively complex? Jervis reports another insight from the world of psychology, in noting that people with "high cognitive complexity tend to be less confident of their judgment than do people of low complexity" when dealing with consistent information. One struggles to name more than a handful of senior officials in the American government in recent memory of whom that would be true: the reviewer thinks of the Pentagon official who gave him as evidence that the public was "pro-Defense" the fact that the businessmen seeing him everyday were "high on the pentagon." These were the contractors visiting the senior American official dealing with Defense industries; no oddity was seen. Jervis's book will influence the milieu from which the best of our statesmen will emerge, and one can at least dream of a world in which our leaders actually read and ponder books like this.

he other quibble goes to the heart of material to which Jervis hopes his terly study will be applied, Soviet-erican perceptions. He concludes a tentative and impartial treatment of al and deterrence models of per-ion with the suggestion that one d, United States) should "procure the ls and numbers of weapons that are ul for deterrence without simultane-y being as effective for aggression." hat if the adversary won't play that e, and chooses weapons whose ed purpose is to provide a war-fight-capability that its doctrine explicitly ifies? What, then, for us, if deterrence ? One can overdo his impartiality, as any scholars did in the 1930s as they ght to avert a general war. True, as is concludes, the "cost of overes-ating the other's hostility is itself n underestimated" (p. 424), but the ation is highly assymetrical as there no scholars like himself on the other interpreting perceptions with such histicated impartiality for the schol-and policy audience.

here are, after all, a few facts in this ute, and they exist quite apart from opinions of the separate schools with r different theories. It might have n better had the author either gone a further in their pursuit (what, for nple, of the Intelligence commu-'s underestimation of the proportion e defense budget to the Soviet GNP a factor of at least two—and the erican intelligentsia's dogged refusal ce the implications of this?) or gone a less far and allowed the reader to ly the book's lessons to the present text without his own implicit or licit assistance. For if there is a ory of misperceptions, cognitive dis-ance, or overestimating one's own ortance, it surely is here and now, as struggle to learn the meaning of a sive Soviet arms buildup countered an approximately equally large cut-k (in constant dollars) in our own ense spending. If Professor Jervis's k has lessons to teach, which it does, would surely be to look carefully at at the two sides are currently doing: and not to overreact to the "lessons of Vietnam" and whatever else is past.

W. SCOTT THOMPSON

Tufts University
Medford
Massachusetts

JEANE KIRKPATRICK. *The New Presidential Elite: Men and Women in National Politics*. Pp. 630. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. $20.00.

Jeane Kirkpatrick has written an important book. The delegates to the 1972 Democratic and Republican Conventions, a large sample of whom was extensively surveyed through mail questionnaires and personal interviews, are the presidential elite of her title. Her research was "inspired by the belief that American politics is being transformed in some important, fairly fundamental ways by the ascendancy to power in the majority party of large numbers of new men and women whose motives, goals, ideals, ideas, and patterns of organizational behavior are different from those of the people who have dominated American politics in the past." The hypothesized "new breed" of delegate was indeed found to exist, and Kirkpatrick analyzes their characteristics and reflects on their impact on the political system thoroughly and insightfully.

The McGovern delegates were the core of the new breed while the Humphrey and Muskie delegates were more likely to look at politics in traditional ways. Of particular note was the disproportionate number of "symbol specialists" (teachers, journalists, clergy, social scientists) in the McGovern ranks. The symbol specialists appear to be the vanguard of the future among political activists, and Kirkpatrick is not sanguine about their systemic impact. "A symbol specialist may be said to have a vested interest in the intellectual and moral aspects of politics because he is expert in articulating, analyzing, criticizing, and moralizing." Thus, politics under the new breed is marked by ideological conflict and criticism of traditional values. But Kirkpatrick does not see the

rise of ideology leading to a renaissance for the parties; the new breed's commitments are to causes, not organizations. The continuation of party decomposition is likely as personalist factions surge and decline with the currents of events. And the health of the Democratic party will not be improved by the split between the "cultural transformers" in the new breed and the "cultural preservationists" who are predominant in the party's rank-and-file.

The richness of Kirkpatrick's analysis has only been touched upon. Her discussion of the limited impact of the quota requirements on the Democratic Convention, for example, is highly instructive. So are her comments on the prospects for women in the upper reaches of the party hierarchies. With all its merits it is regrettable that the price and length of *The New Presidential Elite* will make it inaccessible to most students. An editor and publisher who put out an abridged, paperback edition of this fine study would profit themselves and the many people who would surely buy their product.

PAUL LENCHNER
East Texas State University
Commerce

DAVID KNOKE. *Change and Continuity in American Politics*. Pp. 187. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. $11.50

Change and Continuity in American Politics is an examination of the social bases of American political parties using the method of quantitative data analysis. Dissecting "the parties in the electorate along the religious, racial, regional, and socioeconomic fault lines of the post-World War II period," the author produces a study that confirms much of the popular wisdom about political parties and that is also a reasoned, though sometimes ponderous and difficult, data analysis approach to problems in the social sciences.

The book's central theme is that there has been in the last three decades a considerable continuity in the pattern of social bases for party affiliation. Change, however, is not totally absent as is exemplified in the growing number of independent voters.

The author notes the affinity of Catholics and Jews for the Democratic party and the fact that as Catholics become more affluent, they tend to become more Republican. He says that Protestants are distinctly more Republican, "but important stable political cleavages within the large Protestant group were found. The high status Protestant denominations exhibit strikingly higher degrees of Republicanism than do the lower class denominations." A chapter on socioeconomic differences gives too limited a role to these concerns in structuring party differences. Another on the party system approaches but stops short of offering any significant conclusions.

Mr. Knoke does not attempt to probe the reasons why various groups act as they do in the political spectrum. Rather, he is content to take empirical data, analyze it, and present only those conclusions that can be objectively verified.

Few of the major themes of this study will prove particularly new to the seasoned political observer. Nevertheless, the book does have value in that it provides a model for data analysis study and by offering a number of perceptions, most of which are somewhat limited, about the social bases for political affiliations that will prove of use to future scholars.

GENO BARONI
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MICHAEL LEIGH. *Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937–1947*. Pp. xvi, 188. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $14.50.

Democratic theory has long attributed a special importance to public opinion. A "traditionalist" group has argued that policy-makers are constrained by public

opinion while a "radical" group has seen policy-makers manipulating public opinion in favor of their predetermined policy choices. This book by Michael Leigh (a Tutor in International Relations at the University of Sussex) attempts to resolve this debate. This topic is of special importance if President Carter, following his campaign promises, does open up the making of foreign policy to both the public and the Congress.

Leigh's study spans the decade that began with Roosevelt's "quarantine the aggressors" speech and ended with Truman's proposal of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Using the techniques of both the political scientist and the historian, he has drawn upon little-used archival materials, especially unpublished reports of various U.S. government agencies concerned with public opinion. His working hypothesis is that the more highly developed the government's information function, the weaker the public opinion constraint. His history of the various bodies created during World Wars I and II is especially interesting and useful.

Leigh finds that the change in Presidential prerogatives since the 1930s rests on "the transformation of the opinion-policy relationship The President's sense of the possible has grown with his capacity to invoke his separate constituency, the mass public" (p. 168), which liberated the White House from dependence on congressional and other surrogates for popular opinion. The author believes that the "fine tuning of mass opinion is a patent impossibility. . . . the instruments for mobilizing consent, though comparatively sophisticated in the postwar period, remain crude and imperfect. . . . Yesterday's manipulation is today's constraint" (pp. 169–170).

He concludes that neither the radical nor the traditional model of the opinion-policy relationship is valid, since neither side has specified the linkages between what the public believes and how policy-makers behave. Both have failed to explain systematically how public opinion is crystallized, transmitted to, and interpreted by people at the top of the bureaucracy. "The participation of the outer circles of opinion in policy-making does not fall neatly into the category of manipulation or constraint. The form of participation, as well as its probability, is determined by a complex set of factors, some of which have been identified in this analysis" (p. 171). Thus, the author ends by admitting that his is not the final analysis of this important part of the governing process.

A minor comment on the work of either the author or the proofreader is that the incorrect spelling, in one place or another, of "Isaiah Bowman," "Emanuel Celler," "Cincinnati," "Hadley Cantril," "Kenneth McKellar," "Robert McNamara," "Vyacheslav Molotov," and "Llewellyn Thompson" (and a number of other words) mars what is otherwise a careful study.

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MICHAEL K. O'LEARY and WILLIAM D. COPLIN. *Quantitative Techniques in Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting*. Pp. v, 291. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. $20.00.

Prepared under the auspices of the State Department's external research department, this volume is an ambitious effort to apply advanced social science methodology to the study of foreign policy. The applications of quantitative data and techniques to foreign affairs analysis, with the full cooperation of the State Department, has led to a series of essays that aim at middle range theory: neither issue specific nor macro-level.

Part I of the book, one chapter, presents a report of the project and summarizes the work of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for one year; that experience provided the data base for the project. Six case studies comprise Part II, selected to demonstrate the utility of a variety of social science techniques. The cases deal with instability in African politics; voting in Western Europe, the politics of bargaining between North and South Korea; military expenditures in Latin America; monitor-

ing and predicting violence in the Middle East; and the politics of global oil flows.

Part III consists of the authors' analysis of the general usefulness of social science methodology to foreign policy analysts. An appendix contains the specific recommendations of the authors to the State Department about the limitations and advantages to be derived from the systematic employment of the advanced statistical and methodological techniques applied in the case studies.

As the authors discuss in their conclusion, the success of applying new methodologies to the work of the foreign policy analyst will depend on the hypotheses and assumptions of the analyst, first and foremost, and not with the quantitative techniques available. If it is possible to standardize the assumptions and hypotheses employed by the analysts; improve the quality and the quantity of available data, eliminate cultural and historical pre- and misconceptions, then the techniques demonstrated in the case studies should prove useful in three areas: information gathering, descriptive analysis, and forecasting.

The first two categories, if time, effort and financing are available, will prove to be most useful in coming to grips with the complexities of the real world of foreign policy analysis. The capacity of such techniques to contribute significantly to forecasting will respond principally to the demands of the moment. Forecasting in crisis situations will leave little room for quantitative techniques. Long range prediction, if viewed as offering sets of alternatives and elucidating the complexities of sets of variables that impinge on specific foreign policy areas, will be more successful if integrated into the ongoing policy process and not left in the hands of the research and analysis specialists alone. The possibility of that happening in the foreseeable future is highly problematical.

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AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

FREDERICK P. BOWSER. *The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524–1650.* Pp. xiv, 439. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975. $16.50.

Here is the most intensively researched work ever to appear on African slavery in Latin America. The book is based on archival material found in Perú, Spain, and Portugal. Both coastal and urban Perú were so dependent on black labor and slavery that virtually every agency of civil and ecclesiastical government generated documents dealing with Afro-Peruvians. The book contains an index, appendices, excellent footnotes, a superior bibliography, and literary skill throughout.

The book traces the complex interaction between Spaniard, African, and Indian within the socioeconomic structure of colonial Perú. Primarily, it studies the function and evolution of African slavery as an urban institution centered in Lima, a city with the largest concentration of blacks in the Western Hemisphere. By the 1570s, slavery in Perú was an economic necessity, but it soon became entrenched in Spanish society. By 1650, social attitudes that made for the assimilation of the Afro-Peruvian had been firmly established. All in all, concludes Professor Bowser, the lives of most Afro-Peruvians in the 16th and 17th centuries were bleak and monotonous. The dominant note was not grinding hardship nor misery but drabness and indifference.

Several chapters are particularly outstanding: "African Versus Indian Labor" (Chapter 5) shows how the economic and demographic realities of Perú transformed forced Indian labor (*mita*) and African slavery into complementary and enduring institutions. "The Control of the African Cimarrones" (Chapter 8) relates the harsh penalties for runaway slaves. Captors legally could kill escapees who resisted apprehension; the head alone sufficed as proof for reward. In "Spiritual Concerns" (Chapter 9), slaveowners opposed the Christianization and marriage of blacks. Such at-

titudes and the sexual imbalance in rural and urban areas, moreover, encouraged promiscuity and illegitimate offspring. Finally, in "The Free Person of Color" (Chapter 11), the author notes how many free Afro-Peruvians gained modest fortune and acceptance, yet racial cohesion and identity were lost in the process. Race mixture—the widespread sexual mingling of Indian, African, and Spaniard—played an important role in creating and sustaining a class of free Afro-Peruvians. The key to socioeconomic advancement was "whitening" and "passing"—culturally if not racially. Spanish culture was therefore the model for most free Afro-Peruvians.

Professor Bowser, however, does not capture and communicate black emotions. What did it feel like to be a slave in colonial Perú? The author says it is difficult to make the black man come alive. His further admission that the vast and rich fund of documentation has but one flaw—that the African slave (even the free person of color) was rarely viewed as a person but as part of the masses—does not fill the void (p. ix). The author again states (p. 80) that the preferred *bozal* was the "Guinea" slave but does not give reasons for this preference in origin. He also does not wish to leave an impression that the urban residents of Perú owned slaves simply to establish their own social status (p. 103), but indeed he does (p. 101). At times, assumptions are made, for example (p. 158): ". . . a similar policy was probably followed elsewhere in Perú." Yet, despite very few and minor criticisms, this is an essential volume for historians and libraries everywhere.

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A. J. DAWISHA. *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy.* Pp. ix, 234. New York. Halsted Press, 1976. $24.50

Shortly after the 1952 revolution, Nasser became the undisputed national leader of Egypt. After the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack against Egypt in 1956, he emerged as an influential leader in the Arab world. Moreover, his friendship with President Tito of Yugoslavia and his relations and adventures with Russia and the United States further enhanced his stature among the Third World leaders.

Did Nasser plan Egypt's foreign policy step by step in order to achieve his goals, or did he act spontaneously as he faced foreign policy decisions? This book attempts to answer this question methodically with emphasis on Nasser's decisions in regard to Egypt's foreign policy toward other Arab states in the Middle East.

Part I of this book contains five chapters and supplies the historical setting for Egypt's foreign policy during 1952–1970, using the union with Syria in 1958 as a focal point. It summarizes the pre-union involvement, the union experience, and the post union events which led ultimately to the June war of 1967. Part II is a methodical evaluation of the underlying elements of the events based upon what is described as action-response-reaction nexus.

In the final analysis, the author seems to imply that Nasser's major foreign policy decisions may be justified and even rationalized if certain circumstances and constraints involving these decisions are taken into consideration. On the basis of this assumption, the author supplies a number of reasons for Nasser's major foreign policy decisions. In one instance, however, he goes a little bit too far when he attempts to rationalize Nasser's decision to dismiss the United Nations Emergency Forces from Sinai in 1967 (p. 110).

There is no doubt that Nasser made many sound decisions in the conduct of Egypt's foreign policy, but he also made a number of other decisions in which he merely reacted to certain events without weighing the consequences. It is not difficult at all to cite several good reasons for any particular foreign policy decision, yet a sound decision in any situation is made only after all aspects are taken into consideration, including the all-important aspect of economics. In this respect, President Sadat is considered a master of foreign policy decisions, sim-

ply because he weighs carefully all the possibilities and constraints of any situation before he makes his final decision.

This book is well-written and well-organized. It is informative as well as challenging and thought-provoking. The author is to be complimented for his methodology and insight.

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ERNEST S. DODGE. *Islands and Empires: Western Impact on the Pacific and East Asia*. Pp. xvi, 364. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976. $16.00.

Islands and Empires is part of a new series from Minnesota called "Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion." Most of the projected ten volumes have now been published, and the publishers are to be congratulated on producing such a series at a time when "imperial" history is pretty much at a discount. Perhaps the whole series will *in toto* provide a new direction and rationale for this currently unfashionable area of inquiry.

The present book is a very readable survey of European activities in the Pacific and East Asia, beginning with the very earliest contacts and ending around 1900. Dodge covers various European "impacts" on the two areas—the work of explorers, missionaries, traders, diplomats, adventurers, settlers—and also sketches reverse influences, such as the fashionable adulation of Polynesian visitors in Regency England, and the chinoiserie fad in Europe and America. Many topics are deftly handled in a light colloquial style. There is little new here, but this book should appeal to a wide public, for much ground is covered in a very attractive manner.

I don't know who decided that this book should cover both East Asia and the Pacific, but this is what must give qualms to Dodge's fellow scholars. He himself says both that "This is the first time this subject [of Western impact] has ever been considered combining the Pacific and Eastern Asia" and "The subject of this volume almost automatically divides itself into two parts . . . presenting very different problems." The book is in fact clearly divided into two parts, and there is little integration between the two. To my mind lumping together two such different areas was a serious mistake, for they simply have nothing in common. The East Asia part is wholly derivative and only one third of the book anyway. It deserves a full volume written by a specialist. Dodge is an eminent authority on the Pacific. If only he could have had a full volume to expand on his present excellent, but necessarily rather compressed, coverage of this area.

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RIAD EL-RAYYES and DUNIA NAHAS. *Guerrillas for Palestine*. Pp. i, 155. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. $15.95.

This thin, polemic-free volume presents a fragmentary, badly organized, but seemingly accurate description of some fifteen Palestinian guerrilla organizations. It is incredibly candid regarding their acts of terrorism and their internal conflicts. It includes a partial description of their "political apparatus," and a useful but all too brief account of their relations with the Arab states and with China and the USSR. Finally, it devotes some eleven pages to brief biographical sketches of eight of their principal leaders.

A scholarly study of, or even a comprehensive report on, the Palestinian "resistance" movement would be a welcome addition to the knowledge that is essential for understanding and resolving one of the world's most serious conflicts. For reasons in addition to those already indicated, however, this monograph has very limited utility: First, the authors are not identified, although it appears that they are Palestinians. Second, there is no documentation and no bibliography. An introductory statement reveals only that the book, which was first published in London, "is based largely on contacts and interviews . . .

conducted by the Palestinian affairs specialists on the research staff of *An-Nahar Arab Report*." Third, the authors assume that the reader is already thoroughly familiar with the history, the politics, and the continuing issues that are central to understanding the creation and the mission of *Guerrillas for Palestine*. In consequence, there is no summary of the evolution of the problem. Moreover, there is no indication of who the Palestinians are, how many and where they are, what their specific grievances are, or what has been done—apart from guerrilla activity—in their behalf.

In spite of its limitations, this work provides much useful information, although most of it is already familiar to careful readers of *The New York Times* and other informed sources. Here is an account of the loose confederation called the Palestine Liberation Organization, from its creation in 1964, as a means of restraining Palestinian nationalism in favor of Nasser's pan-Arab movement, to its capture by Yasir Arafat and its domination in and after 1968 by his relatively moderate Fateh, dedicated initially to "the return of all Palestinian Arabs . . . to live in a secular, democratic state . . . with all of the present inhabitants, irrespective of their religion or their cultural background . . ." (p. 20).

As all should know, the PLO has always been a fragmented confederation of semi-autonomous organizations. Terrorist activities of some of its components—particularly those organizations comprising the "rejection front"—have often embarrassed Fateh and obstructed its programs. Since Fateh itself is a guerrilla force, it is not surprising that from time to time its "defecting" members have organized such extremist groups as Black September, the perpetrator of the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes in 1972. Thus, the PLO is polarized internally, with some of its components—particularly the "rejection front"—insisting on campaigns of terror, assassination, and sabotage against Israel in order to liberate the whole of Palestine, in contrast to the Arafat group (Fateh) and the Syrian-controlled organization (Sa'eqa) which are "prepared to negotiate a settlement which approves the establishment of a Palestine (such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) as a step towards the goal of a secular democratic republic throughout the whole region" (p. 25). This relatively moderate goal, of course, is itself clearly an ultimate threat to Israel, but elsewhere the authors indicate that the PLO, early in 1971, implicitly accepted the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242, as have Syria and Egypt, which recognizes the right to exist of all states in the region (pp. 93–94, 98).

Among the Palestinians' continuing problems, according to the authors, is the Arab states' tendency to put their national interests above those of the Palestinians. Most of these regimes thus seek an overall settlement, and all signs indicate that the Palestinians' principal sources of support—the more powerful Arab states and even the USSR and China—are hostile to the "rejection front."

Since the date when this book was completed, the extremist components within the PLO have been decimated by Syrian forces operating in Lebanon. In consequence, the "moderate" factions of PLO are stronger than ever, while the principal actors in this tragic conflict proceed, as requested by the 1976 General Assembly, to reconvene the Geneva conference "not later than" March 31, 1977, in negotiations that, according to the Assembly, must include PLO representation. As movement of this kind becomes productive, whether on schedule or not, *Guerrillas for Palestine* will be a useful reference work regarding the roles and limitations of the PLO and the Arab states in the quest for peace.

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ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL, ed. *The Peruvian Experiment*. Pp. x, 479. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976. $22.50.

The most recent decade of Peruvian history is an appealing period for social and political analysis. In 1968, at the time

of the Velasco military takeover, the nation exhibited many of the characteristics of developing nations; Peru's large indigenous population had not yet been incorporated in the mainstream of the country's development; there was a very unequal distribution of wealth and income; the economy relied heavily on natural resources; and there was a high degree of dependence on more developed nations—especially the United States.

When Velasco took power in 1968, political scientists groped unsuccessfully for a category to describe the new government's orientation. Nationalization of the International Petroleum Company, agrarian reform programs, and efforts to institutionalize "social property" were not consistent with actions of traditional right wing Latin American military dictatorships. Neither, however, did the Velasco regime align itself with the leftist regimes of the hemisphere.

This book is one of the first comprehensive efforts to analyze the Velasco government and to compare it with the civilian regime that preceded it. The ten essays it comprises resulted from a 1973 seminar on continuity and change in contemporary Peru sponsored by the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York. Generally, the essays are easy to read and do not require a high level of technical expertise in any specific academic field. In discussing such diverse topics as land tenure, squatter settlements, income distribution, foreign investment, education and urbanization, the authors did not attempt to develop a coherent theme. Rather, the dimensions and significance of the military regime were explored from the authors' own perspectives. Nevertheless, several overall impressions emerge from the volume.

First, there is still no consensus regarding how to classify the military government. There is a gap between the government's achievements and its own revolutionary slogans. It is not clear that it really is a different *kind* of government. There is some support for the view that it is just another military regime operating pragmatically within the nation's political and social constraints.

The Velasco government gave considerable attention to improving income distribution. While there have been absolute gains in the standards of living in most sectors, it appears that inequality has actually been growing. Furthermore, the sectors needing most improvement may be benefiting least.

Increasingly, it is recognized that even with the best of intentions, it is difficult to distribute wealth effectively and equitably in a country where much of the population is not socially mobilized. Those among the lower income groups who are best organized tend to receive the most. For example, despite the publicity given to a major program such as agrarian reform, the total income transfer is estimated to be less than 2 percent. "Furthermore, even if it is fully carried out, the agrarian reform will benefit less than 40 percent of all farm families needing assistance and less than 10 percent of the Indian communities" (p. 204).

A great deal of effort will be required to achieve popular participation. It is not clear whether a continuation of present policies will result in greater tension and the need for more force to retain control. One author anticipates growing confrontation with the supposed beneficiaries of the regime because of unrealized objectives.

The Peruvian Experiment represents a valuable contribution to the analysis of Peru's recent experience. It should definitely be read by students of Peru and will also be useful to readers with a general interest in developing nations who want to better understand what may be a more novel approach to development by a military government.

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KITSIRI MALALGODA. *Buddhism in Sinhalese Society, 1750–1900: A Study of Religious Revival and Change*. Pp. xiii, 300. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $16.50.

Kitsiri Malalgoda, of the Department of Sociology, University of Auckland, has

contributed a valuable study which will be indispensable to any serious student of modern Sinhalese Buddhism. While various writers have addressed themselves to the relationship between religion and society in Ceylon since independence, this has been done without benefit of the kind of detailed historical analysis of the early modern period provided by the present book. Much of the previous writing on the British period has played the nationalist theme of the "betrayal of Buddhism," without greatly adding to our knowledge of the internal dynamics of Buddhism challenged by an aggressive Christianity. Dr. Malalgoda's study, on the other hand, in filling this gap presents scholarship of a high order: good documentation, sound generalizations, balanced judgments.

After a quick overview of the historical development of Buddhism in Ceylon and the impact of the Portuguese and Dutch, Malalgoda goes to his two major themes. Part One deals with schisms within the Sangha (monastic order) and the rise of new monastic fraternities. Under King Kirti Sri Rajasinha's remarkable reforms, monks were brought from Siam to reestablish the Theravada ordination, resulting in a steady increase in the number of duly ordained Sinhalese monks. As these were all recruited from the high Goyigama caste, low-caste protests resulted in the rise of the Amarapura and other fraternities. The author's detailed treatment of this caste-inspired segmentation of the Sangha emphasizes the shift of the effective center of Buddhism from Kandy to the low country.

Part Two is entitled "Protestant Buddhism," and deals with the response of resurgent Buddhism to the Christian missionaries' challenge. Among other things, the author stresses the point that a highly effective defense of Buddhism was being made by Sinhalese monks long before Colonel Henry Steel Olcott arrived on the scene in 1880. Olcott himself described his visit as "the beginning of the second and permanent stage of the Buddhist revival," and attributed the first to the monk Ven. Mohottivatte. The author suggests that the monkhood's ancient tradition of keeping on good terms with the established political authority, whatever it might be, helps to explain the fact that the Buddhist revival never developed into an organized nationalist movement to drive the British out.

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RICHARD H. MITCHELL. *Thought Control in Prewar Japan*. Pp. 226. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $10.95.

The *system* of the control of "subversive" political thought of the variegated left and also later of the ultraright in Japan from around the turn of the century to 1941 is the subject of this slim but well documented study. Not only is the legislative history of the "notorious" Peace Preservation Law of 1925 and its subsequent revisions of 1929 and 1941 traced but also examined are the applications of the law, alternative administrative procedures (such as preventive detention), new techniques that would help induce "conversion" (*tenkō*), and the whole governmental structure that became involved. This included particularly the Justice and Home Ministries, the thought procurators and thought police. Thought control was spearheaded by Hiranuma Kiichirō (a Justice official who became Prime Minister in 1939), whose bureaucratic faction had made the system work across the grain of the independent and rival sections of the government. The author reviews the Morito (1920) and Kyoto Student Association (1925) cases, the mass arrests (March 15, 1928), and the public trials of Communists (1931–32). These were milestones lining the way to the "spiritual mobilization" of 1938–39 and the acceptance of a narrow, authoritarian value system and support for all-out war.

Professor Mitchell attempts to write an objective account. He states that the Communist "threat" was pitifully small and shows how the definition of "dangerous" and "unhealthy" thought

widened to cover the mildest liberalism. Nevertheless, he describes the problems through the eyes of the bureaucrats and makes some of his value judgments from their point of view, such as regarding the "success" of the program, though in the end it helped bring defeat to Japan. Mitchell argues that Hiranuma was not a "fascist" but a "conservative" who ultimately opposed a more repressive system (p. 175).

While not discussing this, in Japan today there remains on the books the early postoccupation antisubversive law of 1952 ("*Habōhō*") that could, under changed circumstances, be applied in what Mitchell characterized as a "nonrational" manner. In the United States, too, not all the laws from the Joe McCarthy period have been expunged. Thus, the unique characteristics of Japanese antidemocratic thought control should not hide the more general dynamics that come into play when conservatism tries to stop change in its tracks even in a non-fascist polity, where there is no dictator and where the populace is well-educated and better-off financially than in the less developed nations. It is in this sense that his study holds intrinsic interest not only for those who specialize in Japanese politics, law, and history, but also for those interested in preserving civil liberties in modern, affluent societies.

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JAMES C. SCOTT. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Pp. ix, 246. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976. $15.00.

In many ways this is a gem of a book. To a high level of scholarship conceptualization, analysis, and an original and consistent approach, it adds clear and readable prose.

The core of the argument is the nature of the subsistence ethic, described analytically in the first chapter. The subsistence ethic stems from peasant preoccupation with minimal subsistence needs and protection against crisis periods resulting from crop failures and, in market economies, price fluctuations. Subsistence is considered by the peasant as a right and much of traditional peasant society is concerned with the security of this right. Minimal subsistence involves more than food, it involves performance of social obligations as these are defined in each society. From this ethic flow much of the moral value systems of each group and their perception of what is right and just, and from it flow not only the nature of economic decisions and acceptable alternatives but unrest, resistance, and rebellion as well.

Chapter 2 elaborates the moral dimensions as revealed in various social and economic arrangements. In traditional societies individual household security is provided by reciprocity (viewed more broadly than it is by Polanyi) and redistributive mechanisms, although there is no protection for collective disaster. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 apply these arguments to the development of colonial economies and peasant politics in Southeast Asia. Structural changes in the colonial economy and the effects of fiscal claims by the state upon the peasant are examined. Chapter 5 analyzes two major peasant rebellions in Burma and Vietnam in the light of the subsistence ethic and the search for security. Chapter 6 deals with the influence of the political economy of the subsistence ethic on peasant politics. This involves analysis of the peasant ideas of social justice and offers an operational definition of exploitation. Chapter 7 considers the why and when of peasant rebellions or their failure to occur.

The theoretical approach draws on Marxist ideas but frequently departs from them. However some concepts are adopted uncritically. The term "peasant" is loosely used, reflecting widespread confusion about the term. It is not always clear what is meant, and smallholders, tenant farmers, artisans, and laborers evidently are all included. I happen to think this is proper in rural settings, but some disagree strongly. Employment of the term "class" is very loose and there is no clear definition of

what is meant; in some cases occupational or status groups seem to be so labeled. Techniques of exploiting the peasant frequently attributed to the colonial regimes, are elsewhere recognized as present in pre-colonial situations. What emerges is that the colonial states are much more efficient.

The clearest departure from Marxism is in attempts to deal with the concept of "exploitation" in Chapter 6. Several definitions are examined and a new operational definition is offered.

Despite these minor caveats, the book should be useful to a wide variety of readers.

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DAVID R. STURTEVANT. *Popular Uprising in the Philippines, 1840–1940*. Pp. 317. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $17.50.

This book deals with violent peasant movements in the Philippines over a century spanning the late Spanish and the whole of the U.S. colonial periods, plus the first years of the Philippines Commonwealth. It will be of value to anthropologists, historians, political scientists and sociologists interested in peasant movements in general and in Southeast Asia.

Professor Sturtevant has been writing about Philippine peasant movements since the early 1960s. In this work he has revised and drawn together parts of previously published papers and expanded them with new data to make a readable book. As well as the usual official documents, he has used newspaper files and the memoirs and private papers of Spanish, U.S. and Philippine officials. He has let us hear the voice of the rebels themselves by including contemporary interviews with captives and his personal interviews with former leaders.

Professor Sturtevant's thesis is that the basic conflict in the countryside came from a cultural rather than economic or political clash. Thus the uprisings are revitalization movements that point to the existence of serious tensions between what Robert Redfield saw as the little tradition of village folk and the great tradition of a rational urban centered culture. The only common theme he finds in movements before about 1935 is the messianic behavior of leaders and the millenarian religious behavior of members who believed in an imminent apocalypse that only the purified members of rigorously egalitarian fraternities would survive. In confrontations with the authorities they trusted in the miraculous power of amulets to turn away the bullets and bring victory.

The Sakdal movement in the 1930s marks a transition from supernaturalism and utopian "impossibilism" to secular movements that had more limited goals, more rational and coherent leadership, and perhaps more effect. This was the time when urban middle and upper class intellectuals took a hand in peasant organization.

The rich detail of exotic belief and practice and the religious form of the earlier peasant utopias described remind us that it is only in recent times that people with a wider viewpoint have turned pandemic peasant discontent with their lot into well-organized and sometimes successful wars of national liberation or class war.

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HUGH TINKER. *Separate and Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920–1950*. Pp. 460. Vancouver, Ca.: University of British Columbia Press, 1976. $18.50.

The coerced migration of populations is as old and recurring as human history. The subject in all its tragic dimensions demands systematic attention, but for any major international movement of populations in the modern world, its demographic, cultural and political implications are enormously complex. This is preeminently true for the worldwide

diaspora of the peoples of India over the past two hundred years. No historian except Hugh Tinker would be capable of the synthesis which his new two-volume history of the subject achieves. Broadly experienced as both administrator and scholar in several parts of the Empire and Commonwealth, Tinker provides both an intimate understanding of politics and society in India and a balanced analysis of the diplomacy of the Empire.

In the first volume, *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830–1920*, he traces the migration of Indian labor after the formal abolition of slavery in the British Empire, from homelands in several provinces of British India to plantations around the tropical world. His account is acutely aware not only of the imperial politics and international economics of the subject, but of the cultures of the castes in question, and even the soil and weather conditions which underlay the entire story.

Separate and Unequal continues this epic story for the years between World War I and the birth of the British Commonwealth, this time with relatively greater emphasis on the politics of empire and nationalism. From the Indians' perspective this entailed at least three foci of political initiative. From the time of Gandhi's work in Africa onward, the Indian National Congress persistently struggled to gain from London a policy guaranteeing full civil equality for Indians in all parts of the Empire. The Viceroy's government in New Delhi, responding to pressures from Congress, for the most part urged London to construct a single policy imposed consistently on all colonies and Dominions.

But the Colonial Office in London was responding to different sets of pressures; its sympathies were for the most part incompatible with India's sense of justice and consistency. The colonial elites maintained white supremacist policies, and even Dominions like Canada limited immigration of Indians after World War I. Together they fought for what they euphemistically described as a decentralized approach for the Empire, one which would allow each colony or Dominion control over its own policies. British Africa especially, which was central to the interests of the overseas Indians, successfully defended the principle of local control even through the intricate negotiations which transformed the Empire into the Commonwealth in the 1940s. Tinker's final chapters trace the intricate diplomatic maneuvering which brought independent India into the Commonwealth after 1947, despite London's continued failure to resolve the demand for racial equality with the power of the white supremacists.

The author makes it evident that this diplomatic tightrope resolved the question to no one's permanent satisfaction. The issue, of course, is still with us, as negotiations over control of Southern Rhodesia continue into 1977. Hugh Tinker's analysis of its background as seen from London and New Delhi thus takes on contemporary urgency as well as great distinction for all historians interested in colonization, nationalism and multiracial politics.

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FRANKLIN B. WEINSTEIN. *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence—From Sukarno to Soeharto*. Pp. 384. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $17.50.

This is an uncommonly interesting and valuable study, if for no other reason than that the author looks at the problem through the eyes and with the words of the Indonesian foreign policy elite. Overwhelmingly, the vast literature on the problems of the developing countries assays them from our Western perspective. Ideally, we should read as much written by them and give at least as much attention to what they think as we do to our own Western studies. This volume is a happy compromise since Dr. Weinstein can hardly divest himself of everything he is.

Clearly, there is an almost inevitable

l largely unresolvable ambivalence in lonesian thinking. Its leaders see the rld as hostile, whatever the ideologi- stripe of any given country, each ng motivated by its own self-interest, ich means at the expense of In- ıesia. Hence, the urge for total inde- ıdence in all areas of activity and the ed for self-reliance. Many leaders mire the Peoples Republic of China, t they either cannot bring themselves follow that path, or believe that lonesians are incapable of the disci- ne it would require.

In contrast, there is a general convic- n that Indonesian poverty and under- velopment are so great that they can be lved only through massive foreign aid, d that means some degree of limitation freedom of action—dependence. In- nesian leaders are fixed on the idea at development means industrializa- n and produce, produce, produce—an ea of course picked up while studying Western universities, and primarily in nerican ones. Surely, in the Hereafter ere must be some special form of mishment reserved for economists ho for a generation now and still oselytize Western development mod- s for the rest of the world, totally blivious of the fact that the conditions hich made Western development pos- ble simply do not exist in most of the st of the world and never will.

This study is a well informed and erceptive account of the struggle be- veen these two main themes, as mod- ed and influenced by other internal nd external forces. The final impression not exactly hopeful. I would even call bleak.

Dr. Weinstein asserts that a principal urpose in his study is to find lessons for ther developing countries. His conclu- ions are so few and so general that they re either cliches or not conclusions at ll. Although he does not say so, I read im as implying that each country is a problem unique to itself. I would add that each one must make its own decision as to whether and to what extent to compromise its freedom of action, or whether to stand alone—and pay the price. The last sentence in the book seems to me the most significant: "It may well be that the only way for them to develop is to seek their own more autonomous paths."

JOHN F. MELBY

University of Guelph
Ontario
Canada

EUROPE

JOSEPH P. LASH. *Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941*. Pp. 528. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. $12.95.

This book is an account of the highly unusual personal and political friendship between the President of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of the U.K. during the first two years of the Second World War. The relationship has been the subject of much comment in autobiographies (including, notably, Churchill's own) and biographies, so that the general picture has long been familiar. But Joseph Lash, a former newspaperman, adds much that is new, supported as he is by the recently opened Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence.

There was, of course, a tremendous difference in the positions of the two statesmen. Churchill headed a warring nation, to whose leadership he had been called in the time of its greatest peril. The power of the British executive gave him great scope and maneuverability in decision-making, and he was able to indulge his dash and flair for unconventional solutions. Roosevelt faced an isolationist opposition between 1939 and 1941, and his freedom in conducting foreign policy was much restricted by the constitutional powers of Congress. His strength with the American voters was qualified by the knowledge that the great majority of them did not want United States involvement.

Both men wished and worked for this outcome. Churchill for the most part understood the President's predicament and only in secret letters did he reveal how much he desired American intervention. He was certainly not above painting the British picture even blacker

than it was in reality, in order to encourage American support. Roosevelt saw the defense of Britain as essential in terms of American strategic self-interest. (Much of his concern in 1940 was about what would happen to the British Navy if Britain surrendered.) Yet what emerges strikingly from these pages is how ideological was the President's commitment. More aware than most Americans of the nature of Nazism, and of the indivisibility of freedom, he felt that it was right that his country should be at war with Hitler. Thus those of us of the wartime generation who looked to him as the true leader of the world's democratic peoples were correct in our impression.

Roosevelt, the idealist, needed Roosevelt the Machiavellian when it came to getting the United States embroiled. Using his powers as Commander-in-Chief he instituted Atlantic patrols that assisted the hard-pressed British Navy, and he took over the occupation of Iceland from the British. At the same time he carefully consulted constitutional lawyers before introducing Lend-Lease and maintained a careful check on public and congressional opinion. The touch-and-go nature of the latter is exemplified by the passage in the House of Representatives in August 1941 by only one vote of the Bill to extend the selective draft even after the clause to allow the use of draftees outside the Western hemisphere had been abandoned. But only three weeks later when the destroyer *Greer* was attacked Roosevelt used the incident to broadcast to the nation a declaration that the Atlantic fleet would henceforward protect all Allied ships in the Western Atlantic, though German and Italian ships would enter such waters "at their own peril." Thus Roosevelt gradually edged public opinion toward an acceptance of belligerency, looking always for pretexts for greater intervention. Never, however, did he move without carrying American public opinion with him.

While the book caters to the male "coffee-table" interest, especially that section of it, very strong in Britain, which consists of World War II veterans; it is nevertheless more than an account of the development of a political friendship. Doubtless diplomatic historians will analyze more thoroughly the correspondence and relate it more knowledgeably to the political circumstances of the time. Yet the author's treatment is not without erudition and, if his style sometimes stumbles into journalese, for the most part it sustains the reader through the fascinating story.

FRANK BEALEY
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Scotland

JACQUES LERUEZ. *Economic Planning and Politics in Britain*. Pp. xi, 324. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975. No price.

FRANK STACEY. *British Government, 1966–1975: The Years of Reform*. Pp. ix, 243. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. $17.00.

The economic misfortune which has befallen Great Britain has caused many social scientists to re-examine the classic model of British Government in terms of economic policy. Such a reexamination is central to two very different kinds of books which give insights into the operation of British Government, especially in new areas of endeavor. In *British Government, 1966–1975* Frank Stacey examines reform in the electoral system, Parliament, including attempts to change the House of Lords, the ministries and central planning, the Civil Service, local and regional government, the National Health Service and procedures for the redress of grievances. In a study of much greater depth entitled *Economic Planning and Politics in Britain* author Jacques Leruez traces planning and a significant amount of general economic policy in theory and practice from 1945 to 1972.

Neither of these books will be useful for people who do not have a sound knowledge of the British political system. In many respects the Stacey book can be considered a sequel to a longer book written by the same author entitled *The Government of Great Britain*. In the *British Government, 1966–1975* Stacey

primarily focuses on institutional reform and the book is fundamentally descriptive. Little attention is paid to the enormous social change that has taken place in Great Britain in the post World War II era, change which must be considered as background to any study of reform.

Leruez is a French scholar who offers the benefits of a comparative perspective and his reference to French planning is an important element in his book. This is especially true in a brief but very thoughtful concluding chapter. This is a thorough work which displays significant insights into the economic and political forces which bear on planning as well as the operation of the structural elements involved in the making of economic policy. Particularly interesting is the comparison the author gives of the idealistic approach of the Labour Party to planning and the begrudging use of it by Conservative Governments. The discussion of the failure of the 1965 National Plan and the consequences of this failure provide vital material necessary to understand Britain's economic plight. In fact, Leruez argues persuasively that the enormity of the economic difficulty in which Britain finds itself can be traced to its approach to planning and the few real achievements of its planning efforts. This book is undoubtedly one of the most important comprehensive approaches to British economic policies written in recent years.

STEPHEN P. KOFF

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New York

RALPH B. LEVERING. *American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939–1945.* Pp. xv, 262. Chapel Hill. The University of North Carolina Press, 1976. $17.95.

Soviet Russia has long been unknown and often distrusted by Americans and its image as a result has always had an unreal quality about it. And at no time were American fantasies about Russia greater than during World War II when attitudes fluctuated wildly from suspicions, to extreme hostility, to friendship and brotherhood in a crusade to save th free world, back to suspiciousness an ultimately to deep enmity and fear durin the cold war period. Professor Leverin has carefully plotted these oscillations o attitudes from 1939 to 1945 using th numerous public opinion polls of th period and a wide variety of publication and broadcasts. He uses these material to document the changing views of th conservatives, liberals, the various hue of intellectuals and the popular press.

In his review and analysis Professo Levering found nothing new or startling Popular and elite attitudes fluctuate primarily according to what American thought Russia was contributing to th war against fascism and their optimisn about the postwar world. At the height o friendship for Russia in 1942–43 man Americans came to believe the Unite States and the Soviet Union had commo postwar goals. This latter fiction was kep alive as long as possible by the govern ment and particularly Roosevelt. But b 1944 suspicions of Soviet motivation steadily began to increase and soon afte 1945 led to the cold war. Although th majority of American opinion shifte back and forth from the beginning to th end of the war there was a hard core o opinion makers and about one quarter o the population who remained distrustfu of the Russians throughout. For the mos part the spectrum of views of the elit and masses coincided and from this th author concludes that the opinions of th rank-and-file Americans on Russia wer determined and guided by the elit opinion makers. He assumes that th level of knowledge about Russia was s low that people looked to the accepte opinion leaders rather than judgin themselves the contributions bein made by the Russians and their trustwor thiness as allies.

For the most part this study is a straight forward chronology of American at titudes, but at times Professor Leverin is very judgmental toward certain view which were expressed, calling som excellent and others ill-conceived. Fron historical hindsight it may be tempting t criticize certain views but it really doe not belong to a detached analysis o

changing attitudes. At the end of the volume the author is particularly critical of Roosevelt for not warning the American people about the different and contrary postwar objectives of Russia and the United States. In this case I think the author may have missed the point of Roosevelt's policy which was based on the belief that Churchill, Stalin, and he, Roosevelt, could personally reach compromises and settlements for the world and keep the peace under a benevolent three power hegemony. At least until after Yalta Roosevelt seemed to have believed that such a postwar arrangement would be possible. Furthermore, there is evidence that Stalin was also taken with this scheme as the best means to get what he wanted and to avoid conflict with the United States. Therefore, for Roosevelt to have warned the American people of the differences between Russia and the United States would have directly undermined any hope of settling issues at the summit. That Roosevelt may have underestimated the problems and overestimated his own ability is another question. In spite of the judgmental quality of some of the discussion, this volume makes a valuable contribution in summarizing and carefully documenting the fluctuations of American popular and elite attitudes toward the Soviet Union during World War II.

DAVID T. CATTELL
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JOHN PAXTON. *The Developing Common Market: The Structure of the E. E. C. in Theory and in Practice, 1957–1976.* Pp. 240. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976. $25.00.

Since the late 1960s there has been increasing comment in the popular press on the declining health of the European Economic Community. These fading hopes for a united Europe have been engendered by both the narrowly nationalistic attitudes of member states and, increasingly, by perceived structural imperfections in the Community's institutions. Largely ignoring these pessimistic winds which have been blowing around the Community's headquarters in Brussels, is a new book by John Paxton of Great Britain, *The Developing Common Market: The Structure of the E. E. C. in Theory and in Practice, 1957–1976.*

Mr. Paxton's optimistic treatment of Common Market structure and practice is unique in several ways. First, his emphasis is on explanation and operation rather than discussion and evaluation. Possible criticisms of current practice are largely ignored in favor of precise descriptive analysis. Second, an attempt is made by the author to show the actual economic results of various provisions of the Rome Treaty and its resultant regulations. The use of charts to explain the practical operation of tariffs, social security rules and taxes is quite helpful in gauging the importance of certain procedures to the operation of the complete system. Of key importance to Mr. Paxton's approach is the political nature of the Community's origin and current functioning. Although the author's prediction that "on the horizon lies political union" belies current realities, there is an infectious quality to his optimism that carries the reader beyond the depressing noises made by other commentators.

The approach taken by Mr. Paxton is a largely episodic one, dealing first with a summary of post-war economic developments in Western Europe, and then proceeding through an examination of the Community's institutions and policies. Particular attention is given to matters of concern to business leaders. The chapters dealing with the rules of competition, the operation of the Value Added Tax (VAT) and the scope of common agricultural policies are the most detailed. The section dealing with the operation of community law within the member states is also well done and is important because it is often omitted or mishandled in books of this type.

Despite the brisk tone, brevity and general accuracy of Mr. Paxton's treatment, there are several criticisms that should be made of his work. First, too much effort is expended in discussing the details of prior provisional periods in the operation of the Community. Second,

to provide a tie to ongoing developments in the *Community's* operation there should have been specific references to the case law that has built up over the past two decades. These references are of substantial import in the merger regulation area. Third, the author's insistence on explanation rather than evaluation is a bit more stringent than it needs to be.

Overall, Mr. Paxton has given us an excellent short treatment of the operation of the Common Market. The book's genesis most likely was an attempt to explain to the educated public in Great Britain the operation of the Economic Community to which they had only recently become attached. One hopes that the author will be willing in his next volume to offer a little more interpretive embroidery to this excellent beginning.

JAMES R. SILKENAT

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JOHANNES STEINHOFF. *Wohin treibt die NATO? Probleme der Verteidigung Westeuropas.* Pp. 279. Hamburg, Germany: Hoffman and Campe, 1976. DM 28.

Where is NATO drifting to? This is not a new question and is asked frequently these days. Steinhoff, a retired German Air Force General, answers it by proposing specific recommendations to the problems associated with defense of Western Europe. Although others have tried a similar approach, this is not a rehash of old proposals. Steinhoff presents an independent assessment that is amplified by his work as Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. Readers will recall that this is the highest military authority in the Alliance.

In assessing the current NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance, he concludes, as most others, that the Soviet threat to Europe has matured and is now more serious than ever before. Rather than orienting its military strategy and diplomatic policy toward this specific threat, Steinhoff argues that NATO is drifting as though this situation did not exist.

Broad answers to tactical and strat concerns are found in his discussio five scenarios outlining possible atta on NATO. No one will be too shoc that a scenario featuring a surpr limited attack in the central sector of the best possibility for Soviet succes capitalizes on the defects of the liance's decision-making structures, absence of coordinated tactical man vering, the maldeployment of NA armies, the poor positioning of the Li of Communication, and lack of inte tion of its air forces. Most importantl fits current Soviet capabilities and int tions.

By completing a detailed structu functional analysis of the defense pr lems of each of the European countr comprising the Alliance and th evaluating problems associated w such specific areas as ground for tactical air forces, and tactical nucl weapons, Steinhoff develops specific r ommendations that could halt NAT drift. Many of his suggestions on proving NATO armed forces could accomplished within his concept of to standardization. Such military st dardization goes beyond armaments a includes training and doctrine, logist communications, and tactics. It wo have the additional advantage of less ing the dependence on nuclear weap by vastly improving conventional fo effectiveness within the NATO str ture.

As an "Atlanticist," Steinhoff is criti of French attitudes. Yet, he does waste time with invective and consid France a vital part of the NATO soluti He would welcome them back into NATO forces structure for a price. T price is acceptance of Atlantic *int dependence*, which he believes e member nation must pay if NATO i successfully prioritize requirements a accomplish these consonant with resources.

Steinhoff displays a faith in NAT efficacy and survival that many n consider remarkable, given the viabi of his critique. He recognizes that o an Alliance can defend Western Eur and he wants NATO strengthened b

militarily and politically to accomplish that. And he does not want the Germans to have the primary responsibility to accomplish this. To stop NATO's drifting, he advocates an Alliance with more integrated, totally standardized armed forces with a policy stressing Atlantic interdependence in defense, political, and economic matters.

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TRAIAN STOIANOVICH. *French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm.* Pp. 260. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. $12.50.

Professor Stoianovich has a thesis, albeit one that would be shared by few of the historians whose work he discusses. He believes that *Annales* historians have created a paradigm or "disciplinary matrix" for the world community of scholarship. This, he says, is the third paradigm in Western historiography. The first, perfected by Machiavelli and Guicardini, was that of exemplary history, which sought in the study of the past to find lessons for contemporary politics. The second was developmental history developed during the nineteenth century by the Germans and closely allied with the idea of linear progress. The third is functional history in which society is considered as a communications system.

This paradigm, according to Stoianovich, has been created by three generations of French historians. The first generation consisted of the founders, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. The second is identified above all with Fernand Braudel. The third includes those working in the tradition of Braudel, of whom the best known in this country are probably Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Pierre Goubert. In Stoianovich's view, the period 1946–72 was critical for the emergence and refinement of the paradigm. His book defines the paradigm, then reconstructs some of the debates that have taken place among *Annales* historians and between *Annales* historians and their Marxist and Structuralist critics with respect to its usefulness and proper implementation. Stoianovich discusses in particular the question of global or total history, the study of cultural areas versus the study of modes of production favored by Marxists, the attention paid to marginal groups without written histories, the use of series and fascination with functions, and the relative rehabilitation of the event as a legitimate topic of historical research.

One can only admire Stoianovich's command of the literature of French historiography. His generous footnotes are sure to be ransacked eagerly by those anxious to bring themselves up-to-date on the writings of the French historians and their critics. But unfortunately, his book cannot be recommended without serious reservations. First, as Braudel points out politely in his introduction, Stoianovich does not provide an adequate account of the origins of the *Annales* School, nor does he delineate properly (as an *Annales* historian would be expected to) the social and institutional context within which French history has been written during the past half century. Second, in his zeal to demonstrate that French historiography possesses a paradigm or model, Stoianovich exaggerates to the point of distortion the unity of method of French historians. Indeed, his book might more appropriately have been entitled "French Historical Methods," for (again as Braudel comments) it was an openness to a multiplicity of approaches and a rejection of monistic models that characterized the *Annales* enterprise, as it was formulated by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. Third, and most seriously, Stoianovich is too entangled in the coils of the vocabulary used by French historians and too beguiled by the glitter of their words to explain satisfactorily what their words mean or to explore the ambiguities implicit in such concepts as "structure," "conjuncture," and "eventmental history." The student who seeks an introduction to the topic is better advised to turn to George Iggers's clear, well-informed, and elegant essay in his recent book on *New Directions* in

European Historiography (Middletown, Connecticut, 1975), pages 43–79; while those desiring a critical assessment of the *Annales* achievement will not find it here.

ROBERT WOHL
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UNITED STATES

JACK S. BLOCKER, JR. *Retreat from Reform: The Prohibition Movement in the United States, 1890–1913*. Contributions in American History, No. 51. Pp. xii, 261. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $14.95.

In this carefully reasoned and arresting study, the author concentrates his attention on the tribulations and decline of the Prohibition party and the emergence and success of the Anti-Saloon League. He shows that in 1896 the Prohibition party became a single issue party, fighting off intruders with other reforms to peddle. Until then, party leaders considered supporting one or more of such varied reforms as free silver, antilynching, woman suffrage, tax reform, antimonopoly legislation, and better treatment of wage earners. In 1892 the party platform embraced several such reforms, but its disappointing showing in the election of that year precipitated a long drawn out intraparty debate over what stance to pursue henceforth. Party platform makers often found it difficult to please church leaders. Whenever they sought to endorse nonprohibition reforms, these leaders pulled away from the party. In some cases this was because of the conservatism of individual churchmen, and in others because of the hesitancy of organized religious groups to become identified with political issues.

Blocker asserts that, although the silver issue was an important cause of the 1896 split, other reform proposals and how to deal with the churches produced wounds too deep to make effective party action possible. This split in the Prohibition party added to the attractiveness of the already expanding Anti-Salo[on] League. Using the balance of pow[er] approach, the League eventually a[c]complished passage of the 18th Amen[d]ment.

In his attempt to find reasons for part[y] failure, one might wonder why Block[er] neglects to analyze the characters, per[]sonalities, and abilities of the leaders [o]f the movement, and why he takes occa[]sion, in a seemingly "tacked on" Intro[]duction and Epilogue, to burden hi[s] narrative with intellectual musings an[d] unresearched discussion of the move[]ment following the period of his stud[y]. These digressions tend to weaken th[e] impact of his well researched an[d] thoughtful presentation of the 1890 1913 period. He refers to the Prohibitio[n] cause as a middle class movement, bu[t] waits until almost the final page t[o] indicate what he considers to be th[e] middle class; and all along he writes a[s] though prohibition is not a reform. Th[e] title of the book, *Retreat from Reform* means retreat from certain reforms bu[t] not from prohibition.

Blocker makes a friendly bow t[o] Gabriel Kolko. He suggests that corpo[]rate interests may have been responsibl[e] for the enactment of the 18th Amen[d]ment, but concedes that such a conclu[]sion must await "the kind of intensiv[e] analysis of the legislative proces[s] through which Kolko has discovere[d] corporate influence behind other Pro[]gressive reforms." Such caution is com[]mendable and, in this particular in[]stance, might well be fortuitous. Thi[s] reviewer and some other historians fin[d] Kolko unconvincing.

HORACE SAMUEL MERRILL
University of Maryland
College Park

JOHN W. DEAN. *Blind Ambition: Th[e] White House Years*. Pp. 415. Ne[w] York: Simon and Schuster, 197[6] $11.95.

In May 1970 John Dean was asked [if] he would be interested in working in th[e] White House. It was a time of massiv[e] convulsions over the Indochina Wa[r] including the ill-fated American inva

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
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UNITED STATES V. NIXON

The President before the Supreme Court

Edited by Leon Friedman, Hofstra Law School

Introductory Essay by Alan Westin, Columbia University

"The documents in this collection tell the story of one of the most important legal and constitutional events in our history: the Supreme Court decision in **United States v. Richard Nixon.** The title of the case itself illustrates the drama. It is usually the President who represents the people and embodies the power of the nation. But in this case the equation was reversed: it was the nation and the people against the President. And the great authority of the Presidency ultimately bowed to the courts and to the people represented by that uniquely pragmatic institution of our times, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force." – **from the Preface by Leon Friedman**

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CONTENTS

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PUBLIC OPINION

Changing Attitudes on Contemporary Political and Social Issues (A CBS News Reference Book)

Compiled by Robert Chandler

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0-0352-0548-7, 1972, 195 pp., $12.95

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Outside Western Hemisphere: Bowker, Erasmus House, Epping, Essex England.

ion of Cambodia, nationwide campus nsurrections, and the murder of unrmed students at Kent and Jackson State niversities. For Dean, however, these vere peripheral matters, if he noticed hem at all. Opportunities for power, nfluence, cars, and women all beckoned he bright young lawyer, who promptly ank into booze-filled reveries about what a big shot I would be as counsel to he President."

Dean's national prominence, as well as he popularity of this book, owes much to is role in planning and later exposing he Watergate coverup. Yet, *Blind Ambition*'s major value lies in its picture of life n the Nixon White House. We read bout the subterranean retreat where ational leaders will operate the govrnment during a nuclear war, the Situaion Room where Henry Kissinger rought his girlfriends to impress them, nd the executive command post for nonitoring public demonstrations (also sed by government officials for a secret howing of *Tricia's Wedding*, a pornoraphic film featuring cavorting transvesites). More significantly, we learn about he day-to-day job of counsel to the President: ordering IRS investigations of dministration critics; superintending pying on political opponents; facilitating lans for wiretaps, mail intercepts, and urglaries; suppressing satirical films, nd harassing individuals or organizaions out of favor. The orders for these perations came from Dean's White louse superiors, and we discover much bout their activities as well.

The most striking aspect of this portrait s the commonality of motivation among hose wielding high-level executive ower. Issues of principle are rarely, if ver, discussed. Human emotions are ubordinated to expediency. From the owest to the highest, White House fficials calculate, dream, and scheme ow to expand their office space, their nfluence, and their jurisdiction. At the op of the heap sits the brooding, suspiious President, his personality and life lighted by the exigencies of ambition. It vould be comforting to view the ruthless areerists of the Nixon era as aberrations, ut their pathology is all too familiar. As long as the scramble for wealth and power is accorded a place of honor in American life, we should prepare ourselves for a longer nightmare than Watergate.

LAWRENCE S. WITTNER
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IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. *Ideology and Utopia in the United States, 1956–1976*. Pp. vii, 464. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $17.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

One of the most significant features of modern classical conservatism—that is, of 18th and 19th century conservatism—is that it emanated from the very soil of politics, Professor Irving Louis Horowitz contends. Modern conservatism was the product of political policymaking and of such statesmen as John Adams and Edmund Burke, who were directly involved in the making and breaking of nations; it began not as an ideological movement with a blueprint for utopia but, rather, as a reactionary movement seeking to preserve order amidst the social and political turbulence of the times.

Twentieth century conservatism is in sharp contrast to the conservatism of Burke and Adams, Professor Horowitz believes. The conservatism of Burke and Adams was a response to political involvement, while 20th century conservatism is a response to alienation from that involvement. Twentieth century conservatism, in other words, is marked by its recognition of the "nonprimacy" of politics: the recognition that there are areas of life which, quite simply, are beyond the competence of politics and of the state to cope with. Twentieth century conservatism, then, is a reaction, perhaps an antidote, to modern utopianism, that is, the belief that paradise can be recreated here on earth purely through human endeavor.

Sharply opposed to American conservatism is American radicalism, which is abrasive, moralistic, egoistic, impatient, and utopian and revolutionary in intent and in character. American radicalism,

observes Professor Horowitz, emphasizes the primacy of the individual will over group interests, and seeks to mobilize the wills of individuals into one total will. American radicalism is strongly and self righteously moralistic, and totalistic: it attacks socialism as well as capitalism, industrialism as well as agrarianism. American radicalism seeks to impose on our society a new social, economic and political order, it wants a violent, sudden, revolutionary and mutational change of our society in order to attain the utopian aim of changing the nature of man.

Very interesting, indeed, is Professor Irving Horowitz's analysis of American radicalism. But it seems to me that, because of the limitations and restrictions of Professor Horowitz's philosophical perspective (he is a man of the Left: a scholar whose mentor is C. Wright Mills), he fails to take into account the view that American radicalism essentially is a pernicious substitute for religion: an attempt to achieve redemption not through faith in a Supreme Being but, rather, through an involvement, a total immersion, in messianic revolutionary politics.

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Arlington Heights
Illinois

ANTHONY JACKSON. *A Place Called Home: A History of Low-Cost Housing in Manhattan*. Pp. ix, 359. Cambridge, Mass.. The MIT Press, 1976. No price.

Anthony Jackson's *A Place Called Home: A History of Low-Cost Housing in Manhattan* is an account of the evolution of dwelling places for the poor in the heart of the nation's principal city. Jackson contends that developers build for that part of the population which can afford to pay and that while this portion included the majority of Manhattan's poorer population in the nineteenth century, in the twentieth century it no longer is the case. Ironically some of the factors which contributed to driving rentals beyond the reach of the poor we the result of requiring builders of ne structures to comply with improv minimum building standards which turn raised the cost of building.

In unfolding his story Jackson relate thorough, if pedantic, history of t subject throughout the nineteenth ce tury as he records the frustrations e countered in striving to provide ad quate housing for all—a noble if el sive goal. The elusiveness is attri uted in part to the prevalence antiquated laws such as one whi required buildings to be construct within the framework of a 25 × 1 lot—a standard originally enacted f single home buildings but never i tended for multiple dwellings.

Furthermore, the reader is introduc to the important figures and institutio of the era, such as Charles Chandl Felix Adler, and *The Plumber a Sanitary Engineer*. As the twentie century unfolded some importa changes in the direction of improv housing seemed to be detected (f example, the requirement for inner cou yards in the construction of new buil ings). Of greater importance than speci legislation of this type, however, w legislation directing a unitary admin tration for housing acts. Eschewing t continuance of numerous governme agencies with overlapping and ambig ous jurisdiction, opponents of unita administration such as Lawrence Ve ler supported by Theodore Rooseve helped usher in a new era for low-c housing. These and other progressi moves of a similar nature notwithstan ing, the story of adequate twentie century housing for the poor is largel story of failure as even the more rece theoretical innovations proved uns cessful according to Jackson. Thus t twentieth century's reliance on the filt ing theory wherein an expansion housing for upper income levels wou eventually provide more housing for t poor, resulted instead in a shortage. T increased cost of home building shra the number of units built for the midd

class and consequently fewer units were available for the lower class.

In his analysis of low-cost housing Jackson makes a number of telling points such as: the public which accepts the principle of taxation for the purpose of providing access to equal educational opportunities for all, but rejects a parallel principle of equity when it comes to adequate housing for all—almost an admission that this is not an inherent right, whereas education is. "With housing as in education the responsibility of government is to satisfy the essential requirements of its electorate." Another of Jackson's points is the assertion that suburban housing receives covert subsidization while inner city dwellings fall into obsolescence. He calls also for an end to unrestricted development.

On the other hand, Jackson's admonition that the responsibility for adequate housing lies with government rather than with private industry is not overly reassuring given its track record. Jackson calls for a role in housing akin to that which it recognizes in providing sewerage or other services (which are not left to private enterprise). Unconvincing also is Jackson's facile comparison of American suburban housing with regulation Soviet apartments, a comparison which would warrant credibility only after a more extensive elucidation than the author provides.

Because of a certain aridity of writing style but even more because of the technical nature of the topic, *A Place Called Home* probably will not gain a wide reading. Nevertheless the book is a useful, informative and interpretive history of low-cost housing, which will undoubtedly serve as a reference work for students of the field. The fact that it concentrates on Manhattan while seemingly of narrow appeal is not in and of itself a limiting factor since it provides a recognizable case history with which to compare and evaluate adequate housing for the poor in other urban centers.

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JOHN W. C. JOHNSTONE, EDWARD J. SLAWSKI and WILLIAM W. BOWMAN. *The News People: A Sociological Portrait of American Journalists and Their Work.* Pp. ix, 257. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976. $9.95.

In reviewing *The News People*, one is torn between two opposing evaluations depending upon one's level of analysis. At the descriptive level, the book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of American journalism. Employing a sampling technique which, despite certain problems of representativeness, is both innovative and probably the best possible for identifying the members of this decentralized population, the authors provide us with an unprecedented volume of demographic and other information on journalists employed by all types and sizes of news organizations. They discuss the basic characteristics of those engaged in the profession, their education and training, career aspirations, professional standards, and other job-related attitudes.

The authors delineate a field dominated by whites, males, and Anglo-Saxons in which two dimensions of conflict emerge. First, journalists are found to be divided over the question of advocative versus objective reporting, or as the authors cleverly put it, "whole truth" versus "nothing but the truth" journalism, with the former claiming strongest support among the more educated, younger, better paid, and urban news people, the latter among their opposites. Second, journalists are found to be torn between a preference for jobs in small organizations which provide for substantial professional autonomy and for those in certain larger organizations which provide for less autonomy but greater professional prestige. The book thus provides needed quantitative support for some rather widely held expectations.

At the analytical level, however, *The News People* is somewhat less satisfying. Too many opportunities are simply over-

looked. For example, the implications of the authors' findings on the distribution of party preferences and political philosophies among journalists, particularly as they relate to the assertions of Efron and others, remain wholly unexplored. Similarly, where their respondents are clearly critical of journalism education in the United States, the authors struggle with several alternative explanations of this finding yet seem somehow to remain unaware of the indictment itself. Given the defensive tone of the preface, perhaps the best way to summarize the point is to say that the authors are just too timid. In their effort to be "deliberately sober and academic," Johnstone and his colleagues have been overly concerned with taxonomy and have not sufficiently exploited their data.

Although the book thus fails to live up to its full potential, its strengths are such that anyone interested in journalism or journalists would find *The News People* well worth the reading.

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MORTON KELLER *Affairs of State. Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America.* Pp. xii, 631. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. $17.50.

Affairs of State examines the character of American public experience from the Civil War to 1900. Viewing politics, law, and government as components of a "polity," Professor Keller has attempted to analyze public life in the same way other historians have tried to analyze the economy or society. In doing this, he has delineated two separate polities: The Post-War Polity (1865–1880), which dealt with the consequences of the Civil War, and The Industrial Polity (1800–1900), which confronted the challenge of rapid industrialization.

Generally, this period is thought of as politically barren, permeated by graft, corruption, subservience to vested interests, and governmental lethargy. Instead, Professor Keller argues that the *late nineteenth century was a tim intense conflict between old values the pressure of massive change: c flicts between dependence on gove ment and hostility to the state, betwe* the desire for freedom and the need f social order, between localism a nationalism. The Civil War's legacy of active, expanded government and a bro view of civil equality spread througho the entire country, both North and Sou until the early 1870s when the typic social values of nineteenth-centu America—racism, localism, and *laisse faire*—recaptured their dominance public policy.

The major development during th period was the move away from t politics of ideology, characteristic of t decade prior to the Civil War and t War itself, to the politics of politic organization which lasted to the turn the century. Ironically, the triumph political organization led to the increa in civil service-protected governme positions—the party in power protecte its adherents by increasing the numb of protected posts before elections ju in case of defeat at the polls.

Based on printed sources and a va body of secondary literature, *Affairs State* is an impressive work of schola ship and analysis producing many us ful insights. For example, state gover ments and the courts were a more pote force in national life than is common supposed today. In addition, the auth refutes the contention that all th best nineteenth-century American min avoided politics for business. The p litical leaders of the late 1800s bridge the gap between an agricultural an an industrial society, they made thin work and should be viewed by th moral standards of their time, not o own. Political bribes and kickbacks we an accommodation, a way of gettin things done.

Specialists will find much to admi and dispute in this work. For exampl the interpretation of Reconstruction symptomatic of developments in pos Civil War America rather than as unique southern experience is likely find opposition. General readers shoul

ind *Affairs of State* an impressive, read-ıble analysis of public life in late nine-eenth-century America. The primary esson to be learned from this work is hat after 1900 the forms in which public oncerns were expressed changed while heir content and the social anxieties vhich produced them remained the ame.

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;ABRIEL KOLKO. *Main Currents in Modern American History*. Pp. xi, 433. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. $9.95.

It is the thesis of this book that the ıast century of American history is lominated by the development of a nature industrial capitalism. During hat time period, American capitalism ought political, economic and social olutions to the challenges it confronted. But because of the very nature of ndustrial capitalism, says Kolko, po-ıtical and economic solutions are fore-loomed to fail, and crisis must inevitably ollow crisis, each progressively more erious and more insoluble than the last. ımerica at the second century mark finds tself unstable: "a society dangerously drift and now locked into an enduring, ermanent crisis at home and in the vorld."

Industrial capitalism not only in-uences domestic and foreign policy, it s all-pervasive and absolutely evil. ndustrial capitalism is blamed for ıoverty, war, inflation, credit, and Presidents and their mellifluous men vho lied as a way of life." Since America s myopic to these realities (a conse-uence of "pervasive self-satisfied chau-inism"), the country "marches into a ıture with its eyes turned toward the ıast, remaining astonishingly indulgent f its own tragedies and foibles, and as nenacing to itself and the world as ever." Kolko views many of the events and all he crisis situations he discusses as "un-ontrollable" or "inevitable." This re-iewer was struck by the sense in which Kolko implies men have no control over heir destinies. It is as if Industrial Capitalism is the evil force controlling hapless, helpless men.

This book is not without its virtues. The author has done a great deal of original research as well as synthesizing much recent scholarship. His style is readable and enjoyable in places. But the work as a whole is flawed by an over concern with the present, particularly in the foreign policy discussions. In these areas the work reads like an apologia for the opponents to the Vietnam war. Perhaps the author gives himself away in his dedication: "To the Vietnamese Revolution and the heroic people who made it."

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ERNEST R. MAY. *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. Pp. viii, 306. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. $12.50.

On August 16, 1823, the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, suggested to the American Minister in London that Britain and the United States should issue a joint statement of policy concerning the Spanish colonies in South America which had revolted from Spain. In the end, the United States did not agree to a joint statement; but the substance of Canning's proposal was included in President Monroe's message to Congress on December 2, 1823, and became known in later years as the Monroe Doctrine.

In exploring how all this came about, Professor May asked himself three questions. (1) Could someone living in 1823, knowing what we know about the values and beliefs of Monroe, Adams, Calhoun, Crawford, Clay and Jackson, have guessed what position these men would have taken and how their debate would conclude? May's answer is "no." (2) Could the imaginary observer of 1823, knowing what the principals knew about the foreign pressures on the United States, have guessed what the administration's foreign policy would be? Again the answer is "no." There were no con-

straints in the foreign scene powerful enough to determine the policies of the American government. (3) Finally, would our imaginary observer of 1823, knowing that all the principals except the President himself were presidential candidates, and examining what they would see as their personal political stake in issues of foreign policy, have been able to predict how they would react to Canning's proposal? The answer this time is "yes." "The test of what was and what was not in the personal political interest of the various candidates would have yielded much more specific predictions . . . [and] most of these predictions would have been right on the nose" (p. 189).

May concludes that domestic policy may be a critical determinant of foreign policy and that in the case of the Monroe Doctrine it was the determinant because of the structure of American politics—the nature of the democratic electoral system compelled the actors to follow the course they did. "The Monroe Doctrine may be said to have epitomized the foreign policy of democracy" (p. 206). May suggests that political scientists should pay more attention to the relationship between foreign policy and governmental structure.

Finally, May claims that his procedure of situating himself at some moment before the event, asking what weighting of causal factors would have produced the best forecast of what actually happened, and explaining the event accordingly, is an important new method of historical investigation. But May tells us in his Preface that he had already intuited, from reading the Adams papers, what his conclusion would be. His new method turns out to be a splendid expository device rather than a new tool of discovery.

This is an elegant work, beautifully written, learned, convincing, and a pleasure to read.

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GEORGE H. THOMPSON. *Arkansas* [illegible] *Reconstruction: The Influence* [illegible] *Geography, Economics, and Pers*[illegible]*ality*. Pp. xii, 296. Port Washingt[illegible] N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1976. $15.00

This book is a welcomed additior[illegible] the scarce literature on Arkansas dur[illegible] Reconstruction. It is the first monogra[illegible] on the subject since the 1920s. Althou[illegible] it is not a comprehensive study [illegible] Arkansas under Republican administ[illegible]tions it does add significantly to [illegible] understanding of a complex period [illegible] Arkansas history. Thompson's cent[illegible] theme is that Reconstruction is be[illegible] understood as a continuum, not [illegible] interregnum, studied through a caref[illegible] interpretation of geographic, economi[illegible] and "personality of leadership" in[illegible]fluences rather than a recitation [illegible] party politics.

The author divides his work into thre[illegible] principal parts and a conclusion. Part [illegible] discusses the three sections of the stat[illegible] —delta, northwest, and southwest—instead of the usual two of lowlands an[illegible] highlands, and lays the foundation fo[illegible] the part they play in the state's political, economic, and social development. It also deals with the concept of patriotism in a border state as it relates to secession and post-war amnesty.

Part II concerns what Thompson calls "De Jure v. De Facto Government." He argues that Arkansans such as David Walker and Augustus H. Garland viewed Republican controlled government as *de facto* to be ignored or endured by refusing to take the oath required for participation or take the oath and try to eliminate Republican ascendancy through the electoral process. It is here the author lays stress upon the personality of leadership as exemplified by Walker, ante-bellum Whig and Unionist president of the secession convention, who refused to take the oath; and Garland, ante-bellum Whig and Confederate legislator, who took the oath. Thompson gives an excellent account of the contest between Joseph Brooks and Elisha Baxter, both Republicans, for the gover-

norship, 1872–1874, which led to the end of Republican rule, and the establishment in the eyes of Democratic-Conservatives of a *de jure* government in 1874.

Part III deals with the most pernicious economic problem in nineteenth-century Arkansas—the use of state credit to promote economic development. Thompson correctly contends that the pledging of state bonds in 1836 for banks and in 1868 for railroads and levees ruined the credit of the state and retarded economic growth. First, by the failure for years to pay the interest on the bank bonds and secondly, the repudiation in 1884 by constitutional amendment of the railroad-aid, levee, and some bank bonds.

Arkansas and Reconstruction is based on thorough research in the sources, especially hitherto unexploited manuscript collections. It is well-illustrated, detailed, amply documented, and objective. The minute discussion of the promoter's frustrations in building the Little Rock and Fort Smith railroad adds little to the basic premise of the work and the publisher may be faulted for placing the footnotes at the end of the book.

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SOCIOLOGY

FRANK F FURSTENBERG, JR. *Unplanned Parenthood: The Social Consequences of Teenage Childbearing.* Pp. vii, 293. New York: The Free Press, 1976. $13.95.

This book is an outgrowth of research which began quite simply as an effort to evaluate a comprehensive hospital service program for teenage mothers. From this modest start, the study was transformed into a comprehensive five-year investigation of all of the consequences of early childbearing. Viewing maternity as one of the unscheduled events of adolescence, the author utilizes a life-course adaptation approach to early parenthood. This perspective "age locates" individuals in both the social structure and in a specific developmental, historical context as well.

The model utilized offers a gripping picture of adolescent unplanned parenthood, viewing it as an outcome of a particular sequence of events in the moral lives of young women. Furstenberg's concentration is on explanations which relate directly to the most provocative social issue: why do some girls engage in a particular sexual activity while others do not?

When all is said and done, we are left with an "accidental" theory of adolescent parenthood. Although this conclusion is described in the foreword as running contrary to the popular assumption that out-of-wedlock births are the consequence of some special kind of motivation, it does seem to me to be consonant with judgments reached through treatment experiences with adolescent patients.

More surprising, however, is the tempering of the notion that an unplanned child leads inevitably to a life of deprivation for all concerned. Furstenberg's case histories strike at the heart of this shibboleth and, despite the fact that cohort group was from black, low income families, their subsequent lives seemed to defy a simple accounting scheme.

Some young women were indeed destroyed by this ill-timed event; others were able to repair the disorder by rearranging their lives and resuming their education. Marriage (or no) did not appear to be a highly predictive variable, while worst of all was the group whose lives were clearly damaged by early pregnancy and whose future prospects were clearly delimited by social, emotional, and economic deprivation.

Furstenberg makes effective use of a controlled group of young women who did not become pregnant in adolescence and also has paid close attention to the infant's developmental experience as one of the important measures in arriving at an assay of the mother's life prospects. While sociology books are not my metier,

I was consistently interested in this book and strongly moved by the author's evocative conclusion:

> . . . the assistance we are prepared to offer [unwed mothers] is woefully inadequate and often temporary as well. Is it possible that we owe the vicious cycle of poverty not to the poor themselves but to the vicious cycle of social inaction?

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ANTHONY GIDDENS. *New Rules of the Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies*. Pp. 192. New York: Basic Books, 1976. $10.95.

The hope of early sociologists such as St. Simon and Comte was that sociology could free society from blind adherence to tradition and in its place substitute a more enlightened way of life. By turning from religion and studying society in as value-free way as possible, sociologists have often tried to develop predictive powers very much along the lines of the physical sciences.

In the *New Rules of the Sociological Method* Anthony Giddens argues that scientific sociology has been a failure not because its methods are less than perfect but because there exists a transformative relationship between the human and the physical world. Giddens believes that sociology, rather than freeing humans from irrational traditions, has succeeded in overturning tradition as a guide to action only to put in its place falsely-labeled natural principles which are neither natural, logical nor eternal. Giddens concludes, "But that knowledge discloses that men are in the thrall of 'external' societal causes which bring about mechanically events that they suppose to be under their rational control; the subject initiating the investigation rediscovers himself as an object" (p. 153).

For Giddens the transformative relationship between subject and object is the key to evolving new rules for the study of society. After telling the reader that Schutz, Winch, Weber, Durkheim, Godamer, Apel and Habermas, among others, have also failed to successfully solve the epistomological and ontological problems of modern society, the author makes his most telling attack on Parsons. Giddens calls Parsons a reductionist because he places the purpose of society at the individual level and thus neglects to explain that power—not individual needs—is the basis of society and its reproduction. I especially recommend Giddens' discussion of Parsons to all sociologists. Parsons may have succeeded in giving Durkheim a psychology, but Giddens may yet give Parsons a viable theory of social power and social action.

While I am impressed with this book and highly recommend it, it is likely that the new rules for sociology will arouse heated debate by empiricists and others who may reply that while empirical evidence is not as good as hoped for in predicting behavior, speculation about ontology and construction of secular eschatologies may be even less successful at prediction. It also will be of interest to see if Giddens succeeds in making functionalism acceptable to Marxists. Because this book is so well written, I recommend it for all those who wish to brush up on some of the current issues of sociological theory construction.

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STEPHEN GUDEMAN. *Relationships, Residence and the Individual: A Rural Panamanian Community*. Pp. xiii, 274. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976. $18.75.

This book is essentially a community study of a small group of subsistence farmers living along the Inter-American Highway in central Panama. In a number of ways the community resembles communities in other parts of Latin America, and the author of the book, an anthropologist, is well aware that the patterns of behavior he has observed are local versions of a widespread social system. Gudeman maintains that "few satisfactory analyses, explanations or models of these systems have emerged. Much of the reportage has remained at the ethno-

graphic level" (p. 10). His treatment of his community is clearly meant to rectify this situation.

The group that Gudeman studied was very loosely structured. The basic unit was the household, composed usually of a nuclear family. There was very little cooperation except among the closest kin (parents and children, and siblings), hardly any ceremonial life or community activity, a great stress on individualism, and pronounced suspicion of outsiders. The major instances of interaction among members of different households were agricultural labor, which was sometimes exchanged but more often purchased, and the system of *compadrazgo* (godparenthood).

In attempting to make sense of these patterns of behavior, Gudeman operates almost entirely at the cultural level (culture is defined as involving beliefs, ideologies and values). He begins with the religious conceptions of the people, then deals with the notions of respect and shame and how these influence the behavior of individuals. The household is discussed in terms of values relating to the division of labor, conjugal relationships, and raising children. The forms of conjugal unions and their instability are explained in terms of individuals choosing certain values over others. And finally, the *compadrazgo* system is described by giving the basic rules which define how godparents are chosen, what their responsibilities are, and the kind of interaction expected of *compadres*.

Since anthropologists are not entirely agreed on the best way to explain social systems, opinions are likely to vary as to whether Gudeman has succeeded in providing a satisfactory "analysis, explanation or model" of his Panamanian community. To this reviewer, it seems clear that Gudeman has produced only another ethnographic (descriptive) account. What makes this description superior to many others is the detail, the obvious care with which the author sought to determine the basic values of his informants, and his success in showing how the values are systematically interrelated. The discussion of *compadrazgo*, in particular, is one of the best in the literature. But description, however detailed, is still description. Gudeman has failed to provide us with either explanation or model.

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TED ROBERT GURR. *Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers: A Political History of Urban Crime and Conflict*. Pp. 192. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976. $10.00.

What do urban planners and criminologists do when they see middle class flight from the city and those left to fend for themselves bolted behind closed doors? They look longingly to societies where cities are *relatively* clean, orderly, economically supportive and the streets are safe from crime. Professor Gurr and associates of Northwestern University take this a step further. For the purpose of analysis of crime, they ask what are the best and worst cities? Can one by studying cross-culturally and across a 150 year period of various eras isolate correlates of crime? What did the best cities do in terms of criminal justice systems, public policy, treatment of civil disorder, and cultural variations of crime to create safe and just cities?

The criterion of the researchers was that Stockholm, London (until its recent economic downturn), and Sydney were the "best" examples and Calcutta, the "worst."

Through a maze of descriptive statistics, charts, journalistic accounts, hueristic models, and a review of theories from left to right, the authors conclude that criminality and urbanization are here to stay and strongly correlated. They also contend that cities are divided by their internal heterogeneity of special interest groups that cancel each other in terms of criminal justice application. Gurr also indicates that reactionary and liberal reforms are less likely to work. Thus, some level of public disorder is in the cards and they describe this in a quasi-path model.

To the authors' credit, they have covered huge hurdles and tried to make

sense of large masses of data. The reader discovers that the three Western cities are not all that crime-free, have had in certain instances turbulent pasts, and have a growing crime rate today. One also finds that Calcutta is indeed in a class by itself. Periodic "order" occurs when the elite and mass converge on ideology and etiology of crime. However, "peace" extracts its costs and periodic reforms appear to be short-lived. In simple terms, the bigger and more complex society evolves, the more unlikely consensus is to emerge. This conclusion was made by Durkheim (and others) numerous years ago, but the French sociologist was hidden away in a short footnote.

On the other hand, an entire section is devoted to defending criminal statistics. The authors' major defense is that private studies support higher incidences of crime but of relative proportion to public crime data. Critics will not rest with this, and the authors lamely conclude that they may be in error, but at least one knows their procedure.

This is not a cheap shot though, for the book has its overwhelming merits in describing the complexity of the problem. And it is not a book to dash the hopes of reformers. For Gurr and his fellow researchers see the problem as tolerable, but not easily legislated out of existence. Crime and public disorder should be thought of as a "given" in contemporary urban life.

The book is heavy going for undergrads, but is a must for researchers and graduate students. For Gurr, the underlying theme is to establish the delicate balance of power between the thief and the policeman and who will break down your door. Some cures, he notes, are worse than the illness.

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MICHAEL B. KATZ. *The People of Hamilton, Canada West. Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth-Century City.* Pp. xiii, 381. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975. $17.50.

A mixture, in the author's words, of "hard data and rash speculation," Michael Katz's book is the first major product of the "new social history in Canada. It joins the recent, considerable volume of publications dealing with the reinterpretation of the demographic and social history of urban and rural areas in Europe, Great Britain, and the United States. Katz began work on Hamilton in 1967 and, after tantalizing his readership with several journal articles and interim project reports, has now produced this long-awaited monograph. The book presents in detail the results of his data analysis for the decade 1851 to 1861 with occasional forays into the 1870s, but in many ways it represents a progress report on his continuing research into the social and demographic effects of industrialization on Hamilton from 1850 to 1900.

The "stratified, transient, and anxious world of the nineteenth century city" is Katz's canvas, and his case study of Hamilton is based on a careful, even loving, reconstitution of the personal histories of individuals using the manuscript census records of 1851 and 1861, the assessment rolls for 1852 and 1861, city directories, newspapers, and so forth. These sources contain data on personal characteristics, including age, marital status, birthplace, religion, ethnicity, literacy, school attendance, occupation, property ownership, and permit the study of changes in residential patterns, social and economic mobility, wealth, family composition, and transiency over the decade.

According to Katz, nineteenth-century urban history is characterized by high levels of transiency and inequality. "Persisters" (only 31 percent of males enumerated in the 1851 census appear in the 1861 census [p. 122]) are persons who can be linked from an earlier data source to a later one, and "transients" are those who disappear. (Linkage techniques are discussed briefly in Appendix 3, pp. 349–52.) Clearly, the rate of transiency is upward-biased because of deaths, errors and ambiguities in enumeration, and coding errors. Most of the results are not very surprising. Tran-

siency appears to have been affected by age and family status: transiency is highest for males in the 16–25 year old age group and for those 61 and over, and is lower for married males than for singles. Home ownership also seems to be an important determinant of persistence: tenants are more likely to be transients.

With regard to inequality, Katz considers property ownership and income as possible measures but concludes that a wealth concept which is a "construct of different items and does not correspond exactly to either total income or assessed property . . . is . . . the best available indicator of economic rank" (p. 25). Later, this concept is defined as "the sum of an individual's assessed worth based on all his property holdings throughout the city" (p. 53). Since these two statements do not agree, a more complete definition of the concept could profitably have been included in the book, even if relegated to an Appendix. In any case, the results show that persons with economic ranking in the 90–100th percentiles owned 60 percent of assessed wealth in Hamilton in 1851 and 63 percent in 1861, whereas persons in the 0–59th percentiles held 13 percent and 10 percent respectively (p. 54).

Changes in occupational structure are analyzed using Katz's classification of occupations (Appendix 2, pp. 343–8), and show varying rates of mobility from one occupation to another, with much persistence in the skilled, building trades and little in transitional employment as teamsters, porters, and servants. Incidentally, his analysis of occupational mobility must yet come to grips with the way in which occupation, in the nineteenth century, tended to be regarded more as a characteristic of an individual (like birthplace) than as an activity in which he was engaged currently.

Why did mobility occur? Katz argues it was partly a function of personal characteristics—intelligence, energy, perseverance, and education, among them—but, given his data sources, turns to look, in particular, at the influence of age and ethnic (religious) differences. Both occupational mobility and changes in economic ranking appear to be related to age: the variation is clearest in the latter case, where economic rank increases for the young (under 30) and decreases for the elderly (over 60). "Men who did not succeed early by and large did not succeed at all" (p. 162). According to Katz, ethnicity had an even greater impact on a man's prospects of economic advancement. The Irish had the lowest rate of upward economic mobility and were most likely to remain poor compared with the Scots, English, or Canadian-born. "Laboring as well as poverty formed a way of life for the Irish and a temporary state for other groups" (p. 165).

The second major theme involves changes in the family and the household. The simple family household comprised of married couple (or widowed person) and children was predominant and the classic extended family was rare. However, Katz found that boarders and servants were normally resident in about 30 percent of households in 1851 and about 20 percent in 1861, and that some 15 percent of households had at least one resident relative (pp. 220–2). Boarders were predominantly male, and relatives and servants predominantly female. Mean household size declined over the decade from 5.8 persons in 1851 to 5.3 persons in 1861 (p. 224), reflecting the decrease in the numbers of boarders and servants. Household size appears to have varied with wealth: a large household comprised of children, relatives, boarders, and servants was likely to be associated with high economic ranking. Size was also influenced, as expected, by the age of the household's head.

Katz emphasizes the role played by boarding and by entering service in the socialization of young men and women. Consider, for example, the situation of young men. Katz's figures show that a young man tended to leave home at 16 or 17, find work and live as a boarder with a "surrogate" family until marriage, usually between the ages of 25 and 30. This period of about 10 years he considers an age of "semi-autonomy," a transitional step between childhood/dependence and adulthood/indepen-

dence. Young men were expected to establish themselves financially before beginning a family, as young married couples almost always established their own households away from their parents. The length of this period of semi-autonomy fell by 1861 and again by 1871, possibly as a result of economic conditions but also because of shifting behavioral patterns as young men and women began to remain longer at home. The rate and length of school attendance increased during this period as well. This is an interesting argument which Katz intends to refine as data for the late nineteenth century become available, but his use of data for one decade, especially a decade ending in a severe depression, makes the selection of the appropriate causal mechanism appear to be as yet problematic.

This is a book with shortcomings. One major problem of indeterminate effect is the questionable reliability of the primary data sources. Nineteenth-century censuses were flawed by under-enumeration and enumerator error, and it is impossible to assess the consequences of such errors for Katz's empirical findings. Secondly, I have some methodological concerns about Katz's reliance on cross-classification tables and whether some of his inferences can be substantiated. In his discussion of transiency, for example, Katz writes: "Clearly, the life cycle, reflected in age and household status, exerted an independent influence on persistence. The same cannot be said for ethnicity which . . . exerted no independent influence whatsoever. . . . Undoubtedly their wealth, rather than any independent cultural factor, most often accounted for the small ethnic differential in the tendency to remain within the city" (pp. 125–7). The problem here is that the unique and separable effects of the many social and economic factors cannot be disentangled one from the other unless a different technique, such as regression analysis, is employed.

These reservations aside, Michael Katz has written an important book and social historians eagerly await his next installment on the Hamilton project.

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CHARLES E. LEWIS, RASHI FEIN and DAVID MECHANIC. *A Right to Health: The Problems of Access to Primary Medical Care*. Pp. v, 367. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. $17.95.

DAVID MECHANIC, ed. *The Growth of Bureaucratic Medicine: An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Patient Behavior and the Organization of Medical Care*. Pp. vii, 345. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. $14.95.

It is widely held that the introduction of a new element into any system changes the entire system. The three essays in *A Right to Health: The Problem of Access to Primary Medical Care* demonstrate that government interventions into a "non-system," namely the American health care scene, have tended to produce little significant change. The authors argue that past and current piecemeal responses to medical care problems are ineffective not necessarily because they are piecemeal *per se*, but because these limited (and often extremely costly) efforts are not backed by sound and coherent policies.

This theme has been repeated many times by many different authors but not always with the clarity and sound documentation found in this book. The clarity of the presentation is due in part to the definitions and conceptual model set forth in the first section by David Mechanic. In Part II, Charles Lewis, employing Mechanic's classification of barriers to health care, analyzes eleven different programs which were designed to affect either the supply of or the demand for health care services. Lewis's concise and well documented discussion of these various projects indicates that most have been costly, have failed to have the desired impact, and, in some instances, have been politically unfeasible. Rashi Fein, in the final sec-

tion, considers the policies which have led to these interventions and goes on to argue for fundamental changes in the financing and delivery of health care. Fein does not necessarily minimize the value of a piecemeal approach, but he insists that any type of intervention should be based on a coherent health policy.

Individuals who agree with more radical criticisms of the American health care system will find this volume rather tame. It remains an excellent discussion backed up by good factual information.

The Growth of Bureaucratic Medicine is also concerned with trends in modern medical care and the author, at times, deals with issues similar to the ones raised in the earlier book. However, the basic orientation is quite different. Here, Mechanic indicates that he is primarily concerned with the nature of the complex organizations that are now becoming such an important part of the delivery of health care. The basic theme of the book is that while organizational coherence is a necessity in the highly technical field of modern medicine, the application of the traditional bureaucratic model to health care "would be inappropriate for the effective and humane performance of medicine" (p. 1). This basic theme is then presented and developed in a series of essays written either by Mechanic himself or by some of his colleagues. Part I looks at the growth of bureaucratic medicine in a comparative perspective. Parts II and III consist mainly of empirical studies focusing, first, on different delivery programs and, second, on patient perspectives on illness and how these perspectives relate to the organization of services. In Part IV, the author looks at broader issues concerning policy, evaluation, and the role of the social scientist in medicine.

The growing complexity of medical practice is an extremely important trend and Mechanic clearly understands the process and its implications. The main shortcoming of the book is that it appears to consist of essays strung together by transitional phrases and paragraphs. While many of the chapters are excellent, the book itself does not represent the kind of in-depth, step-by-step analysis of increasing bureaucratization that seems to be needed. This reviewer also found that while the empirical papers presented in Parts II and III were of some interest, they hardly reflected the level of theoretical sophistication that Mechanic quite rightly called for in Chapter Four.

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GRAEME NEWMAN. *Comparative Deviance: Perception and Law in Six Cultures*. Pp. xii, 332. New York: Elsevier, 1976. $12.95.

With encouragement by the United Nations Secretariat and a grant from the Ford Foundation, Graeme Newman has undertaken an ambitious cross-cultural study of public attitudes toward deviant behavior. The author is interested in assessing the evidence for three issues: the respective theoretical positions of absolutism and of relativism in deviant behavior, comparisons of public perceptions and substantive law in each country; and the validity of the concept of subcultures of deviant behavior.

This book reviews the literature and theoretical background of these topics, describes the methodologies used in the present investigation, and presents both the empirical results and the author's theoretical conclusions. From about 200 to 500 respondents provided the samples from each of the countries: India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy (Sardinia), United States (New York City and State), and Yugoslavia. Subjects were interviewed to obtain responses to six components of their perceptions (intensity of reaction, knowledge of the law, definition of the act, recommendations for societal reaction, should act be prohibited by law, and perception of how official agencies

deal with violations), with respect to ten short descriptions of crimes or deviant behavior (robbery, incest, appropriation of public funds, homosexuality, abortion, taking drugs, factory pollution, individual pollution, not helping, and public protest).

Although the results indicate that the magnitude of response to deviance varies widely among countries, the rank order of responses to different types of deviant behavior are very similar; and so are the qualitative categories into which respondents of each country classify different types of deviance. The author accepts this evidence as supporting the notion of absolutism (or universalism) of moral norms. There are considerable gaps between public preferences and minimal sanctions prescribed by law. With the exception of Sardinia, the evidence is ambiguous regarding subcultural differentiation of rural-urban areas.

There are some interesting empirical results reported. The author not only utilizes sophisticated statistical techniques for analysis of his data, but he shows an awareness of many of the methodological and theoretical problems of comparative analysis. In the opinion of the present reviewer, however, the research report can be faulted on a number of serious counts, about which only brief mention of a few can be indicated here.

(1) The presentation of raw data, empirical analysis, and conceptual conclusions is difficult to follow (inconsistent use of concepts, incomplete information for meaningful reading, poor indexing).

(2) A plethora of empirical findings are often irrelevant and undigested, exacerbated by ex post facto explanations of unexpected findings.

(3) Resolution of the issue of absolutism versus relativism of cultural norms is in no way aided by the limited empirical data of this study nor by the inadequate theoretical conceptualization of the problem. Ignored is the fact that all of these countries have had extensive contact with European culture.

(4) It is incorrect and misleading to identify "consensus" theory with absolutism of morals; and "conflict" theory with relativism. The proportion of a population which agrees on the definition of a norm is, in itself, almost irrelevant to "consenses" or "conflict" theories.

(5) Some stated implications of the findings for consensus, Marxian, and labelling theories grossly oversimplify and misjudge the nature of these theories.

(6) The data of this study can in no way serve as a basis for judging the case for the "evolution" of morals.

(7) Absence of correlations of sex, age, education, and religion with deviance perceptions is *not* evidence that "sociological" factors are unimportant (these factors are only crude indicators; there are other "sociological" factors).

(8) The gaps found between legal sanctions and public perceptions are essentially meaningless because of the nonrepresentative samples used; and, in any case, that these gaps "should" be narrowed is a value judgment. Policy decisions depend, in addition, on other considerations.

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DAVID T. STANLEY. *Prisoners Among Us: The Problem of Parole*. Pp. xvii, 205. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. $9.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

For correctional institution staff members or parole officers David Stanley's *Prisoners Among Us* is a good summary statement of the whole field of parole and its problems. This work is not written, like Jessica Mitford's *Kind and Usual Punishment*, to influence a larger audience of intelligent laymen, nor is it, in the reviewer's opinion, designed for academic criminologists. The author, at the time of the study a senior fellow in the Brookings Governmental Studies program, presents a mix of results from published studies along with interviews

and statistics which he himself collected in six jurisdictions. A description of his research design and any consideration of the representativeness of his interviews with officials and others is very fragmentary and incomplete. He does mention visits to four halfway houses and indicates that he or an assistant talked to 36 parolees who happened to be in offices on days when officials were being interviewed. The reader will encounter a text which shifts from general statements about the parole systems in the United States to summaries of studies conducted in a variety of jurisdictions and then to observations about the state and federal parole systems visited by the author.

The book tries to do too much in 191 pages of text, ranging from a consideration of theories of punishment to supervision on parole, and dealing with complicated issues such as decision-making by parole boards in a rather brief fashion, even though the literature in such a field is now quite extensive. Although individual chapters may be good summaries of the "state of the art" and its evaluation, a knowledgeable practitioner or academic will hardly be surprised at the author's major conclusions such as, for example, that decisions by parole boards have little accuracy, that parole hearings tend to be cursory, and that supervisory strategies are unreliable and real parole surveillance is impossible.

The author concludes his work by proposing a series of recommendations including release without parole combined with a modified system of sentencing discretion. Rehabilitation does not work; sentences should be appropriate punishment for crime. A brief selected bibliography is included at the end of the book.

Although the ideas in this work are quite unexceptional and do not seem to add to our knowledge in the field, the author does bring together a large amount of material for the relatively uninitiated. Chapter III, on the parole board hearing itself, presents one of the best descriptions I have seen of the actual questioning and atmosphere during a board hearing, along with a statement of the pros and cons of such hearings.

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JOHN WESTERGAARD and HENRIETTA RESLER. *Class in a Capitalist Society: A Study of Contemporary Britain.* Pp. xv, 432. New York: Basic Books, 1976. $15.00.

The authors of this important volume on social inequality are not Americans, which in itself might be taken as a significant qualification. John Westergaard is a specialist on class structure and urban development and is Professor of Sociology at the University of Sheffield in Great Britain. Henrietta Resler teaches in the Department of Sociology at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Using British society as a case study, they have produced a singularly lucid, incisive and searching analysis of the structural sources and consequences of inequality in modern capitalist society. Their perspective is Marxist and their structural and comparative orientation provide an important supplement to the "parochial" studies of social stratification done by American sociologists.

Eschewing data derived from the subjective views of interested respondents, the authors rely mainly on official statistics and government reports for documentation of existing class inequalities in contemporary Great Britain. The book is divided into five parts: "Themes and Issues," "Inequalities of Condition and Security," "Inequality of Power," "Inequalities of Opportunity," and "Acquiescence and Dissent: Responses to Inequality."

While there is no bibliography as such, the excellent footnoting and ample documentation serve the same purpose. Included are discussions of the functionalist versus the Marxist approach to stratification, the various meanings of equality and inequality, the relation be-

tween color (race) and class, the nature of power and its relation to inequality and the various forms of adaption and response by social groups to the conditions of social inequality.

In emphasizing the "concentration of power and property in a very small section of the population" as the basis of social inequality, the authors go far in overcoming the tendency of the commonly used language of class to conceal its most central feature. They make a major contribution in illuminating some of the complex issues in this difficult and critical area of investigation. The volume is highly recommended for all social scientists and is must reading for specialists in social stratification.

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JOZEF WILCZYNSKI. *The Multinationals and East-West Relations: Towards Transideological Collaboration*. Pp. vi, 235. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1976. $27.50.

Anyone interested in the economic development of Eastern Europe or in the evolution of East-West trade relations is familiar with the numerous publications of Jozef Wilczynski on these and related subjects. Wilczynski's most recent book, *The Multinationals and East-West Relations*, although in a field that has been inundated with new monographs, provides a very useful description of the economic ties that have developed during the past decade between the major multinational corporations of the West and the socialist governments—primarily those of Europe.

One of the most beneficial contributions, especially for the person uninitiated into the intricacies of East-West economic relations, consists of the numerous tables that summarize such information as that concerning the major industrial multinationals that are involved in commercial dealings with the socialist states; the major contracts, licenses, and cooperation agreements between individual Western multinationals and their socialist partners; and the credits extended to socialist states by Western banks.

In general, *The Multinationals and East-West Relations* is a straightforward descriptive account of both the development of East-West commercial relations and the benefits which both sides expect to gain from their "transideological collaboration." Wilczynski covers the topics that have now become *de rigeur* in books in East-West commercial relations—trade, licenses, industrial cooperation including joint ventures, and finance. One of the more interesting sections concerns the development of socialist "multinationals" and the activities of socialist enterprises in the West. The discussion of socialist exports of licenses and of specialized manufactured products, including entire manufacturing plants, is especially valuable.

Wilczynski views the expansion of East-West commercial ties largely in optimistic terms, with expanding economic ties serving to reduce the hostility of socialist and Western industrial states However, one wonders that the author does no more than mention the arguments of those who have maintained that expanding commercial contact serves primarily to strengthen the Soviets and their allies militarily. The assumptions about the benefits from continued East-West collaboration run directly contrary to those of critics of East-West trade like Antony Sutton

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ROBERT WUTHNOW. *The Consciousness Reformation*. Pp. x, 309. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $12.50.

Addressing those who hope to improve society and those who seek to understand the changes occurring in our lives today, Wuthnow's *The Consciousness Reformation* explores the experimentation going on from the late 1960s to the present, in politics, family styles, dress, leisure, education, and religion, which constitutes, the counterculture.

What changes are actually taking place? How many people are experimenting? What kind of people in terms of age, race. sex, attitudes are experimenting? Why is experimentation going on and to such a marked degree? What is the attitude of those not actively part of the counterculture toward the changes observed? Most importantly, how much impact are these changes having, or may they be expected to have, on the traditional culture that at present remains dominant?

To answer these questions, Wuthnow brings into service a very impressive skill in the devising, administering, and evaluating of test questions and responses presented to a sampling of 1000 individuals in the Bay Area of San Francisco. While aware that this area exhibits a greater degree of change than other sections of the country, particularly as the study emphasizes the under 30 group, Wuthnow theorizes that the Bay Area is very probably an advance agent of change and therefore represents a trend, not a unique sector of the country. Defining consciousness as "*the ongoing process of constructing reality out of symbols and experience*" [italics the author's], Wuthnow considers differing ways Americans make selections that determine their relationship as individuals to some meaningful pattern of existence. His study involves four meaning systems: theistic, rugged individualism, social science, mysticism. Through the use of national polls as well as his questionnaire, plus an excellent chapter giving a historical and philosophical perspective on religion and individualism in America, Wuthnow notes the previous reliance on these systems. He further traces their decline and the rise of faith in social science and in mysticism. Though the vast majority still hold traditional values, and the actual percentage of experimenters is 5 percent or less in most areas of activity, the experiments are still of major importance. Increasingly, those who are not actually experimenting at present, are accepting the idea of others doing so, or are considering participation themselves. For instance, census figures in 1960 revealed 17,000 persons reported living with a partner of the opposite sex to whom they were not married. The 1971 figure was 143,000. This is a large increase but still represents a small percentage of the total population. However, a recent poll shows 25 percent of the population approves of living together out of wedlock, and 15 percent express interest in trying it themselves.

There is a high correlation between those whose system of values has shifted to social science and/or mysticism and a willingness to change or to accept change. This seems to indicate a society that will be more and more varied, and one which must learn to interact cooperatively in new ways.

Sociologists, philosophers, political scientists, and those interested in religion will find much of value in this painstaking and well documented study. All of us should find some degree of optimism in Professor Wuthnow's faith that in diversity and the interaction of differing systems, a new and dynamic society will hopefully emerge.

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ECONOMICS

JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI and T. N. SRINIVASAN. *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India.* Pp. xii, 261. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975. $15.00.

The National Bureau of Economic Research has sponsored a comprehensive program of study into the relationships between foreign trade policies and economic development. This series, which uses a common analytical framework, consists of ten country case studies (by individual authors) and two summary volumes (by the general editors, Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne Kreuger). The volume under review is Number 6 in this series.

Bhagwati and Srinivasan analyze India's experience with foreign trade con-

trols and, more explicitly, the impact—both external and internal—of the 1966 devaluation of the rupee and the associated changes in the type and magnitude of the intervention in foreign trade. Although major attention is devoted to examining the period from 1966 to (approximately) 1972, the study includes in a comprehensive fashion an overview of the trade regimes, and the implications thereof, that prevailed from 1950–1966.

The first four chapters—largely summarized from the relevant portions of J. Bhagwati and P. Desai, *India: Planning for Industrialization* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970)—establish the background of Indian economic development since 1950 and of the increasing recourse to trade controls since 1956. The impact of such controls, generally the *ad hoc* response to the latest foreign exchange crisis, is briefly (pp. 41–51) but masterfully developed. There is little that is new here, but it is so well done that it is very welcome.

Major attention attaches to evaluating the 1966 devaluation and associated policy changes. Since policy changes do not take place under controlled conditions it is particularly important to avoid *post hoc ergo propter hoc* type of reasoning. Bhagwati and Srinivasan argue that all too much of the discussion of the measures, particularly that undertaken soon after the devaluation, was of this type. They provide, instead, a simple yet largely persuasive method of accounting for the impact of stochastic events, such as harvest failures or other policy changes (which were not directly related to devaluation or trade policies), attention is also directed to lags in the adjustment process. Particularly welcome is the substantial attempt (Chapters 12–16) to go beyond traditional static allocational efficiency issues to consider the impact of trade policies on investment, innovation, and savings and thus on the pattern and pace of growth.

A brief review cannot hope to do justice to this important and stimulating work. Complex arguments are presented with clarity; at the same time no attempt is made to gloss over inherent complexities and areas of disagreement, so that the work is remarkably stimulating and provocative. It is highly recommended: it is required reading for students of the Indian economy but it is also of significant interest to those concerned with general problems of trade policies and development strategies.

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CLAUDIA DALE GOLDIN. *Urban Slavery in the American South, 1820–1860: A Quantitative History*. Pp. vii, 168. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. $12.95.

Although slaves in cities composed no more than 10 percent of the American South's slave population, the sharp decline in their numbers during the 1850s has led some historians to conclude that slavery could not flourish in an urban environment, and that slavery as an institution was in decline. Analyzing censuses for the 10 largest Southern cities, Professor Goldin finds that the numbers of urban slaves both increased and decreased between 1820 and 1860. She convincingly explains these fluctuations with economic variables.

The traditional literature offers theories which Goldin summarizes as either "push," that is, demand for urban slaves declined due to their unruliness, or "pull," demand for slaves increased faster in the countryside than in the cities because of the greater suitability of slave labor to large-scale agriculture. After three interesting chapters characterizing the urban slave population as disproportionately female, roughly one-fifth skilled, and relatively freer through self-hire and living-out arrangements, Goldin presents her modified "pull" hypothesis and proof.

She constructs equations using changes in slave and free populations, slave prices and wage rates, costs specific to holding slaves, income per capita and value added, in order to determine price elasticities of demand. Solving the equations proves that elasticities in the cities were 17 times greater than those in rural areas. In other words, given a certain

rise in slave prices or hire rates, or a fall in wages, an urban slave user would be much more disposed to sell or stop hiring slaves than a rural slave user.

Goldin explains this greater disposition to shift back and forth between slave and free labor as the result of the presence in cities of groups of native or immigrant free workers who could substitute for slaves. In rural areas, "for reasons which are not yet entirely clear, free labor could not be mobilized for large-scale gang labor on farms at a wage rate competitive with the shadow price on slaves" (p. 105). She does not quantify mortality changes, however, which could have been important also.

Goldin concludes that slavery was not incompatible with the cities nor in decline in the 1850s, and that demand depended upon the growth of the urban market and the cost of free labor relative to slave labor, and not upon control costs, which did not increase significantly. Her study, originally a dissertation under Robert W. Fogel, is tightly argued and clearly written. It deserves reading by those who prefer more exact specifications of historical processes to impressionistic evidence and vague lists of causal factors.

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MARKOS J. MAMALAKIS. *The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy: From Independence to Allende.* Pp. vii, 390. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976. $20.00.

Chile is one of the most interesting and controversial of the developing countries because it has had a varied political and economic experience which has inspired a number of generalizations about the development process: the secular deterioration in the terms of trade of primary producers, the structuralist causes of inflation, the regressive role of *latifundio* in distribution and development, and the implications of international *dependencia.* Mamalakis has been immersed in studies of the Chilean experience for well over a decade. This long-awaited book summarizes his analysis of the Chilean experiences.

The scope of the book is large. It covers the more than a century and a half from independence in 1818 to the fall of Allende in 1973. Part 1, about one fourth of the book, is devoted to the pre-Great Depression years. Part 2, over half of the book, discusses the 1930–1973 period. Part 3, about a fifth of the book, explores two aspects of capital accumulation (that is, the role of CORFO, the Development Corporation, and the reasons for negative estimates of personal savings in the national accounts) and summarizes the study.

Mamalakis argues that to understand the development process in general and the Chilean experience in particular, one must take a broader view than do either Western or Marxian economists and consider the processes of production, distribution, and capital formation and the interactions among them. He also emphasizes the pluralistic nature of the Chilean experience and the importance of sectoral, as opposed to class, conflicts.

In regard to production, he attributes the increasing agricultural import desubstitution to the disincentives created by policies designed to transfer surplus from that sector due to a "latifundio psychosis" in which the nonagricultural population had excessive preoccupation with the incorrect notion that Chile was a *latifundio* based society. Mining, first through nitrates and then through copper, provided exports and large rents which could have been transformed into the human and capital basis for sustained growth, but largely were used in subsidizing consumer imports and in Chilean and foreign capital flight (induced substantially by internal economic instability). Industry, through import substitution and other preferential policy treatment, grew to include a wide variety of consumer and intermediate products, but failed to become a dynamic leading sector. Services became the largest and, except for mining, the most productive sector by performing relatively well the time-, quantity-, and location transforma-

tion functions to complement commodity production and the quality maintenance function associated with education and housing. However, the incentives caused this sector to perform some functions, such as quality improvement and financial intermediation poorly and others, such as transportation, at high social costs.

In regard to distribution, the secular shift in recent decades of the period covered was toward greater national, as opposed to foreign, control and a greater share for laborers. Rents were transferred from mining and, to a lesser extent, agriculture to industry and the urban services. However, great disparities remained among and within factors and sectors. Also certain functions—most importantly, food production, quality improvement, and financial intermediation—were discouraged by redistribution policies, with high social costs in terms of development.

In regard to capital formation, finally, Chile has been plagued by gaps between actual and potential (primarily mineral) resource surpluses, between actual and potential supplies of producer durables and between actual and desirable financial intermediation and surplus/reinvestment ratios. The conversion of potentialities into realities was limited by leakages to consumption and to abroad, by fluctuations generated internally and in international markets, and by distorted incentives due to inflation, protection and redistribution policies.

This book has some very strong points. (1) The analysis is based on careful consideration of Chilean data, with some new combinations of series to provide insights in regard to savings, distribution, and the foreign position. (2) The overall perspective is broad, both in a cross section and in a time series sense. (3) Services, with their large production and employment shares, are considered in some detail. (4) Mamalakis raises important questions about many of the conclusions of other analyses of the Chilean experience: the Ramirez-Véliz conclusion that industry was stifled prior to 1930 by free trade; the Fetter-Ramirez claim that inflation was due to policies designed to benefit heavily indebted landlords; the extent to which rents from mineral exports went to Chilean capital flight abroad; the widespread belief in the importance of the *latifundio* in controlling Chilean society. (5) He also shows extensive familiarity with studies of the Chilean economy published by the late 1960s. (6) Moreover, he makes some insightful observations on the longer run implications of the Allende years.

The book also has some major shortcomings: (1) An introductory historical perspective or listing of important dates is not provided, so a reader who is not already familiar with Chilean history will be confused. (2) The Mamalakis scheme of production-distribution-capital accumulation is not a theory with testable hypotheses, but is only descriptive. (3) The book ignores most of the important studies of the Chilean economy which have become available in the past decade. (4) In some curious ways, such as in regard to the operations of the Development Corporation, the book also ignores much recent experience even though it acknowledges that such experience was quite significant. (5) There is almost no attempt to apply the modern empirical tools of economics to test hypotheses.

The book would be a much more substantial contribution if it did not suffer from these major inadequacies. Nevertheless, it is a significant addition to the literature on the Chilean experience with numerous insights and provocative observations for the serious student of that important experience.

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RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN and JOEL SELIGMAN. *Taming the Giant Corporation*. Pp. 296. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976. $10.50.

ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER. *The Modern Corporate State: Private Governments and the American Constitution*. Pp. xi, 264. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976. $15.00.

These provocative books are part of the debate about "what the American economy is *really* like," and "where do we go from here?" Answers to these questions range from the view that the market system is alive and well—or that we should *post haste* return to such a system—to the Marxist judgment that America is controlled by a corporate octopus and that socialism is the cure.

The ambiguities and complexities of reality help explain the difficulty of *really* ascertaining what the economy is like—thus opening to varying interpretations and to the genuine possibility that nearly everyone, including Miller and Nader *et al.*, is at least partially correct in his analysis.

Miller describes the corporate state, American style, leaving to others, such as Nader and his colleagues, the task of prescribing what is done about it. The Nader-Green book is basically prescription and that of Miller description. His description is, in short, a reasonably documented, scholarly portrayal of Galbraith's new industrial state. We have evolved into a coalition of big government, big business, unions, and universities who coordinate the affairs of the nation in a kind of interest-group, latter-day feudalism. In his conception many of the blue chips in the game belong to the blue chip corporations. But Miller's model is much more complex than a Marxist image, or that of Nader-Green, for the federal government with its executive branch and administrative apparatus is viewed as a dominant player as well.

He documents in a rather balanced way the transformation of the American system from an individualistic, market-based, limited and representative government scheme to one of interest group power and "functional federalism," wherein the "new governments" of large corporations and labor unions together with the executive branch seek to direct the course of events. American society is one which trades freedom for materialism and an elitism within large organizations and society at large. As you would expect from a student of constitutional law, significant attention is directed to constitutional implications of the shift from individualism to corporativism.

Miller's book is a rather rich analysis, well-written (but occasionally repetitious), portraying a corporativist system that must be frightening to liberals and conservatives alike. Part of the perplexity of his analysis is that some of the elements of the "new order" were introduced for good reasons that elicit the support of many. His book points up the fundamental necessity for a constant vigilance and wisdom to maintain a free and just society.

Nader and his associates, undoubtedly writing for a different audience, have a simpler picture of what is wrong in America. As the title indicates, essentially all problems can be assigned to the machinations of big business. However, much of the book concentrates on prescriptions for reform. These are spelled out in detail, some aimed at reorganizing the power balances of the corporation, as with vigorous federal chartering and independent, full-time directors. These directors would represent constituencies, but along with responsibility for general policies, become experts in assigned functional areas. Interlocking directorates are completely outlawed; stockholders get new power, and referendums are provided when local communities are affected by corporate activity.

A sharp increase in disclosure is part of the Nader-Green package, on every conceivable item of social and employee cost and with full financial facts concerning product-line and conglomerate divisions. A bill of rights for corporate constituencies would be devised, based on the contention that corporations are indeed governmental structures as well as economic enterprises. Finally, antitrust laws would be significantly expanded and rigorously enforced, increasing the policing powers of competition.

The Nader-Green book is a capstone for earlier volumes. For those who are interested, it gives a current picture of the Nader position and his policy proposals. For example, it is obvious from this book that Nader is not a traditional

socialist, but an advocate of strong regulation and strong competition.

Both of these books are worth reading, although Miller's is the more sophisticated and complex.

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NATHAN ROSENBERG. *Perspectives on Technology*. Pp. x, 353. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $24.95. Paperbound, $6.95.

Economic historians have long been fascinated with the subject of technology, and it has only recently been replaced by an interest in social and urban history. All of the noteworthy new economic historians have worked in this field—Paul David researched the mechanics of reaping, Peter Temin explored iron and steel, and Douglass North investigated ocean shipping, to mention a few. But Nathan Rosenberg, in his many articles and other publications, has surveyed this entire field. His volume *Perspectives on Technology* contains fifteen of his articles, and for those requiring some background it can be read in conjunction with his book *Technology and American Economic Growth*, which covers both theory and applications on a textbook level.

What accounts for this general interest by economic historians in the subject of technology? The most important questions in economic history have concerned growth, and Denison, Kendrick, and Solow, among others, have shown that economic growth can be explained only to a small degree by the increase in factors as conventionally measured. A large part of economic growth therefore remains unexplained and has been termed the "residual." This so-called "measure of our ignorance" must then be due to technological change of some sort. And so the study of the history of an economy becomes the study of the history of technological change. Rosenberg adds two further reasons to study the history of technology. Technological change is far more complicated, notes Rosenberg, than economic theory has led us to believe. Although it is convenient for economists to conceptualize technological advance as a shift of the production function and not merely a movement along an existing one—that is, not merely a substitution of factors within a given technological context—it is far harder to distinguish between the two in practice. Shocking as it is to economic theorists, the very definition of technological change is ambiguous in most real world applications. Furthermore, adds Rosenberg, it is not technological change itself that leads to growth, it is its eventual utilization. Diffusion and adaptation become more important than the forces generating inventions. By studying history we can understand the determinants of a technological menu and an economy's utilization of an existing technology. There are few historians of science or economists of technology more able to demonstrate these lessons from history than Nathan Rosenberg.

His fifteen previously published articles have been arranged in four sections: (1) a discussion of the history of American technological advance in the machine tool industry and in woodworking, with a very suggestive piece on Anglo-American wage differences in 1820; (2) a section of how technologies change, with an article on the problems of implementing current economic theory, (3) a part on the diffusion and adaptation of technology, which is probably Rosenberg's strongest chapter and his greatest contribution to the whole topic, and (4) a somewhat contemporary, although retrospective, section on natural resources and the environment, which is weaker than the rest of the book.

Rosenberg excels at demonstrating the problems raised by the economic concept of production functions, why diffusion and adaptation are the most important aspects of technological change, and how the neglected factors on the supply side have operated to generate technological change. Rosenberg will disappoint many readers by not following these examples with some concrete addition to theory and with a simple

measurement of their relative importance. But these areas are not Rosenberg's strengths and are best left to the Griliches and Jorgensons of economics. This collection of papers is nonetheless an important addition to the history of science in an economic framework. It both serves as a caution and provides a series of suggestions to the economist formulating and testing theories of growth. It is also a well written and engaging series of articles by someone who has now solidly established himself as the dean in the economic realm of the history of technology.

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LEONARD SILK and DAVID VOGEL. *Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business.* Pp. 250. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976. $8.95.

Every American institution of late has come under extensive criticism and the public seems to have less faith in many of these institutions including American business. Recently, American corporations were under investigation for alleged bribery, kickbacks, and illegal campaign contributions.

Many of the economic problems resulting from the oil crisis, inflation, recession, unemployment, and high interest rates, have shaken the confidence of the American public and increased their doubt about the role of corporations in maintaining the economic health of the nation.

The Conference Board had conducted a series of meetings during September 1974 and 1975 and invited some 360 top executives of major American corporations. The authors were invited to attend the meetings and the book is the compilation of the authors' impressions, observations and analysis of the discussion that took place during these meetings. The discussions were very candid, honest as well as soul searching. Many of the executives who participated have remained anonymous. The object of the book has been to present what the authors hope is an accurate and fair portrait of the thinking of American business leaders on a wide variety of issues which are covered in eight chapters ranging from crisis of confidence, national economic planning, corporate autonomy and political freedom plus many others. I think the authors have succeeded in their venture.

Another major issue facing the corporations today is the extent to which they consider themselves threatened by increased governmental control of business. They believe such control is detrimental, unnecessary and inefficient. The authors pinpoint that the "dominant attitude of corporate executives towards government officials, whether elected or appointed, is one of hostility, distrust, and not infrequently, contempt."

What should be the role of Federal Government in terms of managing the health of the economy through economic planning? The authors point out the skepticism and fear among many of the executives about the introduction of economic planning in the U.S.A. It is gratifying to note that the growing number of business leaders believe that to solve the crucial national problems the U.S. Government should engage in some form of economic planning. As the authors point out, "industries would still be free to make their own decisions, but they would do so on the basis of more complete information about long term trends as affected by government policies."

Business executives feel that the press, television, electorate and the elite are hostile and do not try to appreciate what they are doing. It may be true that better economic education about the American economic system is needed. At the same time, the corporations have to become more responsive as well as responsible to meet the changing needs of the society.

The book provides an excellent account of the thinking of American corporate leaders on a variety of issues that form the American society and outline the steps that some businessmen are taking, not only to confront their moral dilemma but also to search for a

new system that will preserve the fabrics of American capitalistic society and maintain the virtues of the American system with economic and political liberty.

The authors have presented the material with clarity and in a style and language that can be understood by the general public. The book will contribute to a better informed public debate about the role of the corporation in America's economic system.

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ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE WORLD TODAY

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PREFACE

George Peter Murdoch's *Ethnographic Atlas*[1] counts 892 ethnic groups living within the borders of nation-states in the world today. Most countries, indeed, have more than five major ethnic groups within their borders[2] and less than a fifth are relatively homogeneous, that is, a single ethnic group makes up more than 90 percent of their population. Relations among ethnic groups are frequently conflictive: since World War II, the most common cause of violence involving states has not been external wars but internal ethnic conflict.[3]

The papers in this volume accomplish two purposes. First, they provide a cross-sectional look at some of the most pressing ethnic conflicts in the world today. Second, they demonstrate the increase in intellectual sophistication that recent analyses of such conflicts display. Several decades ago, in a volume such as this one, the authors would have been primarily concerned with two sets of issues: (1) minorities as potential nations;[4] and (2) discrimination[5] against minorities and the process of their assimilation. Both of these sets of issues are still with us. In recent years, the former process separated Pakistan from India, then Bangladesh from Pakistan. It now nurtures the secessionist movements among the Basques, Bretons, Scots, Nagas, Pakhtuns, Kurds, French Canadians, Georgians and the Muslim fringe nationalities in the Soviet Union, the drive for a homeland for Palestinian refugees, and it will trouble African politics for decades to come.

The second set of issues is also still very much with us, for instance, Protestant versus Catholic battles in Northern Ireland, reactions to rising tides of immigration into Britain and OEC countries, apartheid in Rhodesia and South Africa, and, more generally, our rediscovered concern for human rights.

The papers in this volume, while they also concern themselves with these two historical perspectives, deal with many other aspects of ethnic relations as well. The increase in the range of interest and the enhanced level of analytic sophistication displayed by these articles indicate how far research on this topic has come in the past two decades. The simplistic notions that the fitting outcome of ethnic self-determination movements must be the creation of a new nation-state or that the "melting pot" is the best solution—or, indeed, ever really occurred—have been abandoned.

1. George Peter Murdoch, *Ethnographic Atlas* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).

2. Abdul A. Said and Luis R. Simmons, eds., *Ethnicity in an International Context* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions Press, 1976), p. 10.

3. Ibid., p. 16.

4. For a prototypical statement equating ethnic conflict internationally with the drive for separate nationhood, see Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups" in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, ed., Ralph B. Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 347–72.

5. For a projection of this American perspective on ethnic relations onto the world scene, see Arnold M. Rose, "The Comparative Study of Intergroup Conflict," *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 1 (January 1960), pp. 57–66. Rose's principal classification of countries is according to the degree of severity of discrimination against minorities

In their stead, you will find many more neutral, less prescriptive, and more profound analyses and concepts in the papers that follow.

Moreover, the failure of government policies dealing with ethnic conflict have made us all humble. These devices—for instance, the creation of ethnically separated electorates; proportional or compensatory representation in government; devolution of power to ethnically homogeneous territorial units; provision as a counterweight of a transcendental, ideologically recruited political cadre; establishment of veto power and checks and balances on ethnically relevant governmental decisions; introduction of ethnic quotas in bureaucratic and legislative government bodies; provision of compensatory social and economic benefits to low-status minorities; and the creation of constitutional or statutory guarantees of ethnic blindness or evenhandedness in the use of governmental power —have had only modest success.

Many of these devices and others directed at the management of ethnic conflict emerge in the following papers, as well as the special circumstances which enhance or mute those conflicts in the societies discussed. Fresh concepts and theoretical frameworks taking us well beyond the two principal formulations outlined above are introduced to help classify and explain ethnic conflict. And yet, we have only begun to seek answers to the most fundamental questions of all. Why are ethnic groups and the conflicts they engender so difficult to categorize and analyze, yet so durable and pervasive? Why has the peculiar mixture of blood, religion, language, and territory been so lasting and so potent a force in our own and others' history?

If we can begin to answer these questions, then perhaps the best public policy strategies for minimizing ethnic conflict will be apparent. It is in this spirit that the current issue of the ANNALS is presented.

RICHARD D. LAMBERT
EDITOR

ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION

Most countries are populated by several distinct ethnic groups; and as many as half of all countries have experienced or can expect substantial conflict among such groups in the second half of this century. Ethnic differences are the single most important source of large-scale conflict within states; and they are frequently instrumental in wars between countries as well.[1] Our record in managing ethnic conflict is mixed; and where efforts have been successful, the most frequently used means have been the repression of outspoken ethnic minorities, or pressure on them to assimilate with the dominant cultural groups.

In short, ethnic groups and relationships between them are critical elements in achieving and maintaining social peace in most parts of the world, and if we are to deal intelligently with them, it is crucial to understand their dynamics. But the great variety of its forms and the narrow preconceptions with which analysts and policy-makers have tended to approach the phenomenon have made such an understanding elusive. Thus, for instance, while conflict among ethnic and similar culturally distinct groups in Africa or Southeast Asia is predicted by contemporary theories, it seems anomalous in such stable, industrialized democracies as Canada, the United Kingdom and Belgium or in authoritarian regimes, such as those in the Soviet Union or China. This is because, until recently, both scholarly and general opinion tended to associate ethnicity with premodern stages of development—with primordial or prerational sentiments and with primitive social and political organization.[2]

From this point of view, one would expect the intensity of ethnic identification and conflicts between ethnic groups to fade as societies modernize; and such manifestations of ethnicity in modern societies would be considered either vestiges of a premodern, prenational past or some form of

1. See Martin O. Heisler and B. Guy Peters, *The Implications of Scarcity for the Peaceful Management of Group Conflict* (College Park, Md., University of Maryland, mimeographed, March, 1977), pp. 1–4 and the lists of countries in footnote 1

2. This tendency seems to have had both practical and theoretical sources. Most extensive ethnographic studies have been carried out by social anthropologists, and fieldwork in that discipline long concentrated on preliterate and preindustrial societies. The most important theoretical source of this tendency is probably the equation of the concept ethnic group with a class of undifferentiated community by sociologists. Undifferentiated or diffuse social structures were associated with premodern societies and differentiated or functionally specific structures with modern social and political organization. Thus, as diffuse social structures were expected to give way to specific ones in the course of development so, too, it was predicted by a number of important social theories that ethnic and other ascriptive bases for association would be displaced by achievement based, rational relationships. Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change of Ethnicity," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 56–71 and 53–83 passim.

reversion or retrogression.[3] But many of the essays in this issue, as well as other recent studies, cast doubts on such a perspective. While the classic patterns can be found in many settings, in numerous others we are more likely to comprehend the political, economic and cultural manifestations of ethnic solidarity if we set aside the simple developmental notion that the more modern a society the less evident and important ethnicity ought to be in it.[4] For, in many cases, ethnic group-based activities seem to be rational responses—even calculated strategies on the part of individuals and groups—to contemporary situations encountered in modern societies.

This illustration of an anomaly—a manifestation not adequately explained by existing theories or studied through currently dominant approaches—points to a need to supplement our perspectives. Broadly interdisciplinary approaches may help us to grasp phenomena not adequately handled through the traditional orientations developed in sociology and anthropology, the two disciplines that historically focused on the systematic study of ethnic relations. Our enhanced awareness of the economic, political, ethical and legal aspects of ethnic group dynamics—in addition to the social, cultural and psychological—is one reason for this. Another inheres the actual manifestations of ethnic conflict today: As Professor Lambert noted in the preface to this issue, concerns with ethnic relations have shifted from the idea that such movements can be expected to be resolved—ought to be resolved?—either by the complete autonomy of ethnically self-conscious groups or by their assimilation into the larger social setting in which they find themselves.

For, while these two outcomes of ethnic movements remain serious possibilities, as the current Canadian and historical American cases of secession movements and the periodic Russian and Chinese policies of assimilation discussed below show, in many cases they are coming to be viewed by politicians, as well as by scholars, as too costly, impractical or unnecessary. If complete separation and assimilation are the end points on a continuum of ethnic conflict, then most actual situations may prove manageable at some intermediate point on that continuum.

Demands for complete autonomy and pressures for complete assimilation are likely to evoke strong resistance: the former, on the part of the central authorities, since they will perceive such demands as direct challenges to their legitimacy and to the integrity of the system; the latter, on the part of the minorities, whose cultural distinctness is under attack. The human and material costs of such conflict, whether civil war to avert secession or civil disobedience or terrorism to forestall assimilation, have been very high in modern times, even for the winners. In addition, ethnic groups' interests, in terms of economic opportunities or defense capabilities, for instance, may not be well served by complete autonomy. And even if governments with repressive or assimilationist policies were able to absorb the direct costs of

3. See, for instance, Walker Connor, "Self-determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, vol. 20, no. 1 (October 1967), pp. 30–53; and *idem*, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1973), pp. 1–21.

4. Cf. the sociological theory referred to in footnote 2 above. For a thoughtful and effective critique of this simplistic developmental notion, see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973).

coercion, they might be unable to govern in the climate of questioned legitimacy and uncertain compliance that would be created by heavy-handed treatment of ethnic groups. An awareness of such direct and indirect costs explains, in part, why many ethnic movements do not culminate in demands for complete autonomy, and it may also help us understand the relatively peaceful and moderate policies sometimes followed in this realm by generally authoritarian regimes.

The peaceful and effective management of conflict between ethnic groups involves the building of rules and institutions for coexistence in a single society, state and economy. One or both of two types of problems need to be dealt with in most situations.

First, smaller or weaker groups are often concerned about discrimination against them through the state's machinery. The perceived discrimination may involve matters of status (rights) or material goods. The systematic disadvantaging of some groups seems a common trait of multiethnic societies in general, as the discussions below of the historic relationships between major population groups in Canada, Belgium, Ulster, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and South Asia show.

Sometimes such disadvantages reflect asymmetrical development or modernization, while in other cases they are produced by purposeful government policies. In some situations, as Cynthia Enloe's paper on the roles of the police and military in several multiethnic societies demonstrates, agencies of the state serve to create or sustain such systematic disadvantages.

Regardless of the source of disadvantages and inequalities in multiethnic societies, increasing and increasingly group-based demands for removing them and building protective rules and institutions against their re-emergence can be seen in many societies. Doubtless, the transnational diffusion of egalitarian values and a concern for human rights has fueled these demands and will continue to do so. Several of the articles in this issue touch on these concerns, but one in particular, Professor Das Gupta's paper dealing with differential patterns of distribution of wealth and opportunities in South Asia focuses on them sharply.

A second set of problems revolves around positive, rather than defensive or protective, concerns on the part of ethnic groups. Since ethno-cultural differences can be expected to be reflected in different—even divergent—values from group to group, it is likely that ethnic groups will want to manage some aspects of their collective or social business. The nature and even language of education, the designation of holidays, the development of cultural programs, and a myriad of other policy areas or public questions may become objects of dispute in multiethnic systems. Particularly in modern systems, where public authority delves into many aspects of life, culturally distinct groups may well aspire to control that authority in culturally sensitive areas. These aspirations tend to lead to demands for some form and degree of autonomy for the group vis-à-vis the larger society.

Such autonomy demands, as suggested earlier, tend to stop short of complete autonomy or self-determination. In more limited form, they have become common in many multiethnic societies; and responding to them favorably through decentralization has been a relatively effective means for peacefully coping with conflict-bearing situations. Decentralization or

creative federalism have been the primary responses to ethnic differences in many countries, and it is in these terms that much of the discussion in the papers dealing with the western societies treated in this volume takes place.

The Canadian confederation is presently being tested in this regard, and the capacity of its institutions and the people who staff them to deal with increasingly militant demands for some form of autonomy for the province of Quebec, while protecting the rights of the English-speaking minority there and of French-speaking minorities elsewhere, may determine whether complete autonomy or secession by Quebec can be forestalled or even whether large-scale violence can be averted. These are some of the central problems addressed by Professor McRoberts in his article.

Belgium, created from culturally distinct populations by the major powers in 1830, has moved from a unitary state toward a relatively loose federation during the past fifteen years. If the new decentralized regime can be put into full operation in the near future, the country may avert violent conflict. However, neither the environmental conditions, particularly the prevailing economic situation, nor the residual problems involved in the status of the ethnically mixed and symbolically significant capital, permit appreciable optimism at this time.

In his comparative study of the secession movements in the antebellum South and Quebec, Marc Levine assesses the institutional capabilities of the American and Canadian federations. His article makes a contribution both to the theoretical considerations of institution design in the management of conflicts, based in part or essentially on cultural differences, as well as to our understanding of these two seldom-compared cases.

As in Belgium, Canada and the United States on the eve of the Civil War, so, too, in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China potentially conflicting ethnic groups generally occupy distinct territories. This provides a basis for according some form and degree of jurisdiction to ethnic groups over their own affairs—that is, territory can serve as a basis for exercising some degree of autonomy. For two of the three socialist systems treated in this issue, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the territorial aspect of ethnic divisions has made it possible to accord at least a formal recognition to cultural diversity. However, there, as well as in China, the governing ideological doctrines militate against the real decentralization of authority and the political practices of the ruling communist parties are also quite centralized.

Clearly, the differences in the management of ethnic pluralism between such western states as Belgium and Canada on the one hand and the socialist regimes on the other are substantial. To be sure, important and interesting differences can be noted in the approaches of the three socialist countries to the problem as well. It is noteworthy, however, that the ruling regimes are cognizant of the actual and potential stresses emanating from ethnic distinctions and are sensitive to the need to find means for the peaceful management of the conflict-bearing situations that might arise from them. Differences between western democratic regimes and socialist regimes notwithstanding, ethnic conflict and responses to it can be studied comparatively and meaningfully in all of these settings.

The problems of peacefully managing ethnic conflict seem to be

exacerbated where contending groups do not occupy distinct territories, as well as in situations in which outside powers are substantially involved. These are the major lessons of the prolonged and bloody conflicts in Ulster and in the region of the Near East inhabited by Kurdish groups. The case of Ulster points up the inadequate analytic grasp of scholarly specialists in the study of ethnic conflict, since now even the best among them seem to be running out of constructive proposals for dealing with the situation.[5] The case of the Kurds at once underlines the tensions emanating from a situation in which a population group does not possess either its own territory or a coherent political structure and comes from an unstable international environment.

The lead article by Donald Horowitz provides a conceptual and substantive introduction to the issue based substantially on the sociological and social anthropological orientation from which the study of ethnic relations has grown. It is at once an example of the state-of-the-art from this perspective and a conceptual and theoretical core for developing a broader perspective that includes considerations of institution design, public policy, and so forth. Reading it will prepare the reader for the subsequent articles, which do not develop the fundamental notions of ethnicity, ethnic identity and group in as systematic a manner as Dr. Horowitz does.

The concluding article, by Professor Hewitt, is in one sense the opposite of the lead article: instead of working from the traditional core concepts in the field, it undertakes the most ambitious and far-ranging search for cross-culturally relevant influences on the incidence and intensity of ethnic conflict attempted in the issue. If Dr. Horowitz shows us the direction from which we are coming in studying the phenomenon (and it does much more, of course), Dr. Hewitt provides some indications of the directions in which we may turn in the near future.

The overriding aim in presenting the articles assembled in this issue is to convey, simultaneously, a sense of the generality of the problem of ethnic conflict and extensive illustrations of the different forms it has taken as well as to indicate the approaches evolved for dealing with it. If the cases of Ulster and the Kurds are disheartening and that of Canada produces anxiety, the experiences of Belgium and Yugoslavia may provide a modest basis for optimism regarding the prospects for peacefully managing the problem. In general, ethnic conflict is likely to be with us for the foreseeable future, but we are not helpless before it.

MARTIN O. HEISLER
SPECIAL EDITOR

5. See, in particular, the writings of Richard Rose. In his first book on the problems of Ulster, *Governing without Consensus* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), he offered numerous alternatives to dealing with Ulster's difficulties. More recently, in *Northern Ireland: Time of Choice* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), pp. 165–66, as well as in several newspaper articles, he can call for little more than a general hope that the people of Northern Ireland will somehow—any way they can—survive.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 433, Sept. 1977

Cultural Movements and Ethnic Change

By DONALD L. HOROWITZ

ABSTRACT: There is a new emphasis on change emerging in writings on ethnicity. Some of the most important changes involve group boundaries and conflict relationships. Ethnic groups often assimilate with other groups or differentiate themselves from groups of which they were formerly a part. As changes of this kind occur, cultural movements commonly emerge to foster or retard them. These movements range from literary, religious, and historical revivals to full-scale "crisis cults." The form they take is related to the boundary change underway. If group members fear the drifting apart of subgroups, emphasis is often placed on myths of common origin. If, however, an ethnic group is being absorbed by another group, a common reaction is to stress the distinctiveness of group history and culture. Movements of the latter kind often result in political separatism and secessionist violence. Still other cultural revivals have had their origins in anti-colonial sentiment. Since the cultural content and the functionaries needed to propel such movements are to be found at the ethnic-group level, these movements also end by asserting ethnic distinctiveness. Anti-colonial revival movements, as well as cultural movements that aim to rectify ethnic boundaries, thus contribute to conflict between ethnic groups.

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IN RECENT years, there has been a tendency to emphasize the phenomenon of change in the interpretation of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict. For a considerable time, the prevailing view took the ethnic groups as givens of the social order, actors of politics more than acted upon. As creatures of their histories and traditions, ethnic groups were long regarded as largely immutable, even primordial, forces. Today, most students of ethnic relations no longer adhere to what might be called "the firm objective reality" of ethnic groups and ethnic conflict. The emerging view stresses the fluidity and variability of ethnic identities and relationships.[1] In a fairly short time, we have moved from metaphors of blood and stone to clay and putty.

There is much evidence to support the new emphasis on ethnic change. The boundaries of ethnic groups—the definition of who is included and excluded as a member—can and do vary over time. Groups often absorb, merge with, or merge into, other ethnic groups, through a process of assimilation. Sometimes, too, groups divide or subgroups reject the wider entity and branch out on their own, through a process of differentiation.[2] Conflict alignments are also variable, and so, too, is the intensity of conflict. Small wonder, then, that recent writers have often spoken of the situational character of ethnicity.

That ethnicity may be situational or contextual does not, of course, mean that it is randomly subjected to the buffeting of other social and political forces or endlessly susceptible to the manipulation of political leaders seeking to advance their own interests. If they are to take hold, new conceptions of the ethnic group and its enemies must strike responsive chords in the concrete social experience of group members. Variability is not the same as infinite malleability. There are patterns of ethnic change, regularities in the ways that certain social conditions tend to evoke similar collective responses. Rather less attention has been paid to identifying these patterns than has been given to chronicling the existence of ethnic change itself.

I intend here to explore several such patterns of change. In each case, I take as my theme the interplay between movements of cultural revival and changes in the boundaries and conflict relationships of ethnic groups. The material is drawn almost entirely from the colonial and post-colonial experience of the developing countries, which have generated an array of cultural revival movements, as well as profound changes in group boundaries and often intense ethnic conflict.

During the colonial period, a great many movements of cultural revival were born. These movements ranged from mild literary, religious, and historical revivals to full-fledged revitalization movements and crisis cults.[3] Their most common theme

1. Notable among recent writings along these lines is Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976).

2. I have dealt with these forms of boundary change in my essay, "Ethnic Identity," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 111–40.

3. The terms are those used by Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," in Barry McLaughlin, ed., *Studies in Social Movements. A Social Psychological Perspective* (New York The Free Press, 1969), pp. 30–52; Weston LaBarre, "Materials for

was the attempt to recapture a fading culture or a glorious past, in order to explain an unsatisfying present and point the way to a more fulfilling future. Many of these movements had roots in ethnic relations, and many more ultimately had effects on ethnic relations.

A common source of cultural movements was concern about potential shifts in group boundaries, shifts of the kind already enumerated. An ethnic group that found itself being fragmented into subgroups which threatened to overtake the larger group identity might react by reinforcing elements of common culture. A group that found itself losing its distinctive identity by absorption in another ethnic unit might react by reemphasizing its cultural uniqueness. Cultural revivals often went hand-in-hand with threats to group identity.

However, some groups that were not undergoing marked changes in boundaries also experienced cultural revivals. Such movements were often stimulated by the impact of colonial rule and changes in the criteria of prestige and stratification that accompanied it. Revival movements of this kind constituted an effort to assert the dignity and worth denied by the presence of the Europeans.

Both types of revivals tended to foster ethnic conflict. The movements generally hardened group boundaries, affirmed the legitimacy of ethnic identity at the expense of national identity, and gave a firmer foundation of support to ethnically-based political organizations. Their emphasis on history sometimes rekindled dimly remembered ethnic antagonisms, as they suppressed elements of shared, peaceful interethnic experience. They accorded increased prestige and influence to a class of highly ethnocentric cultural functionaries. Finally, cultural movements in some countries contributed to ethnic conflict by demanding state patronage for their segmental goals and programs.[4]

REVIVAL MOVEMENTS AND GROUP BOUNDARIES

Boundaries must be underpinned by a suitable mythological apparatus. Those who seek to promote or reverse boundary changes are gen-

a History of Studies of Crisis Cults: A Bibliographic Essay," *Current Anthropology*, vol. 12, no. 1 (February 1971), pp. 3–44

4. To suggest that these have been the consequences of revival movements is, of course, not to assert that such movements were always intentionally geared in these directions. Purposeful action toward such goals has sometimes been present, sometimes not. Some anthropologists have argued that the purely evocative, expressive, and consummatory aspects of revival movements may outweigh their political motivation. They have accordingly cautioned against interpretations of such movements solely in terms of their utility as instruments of political mobilization. See James W. Fernandez, "The Affirmation of Things Past: Alar Ayong and Bwiti as Movements of Protest in Central and Northern Gabon," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, eds., *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 427–57. No doubt this warning against the instrumentalist bias of post facto interpretation is well-taken, for the culture of revival movements may be so self-contained and "self-indulgent" as to make it difficult for leaders to steer them in wholly preconceived directions. Despite this, leadership does play an important role in such movements, and, even in the absence of political motivation, cultural revivals have political consequences, particularly for ethnic relations. For a good discussion of the political implications of cultural movements, see the conclusion to Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1957).

erally also proponents of movements to reorient collective beliefs, for an established or emerging group boundary is always vulnerable to the charge that it does not appropriately or accurately reflect the collective situation.

As already indicated, revival movements are often reconstitutive responses either to growing differentiation or to growing assimilation, to the drifting apart of subgroups or to the blurring of boundaries between groups. When threatened changes in group boundaries spur cultural revivals, the forms taken by the movements bear a relationship to the kind of boundary change that is occurring. If the drifting apart of subgroups is to be reversed, the reconstruction of history that is likely to take place will no doubt lay considerable emphasis on myths of common origin, and especially on a single ancestor.[5] This is natural enough, for it provides a counter to accelerating diversity. If, however, what is feared is the loss of distinctive identity through merger into some other group, a greater emphasis may be placed on recalling the ancient glories of the culture that binds group members, resuscitating all that distinguishes them from others, destroying all that links them to others. Here form follows function. This can be made clear by considering examples of both types of movements.

Movements of assimilation

Cultural movements among the Fang of Gabon and Cameroon were clear responses of the Fang to their increasing differentiation. Conquerors of significant parts of Equatorial Africa, the Fang were then conquered in turn by the French. They were "a people with a sense of a past, but with a depressing sense of the future."[6] In the course of their migrations and conquests, they had become dispersed and divided into many clans and dialect clusters, some of which were mutually hostile. This disintegration had important consequences for group ambitions, for in both Cameroon and Gabon the Fang found themselves in increasing contact with other ethnic groups. Particularly in Gabon, the Fang were in the early part of the twentieth century developing a rivalry with the more educated and better-placed Mpongwé, which after World War II grew into political conflict.[7]

The Fang, then, had reason to return to their past, to reaffirm its validity and utilize it to recreate the unity that, according to Fang myth, had earlier prevailed. A prominent part in the Fang revival was played by a legend of common origin and migration, which rested on genuine genealogies but also contained new elements of dubious historical accuracy. The legend traced the dispersion and conflict among the Fang, explaining these in terms of family quarrels and analogizing them to

5. To call these "myths" is not to deny that there may actually have been a common ancestor for some of these groups. See I. Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1967), p. 27.

6. Fernandez, "The Affirmation of Things Past," p. 442. I am indebted to Brian Weinstein for helpful comments on the African materials in this essay.

7. John A. Ballard, "Four Equatorial States," in Gwendolen Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 235–55, Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 343–58.

strife among the European powers.[8] The legend thus constituted something of a rejoinder to European assumptions of superiority and provided an inclusive basis for ethnic identity in the face of ethnic competition. The Fang movement was an integral part of attempts by the Fang to reconstitute themselves, "for they well understood their dispersion was a weakness and that only through regroupment could they expect to exert influence in tribal and colonial affairs."[9] In this, the Fang have been at least partially successful. Though coastal and inland Fang have been at odds, the Fang have nonetheless participated in politics on the basis of a unity that has transcended the old divisions of dialect and clan,[10] with various reconstitutive cults lending their support to Fang-dominated political parties.

The Fang legend was thus "an important instrument of political regroupment in the hands of an early group of African nationalists."[11] Similar legends have served similar purposes for other fragmented groups, such as the Lozi of Zambia,[12] the Bakongo of Zaire, Angola, and the Congo Republic,[13] and the Yoruba of Nigeria. During the colonial period, the Yoruba, searching for commonality, turned to their mythical ancestor, Oduduwa, and founded a cultural organization based on that myth. The Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Children of Oduduwa) was closely linked to the Yoruba political party, the Action Group. Indeed, the Action Group was created by the Egbe and its leaders. Like the Fang, the Yoruba had undergone a process of internal differentiation into a number of subgroups, and conscious attempts were made to unite them as the colonial period drew to a close. The common ancestor myth was an integral part of this regroupment. "One of the purposes has been to unite the Yoruba, who were divided into independent states which warred against one another throughout most of the last century."[14] Also like the Fang, the Yoruba managed to surmount internal differences and participate in politics on a broader group basis, but the regroupment was not complete. At various points, the Yoruba fell back on their earlier subgroups for political organization.

Movements of differentiation

Whereas groups threatened with differentiation turn to the past to reduce their diversity, groups threatened with assimilation resort to their history to affirm their distinctiveness. Often begun by those group members furthest along in the individual assimilation process, these movements commonly result in an explosive and violent assertion of group separateness.

One such group was the Bakonjo of western Uganda. The Bakonjo

8. "The reference in the traditional legends to family conflict evokes a satisfying explanation for fractionalism and dispersion It also provides the basis and rationale for regroupment" Fernandez, "The Affirmation of Things Past," p 432

9. James W Fernandez, "Folklore as an Agent of Nationalism," *African Studies Bulletin*, vol 5, no. 2 (May 1962), p. 5.

10. Fernandez, "The Affirmation of Things Past," p. 456, Ballard, "Four Equatorial States," pp 253-61

11. Fernandez, "Folklore as an Agent of Nationalism," p. 7

12. See Gerald L Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969* (London, Hurst & Co., 1970), chap 1

13. See Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton, N.J Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 247.

14. William Bascom, "Comment: African Arts and Social Control," *African Studies Bulletin*, vol. 5, no. 2 (May 1962), p. 24.

Life History Research Society was a direct antecedent of an armed Bakonjo rebellion. The society was founded in the early 1950s, during a period when the customs and practices of the Batoro, near neighbors and sometimes antagonists of the Bakonjo, had high prestige among educated Bakonjo. This admiration had even reached the point of producing an abandonment of Bakonjo rites and language in favor of Batoro practices. Among the leaders of the Life History Society were educated young men who earlier shared a disparaging view of their own culture and had sought to emulate the Batoro.[15] Some Bakonjo had already adopted Toro as their language, and even the language of the Bakonjo was rapidly being infused with Toro vocabulary. In fact, one of the first efforts to reconstruct Bakonjo history was made by a Bakonjo chief writing in the Toro language.[16]

The movement thus began as the Bakonjo sensed they were in danger of losing their separate identity. The society's preoccupation with the Bakonjo past inevitably sharpened the line between Bakonjo and Batoro. For it was to a tradition of "lost independence and memories of insults"[17] inflicted by the Batoro that the Bakonjo turned. Nor did the movement stop there. Led by a former schoolteacher who established branches throughout the Bakonjo area, the Life History Research Society was transformed into a separatist movement that eventually began hostilities aimed at Bakonjo autonomy. Whereas the Fang and Yoruba movements ended a tradition of warfare to consolidate identity, the Bakonjo movement slid into warfare as it fractured identity.

Like the Bakonjo movement, the Kurdish cultural revival of the interwar period was a reaction to an apprehended loss of distinctive identity. Kurdish migrants to distant towns, particularly professionals and civil servants, had many incentives to adopt the local languages and succumb to Arabization, Persianization, or Turkification. In this way, elites were being siphoned off, their group membership forgotten.[18] Persian, Turkish, and Arabic had been making inroads on the Kurdish language, and Kurdish literature was in decline. After World War I, however, the British embarked on a significant experiment in establishing a Kurdish regional administration in Sulaymani, Iraq. The language of administration and education was Kurdish. The experiment, though short-lived, had a profound impact in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. There was a rapid upsurge in Kurdish cultural activity, the way pointed by the new uses to which the Kurdish language had been put. Kurdish literature, newspapers, grammars, religious and political essays were all produced in abundance. "Kurdish progressively replaced Persian and Turkish for private correspondence. . . . The

15. Kirsten Alnaes, "Songs of the Rwenzururu Rebellion," in P. H. Gulliver, ed., *Tradition and Transition in East Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 246.

16. Ibid.

17. Martin R. Doornbos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzururu: Two Responses to Ethnic Inequality," in Rotberg and Mazrui, eds., *Protest and Power in Black Africa*, p. 1,120.

18. Manfred W. Wenner, "A Comparative Analysis of Modern Separatist Movements: Examples from Western Europe and the Middle East" (unpublished paper presented at the 1969 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, mimeo.), pp. 17–18.

extended use of the language marched hand in hand with the nationalist spirit, and there was a conscious effort to resist the encroachment of Arabic words and to preserve the rich and lively native vocabulary unspoiled."[19] As in western Uganda, the Kurdish cultural revival in Iraq was the precursor of a full-fledged separatist movement that has flared into civil war intermittently in the intervening 50 years.

The Kurdish movement shared many elements in common with revivals among the Basques in Spain, the Sikhs of the Punjab, and the Hausa in Ibadan, western Nigeria.[20] As the Kurds feared assimilation in distant urban centers, so the Basques had begun to lose portions of their elite in Spanish towns. Begun by Castilianized urban intellectuals, the Basques' movement back to their folklore, dancing, and history glorified the purity of the rural Basque way of life. Reacting against the fact that Basque had become merely the "language of the stable," a young Basque lawyer who had learned Basque only as an adult set out to excise Spanish words from his adopted tongue, much as the Kurds were de-Arabizing their own vocabulary.[21]

A comparable "purification" was a central feature of the Sikh movement, which systematically eliminated Hindu influences from Sikh religious practices.[22] The aim of the Sikh reformers was to prevent the assimilation of the Sikhs into the mass of Hinduism. To accomplish this, they introduced new religious rites, new schools, and new systems of shrine management. The struggle to claim control of the Sikh shrines or *gurdwaras* from their Hindu custodians became a mass movement that embittered Sikh-Hindu relations.[23]

Although the rhetoric of the Sikh movement was cast in terms of a "return" to a purer state of orthodoxy, the traditionally close relations of the two religions made this a description of doubtful historical accuracy. Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, was, like his successors, a Hindu who preached to Sikhs and Hindus alike. The effect of the reforms, therefore, was to create embarrassing contradictions between the works of the original gurus and contemporary Sikh doctrine. But the goal was to reinforce and compel official recognition of Sikh identity and later a separate Sikh state. This goal prevailed over doctrinal fi-

19. C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1971), p. 94.

20. Religious change among the Hausa of Ibadan has been interpreted in terms of its utility in reinforcing group distinctiveness. After decades of interaction threatened to blur the lines between the Muslim Hausa migrants and their Yoruba Muslim hosts, the Hausa joined the Tijaniyya Islamic order and withdrew from the Yoruba-dominated central mosque. The result was to minimize social interchange and to give religious support to the separate identity of the Hausa. See Abner Cohen, *Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), chap. 5.

21. William A. Douglass and Milton da Silva, "Basque Nationalism" (unpublished paper, mimeo., n.d.), pp. 10–11, 14–15. See Stanley Payne, "Catalan and Basque Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1971), pp. 31–9.

22. Baldev Raj Nayar, "Sikh Separatism in the Punjab," in Donald Eugene Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 158–59. Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 62–3, 71–3.

23. Nayar, "Sikh Separatism in the Punjab," pp. 160–61.

delity, perhaps because the reform movement was closely tied to the Sikh political party, the Akali Dal.

The Sikh movement had linguistic aspect, as well as a religious aspect. The Punjabi language had been pushed to one side, eclipsed first by Persian, brought by the Muslims, then by Urdu and English, both introduced by the British, and finally by the Hindu of the Hindu reformers. The fear was that the Sikhs were being "denationalized," that they were losing their identity, linguistically as well as religiously.[24] As the Bakonjo, Kurdish, and Basque languages had also lost their prestige and utility, "Punjabi was relegated to the home, the women and the illiterates."[25] For religious purposes, the Sikhs had, however, adhered to Punjabi, written in the Gurmukhi script they had devised for their scriptures. As Sikh separatism grew, the Akali Dal demanded, alternately, a Sikh state and a Punjabi-speaking state, with Gurmukhi as the official script.

As these capsule summaries suggest, one of the most important functions of cultural movements is to support ethnic boundary maintenance or, more properly, boundary reconstruction. Typically, they attempt to repair breaches in boundaries and prevent the loss of group members, especially elite members. They infuse group identity with a new or revived cultural content that may command greater allegiance or demarcate the lines between groups more clearly, reducing the element of individual choice in identity. That cultural movements are employed to effect, forestall, or reverse boundary changes is, of course, evidence that cultural practices and institutions are not givens of ethnic identity but may actually follow from it.

REVIVAL MOVEMENTS AND ANTI-COLONIALISM

Not every revival movement grew up to meet some challenge to group boundaries. Cultural revivals have often constituted integral parts of broader anti-colonial movements. For colonization was a challenge to the value and vitality of the cultures of the colonized. The ultimate foundation of colonial rule was, after all, an assumption of the ethnic supremacy of the colonizer. Colonialism has indeed been defined in these terms, as

> the domination imposed by a foreign minority, racially (or ethnically) and culturally different, acting in the name of a racial (or ethnic) and cultural superiority dogmatically affirmed, and imposing itself on an indigenous population constituting a numerical majority but inferior to the dominant group from a material point of view.[26]

This assumption is not only the rationale for the colonial relationship. It also forms the basis of policies that have profound consequences for social structure, among them policies that denigrate traditional values and criteria of stratification.

It is not surprising that ethnic domination should provoke a response cast in ethnic terms, or that even those movements that begin by being territorial and inclusive

24. Amrik Singh, "Punjabi and the Punjabi Genius," in *Punjabi Suba: A Symposium* (n.p.: National Book Club, n.d.), p. 46.

25. Prakash Tandon, *Punjabi Century* (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1972), p. 67.

26. Georges Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach," in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 54.

should end by themselves being ethnic and exclusive. Both the personnel and the content of a cultural movement are overwhelmingly likely to incline a protracted, nationalist-inspired revival in a subnational direction.

A leading role in the early stages of many nationalist movements of cultural revival was played by members of the Western-educated elite.[27] To the extent that the movement endeavors to relocate fast-disappearing roots, it may become the special preoccupation of "the intellectual who finds himself somehow out of the mainstream of his society's attitudes and ways of life, and seeks a way of personal reintegration into the community."[28] More than one movement back to traditional culture and institutions has begun in the towns of the developing world, among the Western-educated intelligentsia, which, after all, constitutes a living example of the erosion of traditional culture.

Though the movement may begin there, it cannot end there. The alienated intelligentsia may be anxious to rediscover its lost roots, but the very loss of those roots disqualifies it from providing anything more than initial moral and perhaps financial leadership in the search for them. For the Western-educated elite is likely to be ignorant of customary religious practice, deficient in local historical knowledge, unread in local literature, and perhaps not even fully competent in its own language. In the last analysis, it is dependent on an indigenous intelligentsia to carry forward the rediscovery process.

For its own reasons, the indigenous intelligentsia, too, may feel aggrieved by the introduction of alien modes of behavior, of new criteria of stratification, and by the erosion of traditional values—to resent, in other words, being "in moral bondage to the West."[29] Deprived of their former standing, their venerated practices regarded as anachronisms, mere relics of tradition, their language described as primitive, the priests and the "vernacular-medium" teachers, journalists, and writers are commonly the most active militants in these movements. As practitioners of culture, they are indispensable to any cultural movement. Because of their generally parochial outlook and their personal stake in the ethnic culture, these functionaries are inclined to turn the movement in a subnational direction.

In any event, they have little choice. In content, as in leadership, the activities of cultural movements are bound to be conducted at a distinctly subnational level. In a multiethnic society, the cultures to be revived are associated with the particular ethnic groups. The only culture shared across ethnic groups is one associated with the colonizer. Obviously, it can hardly form the basis of a nationalist revival. If the movement is to have a cultural content, it simply must occur at the level of the local languages, histories, religions, and traditions. It is of no importance that the languages may borrow foreign terms or alphabets, that the new histories may contain large components of myth, that

27 For reasons brilliantly explained by Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 132-37.

28. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 127.

29. W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 202.

the religious societies may draw on Western organizational forms, or that the traditions may not be entirely authentic. To attempt to return to a culture is not necessarily to recapture it in its pristine form. A group responding to Western pretensions by returning to its own culture may borrow the weapons of the enemy, if only to fight him more effectively. The Buddhist schools established in Ceylon were modeled on the British type.[30] The Bwiti religious movement in Gabon conducted its rites in chapels containing alarm clocks that could specify ritual hours with a precision and reliability designed to replicate European efficiency.[31] Authentic or not, the Buddhist schools were unmistakably Sinhalese, as Bwiti was clearly a Fang movement.

The nationalist origins and ethnic results of cultural revivals can be clearly seen in the cases of Burma and Ceylon. In both countries the resurgence of Buddhism formed the basis of early anti-colonialism, and in both it eventually fostered deep divisions among ethnic communities.

Buddhism was an integral component of the early Burmese nationalist movement. Monks were the earliest anti-colonialists, beginning with an insurrection that they led immediately after the British conquest and abolition of the Burmese monarchy.[32] Early in the twentieth century, when the British claimed the right to walk on pagoda premises without removing their shoes, this practice became an important nationalist issue, symbolizing the colonial rulers' disrespect for the people they ruled. As decades passed, the spread of Western education and culture increasingly jeopardized the traditional status and contemporary usefulness of monks, and they continued to play a leading role in the anti-British agitation.

Although secularists like Aung San were ascendant in the nationalist movement by the time of independence, Buddhism remained the most important underpinning of national pride and symbol of Burmese culture in contrast to Western-inspired material and educational achievements. In the early post-colonial period, members of the urban intelligentsia, alienated from their heritage, returned to Buddhism with considerable enthusiasm. Much of the impetus for the revival movement came from this group, which had been " 'culturally disinherited by colonial acculturation,' "[33] rather than from the rural areas where acculturation had been much less pronounced. With substantial patronage from the government of U Nu, Buddhist religion and culture were fostered and encouraged. The result was a resurgence of traditionalism—including such practices as spirit-worship, meditation, and the veneration of relics—in all aspects of national life.

An important element of the movement was the demand to use the resources of the modern state

30. Ibid., p. 188

31. Fernandez, "The Affirmation of Things Past."

32. These paragraphs draw heavily on Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1965) See also Hugh Tinker, *The Union of Burma*,. 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Fred R. von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in South-East Asia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).

33. Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma*, p. 124, quoting John F. Brohm, "Burmese Religion and the Burmese Religious Revival" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1957), pp. 449–53, 458–61.

to propagate Buddhism by making it the state religion and teaching it in the schools, to the exclusion of other religions. Despite the argument that Buddhism would provide a common bond to unite the Burmans with the predominantly Buddhist Mons, Shans, and Arakanese, their support for this essentially Burman-sponsored movement was less than enthusiastic.[34] The missionary zeal of the state religion movement was even more ardently opposed by most of the other minorities. For if, in a popular phrase, being a Burman means being a Buddhist,[35] being a Chin or a Kachin probably means being a Christian or animist, being an Arakanese may equally mean being a Muslim, being a Karen may mean being a Christian, and being a Burmese Indian certainly means being a Hindu or Muslim. It is no wonder that the religious upsurge that had proved a strong support of anti-colonialism and Burmese dignity proved equally conducive to the growth of "intolerant communalist forces which are disruptive of national unity. . . ."[36]

Ceylon had a comparable revival, with equally disruptive results. But, since European rule went back much further in Ceylon than in Burma, the movement began earlier. Four and a half centuries of Western colonialism, beginning with the Portuguese and Dutch and ending with the British, had greatly disrupted traditional social, religious, and political institutions. In the nineteenth century, the Sinhalese began a movement of revival, much of the impetus for which emanated from the coastal areas that had most felt Western influence.[37] Early leadership was provided by "members of the middle-class lay intelligentsia who had been educated in the Christian missionary schools of the Southwest and had reacted to Christian evangelicalism by developing a renewed interest in Buddhism and enthusiasm for its regeneration."[38]

The movement was unquestionably anti-colonial, as evidenced by the strong temperance and anti-Christian themes it embraced. The main focus of the revival was the reconstruction of Buddhism, which had suffered from the impact of Christian missionaries and from the loss of the traditional patronage of the Sinhalese monarchy. Nevertheless, the means of reconstruction were hardly traditional. As noted earlier, Buddhist schools consciously emulated the Christian and secular schools introduced by the British, and in 1956, when the Buddhist Commission recommended measures to restore Buddhism to its "rightful position," its report

> assumed throughout that progress could be achieved in the religious and social world through proper legislative, financial and institutional reforms. As such, it was a document impregnated with modern Western attitudes and represented a revolutionary departure for Theravada Buddhist laymen.[39]

As in Burma, early leadership of the Buddhist revival was provided by those most exposed to the West, but it was propelled forward by the efforts of the Buddhist monks, who had suffered a decline in prestige

34. See Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma*, pp. 321–22.
35. Ibid., p. 83.
36. Ibid., p. 183.

37. See generally Robert N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), chap. 2.
38. Ibid., p. 43.
39. Wriggins, *Ceylon*, pp. 196–97.

and influence under British rule. As the movement came more and more to depend on government patronage, the monks became more and more immersed in political activity. Once their influence was felt, as it was rather dramatically in the 1956 election, not only was government support for religion forthcoming, but the monks became a powerful interest group whose concerns had always to be taken into account. The main Sinhalese parties have competed for their support, and on certain ethnic issues have been obliged to accord them, in effect, a veto. As might be expected, the concerns of the monks have tended to be highly parochial. Their political activity has prevented those Sinhalese who are opposed to Sinhalese "communalism" from dictating the course of Sinhalese-Tamil relations.

Buddhism and the Sinhalese ethnic identity are closely interwoven. For the Sinhalese, Ceylon is "the island destined to preserve and propagate the Buddha's doctrine."[40] Necessarily, therefore, the Buddhist revival

> strengthened realization of the unique bonds between Buddhism and the Sinhalese. When memories of the past were recalled, it was a Sinhalese past that was remembered. Revived memories of the ancient wars between Sinhalese and Tamils, preserved in the *Mahāvaṃsa* [the Sinhalese chronicle] and the folk-legends of the Sinhalese, emphasized the past periods of struggle with Tamil invaders and tended to depict the Sinhalese people's triumphs and humiliations as victories or defeats in contests with the Tamils.[41]

Ultimately, the cultural resurgence in Ceylon turned against the Tamils. As the Tamils were Hindus, no Buddhist movement could possibly encompass them. As they had been invaders, no historical recollection could fail to emphasize the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms. There was no traditionally inclusive "Ceylonese" culture to revive, and the earlier close contacts of the Sinhalese with the Tamils and of Ceylon with South India were forgotten. There was, for example, no historical memory of the rather considerable degree of early intermarriage between Tamils and Sinhalese. Also ignored was the absorption of large groups of Tamil-speaking immigrants into the Sinhalese caste structure as recently as a few centuries ago. Nor was there any acknowledgment of cultural penetration, such as the presence of Hindu deities in Buddhist temples or Tamil roots in Sinhalese words.[42] The Buddhist revival was selective. It sharpened the sense of Sinhalese uniqueness. As it helped create the bases for opposition to foreign rule and for mass participation in politics, the Sinhalese revival simultaneously contributed to conflict with the Tamils.

THE POLITICS OF CULTURE

Those cultural movements that aimed at the reconstruction of ethnic boundaries generally had close and explicit political connections from their inception. Harnessed to the exigencies of party politics, one of the main purposes of such move-

40. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon*, p. 41.
41. Ibid., pp. 50–1.
42. See S. J. Tambiah, "The Politics of Language in India and Ceylon," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 1, pt. 3 (July 1967), p. 222; I.D.S. Weerawardena, "Minority Problems in Ceylon," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 3 (Sept. 1952), pp. 278–87; Bryce Ryan, *Caste in Modern Ceylon* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), p. 104.

ments was to sanction a realignment of boundaries that would leave the groups better equipped to cope with the struggles ahead.

A group vulnerable to subgroup fission was liable to divide its support "uneconomically" among several political parties unless efforts were first made to lay the foundation for ethnic reunification. Those movements that aimed to unify fragmented groups like the Fang and the Yoruba were generally utilized by political party leaders, with varying success, to mobilize the groups for effective party competition.

On the other hand, movements that aimed to reassert the distinctiveness of groups believed in danger of assimilation—Bakonjo, Kurds, Basques, and Sikhs—soon became separatist. The first three of these movements paved the way for secessionist insurgencies, and the Sikh movement periodically threatened to cross over into insurrection until a separate state was finally created in 1966. The violently separatist character of these responses to impending assimilation is a powerful point in the case against assimilationist policies of nation building.

Just as these boundary-rectifying movements heightened ethnic tensions, cultural movements that pointed initially in an anti-colonial direction arrived more slowly and circuitously at the same destination. Although anti-colonial revival movements usually preceded party activity, they later established links with political parties, and it was not always easy to demarcate the lines between the two. Overlapping memberships tended to infuse nationalist parties with a sometimes unwanted ethnic character. After independence, the previously-suppressed indigenous elites who rose to prominence in such movements usually retained the position they had gained, challenging Western-educated elites, who sometimes exhibited continuing disdain for their influence.

The links forged between cultural movements and political parties also gave the movements influence over the direction the parties took, imparting cultural content to the political claims advanced by the parties. With political power now accessible, adherents of the movements were often in a position to condition their support on state recognition and patronage—for example, of religion in Burma, religion and language in Ceylon. Success in the struggle for recognition of such claims bolstered the status of the generally ethnocentric functionaries who led the movements. At the same time, demands for state patronage and official adoption of ethnic symbols were seen as exclusivist by members of other ethnic groups. Concessions to such demands precipitated secessionist movements in Burma and ethnic violence in Ceylon. Culture had become a public issue, its revival an intrinsically divisive matter whose reverberations could not be confined to the pages of the grammars, histories, and scriptures.

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Quebec and the Canadian Political Crisis

By KENNETH MCROBERTS

ABSTRACT: For the first 90 years of Canada's existence, political conflict between the French-Canadian minority and the English-Canadian majority embraced electoral politics, government policies, and federal-provincial relations, but there was no major challenge to the Canadian political community itself. At the same time, there was only limited accommodation of French Canadians in federal institutions and virtually none in provinces other than Quebec. Apparently, the existence of a Quebec provincial government sufficed to prevent the rise of a strong secessionist movement. With the modernization of Quebec, however, such a movement has now emerged. The large difference in size between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority appears to preclude mutual veto arrangements or general parity of representation in federal institutions. It has even hindered the attainment of proportional representation in federal power structures. Attempts to reinforce the French-Canadian presence outside Quebec have also been frustrated by demographic factors. Meanwhile, intensification of ethnic conflict within Quebec and preference for French-Canadian controlled institutions have strengthened demands by French Canadians to make Quebec their primary political community.

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AFTER over 100 years of relative stability, Canada's very persistence as a political system is now in question. The movement for the withdrawal of Quebec from the Canadian federation to form a sovereign state has now entered a new and decisive phase, with the election to the Quebec provincial government of the Parti québécois on November 15, 1976. The Parti québécois government intends within its present tenure to hold a referendum among the Quebec electorate on its combined option of political independence and limited economic association (perhaps a customs union) with the rest of Canada. Over the pre-referendum period, the Quebec government may well mobilize sufficient support for the referendum to be close, if not successful. Recent surveys suggest that about one-third of the total Quebec population is already in favor of the Parti québécois option, a substantial proportion (as much as 30 percent) is not yet firmly committed one way or the other.[1] It is difficult at this point to predict whether a successful referendum would, in fact, result in the arrangements advocated by the Parti québécois. In particular, it is not at all clear how the rest of Canada would react to a successful referendum. But the mere possibility of a popular mandate for Quebec independence has thrown Canada into a severe and protracted crisis that is unlike any other in its relatively long history.

For many observers, both within Canada and without, the present crisis came as a surprise. Canada has frequently experienced conflict between its two primary linguistic groups: English Canadians and French Canadians. But until recently this conflict always had lesser political foci than the political community. Contests for the leadership of the national parties have often been marked by the English-French cleavage, as have choices among parties at election time. There have been major crises over governmental policies, most notably during the two world wars when many English Canadians were led by identification with Great Britain to advocate conscription for overseas military service and French Canadians (who did not share this identification) just as vigorously opposed it. The Quebec provincial government has, since the 1880s, proclaimed itself to be the only true protector of French-Canadian rights and, on this basis, has consistently sought to exclude the federal government from acting within Quebec's provincial jurisdictions. But only in the last 15 years has French Canada produced a serious secessionist movement.

The emergence of such a crisis of political community is not so surprising, however, when one examines the demographic structure of language within Canada and the very limited extent to which, historically, Canadian elites have sought to counter the political impact of this demographic structure. In fact, these considerations might lead one to wonder why the present crisis did

1 A survey conducted in Quebec in late February and early March 1977 found that 32.4 percent of all respondents were in favor of Quebec becoming an independent country, in economic association with the rest of Canada, 51.8 percent were opposed, and 14.4 percent were undecided (*La Presse*, 4 April 1977, p. 1). A second survey of Quebec respondents, published in mid-May 1977, again found that 32 percent were in favor of independence with an economic association and that as many as one-third were ready to be swayed for or against independence (*Montreal Star*, 14 May 1977, p. 1, and *Toronto Star*, 14 May 1977, p. A9).

not emerge sooner. Clearly, multi-ethnic political systems can enjoy long periods of stability, however unfavorable may be demography and however limited political accommodation.

DEMOGRAPHY AND ETHNIC ACCOMMODATION

There are two aspects of the demographic structure of multi-ethnic polities which would seem critically important to both stability and persistence. First, the existing literature calls attention to the number and relative size of groups, claiming that these factors will condition the degree of political accommodation of the various ethnic groups and, on this basis, the degree of systemic stability.[2] At least within the context of liberal democratic politics, where numbers are a critical political resource, multi-ethnic polities are more likely to be stable if there are several groups present, none commanding an absolute majority of the population. Under these conditions, the major ethnic groups are likely to enjoy extensive political recognition of their rights and interests. Such accommodation will come from the simple necessity of creating working coalitions to govern the country. Moreover, once ethnic rights are established, they will be protected by the fact that aggrandizement of one group against another likely will be blocked by the remaining groups, who will see in it a potential threat to themselves. But where a single group enjoys a strong majority position, the political status of the remaining groups may be very precarious. In the extreme case, the majority group can govern without the cooperation or participation of any members of the minorities. There may be no practical necessity of developing habits of accommodation and deference to minority groups. Ethnic representation and recognition of language rights may be very uncertain. Under these conditions, ethnic minorities are especially likely to be unhappy with their lot.

A second factor in the stability of multi-ethnic polities is the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. The potential for secessionist movements obviously will be much greater if a group is concentrated in a particular region and constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population of that region. In theory at least, an ethnic group which is unhappy with its treatment by other groups then has the option of pursuing secession, without abandoning large numbers of coethnics and with the expectation that the vast majority within the region can be won to the cause.

LINGUISTIC DEMOGRAPHY IN CANADA

In the case of Canada, both aspects of demography would presage a high level of political instability. First, there are only two major groups if, as usually has been the practice in Canada, language is used to define the primary cultural division. Throughout the history of Confederation, English-speakers[3] have

2. These considerations appear clearly in the writings on "consociationalism," which seeks to elaborate the conditions of political accommodation in culturally "fragmented" societies. See Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2 (January 1969), p. 217.

3. Our usage of the term "English-speaking Canadian" (and, as a shorter form, "English Canadian") embraces the very large number of immigrants from continental Europe who have joined the English-language community. There has been ethnic conflict among these various elements of the English-language

been the overwhelming majority, averaging about 67 percent. French Canadians have rarely constituted more than 30 percent; over recent decades their proportion has been steadily declining. In 1971, 67 percent of Canadians used English as their first language, 26 percent used French, and 7 percent used another language.[4] Second, French Canadians always have been concentrated primarily in the Province of Quebec. In 1871, 86 percent of French-speaking Canadians lived in Quebec; in 1971, 88 percent lived in Quebec.[5] Also, French Canadians always have formed the overwhelming majority of the Quebec population, around 80 percent.[6] In sum, the demographic structure of Canadian society would hardly seem likely to engender extensive political accommodation of French Canadians; at the same time, it provides the basis for attraction to a strategy of secession. Yet, major secessionist movements have appeared only recently in Canada.

A possible explanation of the relative absence of secessionism before the 1960s could be that French Canadians somehow had secured a much greater degree of political accommodation than their demographic position would lead one to expect. However, a brief examination of the functioning of Canadian political institutions up to 1960 will show that this has not been the case.

FRENCH CANADIANS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Historically, federal political institutions have displayed a certain capacity to provide services in French. Some formal prescription is provided in Canada's central document, the British North America Act. The act states that both English and French may be used in the federal Parliament and requires that parliamentary debates be published in both languages. It also guarantees the right of individuals to use French in federal courts. It appears that these provisions generally have been followed. In fact, a substantial number of federal documents always have been published in both languages. In addition, it often has been possible for French Canadians to deal in French with federal civil servants and there has long been a French-language branch of the public broadcasting network. But this political accommodation has closely followed demography: until very recently these facilities were not available outside Quebec and the federal capital of Ottawa. More importantly, whatever the level of government services in French, the critical measures of political accommodation are those which focus on the distribution of power: representation within governmental structures and control over governmental outputs. In both respects, the impact of demography has been strong and political accommodation correspondingly limited.

At the federal level, some essentially symbolic positions, such as governor-general, have been occupied alternatively by English Ca-

community, but the more politically salient conflict has been between English Canadians and French Canadians.

4. Canada, *1971 Census*, vol. I, pt. 3, table 26. These data bear upon the language regularly used at home.

5. Percentage for 1871 taken from Richard Arès, *Les Positions ethniques, linguistiques et religieuses des Canadiens français à la suite du Recensement de 1971* (Montreal: Les Editions Bellarmin, 1975), table 35. Percentage for 1971 from Canada, *1971 Census*, vol. I, pt. 3, table 26.

6. Arès, *Les Positions ethniques*, table 22.

nadians and French Canadians. Presumably, this practice has been intended to suggest some sort of equality in status between the two linguistic groups. But within real decision-making structures, the prevailing assumption has always been that French Canadians should have no more than a minority of positions. Moreover, within these structures the proportion of French Canadians always has fallen off markedly at the centers of power.[7]

In the Canadian House of Commons, the French-Canadian presence has usually been roughly proportional to the French-Canadian presence within the total population.[8] Within a parliamentary system that usually has been marked by majority governments, the presence of a large contingent of French-Canadian M.P.s has been no guarantee of direct French-Canadian participation in the government itself. But Quebec French-Canadian M.P.s usually have found themselves to be within the government party. In fact, it appears that the single-member, plurality electoral system produces such a high degree of "bloc voting" in Quebec that, to a large extent, Quebec voters themselves have determined which party would form the government.[9]

Despite the dependence of government parties upon the "Quebec vote," the French-Canadian presence within the cabinet has rarely exceeded the French-Canadian proportion, usually it has been somewhat less. The prevailing norm of Canadian cabinets has been proportional representation of all politically important elements of the Canadian population, whatever their contribution to the government party's electoral victory. Thus, over the period 1867–1960, when secessionist movements were largely absent, French-Canadian cabinet representation varied between 20 percent and 30 percent.[10]

More important than the numerical presence of French Canadians within the cabinet are the positions customarily held by French Canadians. It is especially at this point that the weakness of French-Canadian representation becomes evident. Prior to 1960, French Canadians usually did not enjoy a proportionate share of the most powerful and prestigious ministries. In particular, they were virtually excluded from the portfolios dealing with the economy. Between 1867 and 1960, no French Canadian held the ministries of Finance, Trade and Commerce, or Labor. Moreover, out of the 13 prime ministers between 1867 and 1960, only two were French Canadians. Within

7. The main exception to this pattern has been the Liberal party's informal norm of alternating between English-Canadian and French-Canadian leaders, the Conservative party has never had a French-Canadian leader. A survey of delegates to the 1968 Liberal party convention found that only 29 percent of respondents felt that this practice is a "good tradition" (Peter Regenstreif, "Note on the 'Alternation' of French and English Leaders in the Liberal Party of Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 2, no. 1 [March 1969], pp 118–22).

8. See David Hoffman and Norman Ward, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons*, Documents of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 23.

9. Allan Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 1968), p. 73.

10. Frederick W. Gibson, ed., *Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations*, Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 175–77.

some cabinets, the leader of the French-Canadian delegation was dubbed "chief lieutenant" to the prime minister. But this practice was not an established norm of Canadian cabinets. Finally, while little is known for certain about decision-making processes of the cabinet, it appears that the Quebec members did not enjoy any specially enhanced role in cabinet decision making. In particular, they did not have an established right to any generally applicable veto.[11] Accordingly, even with proportional representation of French Canadians in the cabinet, French-Canadian interests would have no defense against a united English-Canadian majority.

Historically, the presence of French Canadians has been even weaker in the upper levels of the federal bureaucracy. In the early post-Confederation days, the patronage system did ensure a substantial French-Canadian presence in the bureaucracy, given the usual electoral importance of Quebec within the government party. But with the establishment of a merit system after 1918, French Canadians lost any reliable basis for access to the bureaucracy. Within the new formal criteria for recruitment and promotion, stress upon capacity in English, preference for technical education, and recognition of military service all put French Canadians at a competitive disadvantage. In addition, informal factors in promotion decisions appear to have weighed against French Canadians, given the established dominance of English Canadians in supervisorial positions. As a consequence of these factors, the presence of French Canadians in the federal civil service fell from 22 percent in 1918 to 13 percent in 1946.[12] Unlike the cabinet, there has been little English-Canadian support, until recently, for any norm of proportional representation of social groups, including French Canadians, within the upper levels of the bureaucracy. Recruitment and promotion could be properly based upon only the norms of competence and qualification. At the same time, there was little support for structural reforms, such as enlarging the role of French as a language of internal communication, that might have facilitated a greater French-Canadian presence while maintaining these norms.

One would expect this weak presence of French Canadians to be reflected in the outputs of the federal government. On the available evidence, it is difficult to determine with precision whether the full range of federal activity historically has favored or disfavored French Canadians or their primary region of concentration, Quebec. With respect to major issues, there usually has not been a clear ethnic polarization. Typically, English-Canadian opinion is itself divided, often along regional lines. But it is possible to identify certain critical issues on which English-Canadian and French-Canadian opinion were strongly opposed. In each case, the English-Canadian preponderance had the expected effect: English-Canadian opinion prevailed, usually without qualification. The most notorious instances include: the hanging of Louis Riel, leader of an 1880s insurrection of Indians and French-

11. These matters are all discussed in ibid.

12. Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Book III. The Work World* (Ottawa. Queen's Printer, 1969), pt. 1, p. 101. See, also, Christopher Beattie, *Minority Men in a Majority Setting* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975).

Canadian halfbreeds in western Canada; the failure of the federal government to prevent abolition of French-language schooling by provincial governments, despite a clear constitutional right to intervene; the imposition of conscription during the two world wars; and, within the last year, the hesitancy of the federal government to permit the use of French as an optional language of aviation within Quebec. All of these issues appear to have mobilized significant segments of the French-Canadian population. In each case, the dominant French-Canadian perception was that the federal government had been controlled by the English-Canadian majority.

FEDERALISM AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF FRENCH CANADIANS

While French Canadians secured only limited opportunities for influence and participation in federal political institutions, they did enjoy a very different position within the provincial institutions of Quebec. Here, with 80 percent of the population Francophone, demography worked in favor of French Canadians. It resulted in a governmental structure manned largely by French Canadians and with whom the public could always deal in French. Moreover, as a provincial government, Quebec held jurisdiction over the matters which, at the time of Confederation, seemed critical to the cultural integrity of the French-Canadian population of Quebec: education, health and welfare, and civil law.

The federal solution to the political impact of linguistic demography had serious limitations. First, the division of powers was satisfactory to French-Canadian elites only as long as they saw the Quebec government as essentially a device for preempting potentially harmful federal action within Quebec, rather than as an agent of social change in Quebec. Second, the federal arrangement reinforced the potentially destabilizing effects of the geographical distribution of French Canadians in Canada. It provided a clear institutional basis for the bulk of French Canadians, concentrated in Quebec, to develop a distinct political identity. Also, the federal structure could only weaken the position of French-Canadian groups outside Quebec. The assignment of education and other culturally critical matters to the provinces meant that the fate of non-Quebec French Canadians was decided in political arenas in which they often were very small minorities. Invariably, these provincial governments responded to their large English-language majorities and established English as the only official language of instruction, at least beyond the elementary level.

In sum, rather than ignoring the demography of language, most of Canada's political institutions have been closely structured by it. Restricted representation within federal institutions, limited influence over federal decisionmaking, and the refusal by provincial governments to grant French-language rights, are precisely what one would expect given the division of Canada's population into an English-speaking majority and a French-speaking minority. This pattern was partially reversed through the establishment of a Province of Quebec, giving French Canadians majority status within certain jurisdictions. But one might anticipate that with the limited accommodation of French Canadians elsewhere in Canada, the existence of a Quebec provincial

government would only institutionalize secessionist sentiment rather than preempt it. Yet, for close to 100 years there was no substantial secessionist movement. Apparently, full-scale political accommodation of French Canadians in federal institutions and in provinces other than Quebec was not necessary to continued support of the system among Quebec French Canadians. The key to both the long-term absence of secessionist sentiment and the contemporary strength of this sentiment appears to lie in the social structure of Quebec itself.

MODERNIZATION AND THE RISE OF QUEBEC SEPARATISM

Only with the social and economic modernization of Quebec did a viable secessionist movement emerge. In part, this is because modernization changed both the foci and the intensity of French-English conflict. In the process, a much larger proportion of Quebec French Canadians were drawn into ethnic conflict. In the past, ethnic conflict often had involved the struggle of French-Canadian minorities outside Quebec to establish or retain linguistic rights, such as French-language education, which had long been secure in Quebec. Quebec French Canadians were not directly touched by these conflicts. Also, as long as the French Canada of Quebec was a substantially rural society, led by a liberal professional and clerical elite, government was not critically important in the lives of Quebec French Canadians, whatever its ethnic character. By the 1960s, modernization had changed all this. Ethnic conflict within Quebec became broader, more intense and focused on new stakes. Government became more important in people's lives. In the process, the demography of language and the definition of the political community acquired a much greater salience to many Quebec French Canadians.

A first effect of modernization was that urbanization destroyed the physical separation of French Canadians from English Canadians which had marked rural Quebec. In most urban settings, the opportunity and necessity for interethnic contact were much greater. On this basis alone, the potential for ethnic conflict was greater. Through such conflict, French Canadians might be led to reject the idea of sharing a political community with English Canada.

The rise of secessionism can be more closely traced to two other consequences of modernization. First, French-Canadian elites began to compete directly with English Canadians for power in the upper levels of the industrial economy. A new class of lay administrators had emerged within the large-scale organizations which the church had been forced to establish in order to provide education, welfare, and health services to urban French Canadians. This new middle class rejected the historical specialization of French-Canadian elites in the liberal professions and the clergy. Increasingly, they challenged the dominance that English Canadians had always enjoyed within the managerial positions of industrial enterprises, whether Canadian-owned or American-owned.

Second, French Canadians were drawn into open conflict with immigrant groups, opposing the standing tendency of immigrants to integrate with the English-speaking community. In Quebec, urbanization and industrialization did not lead to assimilation of French Canadians,

as they have elsewhere in Canada. But, combined with secularization, they did lead to a precipitous decline in the French-Canadian birthrate. It was no longer able to offset the disproportionate anglicization of immigrants. Increasingly, some French Canadians began to fear that the demographic position of their group would decline so drastically that French Canadians would even lose their dominant position within Quebec. In particular, it was feared that French Canadians might lose their majority position within Montreal, the metropolis of Quebec. Thus, some French-Canadian nationalists argued that immigrants should no longer be free to choose their new linguistic community, in particular, immigrant children should be obligated to attend French-language schools.

There are at least two ways in which support for a political community based on Quebec alone was fed by these new foci of ethnic conflict. First, unlike such earlier linguistic demands as separate French-language school systems, these demands necessarily imposed a direct personal cost on at least some non-French Canadians. Improved French-Canadian mobility to managerial positions in the private sector implies reduced mobility for English Canadians, or at the very least the acquisition of French by English Canadians. Also, the closure of English-language schools to immigrant children necessarily reduces the power of parents to shape their children's lives. The imposition of such costs can be more easily defended if French Canadians are defined as the majority, and non-French Canadians the minority. This is possible only within Quebec. Thus, it was argued, Quebec alone must be the political community.

Second, the institutions of the Quebec government were increasingly seen as the indispensable instrument for forcing a change in ethnic relations. Only government, it was argued, could break down the structural obstacles to French-Canadian mobility in the economy, whether through outright nationalization or through the regulation of corporate language use and of recruitment and promotion practices. The Quebec government, manned by French Canadians and responsible to a predominantly French-Canadian electoral majority, was the only government that could be expected to undertake such action. Also, given provincial jurisdiction over education, it was necessarily the government of Quebec which would determine whether immigrant children would be restricted to French-language schools. During the 1960s and 1970s, as the policies of successive Quebec governments failed to change the pattern of ethnic relations quickly and fully enough to satisfy French-Canadian nationalists, Quebec independence seemed a necessary step. Then, it was argued, with Quebec as the sole political community, the Quebec government would have both the mandate and the means to undertake the necessary measures.

The political impact of this direct conflict between French Canadians and non-French Canadians within Quebec was vastly reinforced by other consequences of modernization. While distinguishable from ethnic conflict, they too fed support for the idea of Quebec independence. First, social and economic modernization resulted in pressures for the replacement of private French-Canadian institutions with para-public institutions. The new French Canadian managerial elite, which

had emerged within the church-related health, welfare, and education institutions, had little difficulty demonstrating that these private institutions lacked the resources to provide the level of services that are required in a modern, industrial society. With the 1960s, during what has been dubbed the "*Révolution tranquille*," the Quebec government assumed these responsibilities. As a consequence, it was drawn into a growing struggle with the federal government over powers and resources. To the extent that the federal government appeared insufficiently responsive to these demands, the idea of total independence for Quebec became more compelling.

A second consequence of modernization was the intensification of class conflict among French Canadians. Given the long-standing identification of French-Canadians with their collectivity (and, increasingly, with Quebec), this French-Canadian lower-class militancy did not lead to an increased solidarity with English-Canadian working-class groups. Rather, it led to support for an independent Quebec political community, so that all the powers of government could be used on behalf of socialist goals.

In sum, by the 1970s, Quebec separatism had become a broad-based movement, drawing most particularly upon ethnic conflict within Quebec, but also upon a growing demand that the government of Quebec meet basic social and economic needs.[13]

13. The processes of social, economic, and political modernization in Quebec and their relationship to the rise of Quebec nationalism are traced in detail in Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976).

THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION

With the modernization of Quebec society, the potential for secessionism which had always been present in Canada's linguistic demography was finally realized. At the same time, the available devices for political accommodation of French Canadians appear to have diminished. In particular, federalism, which had been a stabilizing force in the past, has become a destabilizing force. The established division of powers is no longer acceptable to large segments of Quebec French Canadians. The provincial government of Quebec has now become the institutional focus for secessionist sentiment. The consequent crisis for the Canadian political system is all the more acute since federalism had been the primary device upon which the past accommodation of French Canadians rested. The existence of a Quebec provincial government, with certain culturally-sensitive jurisdictions, had served to compensate for the limited political accommodation of French Canadians in the federal government and the virtual absence of any accommodation in the other provinces.

It may yet be shown that federalism can be the basis for a new and enduring accommodation, able to rally most French Canadians. Perhaps the transfer of additional powers and resources to the Quebec provincial government would suffice to draw off support from the idea of full Quebec independence. But serious doubts have been raised. First, it is not clear that within the framework of a federal system Quebec could be granted full control over certain powers that Quebec nationalists claim are essential, most

notably immigration and control of financial institutions. Second, there is always the possibility that further expansion of the powers of the Quebec government will only hasten the movement to full independence. In short, federalism no longer provides as clear and reliable a formula for accommodating French Canadians as it once did.[14]

After some initial attempts to ward off secessionism through transferring powers to Quebec, federal leaders had by the mid-1960s shifted attention to other devices for accommodating French Canadians: representation in the federal government and recognition of language rights by both federal and provincial governments. Programs have been pursued with vigor and determination and have received the support of a large section of English-Canadian elites. Yet the very demographic forces which had blocked the full implementation of these devices up to 1960 have seriously hindered their application now. More importantly, whatever the progress made in applying these programs, they cannot directly reduce what appear to be the fundamental sources of Quebec secessionism: ethnic conflict within Quebec and confidence in institutions manned primarily by fellow French Canadians. In effect, just as the full application of these measures was not necessary to system support from Quebec French Canadians in the past, so it appears unable to restore support now.

As in the past, the norm for French-Canadian representation in federal institutions is proportionality. There has been suggestion from some quarters of formal French-English parity, but the idea has not yet received substantial support from English Canada.[15] Canada's linguistic demography seems to prevent this possibility.[16] Within the cabinet, French Canadians have assumed a much more visible role, twice holding the Trade and Commerce portfolio, but progress has not been as impressive within the public service. While precise figures are difficult to obtain, it appears that the presence of French-speakers in the executive levels has risen to about 20 percent. But Quebec French Canadians continue to be seriously underrepresented; according to some reports only half of the French-speakers at executive levels are from

14. As Benjamin Akzin observes about the historical experience of "ethnoterritorial autonomy": "territorial autonomy served, where there was any appreciable movement for secession within the ranks, as a jumping-off point for realizing these aspirations whenever a momentary weakness of the State or the international situation afforded a favorable opportunity" (Benjamin Akzin, *States and Nations* [Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966], p. 167).

15. This possibility is elaborated by Douglas V. Verney and Diana M. Verney in "A Canadian Political Community? The Case for Tripartite Confederation," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1974), pp. 1–19. The Verneys argue that until 1960 Canada was dominated by a "majoritarian" perspective which "assumes an inferior role for francophones (though not for French Canadians who are bilingual) except in Quebec. . . " (ibid., p. 9). French Canadians have come to constitute a "permanent minority."

16. According to Heinz Kloss, when the weaker of two ethnic groups comprises less than 30 percent of the total population, parity in representation is no longer an available alternative (Heinz Kloss, "Democracy and the Multinational State," in *Les Etats multilingues*, ed. Jean-Guy Savard and Richard Vigneault [Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1975]). The proportion of Canadians whose mother tongue is French has now fallen to 26.9 percent, the proportion who use French regularly at home is 25.7 percent. By all indications, these proportions will continue to fall.

Quebec.[17] Here, too, demography may have a major impact. French Canadians from Quebec are less prepared than those from other parts of Canada to live in Ottawa, with its predominantly English-Canadian ethos. They may also be less prepared to work in English; little progress has been made in increasing opportunities to work in French within the public service. Given the overwhelming numerical presence of English-speakers within the Canadian population and the public service, it may be virtually impossible to displace English from its established role as the sole language of communication for most of the public service in Ottawa.

The expansion of French-language services was seen as a strategy for offsetting the numerical concentration of French Canadians within Quebec. With adequate services throughout Canada, it was hoped, Quebec French Canadians would feel "at home" not just in Quebec but everywhere in Canada. In addition, it was hoped, this program would strengthen the existing French-language communities outside Quebec. Denying as it does the salience of demography alone to language policy, such a program can be based upon only the "personality" principle. the right to services in French should depend upon the desire of the individual, not upon the particular region in which he happens to be. To the greatest extent possible, then, English and French are to have equal status throughout Canada.

Framed in this manner, the federal language program can have only limited direct impact on French Canadians in Quebec. Most government services are already available in French. With its commitment to equality in the status of English and French throughout Canada, the federal government cannot respond to the primary linguistic grievances of French Canadians in Quebec: the limited role of French in some areas of the economy and the choice by immigrants of the English-language community. The federal government has made substantial progress in providing French-language services in other parts of Canada, but has often had difficulty inducing provincial governments to follow suit. More importantly, the basic strategy of reinforcing the French-Canadian presence outside Quebec appears to be doomed. Demographers project assimilation of French Canadians outside Quebec will continue, with the result that by 2001 the proportion of French Canadians living outside Quebec may fall to as low as 5 percent.[18]

CONCLUSION

The Canadian experience clearly demonstrates how demography can shape both the will and the possibility for effective accommodation of ethnic groups. At the same time, it also demonstrates the close relationship between modernization and the intensification of ethnic conflict.

Before the modernization of Quebec, political accommodation of French Canadians was, as Canada's demography would predict, quite limited. Yet, the Canadian political system enjoyed many decades of relative stability. Only after the modernization of Quebec society did the political stakes in ethnic

17. *Le Devoir* 22, 23, and 24 September 1976

18. Jacques Henripin, *L'Immigration et le déséquilibre linguistique* (Ottawa: Main-d'oeuvre et immigration, 1974), p. 22.

conflict move from the choice of political leaders, the shape of governmental policy, or the federal-provincial division of powers to embrace the most fundamental issue: the boundaries of the political community. Yet, just as a more thoroughgoing accommodation of French Canadians has become critically important, so it has become difficult to find the basis of such an accommodation. Federalism no longer provides as clear and reliable a basis for accommodation as it once did. Once an ethnic collectivity defines itself as a modern society and, in particular, seeks to occupy major economic institutions, it may be very difficult to identify major governmental institutions which it can afford to leave in the hands of another level of government, in which it will always have only minority representation and influence.

Yet Canada's demographic makeup appears to rule out any coequal status at the federal level. Improved representation within federal bureaucratic structures and improved French-language services appear difficult to secure; more importantly, they cannot respond to ethnic conflict within Quebec. For Quebec French Canadians who resent English-Canadian preponderance within the economy, who are concerned with the anglicization of immigrants, or who simply have more confidence in French-Canadian controlled institutions, the most attractive political strategy is one which reverses demography in favor of French Canadians: the establishment of an independent Quebec state.

To be sure, the formation of an independent Quebec state, with or without an economic association with the rest of Canada, may well never occur. Political and economic constraints alone may be overwhelming. It may yet be possible to develop a formula for accommodation able to satisfy simultaneously English Canadians and French Canadians. But it is clear that the search for a formula will be a long and difficult one, severely hampered by the demography of Canada's two linguistic groups.

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Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium*

By MARTIN O. HEISLER

ABSTRACT: Belgium is one of several small European democracies that succeeded in fashioning a stable, progressive regime in a society deeply divided by religious and socioeconomic differences. Not until recently did a massive ethno-cultural cleavage between Flemings, Walloons, and the French-speaking majority of the residents of the country's capital, Brussels, become politically salient. Long experience in managing societal divisions is not directly applicable to the ethnic cleavage. The response to the religious and ideological divisions had been to form cohesive institutions and practices among the leaders of the segments. The response to the ethnic cleavage has been, in contrast, to decentralize: Belgium has moved from a unitary to a federal regime in the past decade. While this has constituted a peaceful and rational response to the ethnic cleavage until now, serious residual problems abound. Further, the relatively favorable conditions under which decentralization was launched no longer obtain, clouding prospects for the achievement of a stable, mutually acceptable arrangement between the major contending groups.

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BELGIUM'S society and polity have always been deeply split along several dimensions. Since about 1960, the most important of these has been a massive ethnocultural cleavage that divides Flemings from Walloons—and on some issues the French-speaking majority of Brussels from both of the larger groups. This cleavage has already led to the reorganization of the old unitary regime into a federal one; and while, with a few exceptions, violent conflict has been averted, the division is likely to remain an important source of stress for many years. It is important intrinsically, because it can engender various forms of conflict that—even short of large-scale violence—can debilitate the country's economy and political system. It is also important because it acts as a filter through which other issues must pass. This affects the manner in which a wide range of problems not obviously or directly related to ethno-cultural differences are perceived and acted upon; and, consequently, it affects the system's ability to cope in general.

THE PROBLEM

The ethnic cleavage

About 59 percent of Belgium's somewhat more than 9 million citizens live north of the "linguistic frontier," a cultural demarcation line that has remained remarkably stable for the past 1,500 years.[1] They speak Dutch—or, rather, until standard Dutch began to take hold in the last one or two generations, most spoke one of a number of Flemish dialects of Dutch. French-speaking Walloons living south of the line comprise approximately 30 percent of the country's population. The remaining 10 percent of Belgians live in the capital, Brussels.[2] It is an enclave of predominantly French-speaking but not necessarily ethnically Walloon people slightly north of the linguistic frontier.

Flemings and Walloons exhibit several of the "objective" traits often associated with ethnic groups—for example, linguistic differences, systematic variations in culture and values, religious attitudes, distinct historical experiences, and so on. But no list of such traits for differentiating groups will provide an adequate understanding of the nature and import of ethnicity. Rather, we will be better served by adopting Orlando Patterson's conception of ethnicity for this essay: ethnicity is "that condition wherein certain members of a society . . . choose to emphasize as their most meaningful basis of primary, extrafamilial identity certain assumed cultural, national, or somatic traits."[3]

1. See, for instance, J. d'Honte, *Notes sur l'origine de la frontière linguistique* (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1952).

2. These figures do not include the more than half million foreign workers and their dependents presently living in Belgium (down from a peak of about 800,000 in the early 1970s). About one-half of these live in Wallonia, and one-fourth in the Flemish provinces and in Brussels. There is, in addition, a small (60,000) enclave of ethnic Germans in the extreme eastern part of the country, adjacent to Germany. While there are formal provisions in the new constitution for the German-Belgians, they play a very small role in the country's politics and virtually none in the ethnic confrontation. Consequently, they are not discussed separately in the pages that follow.

3. Orlando Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance. A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, ed. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 308

As did Patterson, I wish to stress the element of choice in selecting traits for emphasis. For conscious choices and calculations of interest are important elements in ethnic relations. This is not to deny that fundamental cultural—perhaps even "primordial"—factors are involved. But it is a view of ethnicity that makes room for reason next to feelings in the calculus of ethnic group relations.

Only during the last few decades have Flemings and Walloons displayed in substantial numbers and with great intensity the essential *subjective trait* of making "we-they" distinctions, so that each came to consider itself a collective entity that was sharply differentiated from the other in terms of culture, values, aspirations, and specific political and economic interests. Most members of the French-speaking majority of Brussels tend to view themselves as "Belgian" or Bruxellois rather than Walloon or Flemish; while the Dutch-speaking minority in the city identifies closely with the country's Dutch-speaking majority.

In other words, the ethno-cultural differences that in some form antedate the creation of the Belgian state (in 1830) were progressively more politicized, until, by about 1960 they had become the most important dimension of cleavage.[4] They brought into question the continued existence of the state, at least in the form it had evolved in its 140 years of existence. Interestingly, and not without irony, the rise of the ethnic cleavage to the fore was made possible at least in part by the successes of the Belgian regime in dealing with two cleavages that dominated earlier periods of its history.

The forms and magnitude of conflict

Conflict between the population groups has occasionally led to mass action, such as demonstrations and riots, and deadly violence, while extremely rare when compared with recent events in Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and other settings of more acute ethnic strife, is not entirely unknown.[5] But the predominant form of conflict has been contention for status and resources, principally in the public sector.

That ethnic conflict should take this form is understandable, once the nature of the system is taken into account. In Belgium, as in most other European democracies, government has a pervasive influence in the economic and social arenas as well as in politics. With the attainment of comprehensive political and economic democracy, near the middle of this century, Belgians increas-

4. While ethno-cultural concerns may have been extremely important for some people (particularly culturally and politically conscious Flemings in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), many writers have found, independently, that the politics of ethnic differences did not displace religious and socioeconomic issues as the dominant continuing item on the elite's political agenda and in the concerns of the masses until about 1960. See M. O. Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium," in *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Post-industrial Democracies*, ed. M. O. Heisler (New York: David McKay, 1974), pp. 198–206. The reasons for the late rise of the problem to the forefront of political action are discussed below, but see, also, Luc Huyse, "Un regard sociologique sur la question linguistique en Belgique," *Septentrion. Revue de culture néerlandaise*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1974), pp. 23–30.

5. For some data and comparisons, see table 1 in the article by Christopher Hewitt, following

ingly expressed concerns for the recognition, protection, or extension of their interests; and these interests were defined more and more in terms of ethnic and/or regional group membership.

These concerns were expressed as demands for status or the control of resources or both. Such demands as the acceptance of one's language in certain settings or the circumscription of the use of the other language, access to public or publicly regulated jobs and benefits and, perhaps most important, the ability to infuse publicly provided collective goods and services—such as education, television, highway networks, economic planning, and development—with particular values and culture became the focal points of ethnic conflict.

In highly developed, democratic welfare states, where governments provide or regulate such goods and services and people have opportunities for expressing their concerns about the way in which they are provided, ethnic or other culture-based differences tend to become important objects of political contention. And these concerns are expressed in terms of group interests. Public or collective goods and services are paid for with taxes, and for most people practical alternatives are not available. When there are strong feelings regarding the values and goals involved in such collective goods, conflicts are likely to ensue.[6]

This paper is a modest attempt to extend recent analyses of the Belgian situation. But, since one of my aims is to determine why the practices and institutions that were effective in dealing with other politically charged cleavages seem to be inadequate or inappropriate in the face of the prevailing ethno-cultural division, I shall preface the discussion of the latter by a short sketch of the evolution of the Belgian regime and the way it dealt with the religious and socioeconomic cleavages.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLEAVAGES AND THE OLD REGIME

The evolution of the religious and socioeconomic cleavages and the structural responses to them in the period 1830–1960 have been narrated elsewhere in richer detail than space would permit here.[7] A few brief observations should suffice for the purposes at hand.

The religious cleavage and elite accommodation

When the religious cleavage was bridged through bargaining and accommodation between Catholic and Liberal leaders, active political roles were open to only a small portion of the country's population.[8] Such

6. See Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Optimal Allocation of Jurisdictional Responsibility: The Principle of 'Fiscal Equivalence,'" in *The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System*, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess (Washington, D.C., 1969), I, pp. 328ff.

7. Extended discussions in English can be found in Val R. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics," in *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, ed. Robert A. Dahl (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 149–70, and Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity," in *Politics in Europe* pp. 183–98.

8. In the early years of Belgian independence, between .5 and 1 percent of the population was enfranchised. The figure doubled during the last third of the nineteenth century to between 1 and 2 percent. See John Gilissen, *Le régime représentatif en Belgique* (Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1958), pp. 188–89.

accommodation made the break from the Netherlands possible, in 1828–30, through a "Union of Oppositions." Political and philosophical differences were put aside by the leaders of the two factions—the supporters of a politically active (Catholic) church and the anti-clerical Liberals—in order to achieve what both elites considered a higher end: Belgium's independence.[9]

This was the first in a series of such accommodations between Catholics and Liberals during the half century following the country's independence. The two groups formed parliamentary and eventually electoral parties and competed vigorously for political power during that time. They alternated in government and opposition. Yet their competition was limited by the realization that, if their fundamental value-differences were allowed to come into unlimited conflict, the small, weak new state's existence would be jeopardized. The elites agreed to disagree within limits; and differences were often negotiated by the political leaders of the two factions.

This pattern was made possible in large part by the fact that the elites had the field to themselves for a long period. The masses were not yet mobilized; and the task of politically selling both the process of inter-elite bargaining and the actual bargains that were struck was relatively simple. Since leaders did not have to contend with large numbers of ideologically committed followers, they retained more control and flexibility in their dealings with each other.

9. Robert Demoulin, *La Révolution de 1830* (Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1950).

Mobilization and the socioeconomic cleavage, segmentation, and cooptation

Mass mobilization occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, without significantly disrupting the mode of conflict management that had been established earlier. Belgian society developed into what has been called a "segmented society."[10] The Catholic, Liberal, and by the turn of the century, Socialist orientations, after all, reflected more than simply political preferences. Catholics had different values and world outlooks than anti-clerical Liberals and Socialists; and, while the latter two agreed in their opposition to a pervasive role for the church in public affairs, they were divided by diametrically opposed economic and social views.

These orientations came to embody most aspects of life, not only political, economic, or religious issues. Each of the three segments of the population established organizational infrastructures to match its worldviews; therefore, it became possible for those who identified with the Catholic, Liberal, or Socialist perspectives—and until recently the vast majority of Belgians did, in fact, identify with one or another of these[11]—to avoid extensive and

10. Lorwin, "Belgium," idem, "Segmented Pluralism. Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 3, no. 2 (January 1971), pp. 141–75, and Luc Huyse, *Passiviteit, Pacificatie en Verzuiling in de Belgische Politiek* (Antwerpen: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1970), pp. 183–246.

11. The diffusion of culture components across segments of particular societies and across many societies through modern communication, lessened religiosity, and ideological commitments have all contributed to a "de-segmentation" or erosion of the

intimate contact with people of a different persuasion. Thus, the church provided comprehensive school systems and preschool programs (and even today more than half of all children in Belgium attend parochial schools), youth auxiliaries and athletic programs, medical plans and insurance, welfare and housing for the indigent, labor unions, managers' and farmers' federations, old age care, funeral arrangements and cemeteries. The Liberals and Socialists similarly made it possible to go literally from cradle to grave without having to step outside the philosophically consistent and supportive segments. The parties were the political aspects of these segments, rather than free-standing, single-function organizations.

By minimizing dealings across cleavage lines, opportunities for direct conflict were reduced. The leaders of the segments' organs, particularly of the parties, could continue to deal with each other with substantial freedom of action, although accountability to constituents increased with the passage of time.

Another adaptation to mass mobilization and another sign of the accommodating tendencies of the Catholic and Liberal leaders was the response to the challenge of a highly antagonistic, new political force—the Socialists. The Socialist party (called the Workers party until the end of World War II) was one of the major agents of mobilization in the period 1864–94.[12] It generated support on the basis of its militancy on socioeconomic issues and its championship of universal (male) suffrage; and it was also markedly anti-clerical. Thus, it differed with the Catholics on religious grounds; and while it found itself on the same side of the religious cleavage with the Liberals, it opposed them sharply on social and economic questions. A decade of often violent resistance to what was seen as a radical threat to the Belgian way of life culminated in the mid-1890s in the cooptation of the new force by the established elites!

Cooptation brought the Socialist leadership into the policy-making arena. It provided access to power. But it also bound the Socialists to the existing regime. Their presence enhanced the legitimacy of the established order and deradicalized the Socialists in one generation.

Cooptation reached into the economic and social domains as well. As the scope and activity of the government increased, policy makers and administrators increasingly consulted the leaders of the segments' economic and social organizations (such as the Catholic, Socialist and Liberal labor union federations, farmers' groups, health care cooperatives, youth groups, and so on). This practice became routinized and more extensive, so that by the middle of the twentieth century some of these organizations had become quasi-official entities, often playing roles in implementing government policies vis-à-vis their membership.

Such cooptation is one of the hallmarks of the smaller European democracies that have achieved political stability by overcoming the often destabilizing effects of massive cleavages.[13] Thus, by channel-

compartmentalized outlooks and lifestyles of segmented societies. See Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," pp. 164–75

12. Léon Delsinne, *Le Parti Ouvrier Belge, dès origines à 1894* (Bruxelles. La Renaissance du Livre, 1955).

13. M. O. Heisler with R. B. Kvavik, "Patterns of European Politics. The 'European Polity' Model," in *Politics in Europe*, ed. Heisler, pp. 37–86.

ling mass behavior so that it supported established patterns, leaders harnessed for decades the political energies generated by democratization, and by coopting a rival—indeed, hostile—faction, they sustained their own positions. By incorporating the economic and social organizations of the segments in policy making and even administration, the regime strengthened them and enhanced the stability and persistence of the segmental structure of the society.

Relationships between the ethnic groups

The Flemish population in Belgium has been more numerous in modern times than the Walloon, but from at least Napoleonic times (that is, more than a generation before independence) to the 1950s or early 1960s it was a "status minority." The occupation of the area during the French revolutionary wars accentuated and gave official sanction to the long-lived tendency of aristocrats, officials, the hierarchy of the church and the growing bourgeoisie to use the French language. The early and rapid industrialization of the southern portion of the country in the nineteenth century and the dynamism of the urban professional and commercial classes that were overwhelmingly French-speaking gave further impetus to this trend. And high-status positions in both government and the private sector tended to be given almost without exception to people able to work in French.

This led ambitious Flemings to adopt the French language and, in varying degrees, other aspects of francophone culture—at least in public. (Hence the saying "French in the parlor, Flemish in the kitchen.") The emerging Belgian culture—the culture of the upper middle and middle classes and of the populations of the larger cities—was indeed characterized by cosmopolitan values as well as by the preferred status of the French language. In the terms of a popular saying in the late nineteenth century, "it was necessary to cease being Flemish in order to become Belgian."[14]

The subordinate position of the Flemish language and culture did lead to resentment and the mobilization of a small number of ethnically conscious activists. But, for several reasons, the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century movements for Flemish assertion failed to "take off." Principal among these reasons were the syphoning off of many of the most able and energetic into the dominant francophone culture and the effectiveness of the existing cooptive structures for gaining access and exercising influence.

These structures—the parties, unions, and other segmental organizations noted earlier—were based on doctrinal and ideological rather than ethnic or regional boundaries. Consequently, they cut across the ethnic divide and integrated the country across it.

There were virtually no politically relevant structures that coincided with or lent themselves to ethnic identification. Language served as the rallying point of the early Flemish movement; and initially it tended to be a literary rather than political focus.[15] On several oc-

14. Carl-Henrik Höjer, *Le régime parlementaire belge de 1918 à 1940* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1946), p. 7.

15. See Leo Picard, *Evolutie van de Vlaamse Beweging van 1795 tot 1950*, (Antwerpen: Standaard-Boekhandel, 1963), vol. I; and Shepard B. Clough, *A History of the Flemish Movement* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1930).

casions, as the movement began to take on a political complexion, it received setbacks. Thus, during the First and Second World Wars, German policy sought to split Flemish and francophone Belgians by championing the Flemish cause; and those Flemings who accepted or who subsequently could be accused, with or without foundation, of having accepted such German "sponsorship" were indelibly tainted in the eyes of most moderate and patriotic Flemish Belgians as well as their French-speaking co-citizens.

What helped to bring the ethnic cleavage to the fore in the two decades following World War II was the success of the regime in managing the religious and ideological cleavages and in achieving political and economic democracy.

THE SALIENCE OF THE ETHNIC CLEAVAGE

An historic church-state agreement on the most sensitive issue associated with the religious conflict—the financing of the huge parochial school system—in 1957–58 and a general decrease in religiosity contributed to the decline in the importance of the religious cleavage. The advent of the welfare state and substantial progress toward economic as well as political democratization muted the socioeconomic cleavage. Against this backdrop, several specific structural shifts can be identified as contributing to the rise of the ethnic cleavage to the forefront of Belgian political concerns.

Flemish ascendancy and Walloons' defensive reaction

The relative positions of Flemings and Walloons shifted during the middle decades of this century. Whereas previously the former had been economically and politically disadvantaged and the latter had enjoyed influence out of proportion to their numbers, long-term economic, political, and demographic changes brought about a reversal. By 1960 Flemings, due to their superior numbers in a regime where political equality had become a reality, had achieved parity in the Parliament and gave every indication of pressing their advantage in filling executive and administrative positions and by producing policies conducive to their values.

The Walloon economy, which had been based on mining and extensive and early industrialization, began to decline in the years following World War II, for several reasons. First, the coal mines were played out, leading to widespread closings and massive lay-offs. By the late 1950s the Walloon provinces were experiencing serious structural unemployment. Second, the industrial plants that had made Wallonia economically advanced and powerful in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came through World War II virtually intact. This was by no means a cause for rejoicing, however, since the old plants were inefficient and no longer competitive. The much less industrialized, less unionized northern provinces proved more attractive to both foreign and domestic investors after the war; and it made more sense to build new industrial plants than to refurbish obsolete ones in the south, where labor was also more costly. Third, from a demographic standpoint, the Walloon population had become one of the oldest in the world, while the Flemish had a low median age. With many young people entering the job market, the Flemish work force was more supple and more economical.

Most Flemings came to feel that, given their larger, more dynamic population and economy, they would be able to achieve both economic and political goals within the framework of the Belgian system through evolutionary means.[16] Walloons and the francophone majority in Brussels also perceived this shift in the early 1960s; and their reaction was predictably defensive. They became concerned with building institutional safeguards against Flemish revenge for real or imagined wrongs inflicted during the long period of francophone cultural, political, and economic dominance.

Improvements in their economic and political positions made Flemings more rather than less assertive in cultural terms, however. The French language continued to act as a magnet, drawing many younger Flemings away from their cultural heritage and leading some parents—particularly in the Brussels area, where the options existed—to send their children to francophone schools in order to make available to them the opportunities afforded by a world language. In addition, increased movement by French-speaking, cosmopolitan, middle-class residents of Brussels into the surrounding Flemish countryside—the local manifestation of the general tendency toward suburbanization in Western societies at this time—also represented a threat of cultural encroachment to Flemings. In fact, the Brussels metropolitan area became the most immediate threat to domestic peace; and as the discussion below shows, remains the most important ground for ethnic conflict in Belgium.

16. Interviews reported in tables 7–10, Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages," pp. 202–3.

Even before the rise of new, one-issue linguistic parties pushed them toward increasingly particularistic positions, the three traditional parties began to respond to such concerns by erecting or strengthening existing legal and institutional safeguards for the two major population groups, where they deemed themselves most vulnerable. For Flemings, this meant making more stringent and actually enforcing a demarcation line and regulations for language usage that had initially been put into law in 1932. In this way, the erosion of the Flemish language area of the country, especially, but not exclusively around Brussels, could be slowed or halted. Further, the financial and administrative means necessary for implementing bilingual opportunities in Brussels were provided. For Walloons, the major concern was to keep Flemings from using the central government to improve their positions at the expense of Walloons.

Political parties organized along ethno-cultural lines were formed in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Flanders (the *Volksunie* [VU]—Peoples' Union) and the Walloon provinces (eventually coalescing into the *Rassemblement Wallon* [RW]), and, in the mid-1960s, in Brussels (most notably, the *Front Democratique des Francophones* [FDF]). These, unlike the three historic parties associated with the ideologically based segments, were essentially one-issue parties. They brought together people from the previously mutually exclusive ideological groups—people often united only by their position on the ethnic differences and their primacy in Belgian politics. The platforms of the VU and RW advocated an increasing separation of the two major population groups; and to the extent that they pressed for some

sort of federal arrangement, they were militating for basic changes in the Belgian regime.

While neither the VU nor the RW succeeded in displacing the strongest of the traditional parties in its region (the Catholics or Christian Social party in the north and the Socialists in the south), they did effectively push the more established, ostensibly regime-supporting forces to embrace more and more decentralizing policies.

DECENTRALIZATION THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL MEANS

Within a period of ten years—from the entry into office of the first government to confront the ethnic cleavage directly to 1971—administrative and financial decentralization were begun, the language laws and regulations buttressed, and the constitutional conversion of the regime into a federal one along ethnic group lines was promulgated, though not fully implemented. What made these rapid and drastic changes acceptable was that they were undertaken by the traditional political forces of the old regime, most notably the leaders of the traditional parties, using the vestiges of legitimacy and prestige they still enjoyed.

These measures of decentralization have been described elsewhere,[17] and space limitations allow no more than a general overview and assessment here.

Administrative separation

Following the reinforcement and more rigorous implementation of the language laws, the ethnic groups' territorial limits were fixed, essentially along the historic "linguistic frontier." (There remained the troublesome Brussels area—formally declared to be bilingual—about which more is said below.) Thus, without massive population transfers or other significant dislocations,[18] the two major ethnocultural groups were imbued with a territorial dimension; and this greatly facilitated the constitutional revision undertaken shortly thereafter, since it made possible the attribution of jurisdictions to the ethnic groups in their guise of regions.

Progressively since the early 1960s, the ethno-culturally and/or regionally most sensitive public goods and services have been decentralized, so that Flemings and Walloons—and in some policy-areas, Bruxellois—have come to control these. Thus, the ministries of education and cultural affairs were split into Dutch- and French-language agencies. Regional development and planning, road construction, and other relatively readily decentralized government activities were also distinguished in regional terms. By 1976 approximately 35–40 percent of the central government's expenditures had been so regionalized.

Such decentralization provided a practical, if limited, means for avoiding some potentially conflict-bearing situations. But in a country

17. See, for instance, ibid. pp. 208–20.

18. Several thousand people were affected when the localities in which they lived were transferred from one to another jurisdiction. In some instances—the Fourons area in particular—dissatisfaction has lingered in the wake of the assignment of a community to one or another linguistic area. Further, the ancient university of Louvain was split and the French-language component removed to a new campus south of the language frontier after prolonged and violent demonstrations by the Flemings of the town as well as, to a substantially lesser extent, of the Flemish branch of the university. In general, however, the dislocations were neither massive nor unmanageable.

where formal, constitutional relationships have been venerated since independence, more comprehensive decentralization, particularly of legislative competence, required the revision of the legal basis of government. Toward this end, a series of discussions among party notables was undertaken in the mid-1960s, followed by a four-year-long constitutional redrafting effort between 1967 and 1971.

Constitutional revision

The constitutional revision created a new level of government and a new legal concept in Belgian politics: the region and the cultural community. It divided the country into three regions—the Flemish, the Walloon and, between these, "Brussels-Capital." The population was divided into Dutch- and French-speaking, thereby incorporating the residents of Brussels into one or the other cultural community. Thus, for some purposes, Belgium could be thought of as a federal entity consisting of three units, while for other purposes it is comprised of only two.

The regions were designed as an intermediate unit of government, fitting between the central government and municipalities. The central government retains control in such areas as foreign policy and commerce, regulatory oversight, most social policies, responsibilities for individual rights, defense, macroeconomic policies, relations with localities, and the most important taxing powers. Municipalities will keep most of their historically significant powers as well.[19]

The "cultural councils," consisting of the members of the Dutch- and French-language members of Parliament (where every member must identify himself as French- or Dutch-speaking) will exercise the powers of the cultural communities. Their sphere of authority encompasses most cultural and educational questions, as well as laws and regulations concerning language usage (of which there are many in Belgium). They will also have an important oversight role with regard to laws and regulations that will emanate from the legislative organs of the regions—organs not yet created.

The "Bargain"

The partial autonomy provided each of the population groups through the creation of the regions and cultural communities did not assuage all of the fears of Walloons regarding their status as a permanent minority on the national level; nor did it respond adequately to the concerns of Flemings about the status of the capital, with its predominantly French-speaking population. Thus, an agreement was reached between Flemings and Walloons—but without the full participation or acceptance of representatives of the Brussels population—to accord near parity to the French-language minority in the national cabinet for a like concession to the 20–25 percent minority of Dutch-speakers in the capital in the government of Brussels. Thus, the new constitution provides that "with the

19. Belgium had approximately 2,700 municipalities a decade ago, many of them very small and administratively and financially quite inefficient. A massive project to merge or, in some cases, federate the smallest of these has been going on for several years. The number at this writing is 596 and will drop slightly in the future. The fusion of municipalities will clearly affect their political roles, but it is not yet clear how.

exception of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet [of the central government] comprises an equal number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers," and a similar provision in the section dealing with Brussels accords parity in the metropolitan government's executive, excepting the presiding officer.

At the national level, this bargain demonstrates that one of the hallmarks of the old regime, a trait that enabled it to manage so effectively both the religious and socioeconomic cleavages, was carried over into the new constitution: the power of majorities is sharply curtailed. It also shows that in advanced industrial societies such as Belgium's much importance is attached to the execution and administration of laws and policies; for the significance of the ethnic composition of cabinets derives essentially from the influence cabinet members have in staffing and directing the day-to-day operations of departments charged with implementing policies.

For Brussels, however, the agreement dramatized and exacerbated what is perhaps the most serious unsolved institution-design problem as well as potential ground for conflict in the new regime. Brussels, after all, is the capital of a country with a Flemish majority; and it is a large city, the permanent residents of which are overwhelmingly French-speaking. Other cultural differences also distinguish the city's population from Flemings. The latter have long called for an arrangement in the city that will allow them "to feel at home in their own capital," and that will also contain the French-speaking and in value terms, alien "oil-slick" that is spreading into the surrounding Flemish, rural communities. The former, understandably, resist yielding so disproportionate a degree of power in the government of the city to the Flemish minority; and they resent and have difficulty accepting as legitimate the bargain they think was struck by Flemings and Walloons at the expense of the majority of Bruxellois.

While the sometimes diverging policy views and underlying cultural differences between Walloons and the francophones of Brussels can be traced back several generations, they were unquestionably magnified by the positions taken by the former in the revision of the constitution and by the latter's resentment those positions engendered. This is one of the reasons that many of the most serious problems in dealing with the ethnic cleavage in Belgium—the problems most likely to engender violent as well as political conflict—are involved with the status and condition of Brussels.

BRUSSELS: AN URBAN SYSTEM, A REGION, AND A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL

Until recently, the city of Brussels consisted of 19 virtually autonomous boroughs, each with its own elected council and executive, its own school system, police force, fire protection arrangements, and so on. Like the elected officials of many other Belgian towns, the leaders of these boroughs often played roles on the national political stage and, thus, tended to protect local autonomy in order to protect their own power bases. The activities of the boroughs were not coordinated until the 1970s, when a metropolitan government was established.

The long overdue integration of

the city began in the climate of ethnic tension and constitution revision, however. Three consequences of the ethnic conflict and the constitutional-legal attempts to manage it were of direct importance to the effective government of the urban system: (1) the tenuous legitimacy of the area's government, especially in the eyes of its francophone majority, (2) its politically drawn boundaries, which limit its normal dynamics, both with respect to suburbanization and economic development; and (3) its continuing role as a political football in a game played at the national level by Flemings and Walloons. The third point has had two especially troublesome concrete aspects. The structure and institutions of the metropolitan area continue to be shaped and reshaped by outside and sometimes hostile forces.

Further, the often unsympathetic, sometimes hostile, central government exercises financial leverage over the city. For, like most other national capitals, Brussels provides services and incurs costs it would not have were it an ordinary city. In addition, the headquarters of the European Communities and NATO are located there. While Brussels is compensated by the central government, at least in part, for the expenses that follow from its national and international roles, the amount and timing of such transfer payments may be used to bring pressure to bear on the city's government.[20]

If the threat of unfriendly interference in the city's government and fiscal affairs constitutes the most important day-to-day, concrete problem for Brussels, Flemish efforts to quarantine the predominantly francophone capital represent the most volatile issue of principle and the most onerous long-term limitation. While most Flemish political elements have followed a hard line on this issue (requiring, for instance, French-speaking residents of predominantly Flemish suburbs to register under "addresses of convenience" in the city proper in order to retain French-language voters' registration papers), even this stance has not satisfied some among them. As this is being written, the militant Flemish *Volksunie* is splitting because the more intransigent faction does not believe that the party leadership should have accepted such compromises.

Francophones in the city feel embattled. The realization of their goals of governmental autonomy, financial viability, and the restoration of what they see as normal urban-suburban dynamics seems no closer than does the often-voiced Flemish desire to be able to feel at home in the capital of the country of which they constitute a majority. Neither the accommodating tendencies and compromising skills of Belgium's political leaders nor institutional experiments are likely to resolve the problems revolving around Brussels in the foreseeable future.

PUTTING THE NEW REGIME INTO OPERATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The old regime's political leaders responded to the ethnic cleavage with the moderation and willingness to compromise and to adapt that had characterized the management of the religious and socioeconomic

20. Based on interviews conducted by the writer with officials of the Brussels metropolitan government, representing both language groups, 1974, 1976.

cleavages. These virtues were evident in the process of constitution revision as well as in the regional scheme that emerged. The regime change is quite comprehensive, and its implementation is likely to take several years. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that it is politicians who must implement those changes; and the possibilities and limitations of the political, economic, and environmental resources at their disposal are likely to change over time.

It has already been noted that due to the erosion of the segments and the nature of the ethnic cleavage, political leaders do not have the freedom from short-term, point-by-point, bargain-by-bargain accountability their predecessors enjoyed in dealing with earlier cleavages. The rise of one-issue, ethnic parties and the mobilization of the masses on this issue has pushed them to be politically more sensitive.

The linguistic and administrative separation that did so much to defuse the ethnic conflict in the 1960s was extremely inefficient and expensive from a narrow cost-accounting viewpoint. While it helped to avoid even more costly overt conflict, it did require substantially higher government expenditures than a unitary system would have. But those expenses could be met in the 1960s and early 1970s, because the Belgian economy was growing. Consequently, public revenues increased sharply, and the costs of decentralization could be met without having to raise new taxes for it or to cut existing programs. Such growth has stopped; and while it may be reasonable to anticipate better economic times ahead, it hardly seems warranted to count on a fiscal dividend from such growth for meeting subsequent costs of regionalization.[21] Consider, for instance, the substantial costs likely to accompany the installation of the new regional governments, with their legislatures, executives, and so on.

But perhaps the most important question regarding the new regime, one that increasingly concerns Belgians, is "Will it work as a government, in confronting the problems of the last decades of the twentieth century?" If the as-yet untested institutions and rules that constitute the new regime prove effective in separating the ethnic groups, channelling their interactions and, thus, managing the cleavage, will they at the same time permit dealing with such problems as inflation, unemployment, urban congestion, rising crime, shortages of energy sources and other materials, and so on?

Clearly, it is too early in the evolution of the regime to venture answers to such questions. Historically, Belgians have acted in economically rational ways, seeking to maximize their material well-being and other interests. Flemings, for the first 120 or 130 years of the country's independence were willing to trade off cultural autonomy and in many cases cultural integrity for social and economic opportunities. Walloons did not place cultural autonomy at the top of their agenda until their regional interests and economic position became very vulnerable. To what extent, if at all, will Belgians sacrifice substantial concrete interests for ethnic integrity if such choices will con-

21. This is developed, with supporting data, in M. O. Heisler and B. Guy Peters, "Implications of Scarcity for the Peaceful Management of Group Conflict," University of Maryland, 1977, mimeograph.

front them in the future? If the new regime proves effective in dealing with the ethnic cleavage but not with more mundane problems, how will it fare with its constituents?

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A set of ancient cultural differences between components of the Belgian population became politically salient in the post-World War II period, after the Belgian regime had successfully coped with religious and socioeconomic cleavages of important proportions. Due partly to the nature of modern political society in Western democracies, where large segments of the population are politically conscious, and partly to the nature of the ethnocultural cleavage, the means of inter-elite bargaining and cooptation did not suffice for managing the ethnic differences. Reacting very swiftly to impending ethnic conflict, the leaders of the old regime moved to provide autonomy for the major groups, through the reinforcement of language distinctions and regulations regarding usage, administrative separation and, as a long-term measure, the conversion of the unitary state into a federal regime. These steps were possible only in the context of the moderate, accommodation-oriented, compromising regime that had successfully managed the earlier conflicts.

While the regional or federal regime seems appropriate for keeping the ethnic groups sufficiently separated to minimize the chances of serious conflict, a number of problems and uncertainties remain. Chief among the former is the status of Brussels. This presents a dilemma: either the aspirations of the country's Flemish majority will be frustrated or the city's French-language majority will lose its capacity for self-government—indeed, for democracy in any real sense. In addition, it is not at all certain that the resources necessary to complete implementation of the regional regime will be available under the foreseeable economic circumstances. Finally, Belgium's capacity to deal with the challenges facing most modern societies using its markedly decentralized new regime is open to question. The decentralization that helps to manage the confrontation of the major ethnic groups may well render the country inefficient for handling economic, social, and other problems. This last uncertainty leads me to wonder whether, if faced with serious challenges outside the realm of ethnic relations, Belgians might not, in the next one or two decades, raise other dimensions of their public life to the fore and relegate their centuries-old cultural differences to a lower place on their agenda.

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Conflict and Cleavage in Northern Ireland

By RONALD J. TERCHEK

ABSTRACT: The ethnic strife in Northern Ireland is more than a repetition of ancient native-Catholic/Protestant-settler conflicts. One of the major contemporary issues, partition, dates back to 1921 and is the basis of the declaration of war by the Irish Republican Army on Great Britain. The other conflict is of more recent origin and involves the inclusion of the Catholic third of the population in the government and an end to institutionalized discrimination against the minority. Protestants have uniformly opposed any unification with the Irish Republic, but intense internal disagreements characterize the Protestant reaction to the other conflict. Moderate Protestant elites have been unable to bind their loyalist constituents to a compromise with the Catholic politicians, but neither Protestant nor Catholic paramilitary groups have been able to impose a military solution on the province. The roots of the first conflict are traced primarily to the historical ethnic cleavage separating the two communities while the second conflict is best explained by the volatile mixture of ethnicity and the strains of modernization. Any solution to the current troubles will have to be addressed to the nature and causes of each conflict.

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MODERN Ulster[1] was created in 1921 as a result of Protestant resistance in Northern Ireland to their inclusion in the new, largely Catholic Free State to the South. Until 1912, Protestants had generally opposed any home rule for the island, but when autonomy for Ireland seemed certain, Protestant politics turned to partition. Comprising a quarter of the population of the entire island, the Protestants feared inclusion in the new state would bring Catholic domination but were confident they could maintain their identity in the six northeastern counties of the island where they constituted 65 percent of the population. However, the Catholics of Northern Ireland desired union with the South and opposed partition which, they believed, would condemn them to an inferior status. Bitter fighting followed the division of Ireland, and more than 500 were killed in the North following partition.[2]

Today's civil strife in Northern Ireland is partially a continuation of the issues left unresolved at the time of partition. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and some other militant Catholics have resorted to violence to bring the immediate unification of the two parts of Ireland, a goal important to most Catholics but one which they are willing to delay. Most Catholics have demanded a guaranteed, consequential role in the governance of Northern Ireland and an end to the discriminatory practices directed against them.

The Protestants, for their part, are uniformly opposed to the end of partition, but there is considerable disagreement about whether and how far other Catholic demands should be met. Some Protestants have actively tried to correct some of the discrimination against Catholics; many other Protestants are opposed to changes in the Catholic status but are also impatient with both Protestant and Catholic paramilitary activities; and still other Protestants are prepared to use any means, including violent ones, to maintain the Protestant ascendency in Ulster. Although the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland pits Catholics and Protestants against each other, the civil strife in Ulster is an ethnic conflict with religion indicating the sides the contestants take, not the content of the issues.

If an ethnic community is defined as a self-conscious group with its own feelings of identity, its own insular contacts, its own history, and its own separate institutions not shared with the rest of the community, then Ulster contains two distinct communities that are based on religion.[3] Catholics and Protestants each attend their own schools, marry almost exclusively within their own faiths, and find most of their friends among their own coreligionists.[4] The distinctiveness and exclusivity of religion in Northern Ireland is so pervasive that it even

1. The terms Northern Ireland and six counties are terms favored by Catholics while Ulster and Province tend to be Protestant expressions. These words are used interchangeably here for the sake of linguistic diversity, and no political meaning should be attributed to their usage in this paper.

2. Richard Rose, *Northern Ireland: Time of Choice* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 21.

3. See Cynthia Enloe in *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), ch. 2.

4. Richard Rose, *Governing without Consensus* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 306–8.

reaches into leisure-time activities, with Gaelic football and hurley played primarily by Catholics and rugby and cricket predominantly Protestant sports.[5] Moreover, each side has its own symbols and rituals that add to its sense of distinctiveness and separate one group from the other. For Protestants the major holiday is July 12, the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, which celebrates the victory of William of Orange over the Catholics and established the Protestant ascendency. For Catholics, Easter is not merely a religious holiday but also the anniversary of the 1916 Easter rising in Dublin against British rule. In Ulster, Christmas is probably the only holiday recognized by both communities.

Two other marks of ethnic identity in Ulster are revealed in the differing sense of national identity and political affiliation in the province. Three-quarters of the Catholics report they think of themselves as Irish, while an equal percentage of Protestants reject that term and favor a British (39 percent), Ulster (32 percent), or Anglo-Irish (2 percent) identity.[6] At the political level, Ulster voters favor religiously based parties more than voters in any other Western European democracy, and since partition the major parties, whether Protestant or Catholic based, have drawn almost exclusively from their own denominations for candidates and votes.[7]

5. Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem A Study in Group Relations* (London, Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 148–51

6. Rose, *Governing without Consensus*, p. 208.

7. Arend Lijphart, *Class Voting and Religious Voting in the European Democracies*. Occassional Paper No 8 (Glasgow: Survey Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 1971), pp. 8–9.

MODERN ULSTER AND THE CURRENT CONFLICT

From the mid-1920s when the fighting over partition ended until the late 1960s when the conflict was renewed, Ulster was relatively peaceful, with 18 deaths traced to ethnic conflict.[8] During this interlude, London was relatively indifferent to Northern Ireland's affairs, and Ulster politics and government were dominated by the Ulster Unionist party, representing the Protestant majority. Conservative in their politics and economics, the Unionists encountered little opposition from class-based parties like the Northern Ireland Labour party, a stable minority party. Catholics voted for parties dedicated to ending partition, and their elected leaders, rejecting the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government, often boycotted their seats in the Ulster Parliament and refused to accept the title of loyal opposition when they did take their seats.

By the mid-1960s, some Catholics began to call for an end to discriminatory practices against the minority in Northern Ireland. Catholic agitation, largely university-based at first, began to intensify and culminated in the 1968 Civil Rights Protests that met hostile and violent Protestant crowds. Shortly afterwards, protests were superseded by rioting in the Catholic communities, the arrival of the British Army, and the formation of the Provisional faction of the IRA who were more militant than the class-oriented Official faction. Protestant paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were also increasing in strength and deter-

8. Rose, *Northern Ireland*, p. 21.

mination, and by 1972 terrorism became commonplace.

Out of a population of one and a half million people, over 1,700 (including British forces) have been killed since 1968. A preliminary analysis of fatalities to 1975 by Christopher Hewitt indicates that roughly a third of the fatalities were security forces killed by Catholics, another third were Catholics killed by Protestant paramilitaries, and an eighth were Protestants killed by Catholic paramilitaries.[9] In other words, the conflict is not restricted to violence by one side, but their targets differ: Catholic violence is primarily directed at the security agents of the state; but Protestant violence, primarily aimed at Catholic civilians, has served as an instrument of retribution and intimidation.

As is the case in other ethnic conflicts, violence tends to be concentrated in areas where the two groups are almost equally divided. In the largely Protestant areas of East Ulster, there is relatively little killing. The number of fatalities increases in the four other counties where the religious mix is often close to parity and is greatest in Belfast and Londonderry where there is close interaction between the two ethnic groups.[10]

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Several historical factors have made a reinforcing, cumulative contribution to ethnic self-identity and cleavage in Northern Ireland.[11] By themselves none of these historical conditions need have fostered communal conflict, but taken in tandem, they provided the basis for each group to form its own identity and its fears and suspicions of the other group.

To begin with, there has been little change in over two centuries in the religious composition of Northern Ireland. About 65 percent of the population is Protestant and the remaining 35 percent Catholic. At the time of partition, Protestants were concentrated in the two eastern counties of Down and Antrim (75 percent Protestant); the central counties of Londonderry and Armagh had a slight Protestant majority (55 percent Protestant); and the two western counties reported a small Catholic majority (55 percent Catholic). With minor variations, these ratios reflect present population distributions.[12]

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, "undertakers" were expected to attract settlers from across the Irish Sea, but few settlers arrived except in Ulster. In the South, the land simply changed ownership and local Irish farmers remained as tenants on the new plantations. But nearly 50,000 English and Scottish farmers settled in the Ulster counties of Antrim and Down by 1633, and

9 Christopher Hewitt, "British Policy in Northern Ireland, 1968–1975," unpublished study, 1976. Similar ethnic patterns of fatalities and killings are found for 1976 in the *Irish Times*, 8 January 1977

10 James A. Schellenberg, "Area Variations of Violence in Northern Ireland," *Sociological Focus*, vol. 10, no. 1 (January 1977), p 73

11 The historical material for this section is taken from Patrick Bukland, *Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1973); J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland* (London: Faber, 1966); Gary MacEoin, *Northern Ireland. Captive of History* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974); and Richard Rose, *Governing without Consensus*.

12. Rose, *Governing without Consensus*, p. 90.

many native Irish were removed from their lands and crowded into smaller holdings in the west and south. The new settlers were virtually all Protestants who retained their religious, linguistic, and cultural identities.

The colonial system in Ireland pitted the settlers against the native population—a common feature of colonialization. However, Ireland presented some unique problems for British colonialism. In the first place, the island was already crowded with natives, and the settler population often had to live side-by-side with the rebellious Irish. In addition, Spanish and French expeditionary forces on Irish soil presented an immediate threat to British security. Moreover, the colonizers confronted a religion that was not merely alien but also hostile to Protestantism. With London suspicious of Irish politics and religion, the natives were considered threats rather than potential partners, and a series of restrictions was imposed on the native Catholics who did not have surplus land to which to retire. Catholics were deprived of political and other rights granted Protestants, were given short leases on their land and charged for any improvements they made on the rented property—rules that did not apply to the Protestant settlers—and suffered harsh treatment under the penal laws which were applied in a discriminatory fashion against the native Catholics. These and scores of other measures designed to protect and benefit the settler population brought the native Catholics into intimate, continuing, and bitter conflict with the Scottish and English settlers.

Internal security problems historically assumed different forms in the northern and southern parts of the island. Small concentrations of settlers in the south were protected by local police within well-marked boundaries. Beyond the pale, settlers confronted Catholics who had formed secret terrorist societies. Although there were some armed civilian Protestant groups in the south, in Ulster, where the Protestant population was more broadly dispersed, Protestant vigilante societies commonly protected fellow Protestants and intimidated Catholics. Groups of armed civilians were a legacy in each ethnic community, the precursors of the paramilitary organizations active in Northern Ireland today.

Stress and ethnic identity tended to be reinforcing. When there were large-scale Catholic, native revolts, the Protestants put aside any internal differences and became a cohesive, self-conscious community. By the same token, laws penalizing Catholics or confiscating native land fashioned the Irish into a community of common grievances and disabilities. The division need not necessarily have proceeded along Protestant–Catholic lines, however. Presbyterians and other dissenters paid tithes to the Church of Ireland and were precluded from some offices open to members only of the established church; in other words, the Presbyterians shared some common grievances with the Catholics. Moreover, manufacturing and merchant interests of all religious persuasions opposed British economic restrictions on Irish commerce and industry. In the late eighteenth century, these common grievances molded many Catholics and Protestants into a broad coalition against various aspects of British policy.

However, the British quickly removed the religious tests for Protestant dissenters and met many of the objections of the commercial interests. The settlement of these issues removed the basis for continuing cooperation between the two religious communities. Coalition politics never lasted for more than a generation, and ethnic interpretations of community thrived where the folklore of ancient battles was reinforced by the realities of current ethnic conflict.

Economic development was concentrated in the two northeastern counties of Ulster. Long a center of textiles and shipbuilding, Belfast came to resemble a nineteenth-century English city rather than an Irish town. Education, income, and economic opportunity were high compared with Ireland as well as Ulster. Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone in the west were generally agricultural and counties Armagh and Londonderry ranked, according to economic indicators, between the industrial east and agrarian west both before partition and since. In short, industrial development was concentrated in the heavily Protestant areas of the province.

In summary, religious differences, landlord-tenant conflict, native-settler identities, close group proximity and continuing conflict, and the pattern of economic development have all reinforced the ethnic identities and grievances that plague contemporary Northern Ireland. With a few exceptions, there has been a tendency for the diverse conflicts —whether over land, penal laws, religious freedom, or independence —to assume a predictable pattern of recruitment: native Catholics formed one ethnic community opposed to and by the Protestant settlers with their own communal identity and loyalties.

CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC DISABILITIES AND MILITANCY

There are several ways to determine ethnic discrimination, and by virtually every measure, Catholics have occupied a disadvantaged position in Northern Ireland. Indicators of objective socioeconomic disabilities, such as housing, education, income, civil service employment, rate of unemployment, or occupational status, show that Catholics are disproportionately in an inferior position to Protestants. For example, in December 1976, unemployment stood at 10.4 percent of the labor force and touched both Protestant and Catholics. But the cities and towns below the average rate of unemployment were mainly Protestant (Belfast, 7.8 percent; Craigavor, 7.9 percent) while Catholic towns showed a reversed pattern (Strabane, 26.7 percent; and Newry and Dungannon at 20 percent).[13]

Economic expansion and mobility theoretically provide disadvantaged groups opportunities to reduce their disabilities, but in Northern Ireland most new industry is located away from Catholic and religiously mixed population areas, and small-scale agriculture, particularly in the west, is becoming depressed. As Catholics move to the largely Protestant, industrial east, they enter a sophisticated labor market, and their lack of skills and education lead

13. *Irish Times*, 22 December 1976. For a further review of Catholic disabilities, see Barritt and Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem*

them to relatively low status jobs. The concentration of economic modernization in the east has not been corrected, further institutionalizing the disabilities of Catholics in Ulster.

Political deprivations experienced by Catholics assumed several different forms. Basing the local council franchise on the householders' taxpayer rates and disenfranchising lodgers disproportionately excluded Catholics with their lower incomes and extended families living under the same roof. Indeed, about a quarter of those qualified to vote in the parliamentary elections were disenfranchised from local council elections.[14] Catholics were also notoriously gerrymandered into election districts which assured minority Protestants control of local councils in all but the most Catholic areas. Where Catholics were 50 to 75 percent of the population, they were generally gerrymandered out of control.[15]

Judicial and police discrimination have been longstanding Catholic grievances. The courts and police are generally staffed by members of the dominant community, and the minority has seen an uneven-handed justice, with understanding and favoritism for the Protestants and harsh, retributive treatment for the Catholics. Especially offensive to the Catholics was the Ulster Special Constabulatory or B-specials, a part-time reserve police unit which sometimes operated under legal sanctions as vigilantes against Catholics.[16]

By 1968, Catholic grievances were real, persistent, and numerous. Moreover, they tended to be reinforcing. Although many Protestants labored under some of the same disabilities —low income, education, and status —they did not face the same political, police, and judicial disadvantages as Catholics.

THE PROTESTANT MILITANTS

Protestant militancy can be partially explained as a reaction to Catholic militancy. However, many Protestants have not aggressively opposed Catholic demands,[17] and in this section, some additional factors associated with militancy in the dominant community will be considered.

Protestant politics had long been dominated by the landed gentry. As was the case in some American Southern states where whites sub-

14. Roger Jull, *The Irish Triangle* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 222. Local franchise requirements and gerrymandered election districts have been corrected since 1968.

15. Derek Berrll, "Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in Northern Ireland," *Sociological Review*, vol. 20, no. 3 (August 1972), p. 324.

16. The B-specials have since been abolished.

17. Several public opinion surveys and election studies indicate that a majority of the Protestants are unprepared to engage in substantial compromises with the Catholics to end the conflict. Rose's 1968 survey revealed that 52 percent of the Protestants approved "any measures" to keep Ulster Protestant, compared to 13 percent of the Catholics who approved "any measures" to end partition. *Governing without Consensus*, pp. 192–93. In the 1974 election, about two-thirds of the Protestants voted for "Loyalist" or militant candidates. Rose, *Northern Ireland*, p. 97. The 1977 local election results repeated this pattern except that Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist party, the most militant alternative in the election, greatly increased its strength at the expense of less strident "Loyalists." *New York Times* and *Baltimore Sun*, 20 May 1977.

merged their internal differences and rallied around the racial issues, ethnicity in Ulster became a cohesive force in the dominant community, and a variety of issues of potential interest to working-class Protestants remained dormant. Although some writers see this as a betrayal of working-class Protestant interests, many Protestants believed that they were betrayed by Unionist Prime Minister Terence O'Neill, who recognized the legitimacy of many Catholic grievances in the 1960s. While Catholics remained unsatisfied until they saw concrete results, many Protestants immediately felt threatened by the symbolic gestures of the government. O'Neill's problem, in part, stemmed from his failure to build constituency support within the Protestant community for what were bold, innovative moves in Ulster. It was in the mid-1960s, long before sustained Catholic activism, that the Reverend Ian Paisley began his rallies against a political elite who was believed to be breaking its bargain with the Protestant majority.

Contrary to some generalizations, Protestant militancy is not primarily a lower-class movement. Based on his 1968 survey of attitudes in Northern Ireland, Rose found that class ranked seventh of the 10 characteristics related to regime outlooks, and another study of the psychological and social attributes of Protestant vigilantes concluded that class was unrelated to Protestant militancy. The Protestant militant has a high sense of political efficacy and confidence, a firm grounding in such traditional values as deference to authority and conventional obedience, and a high level of religiosity. In other words, psychological rather than class characteristics described the Protestant militant who was apt to be a defensive member of the traditional sector of Ulster society rather than a comfortable participant in the modernizing sector.[18]

Many Protestants shared similar experiences with Catholics, but as is often the case in ethnically segmented societies, those similar experiences gave rise to conflicting, discordant perceptions of reality. The condition of those at the bottom is often harsh, but in an environment politicized by ethnic conflict the subordinate group tends to see its problems as primarily resulting from ethnic discrimination. However, such explanations are seldom comprehensible to the many disadvantaged members of the dominant community who face similar disabilities and obviously do not see themselves as victims of religious discrimination.[19] Moreover, the perceptual differences in Protestant and Catholic interpretations about discrimination stem in part from the tendency of people to generalize from their own condition. Like disadvantaged members of the dominant community elsewhere, low income Protestants could not always differentiate gradations in poverty or detect the accumulated disabilities of Catholics. Many Protestants saw Catholics as responsible for their own condition or as suffering the same fate as themselves but simply complaining louder.[20]

18. Rose rejects the class-status explanation in *Governing without Consensus*, chs. 9 and 14. The traditionalist values of the Protestant militants are analyzed in Ronald Terchek, "Religiosity and Militancy in Ulster," paper, Conference for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1976.

19. For a discussion of stereotyping in Northern Ireland, see Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972).

20. Rose found that 74 percent of the

Political, psychological, and perceptual factors help to explain the reaction of militant Protestants to even minor changes in ethnic relationships in Northern Ireland. Embodying the historical religious stereotypes, psychologically anchored in the traditional sectors of Ulster society, and feeling betrayed by moderate Protestant politicians, the militant turned to its own resources to arrest any drift to accommodation with the Catholics.

THE CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT

That Catholics had grievances against the regime and that Protestants were accustomed to repressing minority activism are undeniable, but these factors, alone, do not explain why the current conflict arose when it did or why it has assumed such intensity. Two theories that help to explain the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland today center around political deprivation and the uneven costs assessed by modernization.

For decades, the Nationalist party had been the dominant voice in Catholic politics, but by the 1960s its appeal was quickly fading. Catholic voter turned from the Nationalist's narrow communal appeal of union with the Irish Republic in favor of other Catholic politicians who appealed to the growing Catholic discontent over conditions in Northern Ireland. Although the Catholics were generally unsuccessful in achieving reforms, Protestants were threatened by a loss of power to this new Catholic activism, and, as a group that enjoyed institutionalized power, they reacted defensively to maintain their position.[21]

The rapid pace of change and modernization in Northern Ireland also accounts for both Protestant and Catholic militancy.[22] The industrial structure of the province had been shifting, and occupations and skills that had not existed a generation earlier displaced some established jobs in prestige and income, while some traditional occupations disappeared, or, as in the case of shipbuilding, steadily declined. Growth introduced a variety of other strains into Northern Ireland, many of which were no respectors of the ethnic divide. The older urban centers were yielding to the new suburbs, and once-stable neighborhoods were decaying. Belfast and Londonderry, for example, recorded a 10 percent decline in their populations between 1960 and 1970. At the same time, the educational level of the six counties was rapidly increasing: in 1962, 38 percent of those over 15 remained in public sector schools; by 1968, 69 percent remained, and in 1972, 97 percent.[23]

Protestants compared to 13 percent of the Catholics denied that there was discrimination against Catholics. *Governing without Consensus*, p. 272.

21. Ian McAllister, "Political Opposition in Northern Ireland: The National Democratic Party, 1965–1970," *The Economic and Social Review*, vol. 6, no. 3 (April 1975), pp. 353–66.

22. For a discussion of modernization as applied to Ulster, see Andrew Milnor, *Politics, Violence and Social Change in Northern Ireland*, Occasional Paper No. 5 (Ithaca, N.Y., Western Societies Program, Cornell University, 1976). for a comparative study of modernization which includes Northern Ireland, see Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?" *World Politics*, vol. 24, no. 3 (April 1972). for a discussion of the strains of modernization in dominant communities, see Ronald Terchek, "Popular Resistance to Protest and Disorder: A Comparative Analysis," paper, Annual Meeting International Studies Association, Toronto 1976

23. For changes in the structure of employment and industry, see Milnor, *Politics Violence and Social Change*, David Boulton

But the quality of jobs did not keep pace with increased education, particularly in the cities and depressed west, areas of relatively high contact between Catholics and Protestants.[24] Many of these changes and their attendant strains on social life undoubtedly fueled Catholic frustration and thereby fired Catholic activism. But these same changes also introduced stress into the Protestant community, particularly in those areas where the costs of modernization were high and the benefits relatively small. The costs of change, of course, are not merely material; they are also psychological, and Protestants wedded to th traditional norms of Ulster felt mo: threatened by the forces of moc ernization.

Traditional Protestants also di: approved of political and religiou changes that received some of the impetus from modernization. In a effort to make Ulster a more secula modern society, the O'Neill goverr ment attempted to remove som Catholic disabilities, but this onl excited Ian Paisley to demonstrat‹ Indeed, it was in 1966, two yeaı before the Catholic Civil Righ demonstrations, that the Protestaı paramilitary organization, UVF, wa formed. Although its manifesto rit alistically attacked the IRA, the UV was primarily interested in warnin Protestant elites to drop their polic of "appeasement" to Catholics. In addition, many Protestants weı concerned with their own clerg men who called for greater ec menicalism and who condemne some of the worst forms of di: crimination against the Catholic Not surprisingly, in 1968 whe asked their reactions to the principl of a union between the Protestaı and Catholic churches, only 27 pe cent of the Protestants, compared t 69 percent of the Catholics, thoug such a merger was desirable.[26]

As modernization and attendaı political and religious changes i troduced strains into the Protestaı community, the newly generate frustrations were increasingly chaı neled toward the Catholics, th traditional ethnic antagonist wh had recently assumed an activi: political posture. By providing cre ible explanations for distress or ready target for the release (

The UVF, 1966–1963. An Anatomy of Loyalist Rebellion (Dublin: Tore Books, 1972), pp. 23–33, for population shifts, see *The Ulster Yearbook*, 1976 (Belfast. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), p 9, and for changes in education, see *Abstract of Regional Statistics 1973*, No 9 (London. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973), p. 34.

24. Status incongruency between educational and occupational achievement was particularly telling for better educated Catholics who hold disproportionately fewer upper-status positions than Protestants with a comparable education. Milnor, *Politics, Violence and Social Change*, pp 36–8. With blocked opportunities for better educated Catholics, it is not surprising that Catholic university students and graduates played a disproportionately important role in Catholic political mobilization Their role in the Civil Rights Movement might be expected, but less predictable is the high proportion of Catholics in leadership positions in the SDLP. Ninety percent of the SDLP candidates for the 1975 elections had at least some university background, the same proportion as the moderate Protestant Unionists and middle-class Alliance party but much higher than 75 percent for the three Protestant loyalist parties or the negligible representation of university-trained people running on behalf of the militant Catholic Republican Clubs. These figures are based on biographies of candidates found in the Ian McAllister, *The 1975 Northern Ireland Convention Election*, Occasional Paper, No. 8 (Glascow, Survey Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, 1975), pp 28–46.

25. Boulton, *The UVF, 1966–1963*

26. Rose, *Governing without Consensu* p. 508.

frustration, entrenched ethnic conflict diverted the members of each ethnic community from uniting to solve their common problems generated by modernization.

ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS

There have been several military and political attempts to respond to the conflict and end the violence, but none has been successful. Because there are two conflicts in Ulster, one involving the politicians and their constituencies and the other involving Protestant and Catholic paramilitary organizations and security forces, settlements that might satisfy some of the participants in one of the conflicts may be unacceptable to those in the other.

Police and military attempts to contain the violence have been commonplace throughout the period. Authorities could point to large stores of guns and explosives they uncovered and hundreds of suspects they imprisoned or interned.[27] But the internment campaign suffered from several serious flaws. Any policy which empowers the government to imprison suspects without criminal charges or judicial proceedings clearly invites relaxed judicial standards to brew with ancient prejudices against the minority, and it is not surprising that 95 percent of internees were Catholics. Moreover, many of the Catholic internees, whether innocent or guilty, became martyrs in their neighborhoods. In the end, internship recruited replacements for those imprisoned and intensified Catholic opposition to British rule in Northern Ireland.[28]

In January 1974 moderate Protestant Unionists, the nonsectarian Alliance party, and the Catholic SDLP formed a coalition government, and for the first time in the history of Ulster, a Catholic party was an active and influential participant in government. However, the coalition, referred to as power-sharing in Northern Ireland, rested on a major structural deficiency. As had been the case with O'Neill five years earlier, the moderate Protestant elites failed to consider the breadth or intensity of Protestant opposition which became apparent in a general strike in May. With the province paralyzed, the British unable or unwilling to use military force to break the two-week strike, the government collapsed and power-sharing came to an abrupt end.[29]

In July 1974 the British proposed an elected convention which would draft a new constitution for Northern Ireland, subject to the approval of the Parliament in London. The British expected the new constitution would accept power-sharing between Protestants and Catholics and would recognize Ulster's special relationship with the Republic of Ireland. In the conventional election in May 1975, the Protestant loyalists won an absolute majority of the votes and the conventional seats and bargained from a position of strength. The document they wrote was patterned on the British constitu-

27. In 1976, security forces searched 34,919 occupied and unoccupied dwellings, with several houses searched more than once. There are about 400,000 households in Ulster. *Irish Times*, 29 January 1977.

28. For the modeling impact of internees on recruiting young Catholics to the IRA, see the work of a Belfast child psychiatrist. Morris Fraser, *Children in Conflict: Growing Up in Northern Ireland* (New York: Basic Books, 1977)

29. For a discussion of the 1974 general strike, see Robert Fisk, *The Point of No Return* (London. Andre Deutsch, 1975).

tional principle of majority rule and rejected power-sharing.[30]

But where there is intense ethnic conflict, the minority group is not interested in remaining a permanent political minority. Rather, it is concerned with protesting and advancing its rights. Not unexpectedly, the SDLP and moderates in the convention along with the British House of Commons rejected the draft constitution, and Northern Ireland continued to be ruled from London.

Direct rule from London has been the expedient for governing Ulster since 1972, except for the five-month interlude of power-sharing. The elected legislature and cabinet government of Northern Ireland were suspended, and the British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, accountable only to the Parliament in London, has direct responsibility for the governance of the province. The British hoped direct rule would defuse the situation, which it has not, and that rank and file citizens would pressure their local leaders to solve the constitutional crisis. Although talks among the participants only intermittently occur, negotiations are uncovering some grounds of mutual agreement between Catholic politicians and some Protestants previously associated with the militants.

The Peace Movement, formed in 1976, assumed that Catholics and Protestants had more to share than to divide them, that an overwhelming majority desired peace, and that the traditional politicians had exhausted their usefulness. The movement initially attracted widespread support. Thousands attended its rallies, most churchmen supported its goals, and many politicians, however cautiously and skeptically, endorsed the cause. But when the movement was unable to provide concrete, innovative alternatives, initial enthusiasm waned and rallies drew only hundreds of participants by the spring of 1977. It would be a mistake, however, to discount a movement which developed a strong organizational infrastructure, sound financing, and the dedicated support of many activists.

Independence, an untested solution, was originally the first part of the two-stage IRA plan. In the first stage, the British would withdraw; then the North would be united with the South during the second stage. Despairing of other solutions, several Protestant and some Catholic leaders have turned to independence as a last alternative. Why they believe they could reach a settlement once the British troops and subsidies were gone when they could not while the British offered some security and financial assistance is not clear. Indeed, if the British go, some observers fear a doomsday will result in the ensuing security and political vacuum, with the paramilitaries escalating the violence in order to win a complete victory.[31]

Although there is no simple solution to the current conflict, some steps might be taken to provide the necessary conditions for a future agreement.

1. Some of the strains of modernization need to be reduced.

30 Rose, *Northern Ireland*, pp. 71–139 and McAllister, "Political Opposition in Northern Ireland."

31 The doomsday alternative is given some credence by James Molyneaux, the chief Whip of the Ulster loyalists in the Westminster House of Commons. He claimed that the Protestant strikers planned to establish a provisional government once the strike had crippled the province and they were in control. Cf. *The Times* (London) and *Irish Times*, 5 May 1977.

Regional development outside the industrial east and attention to the typical problems of urban deterioration would in no way bring the parties into a genuine harmony; but such economic strategies would reduce some of the frustrations brought by blocked mobility and perceived deprivation.

2. The British policy of ignoring elected representatives of Northern Ireland should end and elected officials need to be returned to positions of legitimacy and responsibility. Such a policy would reduce the claims of the paramilitaries that they truly represent their ethnic constituencies.

3. Security measures need to be reassessed and redirected. Previous army and police insensitivity to Catholics has only reinforced minority hostility and played into the hands of the IRA. The strict enforcement of laws against the 1977 Protestant strikers made the security forces less offensive to the Catholics, and this policy of impartiality needs to be continued. Now is also the time to act on the growing dissatisfaction throughout Northern Ireland with the paramilitary solution. Some of the paramilitaries have significantly weakened their standing within their own communities as they turned to racketeering and private extortion.[32] Private armies that were once dedicated to the protection of their own communities but have later become a menace to their constituencies have lost the friendly seas in which to swim. Security measures directed against the racketeering elements in the paramilitary organizations would enhance the standing of the authorities while reducing the overall strength of the terrorists.

Any settlement will have to consider the dual nature of the conflict. The military conflict is the traditional Ulster battle between the IRA's working for union with the South and the Protestant paramilitary organizations' assuming a vigilante, settler posture that opposes both union and concessions to the Catholics. The other conflict revolves around the political role of Catholics in the Northern Ireland government and policies discriminating against the minority. A solution that satisfied the problem of Catholic political inclusion and social and economic grievances may antagonize the paramilitaries on both sides: the Protestants because it destroys old patterns and the IRA because it is irrelevant, and quite possibly subversive, to their goal of a united Ireland. It is among the paramilitaries and the militants that the ethnic identities are strongest and the readiness to compromise the weakest. Although the latest ethnic violence may be traced to social discontinuities in Ulster, such as modernization, the momentum of terrorist violence is, unfortunately, not easily reduced by political and economic reforms. The fact remains that the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, based as it is on religious identity, is one of the most intractable kinds of ethnic conflict to solve.

32. On the problem of racketeering in the paramilitary groups, see *Irish Times*, 22 March 1975 and 10 January 1976 and *The Sunday Times* (London), 3 August 1975.

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Institution Design and the Separatist Impulse: Quebec and the Antebellum American South

By MARC V. LEVINE

ABSTRACT: Regional autonomy and separatist movements severely test the conflict management capacities of a nation's political system. Following Calhoun, a series of institutional arrangements and political practices which depart from majority rule decision making have been identified in the literature as contributing to the peaceful management of subcultural cleavages. Such arrangements provide minority subcultures with institutionalized means of self-protection and guarantees against stable unrepresentation and official cultural stigmatization. But, as Schattsneider pointed out, conflicts are best regulated before they start and institutional arrangements such as those above must be made before regional cleavages become too politicized. At a certain stage of conflict, peaceable partition may be the only solution. In Canada and the antebellum U.S., failure to set up "formal modes of sectional self-protection" led to conflict regulation failure and the emergence of separatist movements in Quebec and the South. Without mechanisms of the type noted above and in the context of mass politics, the machinery of national political parties and intersubcultural elite accommodation which had held regional cleavages in check simply proved inadequate.

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DEMOCRATIC stability and political integration depend upon the ability of a nation's political system to regulate social conflict. Politicized subcultural cleavages severely test the capacity of a political system to perform this task. A central problem, therefore, in the study of multicultural societies is specifying the kinds of political structures and public policies that facilitate the peaceful and democratic management of subcultural conflict.

Among the most serious challenges to the conflict management capacities of multicultural political systems are those posed by the development of regional autonomy and separatist movements. A depressing number of historical and contemporary cases provide vivid examples of the dangers of large-scale intrasocietal violence and/or civil war associated with the emergence of separatism. In view of the pervasiveness and significance of the problem, we must systematically and comparatively study those political systems—past and present—which have both succeeded and failed in regulating such movements. Through such analyses, we can contribute to the development of theoretical statements which specify the kinds of institutional arrangements and political practices which appear to have been successful, and unsuccessful, in managing conflicts involving regional subcultures.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the past decade, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have appeared which demonstrate that, at least under certain conditions, the existence of intense subcultural cleavages does not preclude the possibility of stable democracy.[1] The fundamental insights of these studies derive from Calhoun's brilliant observations of more than a century ago concerning the perils of pure majoritarian decision making in severely divided societies. A series of institutional arrangements and political practices which depart from the principle of majority rule have been identified in the literature as contributing to the peaceful management of subcultural cleavages. They include: (1) application of the principle of proportionality in political representation and resource allocation; (2) "all parties" government, in which minority subcultures are invited to share power; (3) concurrent majorities or minority vetoes; and (4) subcultural autonomy in specific policy making and administrative areas.[2]

The reasoning behind such arrangements is straightforward. Whether through a collegial presidency, an "all-parties" parliamentary coalition, or guaranteed subcultural representation in cabinets, legislatures, or extra-governmental policy-making commissions, the underlying aim is to avoid the possibility of subcultures falling into what William Gamson has called a posi-

1. The literature is voluminous and growing "First-generation" essays of this genre are conveniently collected in Kenneth McRae, ed. *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1974).

2. The conflict management potential of these arrangements has been developed in the seminal writings of Arend Lijphart. As an example, see Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in *Consociational Democracy*, ed. McRae, pp. 70–89. See, also, Eric Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1972).

tion of "stable unrepresentation."[3] If subcultures perceive themselves as "permanent minorities," to use Calhoun's phrase, unable to significantly influence a policy process in which decisions are made affecting the subculture, or to prevent numerical majorities from officially "stigmatizing" their subculture, they are increasingly likely to behave in a disruptive or violent fashion. A self-perceived permanent regional minority, under certain conditions, may find such status intolerable and may press for separation from the existing system.

By guaranteeing subcultural minorities structured, regularized access to the policy process—something impossible in "winner take all" majoritarian systems—subcultures perceive themselves, in Heisler's felicitous characterization, to be "sharers" in the policy process rather than winners or losers.[4] No matter who wins the election, no significant group will be unrepresented. That knowledge tends to diminish the need for group mobilization and to mitigate social conflict when combined with two other arrangements: (1) the provision of some form of minority veto—Calhoun's concurrent majority—so that no output can emanate from the central policy process which threatens a subculture's vital interests, and (2) the formal recognition of subcultural autonomy in certain areas deemed strategic by the subculture. To quote Calhoun:

> The concurrent majority . . . tends to unite the most opposite and conflicting interests and to blend the whole in one common attachment to the country. By giving to each interest or portion, the power of self-protection, all strife and struggle between them for ascendancy is prevented. . . . Each sees and feels that it can best promote its own prosperity by conciliating the good will and promoting the prosperity of others.[5]

Such a view, of course, is overly roseate and typically exaggerated; as the preceding paragraphs suggest, structural arrangements more elaborate than simply the practice of requiring a concurrent majority in decision making are required to manage group conflict in complex societies. But Calhoun's statement does capture the basic principle involved: in societies with intense and politicized subcultural cleavages, institutional arrangements which guarantee minority access to decision making and provide effective modes of minority self-protection facilitate the handling of emotionally and symbolically loaded subcultural issues (such as schools, language use, abolition or extension of slavery) in a technical, incremental, and essentially negotiable fashion.

In order to work, of course, such arrangements must be recognized as irrevocable and hence not subject to repeal by majority whim. It is in this context that we can understand the preoccupation of minority subcultures with what appear to be abstract and sterile discussions of legal-constitutional questions. In this regard, therefore, Calhoun's

3. William Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," in *Group Politics A New Emphasis*, ed. E. S Malecki and H. R. Mahood (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 60–76.

4. See Martin O. Heisler, with Robert Kvavick, "Patterns of European Politics. The 'European Polity' Model," in *Politics in Europe. Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies*, ed. Heisler (New York David McKay and Company, 1974), p. 66.

5. John C Calhoun, *A Disquisition on Government* (Indianapolis The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1953), pp 37–8.

emphasis on the role of the constitution as an element in a society's conflict regulation machinery is well taken. The evidence from a number of cases suggests that once diversity is formally recognized and group interests constitutionally delineated, subcultural cleavages become institutionalized, conflict is mitigated, and the dangers of large-scale intrasocietal violence decrease.

STAGES OF CONFLICT AND INSTITUTION DESIGN

In applying these principles of conflict regulation to regionally divided societies, we would do well to keep in mind E. E. Schattsneider's seemingly truistic, but nevertheless powerful observation that the best stage to manage social conflict is before it starts, or at least in its early stages.[6] As conflicts develop, conflict groups undergo various transformations and shifts in objectives, which significantly diminish the appropriateness—and hence the potential efficacy—of conflict ameliorating formulae which might have worked at an earlier stage.

For example, in the beginning (T_1), the demands of regional minorities are likely to focus on guaranteed access to central policy making, constitutional guarantees against cultural "submersion" or stigmatization, or perhaps jurisdictional shifts to permit greater regional autonomy in cultural affairs. Disputes centering on these kinds of questions—essentially questions over how the country should be run—appear amenable to regulation by institutional adjustments along the lines suggested above.

However, should unregulated regional conflicts reach the final state (T_n) where the question is no longer how the country should be run, but whether it should exist at all, the same conflict regulation strategy which might have worked at T_1 may be inappropriate. The goal at T_n is still subcultural self-protection. But the group no longer believes that such self-protection can be achieved through guaranteed access to the central policy process or by the granting of regional autonomy in cultural affairs. Self-protection in the eyes of the subculture at T_n may require comprehensive regional policy-making autonomy or even complete independence. When regional conflicts have reached this stage, the only solution may be peaceable partition, with perhaps some form of economic partnership between the former subcultures.

This point may be illustrated concretely, if somewhat speculatively. Had comprehensive, non-majoritarian institutional arrangements for the self-protection of French Canada been established in 1867 (T_1)—the year of Confederation—mass based Québécois separatism might never have developed. But, by 1977 (T_2), with separatism riding high, and with the focus of even nonseparatist groups less on establishing guaranteed Québécois voice in Ottawa and more toward developing comprehensive provincial policy-making autonomy, the chances of the success of Calhounian conflict management strategy is significantly diminished.[7] In a similar vein, policies and structures which, if instituted

6. E. E. Schattsneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1974), p. 15.

7. By Calhounian, I do not necessarily mean concurrent majorities or dual presidencies, but merely the principles underlying those arrangements. During the Act of Union period (1840–67), Canada did oper-

in 1789, might have precluded the development of Southern separatism probably had less of a chance of doing so even if adopted in the American secession winter of 1860–61.

Thus, in terms of conflict regulation in regionally divided societies, we need to specify not only what kinds of conflict management strategies appear to work, but at what stage of conflict they will be appropriate. As Schattsneider's insight suggests, the stage at which the greatest possibility of effective conflict management exists is before the conflict begins. This suggests that regional subcultures must be formally and institutionally recognized at the nation-building stage. If such arrangements are not forthcoming, and the political system operates under the principle of majority rule, all things being equal, the chances are good that regional autonomism and separatism will develop. Past a certain threshold, at a certain stage of conflict development, the only solutions may be peaceable partition or civil war.

EXAMPLES

The emergence of separatism in the antebellum American South and contemporary Quebec nicely illustrates the deficiencies of pure majority rule democracy (that is, systems with none of the guarantees sketched above) in managing conflicts involving regional subcultures. My aim in the remainder of this article is to tie the progressive politicization of intrasocietal regional divisions and the eventual emergence of separatism in the South and Quebec to the "theory predicted" inappropriateness of the conflict regulation machinery in the antebellum United States and contemporary Canada.

Why compare the growth of separatism in Quebec and the South? While Quebec separatism is easily understood as an example of the general phenomenon of regional-subcultural separatism, Southern separatism is not commonly conceptualized in this fashion. However, in an important essay, Lee Benson has attacked the parochialism of historians who study the American Civil War as a unique event and has chastised American historians for failing to compare Southern separatism to other cases of what he calls "territorial culture group conflict."[8] Benson persuasively argues that these failings account, to a considerable degree, for the low credibility of extant explanations of the causes of the "War for Southern Independence."

No two cases are identical, and the cases of Quebec and the South differ in some obvious and major ways. French-speaking Quebec's regional distinctiveness, of course, is based on language differences from English Canada, while the South differed from the rest of the Union on the basis of its labor system. Moreover, the technologically modern, bureaucratic, perhaps "post-industrial" environment of Canada and Quebec of the 1960s and 1970s presents a sharp contrast to a nineteenth-century America entering the Industrial Revolution and to the agrarian antebellum South.[9]

ate under a "Double Majority" scheme. The period is remembered as one of deadlock and immobilism. The unworkability of the scheme, in fact, encouraged adoption of the political institutions of the B.N.A.

8. Lee Benson, *Toward the Scientific Study of History* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972), pp. 225–340.

9. An interesting question which should be pursued systematically is the extent to

Nevertheless, the cases seem to me to be conceptually of a piece. Both the South and Quebec represent minority regional subcommunities increasingly alienated from the larger political community to which they belong. As regional cleavages became progressively politicized, Québécois and Southerners increasingly conceived of themselves in strikingly similar terms, as members of what numerous provincial and sectional elites referred to as a "nation within a nation."[10] The underlying bases of conflict between South and North and between Quebec and English Canada—albeit the former over slavery, the latter over language—seem the same. Both represent disputes by territorially concentrated subcultures over group honor, self-esteem, and power.

Determining the genuine comparability of cases is a problem which continues to bedevil social scientists engaged in cross-system and cross-time analysis. Significant variations certainly affect the comparability of these two cases. But, viewed from the general perspective sketched above, contemporary Canadian and antebellum American decision makers, grappling with the systems-threatening impulses emanating from Quebec and the South, can be conceptualized as dealing with comparable phenomena. If this perspective is credible, then an examination of the emergence of separatism in Quebec and the South from a public policy and institution design perspective has the potential to yield some general propositions concerning conflict regulation in territorially divided political communities.

INSTITUTION DESIGN AND SEPARATISM: THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH

The political machinery of antebellum America proved ill-suited to the task of regulating conflict between the North and South. Southern separatism, secession, and a bloody Civil War were the consequences. The failure of the American political system to institutionalize sectional cleavages serves as a classic example of the dangers of political institutions and modes of decision making based on majority rule in societies divided into majority and minority subcultures.

In the broadest sense, conflict regulation failure was rooted in a defective constitutional framework which, among other flaws, concentrated indivisible power in a single executive and failed to provide constitutional guarantees of a voice in policy as well as for self-protection for regional subcultures.[11] In the last analysis, despite any de facto arrangements which may have existed, access to the policy process was to be won or lost, not shared. As I suggested above, this is a dangerous mode of operation in deeply divided societies. The "cultural federalism" of nineteenth-century America, as Roy Nichols called it, was not fully comprehended by its political engineers, and formal institutional arrangements simply were not established to accommodate sectional diversity.[12]

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which different lines of cleavage—religious, ethnic, linguistic, and so on—require different conflict regulation machinery.

10. That exact phrase was used by South Carolina political elite William Trescot in the early 1850s and is also a stock phrase of Quebec political elites.

11. See Benson, *Scientific Study*, pp. 307–26.

12. Roy F. Nichols, *American Leviathan: The Evolution and Process of Self-Govern-*

Managing sectional cleavages: the first phase

Sectional cleavages became politicized during the 1819–21 controversy over whether territories carved out of the Louisiana purchase should be allowed to enter the Union as slave states or free states.[13] The battle over the admission of Missouri—as did similar controversies in the 1850s over the status of slavery in the territories and new states—explosively yoked together Southern fears of stable unrepresentation and cultural stigmatization. To ban slavery in new states was to stigmatize slavery and Southern slaveholders. To limit the number of slave states to those already in the Union at least potentially threatened to upset the balance between slave and free states and undermine Southern control of the Senate, where representation was not based on majoritarian principles.

In the three decades following the Missouri controversy, a fragile and largely ad hoc pattern of intersectional political accommodation evolved. This conflict regulation structure contained three main elements.

First, the instability generated by territorial expansion and the admission of new states was temporarily "solved" by the Missouri Compromise formula. It was agreed that in the remainder of the Louisiana purchase area lying north of 36°30′ latitude, slavery would be prohibited. To assuage Southern fears of becoming outnumbered, an unwritten, informal principle of "parallel admission" of new states was accepted. For example, Missouri was admitted to the Union as a slave state, while Maine simultaneously entered as a free state. Thus, while not incorporated as an ironclad, constitutional guarantee, the Missouri formula served a similar purpose. With the exception of some episodes, sectional conflict on the issue of slavery in the territories was defused between 1820–46.

Second, conflict was regulated by the existence of a de facto Southern minority veto power. Southern influence actually went far beyond simple veto power; a cluster of features, including domination of the national Democratic party and through it control of the single presidency, facilitated Southern domination of the federal policy process from 1789–1860.[14]

Southern congressmen and senators, by virtue of seniority, occupied strategic positions in the organizational and procedural structure of national legislative bodies. As David Potter has pointed out:

> In these bodies, by the time of Andrew Jackson, both the processes of legislation and the intricacies of parliamentary procedure had grown so complex and the resources for obstruction had grown so extensive that no effective action could take place unless approval was obtained from certain strategic figures.[15]

As a consequence of Southern control of the congressional committee system, in the absence of a unified, numerically superior North

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ment in the United States (New York Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 182–83

13. On the unawakened state of the South prior to the Missouri controversy, see Charles Sydnor, *The Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819–1848* (Baton Rouge, L.S.U. Press, 1948), pp 1–32

14 See Roy F Nichols, *The Disruption of American Democracy* (New York: MacMillan, Inc., 1948), p. 41, and Benson, *Scientific Study*, pp 269–70

15. David Potter, *The South and the Concurrent Majority* (Baton Rouge, L.S.U. Press, 1972), p 15.

mobilized against the South, it was almost impossible for an output to emanate from the policy process which threatened Southern interests.

Finally, sectional cleavages were held in check by the existence of national, bisectional political parties and informal modes of intersectional elite accommodation which occurred within them. The Democratic party was a particularly important site for such accommodation. Studies of mass voting behavior and congressional voting behavior in the antebellum era suggest that loyalty to party overrode loyalty to section and served to promote national political cohesion.[16] Through 1846, as Joel Silbey has noted, "although there were tensions within the existing parties which might cause their breakdown into sectional blocs, sectional leaders . . . still considered the national parties as the primary instrument of political action".[17]

The machinery breaks down

In 1846, for reasons related to internal Democratic party power struggles, an obscure Pennsylvania congressman named David Wilmot introduced legislation to ban slavery from territories and potential new states acquired in the Mexican-American War. This reintroduction of the issue of slavery in the territories onto the national political agenda unleashed a series of developments which, in the 1850s, undermined the fragile machinery which had managed sectional conflict after the Missouri crisis. Bisectional parties—first the Whigs, then the Congressional Democrats, and finally the entire Democratic party—were shattered. Elite accommodation broke down, and Congress became, in David Potter's words, "a cockpit in which rival groups could match their best fighters against one another," rather than a "meeting place for working out problems."[18] The constitutional-institutional flaws of the American political system were exposed.

Without constitutional guarantees, or "formal modes of sectional self-defense," as Calhoun put it, Southern leaders like Calhoun had always feared that majority rule would eventually lead to stable unrepresentation for the South. The consequences ultimately would be official stigmatization and perhaps submersion of Southern institutions. By the 1820s the numerically superior North already controlled the House of Representatives which was based on representation by population. Should electoral patterns crystallize along sectional lines, the indivisible power of the presidency would be lost to the numerically inferior South. Should free states ever outnumber slave states, given this crystallization of sectional cleavages, Southern dominance in the

16. See Thomas B. Alexander, *Sectional Stress and Party Strength* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), and Joel Silbey, *The Shrine of Party. Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841–1852* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967) on congressional voting. Among the many studies of mass voting behavior and parties, see Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System. Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era* (Chapel Hill. University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

17. Silbey, *Shrine of Party*, p. 85.

18 David Potter, *The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861* (New York· Harper & Row, Publishers, 1976), p. 67. The breakdown of mechanisms of political integration, of course, is much too complex to remotely begin to be adequately summarized here The best accounts are Potter, *Impending Crisis*, and Roy F. Nichol's magisterial *Disruption of American Democracy*.

Senate would be overturned and a majority, unified against the South, would control all branches of the federal government.

Increasingly, in the 1850s, the South faced exactly these circumstances. Unlike the Missouri controversy of 1819, the national debate over slavery extension inspired by Wilmot's legislation occurred in the context of mass politics. The consequence was the crystallization of sectional electoral patterns feared by Calhoun. A political party with an anti-Southern platform, the Republicans, arose in the North, with the power to capture the indivisible power of the presidency. While attempts to build a Southern political party failed in the 1850s, the national debate on slavery encouraged what Nichols has called a "hypersouthernism" in local Southern politics[19] The elite accommodation of earlier years was the casualty of this highly charged, mass mobilized atmosphere; a moderate on questions of sectional rights would be pilloried in local elections as selling out his region. In this context of defective political machinery, political elites could hardly discuss sectional issues in a technical, negotiable fashion.

The abandonment of the Missouri formula, which occurred in 1854 with the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and battles over the admission of California as a free state (1850), the organization of the Nebraska territory (1854), and the admission of Kansas as a possible slave state (1857–58) rekindled the old Southern fear of losing control of the Senate. This fear seemed especially real since extreme sectional polarization, and Northern congressional unity, was developing.

Thus, in the 1850s, Southern leaders not yet bent on secession pressed for constitutional guarantees of autonomy, structured voice in central policy (concurrent majority or dual presidency), and guaranteed, constitutional protection of slavery in the District of Columbia, territories, and newly admitted states. When such guarantees were not forthcoming, the acceptability of separatism as a political alternative to protect Southern interests increased. And, when the candidate of a Northern sectionalist party captured the indivisible power of the presidency in 1860, in a political system containing no "formal modes of sectional self-protection," secession was the logical response for most of the South. Rejection by the Republicans, during secession winter, of any constitutional revisions entailing departure from majority rule or guaranteeing slaveholding rights in the territories, made secession unavoidable for the rest of the South.[20]

INSTITUTION DESIGN AND SEPARATISM: QUEBEC

In November 1976 the separatist Parti Québécois swept to victory in the Quebec provincial elections. By February 1977 the PQ had set up a referendum committee "giving party members the signal to go ahead

19. Nichols, *Disruption of American Democracy*, pp. 20, 45, 47

20. Such plans included Calhoun disciple R. M. T. Hunter's "League of Two Sections" which proposed regional autonomy, a dual presidency, minority veto in the legislature, and proportional representation. The main compromise proposal of secession winter was the Crittenden Compromise which called for the constitutional formalization of the 36-30 line and proposed irrevocable guarantees on the right of Southerners to hold slaves.

and start working on winning the referendum on separatism."[21] Surveys taken in the spring indicated that more than one in three Québécois favored separation from Canada, if economic partnership with Canada after independence were included.

Self-evidently, the nearly decade-old federal policy of bilingualism, aimed at resolving Canada's crisis of national unity, has not succeeded. Why? What characteristics of the Canadian political system have precluded the successful institutionalization of that nation's territorial-linguistic cleavage? A satisfactory answer to that question—as well as to the similar one posed in relation to the antebellum South—would take at least a book. Here I will merely outline in general terms the inadequacies of Canadian conflict regulation machinery in handling the growth of ethnoterritorial nationalism and separatism in Quebec between 1960–77.

Unlike their counterparts in antebellum America, Canadian political engineers did initiate policies and set up institutions which explicitly recognized diversity. However, they were mechanisms inappropriate to handle territorial diversity. In addition, like the American case, Canadian conflict regulation efforts suffered from a failure to depart from majoritarian decision making, a flaw McRae has aptly labeled the "Achilles' heel of the Canadian political system."[22]

Cleavage management: the early stages

Political stability was maintained in Canada between 1867–1960 primarily through informal modes of intersubcultural elite accommodation.[23] Although no comprehensive arrangements were set up along the lines of consociational elite accommodation described by Lijphart, a certain quid pro quo was reached between French- and English-speaking elites. Quebec autonomy in areas like education was granted in return for majority (read: English) rule in national politics. Certain de facto arrangements evolved, such as alternation of Liberal party leadership between the language groups, designed to coopt minority subcultural elites. In a pre-mass political mobilization era, such elite accommodation was able to regulate territorial-linguistic diversity reasonably well.

Under the provincial government of Liberal Premier Jean Lesage, in the early 1960s Quebec underwent rapid modernization, economic development, and political democratization in what was dubbed the "Quiet Revolution." Developing alongside these changes was a new sense of cultural self-awareness among French Canadians and concomitant claims by the government of Quebec to be the vehicle of French-Canadian aspirations. Demands for greater provincial control over what Heisler has called output implementation in such policy areas as education, social welfare, manpower, and taxation emanated from Quebec.[24] At the same

21. The Toronto *Globe and Mail*, 21 February 1977.

22. McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 300.

23 See Richard Pious, "Canada and the Crisis of Quebec," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1973), pp. 53–5.

24 Martin O Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium," in *Politics in Europe*, ed. Heisler, pp. 186–87. On this element of Canadian policy, see Lauren McKinsey, "Dimensions of National Political Integra-

time demands for political autonomy, self-determination, and constitutional guarantees of cultural sovereignty emerged. Lesage called for special status for Quebec and provocatively referred to the province as l'Etat du Quebec.

These changes rendered the elite accommodation pattern of conflict management obsolete. Mass mobilization meant that coopting francophone elites would not sufficiently satisfy mass-based Quebec demands. Further, given the emerging attitudinal differentiation among Quebec elites (old line Union-Nationale types, Lesage Liberals, Separatists) no *one* elite group could speak for—and hammer out agreements for—French Canada.[25]

The initial policy response of Ottawa to the autonomist and separatist impulses was ad hoc. It involved marginal concessions to various Québécois demands and limited decentralization. Quebec was granted tax abatement points and was permitted to "opt out" of federal shared cost projects and begin establishing a comprehensive regional policy apparatus.[26] Symbolic gestures were made toward French Canada, with the appointment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963 and the adoption, in 1964, of a new flag less offensive to francophones. But, institutional changes on the order of recognizing the special status of Quebec were not forthcoming.

New directions: the policy of national bilingualism

Between 1965–69, the margin concessions-limited decentraliz tion policy ended, and a compr hensive national policy for mana ing the cultural-linguistic cleavag emerged. Its architect was Pier Trudeau. The policy combined wh John Meisel has characterized as a enlightened centralism approach Canadian federalism with a con mitment to national bilinguali and equality of the French an English languages.[27]

Trudeau was (and is) a bitter o ponent of Quebec nationalism whether it took the form of "tw nations" or "special status" pr posals, cultural autonomism, or se aratism. Thus, as John Saywe noted in his 1968 review of Can dian politics, the concept behin Trudeau's "federal policy was th if linguistic and cultural equali for French-Canadians could be gua anteed, then in constitutional ma ters Quebec could be treated as province 'commes les autres.' "[28] N special status need be grante violating both the principles majority rule and individual, n group, oriented democracy. As Tr deau repeatedly maintained, mo recently in the wake of the P victory as he was forced to d fend his policies against criti who claimed that granting Quebe special status might undercut se aratism: "The answer to separ tism is making French-speakin Canadians at home in Canada i Vancouver and Toronto as well a

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tion and Disintegration: The Case of Quebec Separatism, 1960–1975," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 9, no. 3 (October 1976), pp. 344–48.

25. In Lijphart's model, tightly organized subcultures with one clear subcultural elite is assumed.

26. McKinsey, "Dimensions of National Political Integration and Disintegration," p. 345.

27. John Meisel, *Cleavages, Parties, an Values in Canada* (Beverly Hills, Calif Sage Publications, 1974), p. 29.

28. John Saywell, *Canadian Annual Re view for 1968* (Toronto: University Toronto Press, 1969), p. 71.

Montreal, and a transfer of power to the provinces will not achieve this end."[29]

But this policy was flawed in at least two related ways. First, it ignored the fact that the objectives of French-Canadian nationalism, while historically focused on the rights of francophones throughout Canada, shifted in the 1960s and aimed at solidifying French-Canadian dominance of Quebec. A policy of national bilingualism did little to satisfy the Québécois goal to be, in the Lesage slogan, maître chez-nous." It promised, to coin a phrase, merely "egalité chez-vous."[30]

Second, the policy did not recognize that a national bilingualism policy is not particularly well suited to societies with territorial concentrations of linguistic groups.[31] The antagonistic reaction of English-speaking Western Canada to the bilingualism policy is clear. And while national bilingualism has been official policy since the Official Languages Act of 1969, Quebec provincial governments have simultaneously pursued a policy of provincial unilingualism. The recently proposed PQ Bill 1, reinforcing French as the sole official language of the province, is the culmination of this pattern.

Solutions and prospects

Canadian efforts at conflict regulation since the mid-1960s were doomed because they failed to follow the principles of conflict management sketched above: in societies divided into regional subcultures, institutional arrangements must be made to guarantee regional self-protection. National bilingualism is a policy recognizing the rights of French-Canadian individuals, not a territorial community, and consequently misses the fundamental bases of Québécois discontent with the existing system.

What institutional arrangements might have succeeded? Several political scientists have suggested the applicability of a consociational elite accommodation model.[32] But, as the experience of antebellum America demonstrated, elite accommodation does not appear to be a particularly appropriate mode of conflict management in mass mobilized societies. We may recall that informal elite accommodation was not able to last through 1960 in Canada.

It has been suggested that perhaps elite accommodation can be implemented within Canadian political parties, particularly the "binational" Liberal party. However, strong areas of disagreement emerged between the Quebec provincial and federal wings of the Liberal party in the 1970s, most vividly demonstrated by Premier Bourassa's veto of the Victoria constitutional revisions in 1971. And federal-provincial elite accommodation does not seem terribly promis-

29. The Toronto *Globe and Mail*, 25 November 1976.

30. See Claude Morin, *Quebec v. Ottawa* (Toronto, 1975), p. 53

31. Andre Donneur, "La solution territoriale au problème de multilinguisme" in J. G. Savard and R. Vigneault, *Les États Multilingues. Problèmes et Solutions* (Quebec. Les Presses de l'Université Laval 1975), pp. 209–26, and J. A. Laponce, "Relating Linguistic to Political Conflicts: The Problems of Language Shift in Multilingual Societies," in Savard and Vigneault, *Les États Multilingue*, pp. 185–208.

32. McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 238–61, and S. J. R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 262–68.

ing with a Parti Québécois government holding power in Quebec.

Following the principles of conflict management suggested above, perhaps the establishment of constitutional guarantees of territorial cultural and linguistic security for Quebec might be appropriate, even at this advanced stage of cleavage politicization. This reasoning underlies proposals such as calls for a "League of Two Nations," or, less drastically, the abandonment of bilingualism and the acceptance of French preeminence in Quebec and English preeminence in the rest of Canada.[33]

In his visit to the United States in February 1977, Trudeau spoke of constitutional revisions to provide guarantees against "cultural submersion" for French Canada.[34] Since 1974, while not "officially," Canadian language policy appears to have begun to tilt away from the personality principle and toward a principle of recognized territorial "security spheres" for language groups.[35] If cleavage politicization is not too advanced, then this kind of solution may contribute to arresting the crisis of Quebec. But, as Schattsneider's insight noted earlier would suggest, the chances (success would have been better ha the same arrangements been mad before the cleavages became poli icized.

33. See Hugh Thorburn, "Needed: A New Look at the Two Nations Theory," *Queens Quarterly*, vol 80, no 2, (Summer 1973), pp. 268–73, Donneur, "La solution territoriale," and Laponce, "Language Shift," in Savard and Vigneault, *Les États multilingues*.

34. New York *Times*, 23 February 1977.

35. Kenneth McRoberts, "Bill 22 and Language Policy in Canada," *Queens Quarterly*, vol. 83, no. 3 (Autumn 1976), pp 464–77.

SUMMARY

The problems involved in manag ing group conflict in multi-cultur societies are multifarious and e: ceedingly complex. Despite recei advances, we are still in need (broad gauge theory specifying wh institutional arrangements an political practices at what stag of cleavage politicization are mo: effective in managing conflicts ir volving regional subcultures. Cor tinued theoretical efforts combine with systematic empirical analysis (cases of conflict regulation succes and failure are needed before trul adequate models are generated.

Brief examinations of the failure (the Canadian and antebellum Ame ican political systems to institu tionalize regional cleavages provid support for Calhounian principles (conflict regulation. The chances (success in managing regional coi flict in majority rule democracie are not good. Formal institution recognition of diversity and gua antees for minority protection– especially under the conditions (mass politics—are essential if re gional cleavages are to be institu tionalized rather than developin into full-fledged separatist move ments.

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Ethnicity in the Soviet Union

By TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE

ABSTRACT: In the Soviet Union, ethnicity is the major force for change. It is a multiethnic society, where the Russians constitute the ruling majority. The country's political system recognizes the ethnic principle in a federal state structure, but the real power is exercised by a unitary and highly centralized Communist party. The ruling ideology of Marxism–Leninism postulates class-based internationalism as the basis of Soviet national integration. Ethnic antagonisms, inherited from Russia's colonial past, were submerged in the Stalinist period, but growing ethnic self-assertion by non-Russian groups became visible in the sixties and seventies, under the impact of accelerated modernization and other policy decisions, such as the development of ethnic cultures. Quantitative and qualitative hegemony of the Russians has been a major catalyst. New Soviet educated elites are the spokesmen for ethnic interests, which are aggregated within national republics. Ethnic conflict manifests itself in all spheres of political, social, economic, and cultural life, but is played by systemic "rules of the game." There is no open separatism or ethnic warfare. Ethnic forces press for an evolution toward greater autonomy, but if it is denied, there may be an explosion.

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THE international and popular Western image of the Soviet Union rarely recognizes the multiethnic and formally federal character of the Soviet State. The usual perception is that the Soviet Union is synonymous with "Russia." This is so, first, because in the Soviet Union the Russians are the dominant nation, quantitatively and qualitatively, their historical hegemony having survived intact the 1917 Revolution and the transition from Imperial Russia to the Soviet "international workers'" state; second, because the highly centralized nature of the Soviet political system, run by the unitary Communist Party renders the federal constitutional state structure largely irrelevant for the purposes of international Realpolitik. Only rarely is one reminded of the federal nature of the USSR, as in the case of Soviet demands to grant full United Nations' status to all of its constituent national republics, or an attempt to have one or another republic acting as a sovereign state in the international arena for selective (and transient) foreign policy purposes,[1] which in the sixties and seventies, for example, resulted in a higher profile for the Soviet Muslim republics. But, as the flow of exchanges and data between the Soviet Union and the West has increased in the post-Stalin era, the phenomenon of ethnicity (the old-fashioned term used in the Soviet Union is "the national problem") and the presence of ethnic conflict there, have become increasingly visible.

The ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union does not take the form of an open conflict of a kind present in many other multiethnic societies throughout the world. The very nature of the Soviet political system precludes that. Marxist-Leninist ideology, which is the source of legitimacy for the monopoly of power the CPSU exercises in the country, denies the existence of conflicts other than those based in class exploitation, and postulates, ex cathedra, that with the achievement of socialism the class and ethnic conflicts in the USSR have both disappeared. The theory is that the unity of the Soviet nations and nationalities stems from the class-based "proletarian internationalism" (all Soviet citizens, of whatever nationality, are the "working people") and that the "national problem" in the Soviet Union has been solved precisely because of the duality of the Soviet political system. The national character of each ethnic group is safeguarded in the constitutional national form, but their overriding class-based unity, the socialist content, is expressed by the leading role of the CPSU—the "toilers'" vanguard and the leading force in society. Consequently, any open ethnic self-assertion which transgresses the limits of the "national form–socialist content" formula is suppressed. But the dichotomy also opens up the avenues for "legitimate" self-assertion.

The nature and appearance of ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union are, therefore, different than in other more "open" societies. On the one hand, the systemic constraints prevent expression of open separatism as well as open ethnic warfare. For this reason there is no agreement among experts whether the highly visible phenomenon of ethnic self-assertion by major Soviet ethnic groups can be defined as nationalism.

1. See Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), chs. 14 and 19.

On the other hand, the legal framework of the system and its ideological premises not only allow the pursuit of ethnic autonomy, but also preempt the option of a return to an imperial state based on Russian nationalism, even though de facto the new "Soviet" value system and patterns of behavior are permeated—for historical reasons—by the Russian political culture content.

In the Soviet Union, therefore, the forces of ethnicity find their expression within the system and the ethnic conflict is regulated by the rules imposed by it. The Russians and the Ukrainians or the Uzbeks, for example, do not fight in the streets; on the contrary, professions of "unbreakable unity" and "fraternal ties" fill the Soviet media, resound in conferences and assemblies, provide the message in the arts, and form the keynote of official pronouncements. Yet, at the same time the whole fabric of Soviet society is permeated, subtly but unmistakably, by ethnic antagonisms and competition between the dominant Russians and all others in political, economic, social, and cultural life.

All available evidence indicates that the rate of growth of the national self-assertion of major Soviet ethnic groups exceeds their rate of assimilation into a common Soviet value system. The problem, while not officially acknowledged, is recognized by the Soviet leadership. In the words of one of the key Politbureau leaders, ethnic antagonisms constitute one of the three main obstacles on the "road to building communism."[2] In the opinion of this writer, the ethnic conflict is now the major force for change in the Soviet Union. It presents no immediate threat to the stability of the system, but in the long-run the build-up of centrifugal ethnic forces may well contribute to a major change in the nature of the Soviet state as it is today, and may even lead to its eventual disintegration. At present, the ethnicity-generated change is slow and evolutionary, even as the forces pressing for it are accelerating. There has been a degree of grudging and conditional recognition for ethnic demands in Moscow but no real accommodations, largely, one suspects, because the leadership cannot find adequate solution to the problem and any changes in the present system may open the floodgates of nationalism. Should there be a violent change in the status quo, however, ethnicity may well trigger a revolutionary change.

The subject is too complex to be explored fully in a short article. Here an attempt is made to discuss the dimensions and the nature of the ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union, with special emphasis on its sources of growth and the dynamics of ethnic interaction as they evolve under the "rules of the game" imposed by the system.

SALIENT VARIABLES

Background

The colonial heritage of Imperial Russia continues to affect relations between the Russians and non-Russians in the Soviet Union even today. The Russian colonial expansion extended into areas geographically contiguous, but followed a familiar pattern of pursuit of economic and political interests followed by conquest. Most of the non-Russian border areas attempted to break away after the 1917 Revolu-

2. Mikhail Suslov, "The Social Sciences—a Combat Arm of the Party in the Building of Communism," *Kommunist* (Moscow), January 1972, pp. 18–30.

tion but were reconquered by the new Bolshevik government in the name of "proletarian unity." Those that did gain independence, such as the three Baltic states, were reincorporated in World War II, at which time also the Soviet boundaries were extended westward to include the Western Ukraine and Belorussia and Moldavia. Despite an effort, in the Soviet period, at an across-the-board modernization and equalization, aspects of colonial relationships survive, inclusive of attitudes. The multiethnic mosaic of Soviet population today is the result of past colonial conquest, the historical—frequently the living—memory of which is a part of the ethnic consciousness of the non-Russian peoples.[3]

The last (1970) Soviet Census listed more than 100 nations and nationalities. The Russians constituted 53 percent of the total population (a decline of 1 percent since the previous census of 1959), but 21 other national groups numbered more than 1 million people each (see table 1). Of these, the Ukrainians (40.8 millions), the Uzbeks (9.2 millions), and the Belorussians (9.1 millions), were the most numerous; in the overall mix the Slavs had an overwhelming majority of 74 percent. Under the 1936 USSR Constitution,[4] the ethnic groups of any significant size have had their own national administrative-territorial units: there are 15 union republics (SSR) (see table 1), 20 autonomous republics (ASSR), 8 autonomous provinces (AO), and 10 national regions. Not all of the major nations, however, have an appropriate national unit; either because of geographic dispersal (the Jews and the Poles) or for political reasons (the Germans and the Crimean Tatars).[5]

The officially sponsored policy of inter-republic migration and ethnic intermixture has affected the basic national settlement pattern of major groups remarkably little in the 60 years of Soviet power. A preponderant majority of most ethnic groups still live in their national areas or in the regions immediately contiguous (see table 1). The Russians are the most significant exception, and the eastward shift of the Soviet population since 1917 occurred largely because of the geographic mobility of the Russian group who now dominate the urban and industrial centers throughout the country. A number of Ukrainians and Belorussians also migrated eastward; among other groups only the Armenians have shown a certain geographic mobility. The Jews, who are almost totally urbanized (see table 1) are a special case.

Levels of ethnic consciousness and economic and social development vary significantly among major Soviet ethnic groups as do the patterns of their national cultures. Along with the historical nations that had enjoyed periods of inde-

3. In the twenties, Soviet historiography recognized and condemned past Russian imperialism. The interpretation changed in the thirties. Now the conquest is presented as an objectively "good" and historically "*progressive*" *phenomenon, because it in*volved the minorities in the Russian Revolution that enabled them to become a part of the world's first socialist state.

4. The draft of the new constitution, made public June 4, 1977, did not introduce any changes in the federal structure.

5. The Crimean Tatars (deported along with the Volga Germans during *World War II for alleged* collaboration with the invaders) are a subgroup of a Tatar national group. There is a Tatar ASSR for the main Tatar group, the Volga Tatars. Both the deported groups were rehabilitated in the sixties but remain in exile, and their autonomous republics were not restored.

TABLE 1

USSR. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS, 1970: NUMBERS, URBANIZATION, SETTLEMENT PATTERN AND COEFFICIENTS OF DEVELOPMENT

	Numbers		Urbanization in % of Population		Settlement Distribution in % of Group Members Resident in Own National Unit*	Coefficient of Development by Republic in 1965
Ethnic Group	Abs Figures (Millions)	% of the Total	By the Group	By Republic		
Russians (1)	129.0	53.3	68	64	83	1.05
Ukrainians (1)	40.8	16.9	49	56	86	1.04
Uzbeks (4)	9.2	3.8	25	37	84	.71
Belorussians (1)	9.1	3.7	44	46	80	1.01
Tatars	5.9	2.4	55	n.a.	26	n.a.
Kazakhs (4)	5.3	2.2	27	52	80	.88
Azerbaijani (2)	4.4	1.8	40	51	86	.71
Armenians (2)	3.6	1.5	65	61	60	.84
Georgians (2)	3.2	1.2	44	48	97	.87
Moldavians	2.7	1.1	20	33	85	.97
Lithuanians (3)	2.7	1.1	47	53	94	1.02
Jews	2.2	0.9	98	n.a.	no unit	n.a.
Tadzhiks (4)	2.1	0.9	26	38	76	.69
Germans	1.8	0.8	46	n.a.	no unit	n.a.
Turkmen (4)	1.5	0.6	31	48	93	.77
Kirgiz (4)	1.5	0.6	15	38	89	.76
Latvians (3)	1.4	0.6	53	64	94	1.17
Poles (1)	1.2	0.5	45	n.a	no unit	n.a.
Estonians (3)	1.0	0.4	55	66	92	1.14

SOURCE Columns 2–6 based on *Results of the 1970 All-Union Census*, vol. 4 (Moscow: Statistika, 1973). Column 7 adapted from K. Vermishev, "On the Level of Economic Development of the Union Republics," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, no. 4 (Moscow), 1970, p. 128. The coefficient was calculated by the Soviet scholar as the ratio of the republic's share of total USSR gross domestic product in 1965 to the share of the given republic's population in total Soviet population in the same year.

NOTE. The USSR population total was 241.7 million, urbanization—56 percent of the population. The national groups which have union republics are in italics. The Russian republic is known as the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, (RSFSR), because it contains most of the lower type national units,, inclusive of Tatar ASSR. Three more groups number over one million people· the Chuvashi (1.7), the Mordvinians (1.3), and the Bashkirs (1 3). All have autonomous republics within RSFSR. Key: (1) Slavs, (2) Caucasians; (3) Baltics, (4) Central Asians

* Except for the Slavs, the major part of union republics' national groups nonresident in their republic are settled in the neighboring areas

pendent statehood, such as the three Baltic republics, Armenia, and Georgia, the Soviet peoples include the Western Slavs and Moldavians, historically subject to the contending influences, respectively, of Russia and Poland, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, later Romania; the Turkic and Iranian groups of Central Asia, the ancient culture of which was destroyed by the thirteenth-century Mongol invasion and who now are developing separate national identities. The dominant Soviet culture is rooted in the Russian Byzantine heritage, but the non-Russians have retained strong traditional cultural identities of their own. These range from the Scandinavian culture and Lutheranism of Estonia and Latvia and Catholicism of Lithuania, to ancient indigenous traditions and Orthodox Christianity of Georgia and Armenia, Western Orthodoxy

of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia, and Islam of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.

Policy impact and ethnicity

The growth of the ethnic self-assertion of major Soviet national groups that became visible in the sixties and seventies is as much an unexpected by-product of Soviet policies—reinforced by examples of ethnic self-assertion throughout the world—as it is the outcome of traditional ethnic hostilities. Paradoxically, instead of the expected "internationalization," many of the Soviet policies aiming at the transformation of society and the building of socialism have served to stimulate ethnic polarization. Five key policy decisions have had a direct impact on the growth of national self-assertion in the multiethnic Soviet society: the legitimization of the system in class-based internationalist ideology of Marxism-Leninism; the federal state-unitary party dichotomy; the policy of accelerated modernization and economic development; the cultural policy aimed at the development of "national forms" of all the Soviet ethnic groups; and the dynamic post-World War II expansionist foreign policy.

Marxist-Leninist ideology postulates unity based in a common working-class identity (proletarian internationalism), which overrides particular national political loyalties. The latter are expected to disappear once socialism is established, but the process which involves a change in attitudes cannot be achieved overnight. Thus, in the meantime, while the ethnic-based sense of political identity is seen as a vestigial, transitory, and gradually disappearing phenomenon, its continuous existence is legitimate and cannot be denied. The dynamics of relations between the traditional national loyalties and the new Soviet one, are seen to be developing on a "rapprochement-merger" dialectical continuum. This means a process of all the Soviet nations and nationalities "ever growing closer together" (rapprochement), that is achieved through the "flowering" of their own national socialist cultures, the reciprocal "enrichment" of which serves to develop a common base, all of which is supposed to lead to an eventual merger into a one common Soviet identity. The ideological image of class-based integration, however, precludes a return to the Russian national ethos as the basis of Soviet political loyalty. The de facto Russian content of Soviet norms, value systems, and patterns of behavior cannot be legitimately acknowledged, even though a claim is always made that the Russians, as the most "progressive," are the leading nation in the Soviet family of nations. The claim partially offsets the ideological handicap, but it also serves to increase non-Russians' resentment of the Russian hegemony.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's compromise formula of a federal state run by a unitary party (a resolution of an endless debate within the party in the early twenties between assimilationists and the autonomists), has built the country's administrative structure on an ethnic base. A brilliant solution to a seemingly insoluble national problem at the time, in the long run it provided a territorial and economic base for the growth of the ethnic demands and political structures for national interests' aggregation and their articulation at the federal level. The federal administration is Russian-

dominated and in pursuit of their local interests the republican authorities tend to identify with their national constituency. The old ethnic conflict has been reinforced by the new administrative one, especially because in the post-Stalin period the ethnic coloration of the republics' state and party apparatus became increasingly local, although the outsiders (mostly ethnic Russians) continue to occupy strategic power positions there.[6] The conflict is evident not only in the state administration, but also within the theoretically unitary party apparatus.

The modernization policy has transformed and developed the Soviet economy and restructured the society through industrialization, collectivization, urbanization, and the development of mass education and communications systems and social services, affecting all of the Soviet peoples. All the major ethnic groups now are better off economically, have access to educational and social benefits, and have evolved modern elites that participate in the power structure. But, given differentials in the take-off point, the rates of social mobilization have been uneven, and the relative comparative standing within the country of ethnic groups has not changed. Economic and social development indicators still stand the highest in the Baltic northwest and the European republics in general and the lowest in Central Asian southeast.[7] (See table 1.) The growing perception, by the new ethnic elites, of their relative deprivation and of their second-class political status vis-à-vis the Russians feeds ethnic antagonisms, while improved living standards and growing access to means of social and self-fulfillment by the masses stimulate the familiar rising expectations. Increasingly, the ethnic base is being perceived as the instrument for the gratification of the new ambitions by the elites as well as by their ethnic constituency, forging a new bond between them, and giving a new meaning to the traditional sense of ethnic identity and national loyalties.

Modernization also has had differential impact on the dynamics of demographic change. The Russians, and other more developed national groups, have shown a decline (in the last intercensal period, 1959–70) in natural growth rates, while the high fertility rates of the least developed groups, in Central Asia primarily, but also in the Caucasus, are among the highest in the world, the result of cultural (Islam) as much as of social development factors. The shift in the demographic pattern has already had political and economic implications. The Russians' weight in the population at large and in the population of the eastern and southern republics has declined. The depopulation of rural areas of European Russia is reaching crisis proportions and the shortage of labor, particularly skilled labor, is felt in the more developed republics and in the Eastern Siberia–

6. In the forties and fifties there was a pattern in personnel placement in national republics, top positions in party and government bodies were reserved for local nationals, the second-in-command positions, for federal representatives, mostly Russians. See Seweryn Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1964, pp. 45–52, Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," ibid., September–October 1967, pp. 16–26; and this author's *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia The Case of Tadzhikistan* (Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), ch. 4.

7. See Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, Frederic Harned, eds., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York. The Free Press, 1975), appendix, pp. 452–58, and 462–64.

Far Eastern region of the RSFSR, where the Soviet economic and strategic build-up has focused in the seventies. At the same time a major pool of unskilled rural-based manpower is building up in Central Asia. Attempts at a resolution of impending manpower crisis may have far-reaching political effects. Cultural factors militate against a natural flow of economic migration (the Muslims of Central Asia do not want to leave their area), while overall political, economic, and strategic considerations make a massive long-range investment to build up manufacturing industries utilizing local manpower in the southeastern regions unlikely.

In the implementation of the national form-socialist content dualism, the Soviet cultural policy aimed at developing the national cultures of the major ethnic groups which would become vehicles for the dissemination of Socialist culture, common to all. National languages were developed and modernized, and a system of mass education was provided in local languages. In some cases this involved the formation of virtually new languages on the basis of regional dialects—as in the case of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia—and written and oral culture forms and fine arts, based in traditional patterns, were revived or developed. The overall thrust of ideological socialization, however, was marked, for all practical purposes by cultural Russification. The study of the Russian language, the common Soviet language and the "language of civilization" has been promoted vigorously; linguistic modernization of national languages took the road of incorporation of Russian-derived vocabulary and grammatical forms and introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet, except in the case of established historical languages; Russian cultural forms have been held as models to be emulated by other groups.

The policy has been extremely successful, but not in a way desired or expected by its initiators. A virtual renaissance of national cultures took place among all the major non-Russian national groups, a renaissance which has become an integral part of their new national self-assertion and a vehicle for the expression of their newly-formed national pride. Bilingualism spread for functional reasons but not the eventually expected linguistic assimilation into the Russian language. Paradoxically, it was the cultural content rather than form that has been affected by the new ethnic cultural renaissance, resulting in the development of officially approved common Soviet forms, the content of which has been increasingly determined by each groups' traditional ethnic heritage.

After World War II the dynamics of Soviet foreign policy combined a drive for an extension of political influence of the USSR as a great power, with an appeal to internationalism of the working class and all progressive forces abroad. The East European socialist states (established in the wake of Soviet armed invasion in 1945) are members of the Socialist Commonwealth, led by the USSR. Within the world Communist movement, Soviet policy has attempted to reestablish its previously undisputed leadership, lost in the aftermath of the death of J. V. Stalin and the challenge by the Chinese. At the same time, the Soviet Union has come to play an increasingly important role in the Third World, as a leader of all "peace loving" and "anti-imperialist" forces. There are contradictions, however, between an international-

ist foreign policy and domestic national integration, which have contributed to the growth of ethnic self-assertion within the Soviet Union as minority groups became aware of examples of successful national self-assertion within the Communist movement and in the Third World.

Theoretically, relations of the states within the Communist bloc and the Communist international movement in general have been governed by the same principle of proletarian internationalism that applies in domestic national relations. In this context, the relative sovereignty enjoyed by the East Europeans provides a tempting example to Soviet ethnic groups and a model to strive for in their search for greater national autonomy within the system. The temptation has been enhanced in the seventies by Soviet efforts at greater integration of the bloc, with its emphasis on the identical nature of "fraternal ties" on both sides of the border[8] as well as a start of direct exchanges between the republics and East European states. In relations with the non-ruling parties, particularly since the birth of "Eurocommunism," the Soviet Union has had to make concessions to polycentrism, including recognition of other parties' right to their own "road to socialism." Ideological concessions lend legitimacy to the republics' quest for greater autonomy, and East European nationalism tends to be contagious.

Finally, in relations with Third World countries, the avowed Soviet support for national self-determination has not passed unnoticed at home, especially because the republics, particularly the Asian ones, are an important asset in foreign policy as models of Soviet-type development as well as justification for the claim that the Soviet Union is an Asian as well as European power. The impact of Third World contacts is particularly important because of numerous exchanges between them and the republics. Members of non-Russian minorities, who feature prominently in Soviet foreign delegations, can thus gain a first-hand knowledge of conditions abroad and can compare their own viability as independent entities (in terms of economic base, infrastructure, educated elites, and so on) with newly independent Third World countries.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE "RULES OF THE GAME"

Dimensions

In party and state relations in the USSR, ethnicity has become the main base for interest group demands, a phenomenon familiar to the students of ethnic relations worldwide.[9] In the absence of institutionalized channels for interest articulation, the republics are the focus for the aggregation of local interests in all spheres of social life; when articulated by local spokesmen, these invariably acquire ethnic overtones. The spokesmen are the new ethnic elites. Fully "socialized" for functional purposes, including fluency in the Russian language and ideological medium, these elites are members of the establishment in their republics—some move up also

8. See this author's "Socialist Internationalism in Eastern Europe—A New Stage," *Survey*, vol. 98, no. 1, (Winter 1976), pp. 38–54.

9 See Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 7.

to the federal level—but, invariably, their position and power is circumscribed by the presence of the ubiquitous Russians. It is the Russian "fact," probably more than any other single factor, that has been the catalyst in the ethnic self-assertion of the national elites, especially because Russian nationalism also has been on the rise. Since they are partners in the system, the thrust of it is not directed at the systemic status quo but only at the constraints imposed within by Russian hegemony. The aim of ethnic self-assertion of the elites is the maximization of autonomy that is formally theirs constitutionally and the realization of the self-determination principle enshrined in the ideology; if an idea of separatism enters the equation, it is not openly articulated. Ethnic demands are uttered in the systemic double talk familiar to all and concern matters that affect local interests. In a system as highly centralized as that of the Soviet Union, a greater share in decision making at the federal level is of great concern, as is a devolution of power from the federal to the republican level, formally or through personal "pull" upstairs.

The elites' relationship with the Russians is ambiguous; the majority now in the republics' authorities, they resent controls imposed by outsiders and attempt to by-pass and counteract them—frequently with considerable success. At the same time, the relationship is close and collaboration in defense of local interests as seen from an administrator's viewpoint, is not uncommon. Those who made it in the federal service may serve as spokesmen for ethnic interests in Moscow, if representing their own republic; otherwise, they tend to merge into the prevalent Russian coloration. Those serving in other national areas frequently champion federal interests more assiduously than do the ethnic Russians.

The elites' ties with their national constituency are also ambiguous. There is a sense of common interests that seems to be growing vis-à-vis the "they" in Moscow and cultural ties which, by all accounts, appear to be stronger than in comparable situations elsewhere. In the Central Asian republics, for example, there is evidence that most members of local elites have emerged directly from a rural background. At the same time, however, in their daily work the elites act as agents of the central authorities enforcing policies which make them unpopular with the populace.

In the past there was relatively little contact between the various ethnic elites, except within the federal administration. This has been changing, however, under the impact of the "rapprochement" policy adopted since 1961. Contacts are now frequent, especially on a regional basis, but there is no evidence of an incipient common front, except in the case of Central Asian Muslims. Foreign contacts, as pointed out above, are also more frequent. Those with Eastern Europe and the developing countries have been important for the diffusion of new ideas and undoubtedly exposed Soviet ethnic elites to the virus of nationalism.

Legitimization

Ethnic self-assertion in the Soviet Union seeks legitimacy in two sources: the constitutional-legal framework and ideological principles. The USSR Constitution gives the republics the right to conduct their own foreign relations and to have their own military establishments; the first was never genuinely

exercised, the latter was precluded de facto by the 1938 military reform.[10] It also gives the formal right to secede, which has had no value in reality. The enumerated federal powers are all-embracing, leaving little residuary authority to republics. Even so, there are numerous minor provisions formally involving the republics—such as republican legislative bodies' approval of federal decrees or of local boundary changes. The genuine exercise of these provisions is one of the targets of the elites. The subject of secession has not been raised formally, but two Kirgiz scholars, have discussed their republic's right to do so in legal terms.

The focus of the demands for self-assertion is in the ideological sphere. The revival of Leninism as the ruling myth has provided an opening for the ethnic spokesmen to resurrect Lenin's views on the national self-determination principle and on national equality under the federal formula. Numerous treatises have appeared on the subject, most couched in impeccable ideological terms, some explicit in their resentment of Russian hegemony.[11] There is also much discussion of old Leninist policy of autonomization of political cadres (*Korenizatsia*), abandoned under Stalin, as an example to be emulated. The current policy of rapprochement is also used by ethnic spokesmen in support of their demands, by way of emphasizing the "flowering" part of the formula, which presupposes full development of particular ethnic cultures. The current line vis-à-vis Eastern Europe and the CPSU dispute with Eurocommunism are watched carefully for changes of wording in current slogans which may provide an opening in the battle for greater autonomy. In general, ethnic spokesmen are at pains to differentiate between their own brand of socialist ethnicity, which is "progressive," and the capitalist one (bourgeois nationalism) which is vigorously condemned. This does not necessarily protect them from being eventually criticized, by federal authorities, as bourgeois nationalists or from being purged.

Political dynamics

In the political arena, ethnic demands center less on the exercise of formal constitutional powers—although these are desirable—and more on the exercise of the real power within the party structure, focusing particularly on access to decision making and on control of cadres (personnel) policy. In this quest, ethnic leaders increasingly court the support of their ethnic constituency; this is sought among local bureaucracies, but also among the populace, particularly on issues related to national culture. Pressures for greater share in decision making are centered in the republics but extend also to the federal arena. This shows in more open articulation of economic and cultural demands. Control of appointments—traditionally a preserve of the party[12] with selections made at

10 Prior to 1938 some units were formed on ethnic basis, but the reform instituted ethnically-mixed, Russian-language units. Some ethnic units were formed during World War II on an ad hoc basis.

11. Of the latter, the best known in the West is a monograph by a Ukrainian journalist, Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), written for and circulated in the Ukrainian party organization, which was later published in the West. Dzyuba has been imprisoned and has since recanted

12 The party's control of the appointments, the so-called *nomenklatura*, extends

a level higher than the appointments—is a political and highly sensitive matter. Here demands for greater autonomization and a reduction of outsiders in politically important positions are stated obliquely, a battle punctuated by recurrent purges of too outspoken or too ambitious ethnic leaders.

The extent of political changes brought about by ethnic pressures may be observed by comparing the current with the pre-1956 situation, even though qualitatively they are small and far below the level of real political autonomy. Outsiders are still, inevitably, occupying the key position of central committee's second secretary (control of cadres) in all republics; but their ratio declined in other key positions in party and state hierarchies. In the meantime ethnic elites' members within have been vigorously promoting local cadres for positions throughout the republics, squeezing out the Russians. Complaints about the latter practice appear sporadically in the press. At the federal level, the republics' first secretaries, invariably of local ethnic origin, are all members of the CPSU Central Committee (the usage that dates back to Stalin's period), but those representing the key republics or regions are also members or candidate members of the ruling Politbureau. The Ukraine contingent has been particularly strong there, because both N. S. Khrushchev and L. I. Brezhnev rose to power from their local base in the Ukraine. In 1976 Central Asia was represented by the Uzbek and Kazakh party first secretaries; Belorussian and Azerbaijani first secretaries were also included. On the state side, heads of the republican state and judicial hierarchies have been ex-officio members of equivalent federal bodies since the sixties. But, although the republican state and party representation at the federal level has improved, they are still a minority in the ruling state and party bodies. Support of the hierarchies of major republics is a significant factor in factional struggles at the top; it diminishes as one of the Politbureau leaders is able to achieve a degree of personal ascendancy. The Byzantine character of Soviet politics emphasizes the importance of personal pull and factional membership for republican leaders, each new "Boss" appoints his men, and the success of this or that republic in having its demands met frequently depends on the quality of its leaderships' contacts at the top. Georgia, for example, has traditionally enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy because the late Joseph Stalin was a Georgian; its degree of autonomy has survived relatively untouched, despite successive purges of ethnic first secretaries there.

Economic demands

In economic relations, the ethnic conflict centers on disputes concerning resource allocation and distribution. Almost every republic would like to maximize its share of investment and to minimize the share of its products allocated to other regions, with total disregard, if one is to believe Soviet sources, of the general interest. The issue is particularly aggravated in the case of economically strongest non-Russian republic, the Ukraine, the leaders of which resent the transfer of

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not only to political jobs but also to all important positions in the economy and in the society in general.

its resources to other regions.[13] It is also crucial in the case of the least developed south-eastern republics, laboring under a handicap of being primarily a resource base for the manufacturing industries of European Russia. They agitate for major long-range capital investment and equalization. Because of the recent population explosion there, they argue now from stronger positions but, so far, unsuccessfully. In general there is evidence of central planners being tired of ethnic-based parochial demands, and arguments appear in economic journals that republics are obsolete for purposes of efficient economic management. Their economic role was left unchallenged, however, in the 1973 reform of economic management, despite streamlining, and no basic changes have appeared in the June 1977 draft of the new constitution. Because of sporadic evidence of heated disputes on the subject, the absence of change indicates the weight of the republics' vested interests in the system. The economic battle also centers around annual and quinquennial plan fulfillment indicators, with habitual doctoring in their favor of statistical results not only by enterprises and federally run industries, but also by republics.

Social relations

The pattern of compact ethnic settlement and the concentration of ethnic population in rural areas has favored the survival of traditional agents of socialization, and there is evidence of a high level of social alienation between the local and immigrant communities in the national areas, which spills over into urban settings despite considerable ethnic intermixture there. Traditional social patterns, values, and modes of behavior are also reinforced by the survival of religion and its close identification with the sense of ethnic identity of most major ethnic groups. Evidence of alienation is seen in patterns of social intercourse between the local and immigrant communities and the low incidence of intermarriage, particularly between the Slavs and Asian groups. Among some groups, social behavior has become an ethnic weapon, as in the case of Central Asian Muslims, whose high fertility rates, conditioned by their relatively low level of modernization, persist also in the urban setting for cultural and political reasons.

At the same time, however, the impact of socioeconomic advancement has greatly increased social mobility of ethnic groups, causing rural exodus to the cities. This, coupled with cultural alienation, has served to intensify ethnic conflict in social relations in an urban setting, where the Russians have been a dominant element. Increasingly, there is competition for jobs not only in the political arena but also in economic-technical and professional spheres—heretofore the domain of the Russians in all but the two northern Baltic republics and, in part, Georgia and Armenia, because of their superior qualifications, but reinforced in all of the republics by political preference in filling sensitive and important positions. Because of the development of autonomization of republican

13. Petro Shelest, the Ukrainian party first secretary, who was purged in 1972, was accused of economic as well as cultural nationalism. His additional problem was that he belonged to a "wrong" Ukrainian faction.

power structures, political preference now works both ways, in favor of local candidates as much as immigrants, depending on who controls the hiring, and at what level—a tug of war which is another source of growing ethnic conflict.

Cultural arena

The evidence of ethnic self-assertion is the most open and intense in the cultural sphere. Cultural conflict is in many ways a substitute for an open political conflict, the appearance of which is muted for systemic reasons. As noted above, all of the republics have had a cultural renaissance (it has been least pronounced in Belorussia and Moldavia). Adherence to national languages exceeds 90 percent among all of the major union republic nations, with the exception of Ukrainians and Belorussians, among whom it is in the 80 percent plus bracket, indicating the degree of emigration from their national areas. In republics where the Russification of ethnic languages has gone the furthest—in the Ukraine and in Central Asia—there is a vigorous language "purification" campaign aimed at substitution of national terms for Russian-derived words and grammatical usages. Local language primary education continues to develop along with Russian-language schools, and there are increasing demands for the introduction of local language instructors in technical and professional secondary and higher educational establishments, where it is now conducted primarily in the Russian language. Numbers and circulation of local language newspapers and periodicals and monographs have been increasing, with some republics acting as regional pacesetters. In the literature and fine arts, there has been a revival of tradition, themes, symbolism, and imager and a marked absence of theme dealing with the current sociali reality and internationalism as doc umented by official criticism. I historiography a battle is raging between the binding official line that consigns most traditional heroes and events (especially those that testify to past resistance to Russian encroachments) to a reactionary category, and local historians attempt a more objective interpretation based on the research in local archives. Dispute over the interpretation of national history has been most pronounced in the Ukraine, the Caucasian republics, and Central Asia. The significant aspect of the ethnic conflict as revealed in the cultural sphere has been an apparent support for cultural self-assertion by the republican party authorities, the approval of which is necessary for anything that appears in print or in any public form. Official criticism, when it comes, is usually generated in Moscow and appears a considerable time after the event in question has taken place.[14]

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

It is clear that under the impact of ongoing change the dual "national in form—socialist in content" framework of the Soviet state has been gradually losing its functionality in the area it was meant to resolve,

14. Considerable literature exists in the English language on Soviet ethnicity and on ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union. For most comprehensive recent coverage, see Katz, Rogers, Hamed, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, and George W. Simmonds, ed., *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit, Mich., The University of Detroit Press, 1977).

namely, that of ethnic relations. Instead of an expected unionwide integration, it has stimulated the forces of ethnicity, the containment of which is proving increasingly difficult. The process has advanced at differential rates among the several major ethnic groups: currently it is most pronounced in the Ukraine and in the Baltic republics, with Georgia and Armenia not far behind, but there are signs that in a relatively short time Central Asia may well move into the forefront of ethnic turmoil. Many aspects of ethnic self-assertion in the Soviet Union are directly comparable to those in other multiethnic areas, and its eventual outcome may be the same as in other societies, where the conflict has been more open and further advanced.

The policy dilemma for the Soviet leadership is evident from its almost complete immobility on the issue, as seen in the pursuance of past policies, punctuated by half-hearted repressions. Soviet leaders find themselves in a position when even small concessions may open the floodgates of a major change, and continue therefore to maintain a hope that eventually the ideologically-predicted integration will take place after all—a hope that, in view of similar experience elsewhere, appears illusory. Forces for ethnic change now push for the evolution of the system. Should this be denied, however, as seems likely in the face of the current leadership's resistance to it, the resulting pressures may eventually lead to an explosion. Latent separatism may also come to the fore in case of a major international upheaval.

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Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia

By GARY K. BERTSCH

ABSTRACT: The multi-ethnic composition of contemporary Yugoslavia grows out of the diverse and complex history of this South Slavic region. Attempting to avoid the interwar Royalist government's policies which exacerbated ethnic differences, the post-World War II socialist leaders established a genuine federation which provided considerable autonomy to the ethnic groups inhabiting the different republics and provinces. Although initially supporting a movement toward "Yugoslavism" and the dissolution of ethnic, religious, and cultural differences, the Yugoslav leaders have more recently emphasized decentralization in political and economic affairs. The guiding principle is that a united community of Yugoslav peoples can best be ensured through governmental respect for ethnic diversity. The political structure, ethnic representation within the government, army, and League of Communists, and the policies of the federal government reflect this guiding principle.

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YUGOSLAVIA is a genuine federal state providing a great deal of regional autonomy to its member nationalities and ethnic groups. In order to deal with its multi-ethnic condition and all the attendant inter-ethnic difficulties experienced before World War II, the new post-war Communist leaders created a federal governmental structure which copied the one earlier adopted in the Soviet Union. However, while the Soviet state tended to be federal in form only, the Yugoslavs attempted to make federal government and "self-managing socialism" a reality.[1]

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Within the postwar Yugoslav federation, each of the major Slavic groups (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians) was granted a republic within which its language and culture would predominate. An additional republic, Bosnia-Hercegovina, was established for the diverse Serb, Croat, and Slavic Moslem inhabitants of this mountainous inland region. Finally, two autonomous provinces were created for the largest non-Slavic minorities, the Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Albanians in Kosovo.

This regional structure, representing the federal political formula of the new state, was set out in Article 1 of the original Yugoslav Constitution:

> The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state.

The phrase "a community of peoples" in this article pointed up the special problem confronting the new Yugoslav state—namely, how to build an integrated political community from a mosaic of diverse and often conflicting peoples, all of whom possessed distinct cultural traditions and separate national identities. At the same time, the article expressed the hope and ideal of a brighter South Slavic future in envisioning a wider community of peoples based upon equal rights, including—at least theoretically—the ultimate right of separation.

The Titoist regime's initial community-building strategy was founded upon the idea of "Yugoslavism," a concept which tended to promote a policy of political and economic centralization.[2] During this temporary stage, which the Yugoslavs refer to as the "administrative phase" of development, manifestations of ethnocentrism—or nationalism in the multinational environment—were by and large repressed in the quest for a unified society. Under the Yugoslavism approach, the party leadership envisioned the rapid development of a higher-order, South Slavic identity and a sense of "Yugoslav nationhood," along with the consolidation of the anti-fascist, socialist state. The rationale underlying this strategy was that a new, supranational identity would evolve along with the dissolution of more

1 For a fine overview of the postwar developments, see: Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). For special emphasis on the federal structure and self-management, see: Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976).

2. For an excellent analysis of the nationalities policies of the Titoist regime, including the various changes over the years, see Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

traditional (that is, ethnic, religious, cultural) and anti-socialist sentiments.

Through the 1950s and early 1960s, the Yugoslav leaders attempted to strike a delicate balance between unity and diversity, or centralism and federalism. While working toward the ideal of Yugoslav unity, they were cautious not to exhibit undue disrespect for the ethnonational units of which the multinational state was comprised. But because of the necessities of postwar development and a variety of external events of major import (for example, the battle over control of Trieste, the Cominform expulsion), *the Titoist building strategy* tended *toward centralism*, with the League of Communists (called the Communist Party of Yugoslavia until 1952) firmly in command.

By the middle 1960s, however, the idea of Yugoslavism and the more centralistic policy it implied were almost entirely discredited. It became increasingly apparent to the leadership that the former ethnic attachments to national cultures, traditions, and interests were not to be easily dissolved into the more abstract notion of a higher-order, Yugoslav identity. To some national groups, the centralist policy smacked of assimilation and constituted an overt threat to their own identities and cultures. In addition, most of the non-Serb groups tended to associate the more centralistic strategy with the idea of a Greater Serbia. Hence, the policy of Yugoslavism was perceived by most groups as a threat, and it therefore often seemed to intensify rather than to attenuate ethnic differences.

During the 1946–65 period, then, a variety of forces were undermining the centralistic Yugoslavism strategy. Perhaps the most significant was the reform policy of political and eco*nomic decentralization that allocated increasing power to the republics* and lower-level political units. As *one* might anticipate, the centralism emphasized under the older policy and the decentralization of the new reforms proved contradictory, and by the early 1960s the former policy and any mention of Yugoslavism began to fade. In contrast to the more centralized approach of the earlier strategy, the guidelines of the new phase seemed to be the "four Ds" of contemporary Yugoslav development: decentralization, deetatization, depoliticization, and democratization. The resultant policy placed greater importance on ethnonational (that is, regional) autonomy and the decentralization of decision-making power.

The reform movement picked up steam through the late 1960s as indicated in the far-reaching set of constitutional amendments approved by the Federal Assembly on June 30, 1971.[3] According to many observers, these constitutional changes would, in effect, make the republics the key units of government and thus bring the Yugoslav political system close to a confederation. Although subsequent nationalist uprisings in the late 1960s and early 1970s rendered both implementation and interpretation of the amendment somewhat difficult, their major purpose was to delimit further the functions and responsibilities of the central government, while simultaneously expanding those of the regional and local authorities under the Yugoslav ideology of self-man-

3. See discussion of the amendment in Paul Shoup, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 21 (January–February 1972), pp. 25–7; and R. V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1971), pp. 31–9.

ging socialism. With the new constitutional changes, in short, the system seemed to be entering its third structural phase of development—from unitary (1946–65) to federal (1966–71) to confederal (1972–).

Under the amendments, the republics were to gain the power to control the central government through a variety of constitutional guarantees, including the right to make appointments to leading governmental bodies at the federation level; however, the degree of uncertainty concerning implementation of the amendments was high, and it was further heightened by what Tito and the "hardliners" perceived in 1971 as "nationalist deviations" within certain sectors of the populace and, more significant, within high organs of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Tito's response to the "national excesses" was to force the resignation and replacement of the highest-level Croatian leaders (among them Miko Tripalo, secretary of the Croatian League of Communists, and Savka Dabcevic Kucar, president of the Croatian Central Committee) in December 1971.

What was initially viewed in some quarters as an anti-Croat campaign soon developed into a broader shakeup of the republic-level party leaderships. During 1972, the LCY leadership structure throughout the country underwent a major reshuffling, marked by the forced resignations of such highly placed leaders as Marko Nikezic and Latinka Perovic, president and secretary of the Serbian Central Committee, respectively. For the first time since the war, central party leaders (including Tito) began to speak of a national crisis threatening the unity of socialist Yugoslavia. The initial LCY response to the dangerous national situation blossomed into a wider political movement against the "enemies" of Yugoslav socialism—"etatistic bureaucratism, technocratism, nationalism, and all anti-self-managing and anti-socialist tendencies."[4] Its main feature was an assault by Tito and the "hardliners" (notably Stane Dolance, Jure Bilic, and others) on what they considered to be revival of an unhealthy level of nationalism and ethno-centrism in some sectors of the society, particularly among high-ranking LCY officials in some of the constituent republics.

The serious concern accorded the national situation was evident from the attention that the Yugoslav Party Presidium devoted to it in 1972. For example, at the 34th Session of the Presidium held July 11 and 12 on the island of Brioni, five members of the Presidium (Todo Kurtovic, Edvard Kardelj, Latinka Perovic, Milka Planinc, and Veljko Vlahovic) lashed out at nationalistic tendencies of two major kinds. Their identification of two types was noteworthy in that it involved condemnation of the notion of unitarism as well as the idea of separatism. The former, which had always been associated primarily with the Serbs and the policy of Yugoslavism, had not been subject to open attack in the past. Criticisms of "excesses" had previously been directed exclusively at the separatist variety, which had been most closely linked with Croatian nationalism. The lumping together of the two varieties was at least in part intended to counter feelings that the central party leadership was carrying on an anti-Croat campaign.

Overall, the party's strategy was

4 *Borba* (Belgrade), 28 June 1972.

to break the power of the strong regional party organizations in the interests of greater unity and (re)-centralization within the LCY structure. In the view of the central leadership, the excesses of decentralization and the concomitant revival of nationalism required a reassertion of anti-nationalist and pro-Yugoslav forces. Such forces were to be found in the revitalized ranks of the LCY.

The reassertion of ideological control and new rules of federal politics within the one-party Yugoslav state were given new expression in 1974. First, in February of that year the Federal Assembly adopted a new constitution unique not only in nature of state, republic, and local intergovernmental relations, but also in the fact that it is a mammoth document and is longer and more detailed than any other written constitution in political history. Surprisingly, perhaps, the new constitution gives the six republics and two provinces virtually complete political jurisdiction within their own territories and reserves only the matters of defense, foreign affairs, banking, and federal economic matters to the central government. In the latter area concerning economic affairs, the new constitution provides that federal laws may not be made without the consent of the republics and provinces. At the very least, the new constitution makes the republics and provinces active participants in the formulation and implementation of federal policies.

The second major event in 1974 giving expression to the new political setting was the Tenth Congress of the LCY held on May 27–30 in Belgrade. Perhaps the major outcome of the Congress was a reaffirmation of a leading party (LCY) role within the Yugoslav federation. After having flirted with the fragmentation and possible disintegration that resulted from experimentation with a less centralized one-party system in the late 1960s,[5] the Yugoslav leaders used the Tenth Congress to affirm that the decentralized form of self-managing socialism could be best charted and coordinated by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. This affirmation meant a more active political role for the central organs of the LCY, a situation which has often come in conflict with continuing desires for ethnic autonomy.

The overall political setting established in 1974, then, was defined by a high level of federalism which took Yugoslavia close to the status of a confederation. At the same time, this governmental decentralization was balanced by a much higher level of ideological unity which was to be provided through the revitalized role of the LCY.

PATTERNS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

The often cited cliché is worn but still true: Yugoslavia is a country with six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one Yugoslav—Tito. Created from the ashes of World War I, and refounded with the national liberation led by Tito and the Communist Partisans in World War II, Yugoslavia is still a country

5. During the democratization and decentralization movement of the 1960s, party leaders spoke of "removing" the LCY from power. While the League certainly did not disappear, it assumed a much lower profile in the political arena. Interestingly, the power relinquished by the central LCY organs during this period was quickly assumed by the regional party organizations (Croatian, Serbian, and so forth) and ultimately led to a high-level or regional conflict pitting one party organization against another.

TABLE 1

YUGOSLAV NATIONALITIES BY REPUBLICS, 1971*

	YUGO-SLAVIA (%)	BOSNIA & HERCE-GOVINA (%)	MONTE-NEGRO (%)	CROATIA (%)	MACE-DONIA (%)	SLOVENIA (%)	SERBIA† (%)
Serbs	39 7	37.2	7.5	14.2	3.0	1.2	71.2
Croats	22.1	20.6	1.7	79.4	.3	2.5	2.2
Moslems	8.4	39 6	13.3	.4	.1	.2	1.8
Slovenes	8.2	.1	.1	.7	.1	94.0	.2
Albanians	6.4	.1	6.7	.1	18.1	.1	11.7
Macedonians	5.8	—	.1	.1	73.8	.1	.5
Montenegrins	2.5	—	67.2	.2	.2	.1	1.5
Others	6.9	2.4	3.4	4.9	4.4	1.8	9.9

SOURCE. *Politika* (Belgrade), 3 January 1973.
* Date of last national census.
† The figures for Serbia include the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo found within her boundaries

characterized by extreme differentiation among its people.

Ethno-cultural differences

Due to early patterns of migration and the historical forces of religious and ethnic development, the territory known today as Yugoslavia came to be an area of great ethno-cultural diversity. Perhaps the major dimension of differentiation in the South Slavic context is nationality,[6] a trait with which so many other ethno-cultural attributes, such as religion and language, correspond. According to the last census (1971), there were around 40 percent Serbs, 22 percent Croats, 8 percent Slovenes, 8 percent Bosnian Moslems (considered as a separate ethnic group), 6 percent Macedonians, 6 percent Albanians, 2 percent Montenegrins, and 2 percent Hungarians among the 21.3 million inhabitants (See table 1). While most of these groups tend to be concentrated within their constituent republics (for example, the Slovenes in Slovenia, Croats in Croatia, and so forth), there is still considerable ethnic overlap into other regions. The republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, for example, is inhabited by sizable sectors of Serbs, Croats, and Moslems, in addition to a sprinkling of many other ethnic minorities.

Religion, language, and other ethno-cultural traits correspond closely with nationality in the Yugoslav context. The northern republics, Slovenia and Croatia, are predominately Catholic and have generally modern, Westernized populations which exhibit the cultural influences they received under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although these two nationalities both use the Latin alphabet in their languages, the spoken and written word of Slovenian and Croatian are clearly distinct and require considerable training before proficiency is developed in the other's language.

When proceeding south across the Yugoslav land area, which is about two-thirds the size of California, one encounters more Easternized Moslem and Orthodox populations.

6. The terms nationality and ethnicity, national group and ethnic group, and so forth are used interchangeably in this essay.

Influenced by the Eastern church as well as by the subsequent centuries of Turkish administration, the Serbs, Bosnians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, and minorities exhibit ethno-cultural traits of considerable contrast from one another as well as from the Slovenes and Croats in the North. The religious affiliations of the Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins are predominately Eastern Orthodox, while the Bosnians reflect the effects of Turkish religious assimilation and are largely Moslem. With the exception of the Albanians, the southernmost groups use the Cyrillic alphabet, although the Macedonians have their own separate language that divides them from the Montenegrins and Serbs. The Albanians are a distinct non-Slavic nationality and share the language and most other ethno-cultural traits with their common stock across the Albanian border.

Political culture

The ethno-cultural differences of the Yugoslav peoples are often reflected in the beliefs and opinions they hold about politics. Through the use of public opinion and survey research, the author found rather different perceptions of politics and preferred public policies among some of the different ethnic groups. While the northern, more economically advanced Slovene and Croatian peoples tend to favor a more decentralized approach to economic development which would leave the individual republics fairly autonomous in the economic sphere, the less advanced groups of the south tend to prefer a more centralized system which would funnel economic profits from the north to the south in order to even the great variability in developmental levels. In an empirical comparison of attitudes concerning this issue, the author found 67 percent of the Slovene sample, 53 percent of the Croat, 46 percent of the Serb, and 35 percent of the Macedonian to favor a "competitive and decentralized" approach to economic development.[7] The differences between the four ethnic groups were statistically significant and corresponded linearly with self-interests and developmental needs of the republics within which the populations resided.

The development of a homogeneous political culture is a pressing need of all fragmented political systems. In order to maximize agreement and minimize political conflict in the heterogeneous Yugoslav setting, the Titoist regime hoped the forces of ideological and social change would mold a new political culture and a more integrated Socialist community. While some movements in the direction of universalism and away from ethnocentrism have been indicated in empirical research, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Yugoslavia is still and will continue to be a state characterized by diverse and often conflicting political cultures.[8]

Socioeconomic differences

Perhaps the primary source of political conflict in Yugoslavia today results from regional and, hence, ethnic inequalities in the goods and services produced and consumed by

7. For a fuller description of this research see Gary K. Bertsch and M. George Zaninovich, "A Factor-Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 6 (January 1974), pp. 219–44.

8. Gary K. Bertsch, *Values and Community in Multi-National Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1976).

the different peoples. The differences are basically ones resulting from a relatively advanced and prosperous north as compared to an economically backward and struggling south. Although the Yugoslav leaders have always contended that these differences must be lessened in the construction of socialism and communism, the gaps have in fact widened over the three decades of Yugoslav socialism. Much higher efficiency coefficients are reflected in the north, particularly in Slovenia, than in the less developed south. While the per capita gross material product was around $1,500 in Slovenia in the early 1970s, it was only a third of that in Macedonia and Montenegro and a sixth of the Slovenian level in the predominately Albanian province of Kosovo.

Considerable controversy surrounds governmental policies designed to reduce regional inequalities and further country-wide economic growth. While the leaders from the northern republics tend to emphasize and prefer the achievement of optimal national growth and profit which means higher investment and growth in the more productive north, those of the south speak in favor of the achievement of inter-regional equality which means governmental subsidies to and higher investment in the southern regions. These conflicting policy alternatives have continued to divide the Yugoslav peoples and confound government planners who would like to achieve both optimal growth and inter-regional equality.

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE

In dealing with the heterogeneous ethnic and reinforcing socioeconomic conditions and the resultant high propensity for interethnic conflict, the Titoist leaders have pursued a strategy uncharacteristic of most other Communist states. Generally speaking, the Yugoslav leaders have attempted to establish a political system in which governmental respect for ethnic autonomy and representation would encourage the support and confidence of all constituent groups. While the general strategy was outlined at the outset, some particular features deserve close consideration here.

Political structure

In addition to the decentralized federal structure which provides the six republics and two provinces considerable policy-making rights and responsibilities, the Yugoslav leaders have established many other institutions which reflect and respect the multi-ethnic character of the country. Perhaps the most innovative, and also potentially the most dangerous, is the nine-member collective State Presidency which includes representatives from each of the republics and provinces and from the LCY. After considering the idea of a single heir to his leadership through the 1960s, Tito rejected that succession strategy in favor of establishing a collective body. With no single successor who stands above the ethnic divisions and commands the support of all ethnic sectors of the country as Tito has done so effectively, the new State Presidency is designed to allow the participation of the various groups within a representative body. While Tito's initial recommendation for the collective Presidency in 1971 called for a 23-member body drawing three representatives from the republics, two from the provinces, and one from the LCY, the smaller nine-member body outlined in the

1974 Constitution has a better chance at being an effective decision-making body.[9] Whether or not it can resolve some of the major policy disagreements dividing the republics and provinces will have to await Tito's passing. Until then, the Constitution has provided Tito the special status of representative from the LCY and president of the State Presidency for life.

The Federal Assembly is another important body giving political expression and power to Yugoslav ethnic groups. Unlike the rubber-stamp assemblies of most other Communist party states, the Yugoslav Assembly is an active and relatively independent policy-making body within the Yugoslav government. Comprised of two houses, the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, and the Federal Chamber, the Assembly is designed to give equal representation to all republics and provinces. Unlike the U.S. Congress, both chambers draw the same number of delegates from all republics and provinces irrespective of population size or wealth. On the basis of considerable evidence, it is acknowledged that the Federal Assembly is an arena of considerable debate and conflict concerning the proper course of Yugoslav development.

The chief administrative organ of government, the Federal Executive Council, also corresponds with the multi-ethnic composition of the country. Elected by the Assembly in conformity with a principle of equal representation among the republics and provinces, the Council assures ethnic parity in the implementation of policy. Accordingly, all three arms of the Yugoslav government—the State Presidency, National Assembly, and Federal Executive Council—are designed to correspond with the multi-ethnic composition of the country.

Within this decentralized political setting, the task of integration and guaranteeing unity falls to the LCY. After the period of LCY decentralization running through the late 1960s, which resulted in a de facto multiparty system (that is, Croatian, Serbian, Leagues of Communists, and so on), the leadership decided that it would have to take a more active centralizing role. As we will see below, this leadership element was not an arm of any dominant group, such as the Serbian, but rather a broadly representative sample of the entire spectrum of ethnic groups within the Yugoslav federation.

Ethnic representation in government, party, and army

One of the great problems that bedeviled the government of interwar Yugoslavia was Serbian domination of the official posts of the state. The new Socialist government knew that it would have to divide the posts more equitably if it were to deal with the ethnic situation fairly and effectively. Representation on the leading governmental bodies discussed above—State Presidency, Federal Assembly, and Federal Executive Council—provides ethnic parity to the major national and ethnic groups residing in the country. Indeed, Yugoslavia's top political organs may more perfectly reflect its ethnic divisions than any other government in the contemporary world.

When examining the figures in table 2, for example, the distribution

9. As outlined in article 321 of the Constitution, the Presidency is composed of nine members, eight elected by secret ballot from the assemblies of each republic and province, and the final member being the president of the LCY.

TABLE 2

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF LEADERS IN FEDERAL ORGANS OF ADMINISTRATION (FOA), LCY MEMBERSHIP, AND YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY (YPA) HIGH COMMAND

	1971 POPULATION (%)	1969 FOA LEADERS (%)	1971 LCY MEMBERS (%)	1971 YPA HIGH COMMAND (%)
Serbs	39.7	39.4	49.4	33.0
Croats	22.0	19.1	17.4	38.0
Moslems	8.4	5.1	4.6	4.1
Slovenes	8.3	10.0	6.3	8.3
Albanians	6.4	0.8	3.4	—
Macedonians	5.6	7.8	6.2	8.3
Montenegrins	2.5	15.1	6.3	8.3
Hungarians	2.5	0.2	1.1	—
Others	4.3	2.5	5.3	—

SOURCE: Adapted from Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution* (New Haven, Conn.. Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 111, 114, 121.

of posts within the federal organs of the administration (FOA) indicates a surprisingly close correspondence with the composition of the population at the last national census. With the federal capital (Belgrade) in Serbia, there has always been the fear among other ethnic groups, particularly the Croats, that federal posts will tend to be dominated by the home population, if for no other reason than that of administrative convenience. While the government's policy of a representative distribution of posts has been exceedingly successful at the higher levels, the farther one moves down the administrative hierarchy, the more the representation deviates from the national distribution. While 39.4 percent of the leadership posts in the federal administrative apparatus are held by Serbs, a figure that matches the Serbs' national representation almost identically, 66.6 percent of all positions in the federal organs of administration are held by Serbs. This is unfortunate, perhaps, but an unavoidable result of locating the federal capital in an area inhabited by one primary ethnic group. Some critics of Serb over-representation in the bureaucracy have recommended moving the capital to Sarajevo, a city that more nearly corresponds with the ethnic composition of the federation. While the proposal has certain benefits in terms of the ethnic situation, the exorbitant costs of relocating the federal capital make it out of the question.

Another indicator of ethnic representation in social and political affairs is membership in the LCY. While considerable concern has been accorded the issue within some of the republics—for example, the over-representation of Serbs within the Croatian League of Communists has been a contentious issue over the years[10]—country-wide membership figures indicate a close correspondence with the overall population breakdown. If the League is to be the unifying force its leaders would prefer, it is absolutely necessary that it be a representative institution. From the lowest territorial units to

10. Denitch notes, for example, that in 1968, 26 percent of the members within the League in Croatia were Serbs although Serbs comprised only 15 percent of the population in the Croatian republic. Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution*, p. 120.

the highest organs, the LCY is a model of ethnic representation.

The question of ethnicity in the Yugoslav military has been a contentious issue in both interwar and postwar Yugoslavia. Before World War II, the military establishment was clearly dominated by the Serbs, resulting in the exclusion of the Croats, Slovenes, and others. This was true at both the level of the officers corp and among the rank and file soldiers. The figures presented in table 2 indicate that at the level of high command within the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) today, the over-representation of Serbs has ceased. While a few groups including the Serbs are now under-represented, the group that has been most critical of Serb dominance in sociopolitical and military affairs, the Croats, is clearly over-represented. The under-representation of the Serbs in the high command is more than balanced, however, by their over-representation in terms of all YPA generals (46 percent) and officers (60.5 percent).

The overall picture of ethnic representation within the contemporary Yugoslav political system is a very impressive one and might serve as a model for other multi-ethnic states. While there have been certain costs accompanying the policy, such as staffing high-level political or military bodies with minorities who otherwise may not possess the necessary qualifications, the benefits have clearly outweighed the costs.

Governmental policy

The federated political system and the structure of ethnic representation within it have had considerable impact upon governmental policy. The common stereotype of an all-powerful central party dictatorship determining policy that the constituent republics must meekly accept is grossly uncharacteristic of the Yugoslav system. On the contrary, the policy process is a competitive struggle among changing ethnic coalitions that on some issues include one set of republics and provinces, and on other issues, another set. True, the LCY has come to play a more active role as arbiter and has sometimes taken a dominant, commanding role in this competitive struggle; however, since its organization is marked by the same ethnic divisions as is the broader federation, its membership too is susceptible to approaching policy issues from the perspective of ethnic self-interests.

The major policy issue confronting the country concerns the question of economic development and the optimal distribution and sharing of resources within the federation. Simply stated, the question is one of welfare versus efficiency. Placing greater emphasis on efficiency, the 1965 economic reforms provided enterprises and republics considerable freedom to invest profits in what they considered to be the most productive manner. Since profits were substantially lower in the southern regions, the Yugoslav leaders recognized that aid of some sort would still have to be provided to assist the welfare of the less-developed south. The general policy has been the use of a credit fund which transfers a certain percentage of profits from the more developed to the less developed regions. As one might expect, most leaders in Slovenia and Croatia have consistently opposed this policy of supporting social services and development in the less developed areas while those from the south (in particular, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montene-

gro) have supported it. The Croats and Slovenes point to excessive waste in the south and the fact that efficiency and profitability are substantially greater in the north. Leaders from the southern regions, on the other hand, draw attention to the structure of investments, the price system, and other special difficulties that make it so very difficult for these areas to initiate economic development. While the debate goes on, the high population growth, severe unemployment, and general economic difficulties in the south border on crisis proportions. Due to the special political setting in the country, the leaders have been unable to act in anything but a piecemeal fashion. Whether or not the resultant incremental policies are sufficient to simultaneously meet the ethnic desires and needs of the regions while contributing to overall economic growth and stability remains an open question.[11]

CONCLUSION

The multi-ethnic condition in Yugoslavia, with its various and often overlapping, reinforcing dimensions, continues to plague the Socialist leaders as they attempt to mold an integrated political community. Essentially, the problem confronts the leaders with two important and in some respects conflicting concerns. First, the leaders recognize the need to provide a high degree of respect for ethnic interests and regional autonomy. At the same time, however, their ultimate and paramount goal is to promote a united Yugoslav state based upon inter-ethnic exchange and cooperation. In the author's opinion, the Yugoslav leaders have been highly effective in balancing these competing concerns.

The apparent success of the Yugoslavs in this respect contrasts rather markedly with the experience of the system they originally emulated, the Soviet Union, given the fact that both states are nominally systems of federated socialist republics. While the Yugoslav system is clearly a federated state both in practice and in conception, the Soviet Union inclines toward highly centralized, unitary rule. The irony of the contrast is that both remain outspokenly Communist states—yet in one great caution is taken to avoid political dominance by a single nationality, while in the other the Communist leadership uses the predominant nationality (Great Russian) as an instrument of control and stability. In the USSR, a major requisite for Communist rule is the dominance of the Great Russians, while in Yugoslavia, Communist rule is likely to be maintained only if no single nationality is allowed to become too strong. Yet there remains the fact that any multi-ethnic system that takes its regional autonomy seriously, as the Yugoslavs obviously do, must also contend with a certain amount of risk and uncertainty concerning country-wide integration and stability. Although the long-range outcome remains uncertain as Yugoslavia prepares for the post-Tito era, it seems clear that the leaders will attempt to continue to balance demands for regional-ethnic autonomy with the needs of a united state system.

11. For a useful analysis of economic policy and the question of ethnicity, see: Nicholas R. Lang, "The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia," *World Politics*, vol. 27 (April 1975), pp. 309–35.

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Ethnic Relations in China

By JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

ABSTRACT: Due to their strategic location and their occupation of some of China's most valuable lands, the ethnic minorities of the Chinese People's Republic have occupied the attention of the central government to a far greater degree than would be expected from their relatively insignificant 6 percent of the CPR's total population. The Chinese Communist party inherited an ethnic cleavage pattern of some salience from prior governments and has been trying to deal with it through alternating policies of tolerance for ethnic particularism with policies repressive of these particularities. The tension between these two policies forms an ongoing theme in China's leadership struggles and can be traced to two different statements by Mao Tse-tung on the proper handling of ethnic problems. The debate between proponents of the two different policies can be expected to go on, though domestic and international constraints seem to portend a continuation of the moderate measures presently in force. The leadership's dissatisfaction with the status of nationalities relations should not be allowed to obscure the CCP's successes in dealing with its ethnic minorities.

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THE Chinese People's Republic (CPR) officially recognizes 54 minority ethnic groups totaling approximately 45 million persons. While even the largest of these groups, the Chuang, who are estimated to number 10 million, is small compared to the over 900 million ethnic Han Chinese, the importance of China's minorities is not to be judged in terms of numbers. At the time of the Communist takeover in 1949, the minority nationalities, as they are called in accordance with Marxist terminology, occupied 50 to 60 percent of China's land area, including much of its richest mineral and timber deposits, and nearly all of its meat and wool producing areas.

STATUS AND LOCATION OF THE MINORITIES

The newly established ruling Chinese Communist party (CCP) perceived these sparsely populated territories in terms of their value to China's economic development and also as areas capable of absorbing large numbers of Han from the seriously overcrowded areas of the country. In addition, the traditional minorities' homelands are of great strategic importance: most minorities live on or near China's land borders, and many are ethnically identical or closely related to groups living under the jurisdiction of other states. There are, for example, Kazakhs and Uighurs in both the Soviet Union and China, and Mongols in China, the Soviet Union, and the Mongolian People's Republic. Chinese Tibetans are closely related to groups in Nepal, Bhutan and Northern India, and the Meo, Yao, Thai, and Nung of Southeast Asia also have counterparts in China. If prosperous and content under Chinese rule, such peoples can help to secure the nation's borders and provide an endorsement of the viability of the Chinese model of socialism for non-Han peoples. Conversely, if discontent, they provide a source through which hostile powers can infiltrate China, carry out subversive movements, and disrupt communications and economic development.

EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC CLEAVAGE PATTERNS

The present-day Chinese state had its origins in the Wei River valley of north China approximately 3,000 years ago. A silk-weaving, rice-cultivating, and city-building culture developed as characteristic of the people who came to be known as Han Chinese[1]; the rest of what is now Chinese territory was inhabited by other peoples whom Chinese historical sources refer to collectively as barbarians. These peoples are identifiable as the ancestors of today's minority groups. Over the course of history, the Han Chinese state, aided by its early development of a written language, advanced theories of statecraft, and a prolific populace, expanded.

The expansion of the Han Chinese state involved the displacement of many indigenous peoples. Some were conquered by Han armies, others became absorbed into the Han through intermarriage, and still others were simply pushed aside, with Han taking over the more desirable lands and obliging the original inhabitants to move to less attractive peripheral areas, such

1. Li Chi, *Formation of the Chinese People* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1928), p. 5.

as high mountains or swampy lowlands. Since the Han were chiefly sedentary agriculturalists, expansion generally proceeded along fertile river valleys and took a southerly direction; the cold, arid lands to the north were unpromising agriculturally and in addition tended to be populated by fierce nomadic herdsmen who were difficult to subdue.

The growth of the Chinese empire in this manner created obvious resentments, and the relations between Han Chinese and barbarians were a persistent concern of Chinese statesmen. A few Chinese statesmen were assimilationists, desiring to make the barbarians into Chinese by teaching them Confucian mores and the Han language, but the prevailing attitude was to allow the barbarians a high degree of autonomy so long as they did not disturb the peace and order of empire. To seek out the barbarians to impart Han Chinese wisdom would have been unseemly and a waste of effort. Those barbarians who were worthy would come of their own volition.

What set apart Han from barbarian was believed to be cultural rather than racial: the acceptance of Han Chinese culture and administrative forms *rather* than the group into which one was *born*. Non-Han dynasties, generally from among the more militant northern groups, could, and occasionally did, rule China, a crucial test of their legitimacy was their ability to employ Chinese administrative forms and Confucian philosophy. Those better able to do so were apt to endure; those who were unwilling or unable to were generally short-lived.

Beginning with the mid-nineteenth century, China became increasingly influenced by Western ideas. Nationalism proved one of the most powerful of these influence and Chinese nationalism, like the Western nationalisms from which it derived, was ethnically rather than culturally based. As it happened, the ruling dynasty during this period when once-mighty China was being humiliated by successive Western invasions was that of the barbarian Manchus. Many Chinese patriots argued forcefully that this was a major source of the country's weakness and that the replacement of barbarian rule by that of Han Chinese was the sine qua non of progress.

In 1911, the dynasty was overthrown and eventually replaced by a republican form of government under the Nationalist party (KMT) of Chiang Kai-shek. Its policy was thoroughly assimilationist and included plans to teach all minorities to speak Chinese, the incorporation of minorities areas into the regular administrative system of the country, and the denial of all forms of autonomy. These policies were never fully implemented, in part because the KMT government did not have complete control of the country and was particularly weak in its outlying areas, and in part because of the intense hostility these policies aroused among the minorities. Although humanitarian motives were not absent from the KMT's policies—minorities would, it was felt, benefit both culturally and materially by being absorbed into the dominant group of the country—these policies were generally administered with great insensitivity to minority group members' needs and feelings. The presence of corruption within the KMT did not help the party's cause. Officials sent to help the minorities often usurped their lands or profited from them in other ways. Some of

the minorities reacted by forcing the KMT into accommodations with their leaders, some by fleeing its administrative forms, and others by collaborating with foreign states.

Thus the Chinese Communist party, on coming to power in 1949, was faced with an ethnic cleavage pattern of some salience. In order to secure the country's borders, begin its drive to recover from war-time devastation, make progress toward economic development, and establish its own legitimacy, it was first necessary for the CCP to win the loyalties of the minority peoples and to persuade them of the merits of the socialist system.

PHILOSOPHY AND STRUCTURE OF CHINA'S MINORITIES POLICY SINCE 1949

1949–1957

The CCP's early minorities policies were characterized by a desire to distinguish itself from the KMT and were heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Happily, the KMT's policies differed so markedly from Marxist-Leninist theories that the CCP's two guiding principles seldom came into conflict. For instance, in sharp distinction from the KMT's policy, and similar to the Soviet Union's, a system of autonomous areas was created for minority peoples. The more important of these, called autonomous regions, were reserved for those more populous minorities who lived in fairly concentrated groups and were equivalent in status to provinces. For progressively smaller groups, autonomous areas were created at prefectural, county, and village levels. Government business in these autonomous areas was to be carried out in both Han Chinese and the host nationality's language; the minorities' percentage of the autonomous area's administrators was expected to correspond roughly to the proportion of minorities in the population, and "national forms" were to be observed in regard to place names and on other matters. Thus, for example, the capital city of Sinkiang, in China's northwest, came to be officially known as Urumchi, its Uighur name, rather than the Chinese Tihua, and the subordinate administrative units of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous region in the northeast are known as leagues and banners in accordance with Mongol custom, rather than prefectures and counties.

Strict warnings were issued to CCP bureaucrats, called cadres in the party's terminology, to avoid "great Han chauvinism" in dealing with minorities. While so-called local nationalism was also admitted to exist, great Han chauvinism was clearly considered the greater problem. The very word the KMT had used for assimilation became taboo, and CCP propaganda stressed the party's goal of gradual, unforced "growing together" of nationalities, in emulation of the Soviet term *sblizhenie*. The country's new constitution allowed minorities the freedom to use their own languages and required courts to provide interpreters for those who needed them. Other documents promised minorities education in their own languages; if a minority did not have a written language, the party would help it to develop one. Minorities' customs were to be respected and, except for those which were detrimental to production, could be retained. Reforms were to be undertaken only at the behest of the broad masses of minorities.

Chinese Communist minorities policy was not a slavish imitation

of the Soviet model—there is, for example, no Chinese counterpart of the USSR's Soviet of Nationalities, and China's autonomous regions, unlike those of the Soviet Union, are constitutionally unable to secede. Nonetheless, Chinese policy was closely influenced by that of the Soviet Union. Soviet ethnographers, technicians, and educators were active in China's minorities areas after 1949, and both their work and the Marxist-Leninist bases of CPR policy were duly credited by the Chinese press. However, it was Mao Tse-tung who received most of the credit for formulating minorities' policy, and his two statements on the subject,

> The Chinese Communist Party has consistently recognized the nationalities question as being one of the major questions of the Chinese revolution and the liberation of the national minorities as being a part of the liberation of the Chinese . . . what has been called nationality struggle is in reality a question of class struggle.

and

> Without a large number of communist cadres of minority nationalities, the thorough settlement of the nationalities question and the complete isolation of the national reactionaries will be impossible [2]

were frequently quoted as the cornerstones of the party's views on ethnic relations.

In practice, the implications of Mao's former statement were largely ignored. Most minorities were judged to have a rather primitively developed class structure and therefore class struggle, which was a major element in carrying out land distribution and other crucial reforms in Han areas, was employed in a more muted form in minorities areas, or was not employed at all. Traditional minorities leaders who "retained the trust of the masses" were generally allowed to remain in office and even given positions of some prestige, though not necessarily power, in the new socialist state "so long as they do not oppose socialism."

By contrast, a great deal of attention was paid to Mao's statement on training minority nationalities cadres. It was considered that the minority masses would be far more willing to accept the party's message if it were brought to them by those of their own ethnic group, and that this would also absolve the party of charges that its socialist philosophy was merely another vehicle for Han assimilationism. As early as 1950, plans were made to establish a Central Nationalities Institute in Peking and several large branch institutes in major regional centers throughout China. These would train outstanding minority group members and Han Chinese to serve in minorities' areas. Minorities studied the Han language, and Han scheduled to work in nationalities areas studied minorities' languages; both groups received instruction in Marxism-Leninism, the party's nationalities policy, and the techniques of propagandizing. Certain potentially useful technical skills, such as photography, might be taught as well. Cadre schools and cadre training classes for minorities existed at lower levels also.

At the grass-roots level, work teams of the People's Liberation Army visited villages and hamlets. By practicing the "three togethers" (live together, eat together, work together), they attempted to win

2. See, for example, Su K'o-ch'in, "Continue to Train Minority Nationalities Cadres," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* (Nationalities Solidarity), vol. 9 (September 1961), p. 5

the trust of the local people and transmit the party's socialist goals to them. Often these teams were able to identify those persons who had leadership qualities and who seemed receptive to socialism; these persons could then be recommended for cadre training.

The animosities developed over many hundreds of years did not disappear overnight, but despite misgivings on both sides, the party's policies in minorities areas did seem to be achieving results. Production statistics in most minority areas showed steady increases, and rebellions were relatively few and limited in scope. However, the pace of reforms was not acceptable to many party leaders. Their misgivings were reinforced by statements which emanated from minorities areas as a result of the so-called Hundred Flowers campaign. This was a nationwide effort in 1956–57 to encourage persons to air their grievances against the party and government. The outpouring of grievances from all quarters proved shocking to the party, but nowhere more so than from the minorities' areas. People complained that the so-called privileges they had received were as useful to them as "ears on a basket," and that they had received "many rights in theory, few in practice." Minorities' cadres were criticized as lap dogs of the Han and traitors to their own people. Suggested solutions ranged from pleas to give minorities more power within the existing system to outright demands for secession. A few angry voices even demanded that all Han Chinese leave their areas immediately.

The party attempted to answer its critics and even modified certain of its policies in response. For example, two new provincial-level autonomous regions were set up in 1958, and in that year also the State Council issued a revision of the financial regulations for autonomous areas which provided them with greater flexibility in raising and allocating revenues.[3] However, the revelations of the Hundred Flowers period also served to strengthen the convictions of those who felt that the policies of gradualism hitherto practiced in minorities areas were not achieving the desired growing together of peoples and that more drastic measures were needed. Their views on minorities policy were part of a growing dissatisfaction among certain members of the Chinese decision-making elite with the progress of reforms in general and the feeling that the Soviet model was not serving the CPR well. The result was a mass campaign on an unprecedented scale, known as the Great Leap Forward (GLF).

1958–1977

The GLF affected minorities' areas in many of the same ways as it did the rest of China, including the establishment of communes, huge common dining halls, virtually compulsory day care for children, and backyard blast furnaces. It also had effects in some ways which were unique to minorities. Many of their customs which had hitherto been respected were now declared to be detrimental to production and were prohibited. The minorities' masses were said to be "demanding" these reforms and eager to join the communes. Even minority groups hitherto

3. Reprinted in United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (SCMP), vol. 1795 (13 June 1958), pp 21–3

barely touched by what party propaganda referred to as "the socialist transformation" were included, being introduced to heavy doses of class struggle. Several high-ranking traditional minorities leaders whom the party had cooperated with were purged as counter-revolutionaries. Local nationalism replaced Han chauvinism as the chief ideological problem in minority areas. Party sources also claimed to have discovered a new high tide of enthusiasm for studying the Han language; conversely, it became socialistically unacceptable to insist on using one's own language, and the wearing of traditional minorities' costumes was regarded at best as frivolous and at worst as indicative of a reactionary temperament. In contrast to the policies of 1949–57, which seemed to pursue unity through diversity, the GLF sought unity through conformity.

The Leap was a failure in China as a whole, causing widespread economic losses and social disorder throughout the country. However, its consequences were particularly devastating in minorities areas. The deteriorating economic situation exacerbated existing internationalities tensions, as did the pressures toward assimilation. There were major revolts in Tibet in 1959 and among the Turkic Muslim peoples of Sinkiang in 1962. Minor uprisings occurred in several other areas. The events in Tibet and Sinkiang were severely embarrassing for the party and potentially dangerous as well: several hundred thousand refugees fled across the borders into India and the Soviet Union, both of whom had become increasingly hostile to China over the previous several years.

Faced with a critical economic situation and widespread popular dissatisfaction, the party took corrective measures. These were accompanied by leadership changes. Though Mao Tse-tung remained as head of the CCP, he did not stand for reelection as head of state and was replaced by Liu Shao-ch'i. It was under Liu's aegis that most of the corrections were made. As these concerned minorities, there was a return to respect for their languages, costumes, and many of their customs. Communes were abandoned in several minorities areas; in others, accommodations in structure were made to conform with the local situation. Several of the minorities leaders who had been purged during the GLF were rehabilitated.

These policies continued in force from approximately 1959 through 1965, at which time China began another mass upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. A leadership struggle, the clash of differing philosophies on methods of economic development, and many other facets were present in addition to the revolution in culture: all of these had ramifications for minorities policy. Although many different shades of opinion were present on all issues, they tended to polarize into conservative and radical views, with the radical voice generally being the only one clearly articulated. Insofar as these involved minorities, radicals opposed concessions to, and special treatment of, minorities, charging that this amounted to capitulation to the reactionary elements among the nationalities. Liu Shao-ch'i's policy was alleged to have caused splits between nationalities. Radicals, quoting Mao's statement that nationality struggle was *in essence* simply class struggle, sought to solve the nationality problem

through class struggle. Groups of young "Red Guards" vowed to destroy vestiges of this decadent past. A Tibetan temple was defaced, and various religious observances interfered with. Broadcasting in minorities languages was sharply curtailed, and many leaders in minorities areas, both Han and minority, were purged for pandering to reactionary customs and habits.

The effects of the Cultural Revolution on minorities areas were not nearly so far-reaching as those of the Great Leap Forward. Disruptions in production occurred but did not seriously affect the living standards of any appreciable number of people. Concern that stirring up ethnic animosities would weaken border defense was openly voiced,[4] and in several instances, Red Guard groups who attacked minorities leaders were ordered to desist.[5] On balance, however, the Cultural Revolution was a victory for assimilationist policies, though it proved rather short-lived.

Coincident with the demise of Lin Piao, the person who emerged from the Cultural Revolution as heir apparent to the aging Mao Tse-tung, minorities policy again took a turn toward leniency and gradualism. Lin's policies were denounced as having caused national splits, and his attitude toward minorities was held demeaning. The broadcasting in minorities languages which had been curtailed during the Cultural Revolution was resumed, great efforts were devoted to publishing books and pamphlets in minorities languages, and the campaign to train minorities cadres was revived. A new heir apparent emerged in the person of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

Teng's status as heir apparent, like Lin's, proved short-lived; he was overthrown by radicals in the early months of 1976. Though his policies, like Lin's and Liu Shao-ch'i's before him, were roundly denounced, attitudes toward minorities underwent few discernible changes. Hua Kuo-feng, who was subsequently named to the number two position after Mao Tse-tung, was originally considered to be a compromise candidate who would be acceptable to both radicals and conservatives. However, shortly after Mao's death, Hua purged the radical "Gang of Four," and his policies in general, and toward minorities in particular, have leaned in a decidedly conservative direction. The Gang of Four has recently been under heavy attack for policies causing national splits and detriment to the unity of nationalities.[6]

Policy during the past several years has taken a relatively lenient position on the preservation of minorities customs and special characteristics. It has placed continuing emphasis on the use of nationality languages in mass media and the training of minorities as skilled workers, teachers, doctors, and especially as cadres. In the autonomous areas, efforts have been made to bring the percentage of minorities

4. See, for example, Huhehot Radio (Inner Mongolia), 17 November 1967, and "Important Instructions of Premier Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng and Other Leaders on the Question of Tibet," in United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Magazines*, vol. 622 (6 June 1968), p. 2

5. See, for example, the orders to desist from attacks on a Tibetan leader reprinted in *SCMP*, vol. 4150 (23–24 March 1968), p. 18, and *SCMP*, vol. 4162 (5 March 1968), p. 10, and on a Uighur leader, in *SCMP*, vol. 4201 (26 May 1968), p. 16.

6. "Exposing Wang Hung-wen's Scheme to Throw China into Disorder," *Peking Review*, vol. 20 (4 February 1977), p. 11.

cadres and party members to the approximate proportion of minorities in the total population.[7]

Role of the minority cadre

Since the brunt of responsibility for the execution of the party's minorities policies falls on these cadres, an examination of their role is in order. Expected to form a bridge between the party and the masses of his or her ethnic group, the successful minority Communist must *stand out* as a minority group member as well as a Communist. To achieve a proper mix of ethnic particularities and Maoist universalities to please the two constituencies one bridges is no easy task: to err on the side of ethnic particularity invites charges of local nationalism and counter-revolutionary tendencies from the party; to over-emphasize one's socialist universality is to court condemnation as a dupe of the Han and traitor to one's own nationality.

Still, with the traditional status hierarchies among minorities now effectively eradicated, the party and the institutions it has established have come to constitute virtually the only meaningful channels of social mobility open to the ambitious minority group member. Many such persons can thus be expected to pursue a task which must often seem thankless. Analysis of the careers of those relatively few minority group members who have risen to high-ranking positions as party secretaries in their provinces or as members of the party central committee's politburo indicate that they have chosen to opt in the direction of the Han version of socialist universality. The wearing of native costumes on ceremonial occasions is practically the only manifestation of ethnic background, with the ability to speak Han Chinese well and reiterate the current party line dutifully seemingly more important, or at least more obvious, concomitants of success. For a high-ranking minority-group Communist to publicly express her or his nationality's grievances is virtually unheard of. While this does not preclude the voicing of one's nationality's grievances privately, as in closed party meetings, the very fact that the meetings are private must limit the member's appeal to her or his ethnic constituency, thereby reducing the member's appeal as a role model with which the rank and file minority group individual can identify.

The cadre's burden is considerably reduced, of course, when the wishes of the party are not sharply in conflict with the desires of the nationality group. But any discussion of mobility for the ethnic minority individual in China must end with a moot question: is the model presented really one of minority mobility, or is it a model of minority assimilation?

SUMMARY AND PROGNOSIS

The venom with which opposing elite groups in China attack each other's minorities policies should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, with the exception of the period following the Great Leap Forward, the dimensions and magnitude of ethnic conflict under the CCP have not been particularly great. Perpetual vigilance has been

7. This is nicely illustrated, in the case of Tibet, by radio broadcasts transcribed in United States Department of Commerce, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service China* (FBIS-CHI) vol. 12 (17 January 1977) p. 14, and, in the case of Sinkiang, *FBIS-CHI*, vol. 15 (15 January 1977), p. 11

the price of this degree of control: suggestions for new directions in policy must be weighed in terms of the minorities' probable reactions, close attention is paid to the activities of potential minorities dissidents, and borders are carefully patrolled.

Many minority groups present no special problems. Peoples such as the Chuang and Pai, who were in general well adapted to life in a predominantly Han Chinese state prior to 1949, have functioned well within the new institutional structure. Many such individuals may have welcomed the wider opportunities presented by the development of governmental and economic structures under the CCP.

Those minority groups who presented imperial and KMT China with their most difficult problems of control have continued to present difficulties for the CCP. Still, again with the exception of the 1958–62 period, one's impression is that the salience of ethnic conflict has been relatively low. Some of this is due to the nonexistence of organized channels of dissent: there is no official sanction for dissident minority groups holding public rallies or press conferences and, even if they did, CCP media tend to treat such unpleasant events with utmost secrecy. Thus, the fact that there are no identifiable protest movements does not mean that these structures do not exist. However, even the CCP media could not hide an event the size of the Tibetan rebellion. Sharp disagreements have existed between party and minority groups and can be expected to continue to exist, but the party's combination of repression on the one hand and accommodation on the other has thus far usually been able to contain disagreements at a level which does not seriously threaten the unity of the Chinese state.

Developmentally, there have been real accomplishments. Factories, mines, and oil refineries have been founded in minorities areas; and roads, railways, and telephone service have been set up to connect them with other parts of China. There have been relatively generous resource allocations from the central government treasury to promising minorities areas such as Sinkiang and Tibet.[8] The GNP of such areas has risen substantially and, at least according to official media, so have local standards of living. Health services and the educational system are being extended to even the more outlying areas. Still, for at least some minority individuals, it is clear that what they have had to give up of their traditional ways of life is not worth the benefits of industrialization. With the factories and mines have come not only the usual discomforts of industrialization, but also large groups of Han Chinese: administrators, technocrats, farmers, and the generally disgruntled surplus young people from large urban centers such as Shanghai and Tientsin.

Thus, despite the CCP's relatively good recent record on minorities policy, there is potential for a serious escalation of minority-Han tensions in the future. Newly educated minorities may well perceive earlier educated Han as obstacles in their

8. A complete treatment of central government resource allocation and changes in provincial gross value of industrial output is contained in Robert Michael Field, Nicholas R. Lardy, and John Philip Emerson, *Provincial Industrial Output in the People's Republic of China: 1949–1975* (Washington, D.C. United States Department of Commerce, 1976).

paths to success, and their already articulated resentments at having to share the wealth of their lands with the Han may reach explosive proportions. Minorities are likely to be aided in their attempts to redress these grievances by the techniques of mass mobilization and organization taught to them by the party.

It is clear that CCP minorities policies, despite their successes, have not yet succeeded in producing a genuine drawing together of peoples, and it can be expected that the debate over how to deal with the continued existence of tensions among nationalities will go on. The reader, on noting that the victors in each successive leadership struggle in Peking have accused their predecessors of national splittist policies, may have wondered whether these policies genuinely differ from one another. Though similarities in goals exist, the methods employed by different leadership elites have indeed differed. The conflict between gradualist and assimilationist theories is an ongoing theme in the relations between Han and minorities in China since 1949, reminiscent of the theory of contradictions so prominent in Mao Tse-tung's analysis of Marxist dialectics. Though the thesis of gradualism has not clashed with the antithesis of assimilationism in nearly so violent a form since the gradualist policies of the early 1950s were counterposed to the assimilationism of the Great Leap Forward, it is obvious that a synthesis which is acceptable to the various shades of opinion within the party's decision-making elite, and among China's different minority groups, has yet to be found.

This tension exists even within Mao's statements on minorities policy, with his analysis of nationality struggle as merely class struggle seeming to portend a rapid, activist solution to the minorities problem, while his words on the importance of minority nationality cadres may be interpreted as sanctioning the existence of a socialism modified by the different medium through which it is received: a minority group cadre who is, and is perceived as, quite unlike the Han Chinese-dominated institutional structure she/he represents. Particularly since his death, Mao's words have been accorded the greatest esteem. It is unlikely that either of these two statements will ever be formally repudiated; one can therefore expect that they will continue to be used to justify the policies advocated by those groups who desire, respectively, gradualist and assimilationist policies.

There are factors which, at least in the short run, seem to work toward a continuation of the gradualist policies presently in force: first, a hostile Soviet Union has been quick to publicize examples, whether real or imagined, which can be interpreted as evidence of assimilationist pressures within China, and the USSR stands ready to encourage the grievance of China's minorities. Second, in a period in which Hua Kuo-feng is trying to consolidate his power and to lead China out of its economic problems of the past few years, it is highly unlikely that he will want to risk the domestic instability and international ramifications which rapid assimilationist policies typically involve. It is, therefore, likely that gradualism will continue.

One should not expect that a continued policy of gradualism will necessarily yield the desired results. While the failures of assimilationist policies have been more vis-

ible and spectacular, it is arguable that the dangers of gradualism, with its easy tolerance of minorities' rights to a separate existence and to concessions not granted to Han, may, in the long run, prove more dangerous to the unity of the Chinese state. And moderate policies have not managed to completely abate hostilities between Han and minority even in the short run: disturbances were reported from minority areas of Yunnan province in 1975, and have been hinted at in Ch'inghai and Sinkiang in 1976–77.[9] Thus, there may be another similarity between gradualist and assimilationist policies in addition to their common goal of a drawing together of peoples: the fact that neither set of policies has been able to eradicate tensions among nationalities. The charges made by opposing factions in the leadership elite have been true: both gradualist and assimilationist policies have left a residue of "national splittism."

The CCP has done well in reducing the salience of ethnic tensions but seems frustrated in its continued attempts to further reduce problems among nationalities. Perhaps, rather than persist in making such failures the subject of diatribes in leadership struggles, a wiser course of action would be to concentrate on keeping ethnic tensions below a certain acceptable threshold, as opposed to the previous concentration on assigning blame for the party's inability to achieve perfection.

9 News of the Yunnan disturbances was reported by the *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong) 11 July 1975, p 4, those in Ch'inghai by *FBIS-CHI*, vol 12 (17 January 1977), p. M6, and in Sinkiang by *FBIS-CHI*, vol 48 (3 March 1977), p. M2.

ANNALS, [illegible]

Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds

By GEORGE S. HARRIS

ABSTRACT: The Kurds seem further from autonomy or independence today than in the past. In part, the cause lies in their disunity in language, religious behavior, and especially tribal structure. The division of their core area among Turkey, Iran, and Iraq after the First World War assured Kurdish nationalism major opponents. In Turkey, the government has attempted to deny the very existence of Kurds as a separate people. While Kurdish leaders can exploit the multi-party system to establish local power bases, they must eschew overt ethnic agitation. In Iraq, the military move of the Barzanis was ultimately squashed by a determined, well-equipped central government. Only minor dissidence seems possible to continue here. In Iran, once the USSR's wartime occupation of the northern part of the country ended in 1946, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad which the Soviets had stimulated and facilitated collapsed. The shah has since maintained tight political control, while permitting the Kurds some cultural expression. Although there is, thus, little prospect of a renewed Kurdish military bid for autonomy or independence in these three states, economic grievances are likely to continue to foster a sense of ethnic identity among the Kurds.

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INDEPENDENCE or recognition as a national entity have both eluded the Kurds. Some of the frequent Kurdish revolts in the twentieth century have sought autonomy; others avowedly aimed at complete independence in a sovereign state. But the fate of all of these insurrections has been the same. No Kurdish movement has succeeded over the long run even in extracting major concessions. Today Kurdish autonomy, let alone independence, seems further from realization than ever.

Yet the Kurdish question seems unlikely to disappear entirely. These people form a more or less indigestible lump clustered in a clearly definable contiguous area—an arc north of Mesopotamia, stretching from near the Mediterranean to the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to the edge of the Iranian plateau. Kurds are as numerous as other peoples who have formed nation-states. Using the criterion of linguistic background, the best test of Kurdishness, it is reasonable to estimate that they number at least 10 million.[1] Thus, while they have conspicuously failed to achieve independence by military means, they are nonetheless too numerous to be easily swallowed up.

The inability of the Kurds to establish their own state reflects the nature of their opponents and the tangled international situation that they have faced in the twentieth century. It also testifies to important disabilities that the Kurds have suffered from within. Indeed, it may well be that for all their reputation as doughty mountain warriors they are not as promising subjects for a national movement as is often imagined. The elements of disunity that affect Kurdish political organization must, therefore, be carefully inspected.

OBSTACLES TO NATIONAL UNITY

Although the Kurds are easily distinguishable from the rest of the world, they are by no means united. Kurds are set apart from their neighbors chiefly by language. Kurdish belongs to the Indo-European family and is a close relative of Iranian. Yet Kurdish is not at all a unified tongue. It is divided into at least three major dialects. Kurdi, subdivided into Gurani and Sulaymani, is spoken by many Iraqi Kurds and is the most common written language. But Kirmanji, itself broken into Mil and Zil subdialects, is used by nearly two-thirds of the Kurdish speakers. Zaza, the third major subdivision, is confined to a group of Kurds in central Turkey; it is not readily intelligible to natives of either of the other two dialects. Thus, though language is the surest touchstone of Kurdishness, dialectical differences militate against a common sense of ethnic identity.

Religious behavior also divides the Kurds. To be sure, the overwhelming majority are Sunnis of the Shafii rite, a version of Islam not widely practiced by others in this region. However, on the level of tribal religious practices and adherence to mystical orders, major divisive tendencies come into play. Kurds seem particularly drawn to various dervish brotherhoods (es-

1. This figure represents a projection of linguistic evidence from various censuses in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. It includes some 600,000 Kurds estimated to live in Syria and the Soviet Union. Some, particularly in the urban centers outside the core area, no longer speak Kurdish; many of these, especially in Turkey, may for all practical purposes be considered assimilated

pecially the Nakshbandis and the Kadiris) and to unorthodox Islamic sects (such as the Nurcular in Turkey and the Ali Ilahis in Iran and Iraq). Even more significant, many tribal leaders—for example, the Barzanis in Iraq and the Kufrevis in Turkey—also combine hereditary religious leadership with their temporal authority. This combination serves to intensify tribal distinctions among Kurds.

Tribal structure is no doubt an important impediment to a national movement. In such societies, the unit of loyalty rarely ranges beyond the tribe; the individual is born into a series of family relationships from which he cannot disentangle himself as long as he remains within the system. And this traditional organization formed from aggregations of clans suffers from built-in rivalries and conflicts with neighbors. Disputes over grazing rights and marriage partners typically set adjoining tribes against each other. These feuds are so deep and hallowed with time that it takes extraordinary circumstances to band tribes of a region together even against outsiders. Hence, the Barzanis in northern Iraq were opposed to the end by their traditional tribal rivals; the Baghdad government was able to field loyal Kurdish units several thousand strong. Also, for dynastic and family reasons, one of Mulla Mustafa Barzani's own sons actively collaborated with the Iraqi central authorities against his father

Tribal organization, however, is gradually breaking down, as the seminomadic, transhumant, and pastoral life become less prevalent among the Kurds. In towns and cities of the Kurdish region as well as the major urban centers in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, there are growing numbers of detribalized Kurds. The latter are generally better educated than their rural brothers and are far more likely to identify with an overarching ethnic cause. A number among them have embraced reformist or radical social doctrines, which at least in theory reject the traditional tribal system as archaic and backward.

Yet it has been within the tribal structure that all major twentieth-century Kurdish leaders have operated. The most successful—Sheikh Said in Turkey, Mulla Mustafa Barzani in Iraq, and Qazi Mohammad in Iran—have managed to go beyond their immediate tribal frame to attract confederations of tribes. The bandwagon effect of charismatic personality and the fame of success against a commonly despised central government have combined to bring allies to the cause. But at best, these have been a loose congeries of disparate elements ready to defect in the face of outside strength and always calculating their own factional advantage. These movements have broken down into their basic tribal units with great rapidity once the paramount leader surrendered or was forced off the scene.

OUTSIDE OPPOSITION

A serious complication militating against a national movement embracing a majority of the Kurds has been the division of their core area among Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The arbitrary line drawn after the First World War frustrated realization of the Kurdish autonomy provided in the still-born Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and assured the Kurds not one, but three major adversaries in any move for autonomy or independence. In Turkey, where today somewhat over 4 million Kurds reside, they are outnumbered about ten to one by the Turks.

The some 2.5 million Kurds in Iran and the 2 million in Iraq each form at most about 20 percent of the population of these states. In this situation, the energies of the Kurds have been focused outward to deal with these national capitals rather than inward in efforts to come together across national frontiers.

In Turkey

All efforts at Kurdish autonomy or independence were consistently and firmly suppressed by the Turkish Kemalists. On the one hand, in 1919 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ordered his followers "to proceed in such a manner as to destroy the possibility of a separatist movement by the Kurds."[2] At the same time, in order to assure maximum support in the Turkish struggle for independence, he wooed the Kufrevis and other powerful Kurdish leaders; in the Grand National Assembly he made a special point of defending the brotherhood of Turks, Kurds, and other "Islamic elements."[3] Ismet Inonu at the Lausanne Peace Conference frequently spoke of Turkey as the "homeland of Kurds and Turks."[4] What Ankara principally intended by these references, however, was to buttress claims for the inclusion in Turkey of territory inhabited by Kurds.

The wartime phase over and a more coherent political machine organized, the Kemalist regime set about entrenching itself in power in ways that seemed to threaten the interests of important Kurdish leaders. Hence, it was not surprising that the Nakshibandi tribal chief, Sheikh Said, revolted in 1925 in the name of the caliph and against the reformist regime in Ankara which was dedicated to uprooting the traditional power system in the country. Said's insurrection, however, did not call for the creation of a Kurdish national state, nor did the majority of the Kurds in Turkey join in. Some actively cooperated with the Turkish army against Sheikh Said, and some who welcomed the revolt at first were soon disaffected by the brigandage of the rebels. Although it was the most widespread revolt Ataturk would face, it was fairly speedily put down by the well-disciplined, experienced troops at Ankara's disposal.

From these events, Ankara drew the conclusion that the Kurdish tribal leadership was responsible for the insurrection. Ataturk thus executed the handful of paramount chiefs and dispersed the lesser lights to enforced residence outside of the Kurdish areas. At the same time, Ankara stepped up the pace of its efforts to assimilate the dissidents. The Kurds were to be encouraged by all practical means to identify as Turks. In the effort to celebrate the pre-Islamic cultural heritage of the Turks as the basis of a new nationalism, the Ankara authorities promoted the view that Kurds were Turanians who had somehow forgotten their linguistic origins. It became the vogue in Turkey to deny the existence of the Kurds as a separate people.[5]

The revolt of Kurdish tribal ele-

2. Ataturk, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal* (Leipzig. K. F. Koehler, 1929), p. 109.

3. Ali Harzya, "Kurt Sorunu," *Emek*, no. 6 (November 1970), p. 46, Turkey, *T.B.M.M Zabit Ceridesi*, Devre 1, Içtima senesi. 1, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (Ankara T.B.M.M. Matbaasi, 1959), p. 165, session of 1 May 1920.

4. Ismet Cheriff Vanly, *Le Kurdistan Irakien Entite Nationale* (Neuchatel. Editions de la Baconniere, 1970), p. 54.

5. See Ismail Beşikçi, *Dogu Anadolu'nun Duzeni* (Istanbul: E. Yayınları, 1969), pp. 13–14, Harzya, "Kurt Sorunu," pp. 49–50.

ments near Mt. Ararat in 1930 which spilled over into the Maku region of Iran was likewise severely suppressed. The Kurdish insurgents were no match for Ankara, which used air power this time in addition to its effective ground forces. And with the failure of the 1937 uprising in Tunceli against the central government's efforts to set up gendarmery posts and schools in this area, the military phase of the Kurdish question came to a close in Turkey.

To assure that further Kurdish revolts would not occur, Ankara imposed stricter administrative controls over eastern Turkey than in the rest of the country. A consistent effort was made to disarm the tribes, and gendarmes were stationed throughout this area. Some Kurdish tribes and especially their leaders were removed from the troubled region. Railway lines were built to facilitate government troop movements.

At the same time, the Kurds suffered severe cultural disabilities. The use of Kurdish as a written language, or as a tongue on the radio and television, was sternly prohibited. While the "Citizen Speak Turkish" campaign of the early 1960s was quickly shelved in view of the practical difficulties of insisting on linguistic conformity by millions of people who did not know this language, the political and legal system in Turkey is heavily biased in favor of Turkish. To be eligible to enter parliament, for example, one must be fluent in Turkish.

Although barred from making overt appeals to ethnicity, the Kurds have been able to take advantage of the Turkish system of multiparty political competition introduced after the Second World War. The parliamentary process offers scope for defending regional—if not avowedly ethnic—interests. And the dynamics of multi-party politics has assured competition by the major parties for local support in the Kurdish provinces. Indeed, this process proceeded to the point that in the 1950s the Democrat party allowed local administration of this area frequently to fall into the hands of natives rather than administrators sent from the capital. And in reaction to this policy of regional concessions, the military junta which took power in 1960 deported 55 Kurdish tribal chiefs to western Turkey. But when civilian rule returned the next year, these leaders were restored to their traditional followers with their power largely unchanged.[6]

Tribes, however, have limitations in the game of parliamentary politics similar to those they suffer in national movements: they provide a relatively narrow base of support. As a result, minor parties in particular have had to be content with the backing that one tribal constituency could give in a province. For example, in 1965 the Turkish Labor party received the lion's share of its votes in Diyarbekir province from the county of Lice, home of its sometime secretary general.[7]

For those Kurdish politicans who aspired to broader power bases, there were social mechanisms that could help somewhat to transcend tribal limits. Fictive relationships based on the sponsorship of circumcision celebrations (*kirvelik*) offered a way for the rich and power-

6. Y. K. Karaosmanoglu described the Democrat tactics, *Ulus*, 6 December 1960. See also *Milliyet*, 27 October 1960, *Hurriyet*, 21 November 1960.

7. Turkey, T. C Başbakanlık, Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu, *1950–1965 Milletvekili ve 1961, 1964 Cumhuriyet Senatosu Uye Seçimleri Sonuçlari* (Ankara, 1966), pp. 425–45

ful to expand the numbers of those who were personally bound to them.[8] The control of landlords over tenants served as another means of constructing the network of relations needed to go beyond the tribal frame. Using these devices, Kurdish politicans in eastern Turkey have developed bases of power independent of party organizations, giving these leaders the option to shift party at will or to run as independents if they could not strike the proper deal with the national organizations. In the 1977 election campaign in Turkey, Kurdish leaders from several eastern provinces reportedly took their followers out of the Republican People's party for such reasons.[9]

The possibility of substantial benefits within the system discourages most of the prominent Kurdish political leaders from risking their positions by overtly promoting ethnic separatism. Embarrassment at being identified with Kurdish national aspirations was clearly evident in 1963, for example, in New Turkey party Secretary General Yusuf Azizoglu's rejection of Minister of Interior Hifzi Oguz Bekata's accusations that he was encouraging Kurdish divisive sympathies. And there could be no mistaking the warning implicit in Republican People's party deputy Asim Eren's parliamentary question in 1959 about the advisability of retaliating against Turkish Kurds for the massacre of Turkmen tribesmen in Mosul.[10]

In this situation, Kurdish nationalist sentiment has been openly exploited only by the most radical of Turkey's legal political bodies, the Turkish Labor party—and then only after this party was solidly established. This avowedly Marxist organization publicly equated the economic backwardness of eastern Turkey with a discriminatory ethnic policy by the Ankara government. For the temerity publicly to return to Inonu's Lausanne formulation that Turkey was a country of Turks and Kurds in its program adopted in November 1970, the Turkish Labor party was summarily closed in mid-1971; its leaders, both Kurds and non-Kurds, were given lengthy jail terms.[11] To a military-backed regime in Ankara, there was evidently no more serious crime than encouraging Kurdish separatism.

If Kurdish nationalist sentiment can no longer be manipulated so openly by formal political parties, it may still be visible in the anarchist and extremist current that has disturbed Turkey in the past decade. Kurds are disproportionately represented in the radical leftist movements in Turkey. Perhaps interest in these causes is generated from the fact that eastern Turkey remains comparatively poor and neglected in the development of the country. Whatever the reason, when Kurdish students go to the major universities, they seem more likely than their Turkish colleagues to join activist movements. In the rebellion against authority common to all these protagonists, the demand for a better deal for the Kurd-

8. Dr. Ayşe Kudat, *Kirvelik* (Ankara, Ayyildiz Matbaası, 1974), passim.

9. *Hurriyet*, 22 April 1977.

10. *Milliyet*, 10 October 1963, *Akşam*, 15 April 1959, carried open telegrams protesting Eren's suggestion and expressing surprise that his party would not disown these "threats." The following day the press noted that the authorities had banned further discussion "on the subject of the Kurds."

11. "Turkiye Işçi Partisi IV. Buyuk Kongre Kararları," *Emek*, no. 7 (December 1970), pp 7–8; *Milliyet*, 15–16 May 1971, claimed that the Labor party was linked to the Democratic party of Kurdistan; *Milliyet*, 15 June 1971.

ish areas is frequently voiced.[12] At present in Turkey there is little propaganda calling directly for Kurdish independence; but in agitation for faster, more equitable economic development of the eastern part of the country, the undercurrent of ethnicity clearly persists.

In Iraq

The Kurds of northern Iraq greeted the advent of British rule after the First World War with traditional tribal revolt. Seeking to resist the imposition of firmer control from Baghdad than they had previously known, Sheikh Mahmud, a major Kurdish leader, rose first in 1919 and in a broader move in 1922. It took the British authorities two years to put down his last insurrection; even then unrest remained endemic in the Kurdish region, though the Iraqi Kurds seemed largely unaffected by the rise and fall of Sheikh Said in Turkey.

By 1927, the Barzani clan had come to the fore as the leading Kurdish dissidents. In the years that followed, the Barzanis earned a reputation for activism and boldness in resisting the central government in Baghdad. In 1929 they demanded the formation of an all-Kurdish province embracing their core area in Iraq, a demand they repeated in 1943. Under this stimulus, in 1930–31 notables petitioned the League of Nations to set up an independent Kurdish government.[13] Their main motives, however, appeared to be to gain concessions from the Arabs to permit the establishment of local autonomy and the use of Kurdish as a language of education as well as to demand a greater share of Iraq's revenues for the development of the northern region. When continuing Barzani agitation elicited a determined thrust from the Baghdad government backed by the British in 1945, Mulla Mustafa Barzani—the most active and charismatic of the leaders of this tribe—fled with a group of followers first to Iran and thence to the USSR on the collapse of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946.

The quiet induced by the departure of Mulla Mustafa, coupled with more capable government in Baghdad and the suppression of Kurdish dissidence in Iran, hardly survived the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. The advent of a radical central government oriented toward the Arab world posed a threat to the Kurds. Abdul Karim Qasim, who initially welcomed Mulla Mustafa Barzani home from refuge in the Soviet Union, soon turned against the Kurdish leader. After granting Barzani's political party—the Democratic party of Kurdistan—legal status in 1960, Qasim encouraged the Baradost and Zibaris to pursue their traditional feuds with Mulla Mustafa.

The Barzani revolt of June 1961, therefore, began as a traditional move to resist the central government and to defend tribal rights. Mulla Mustafa's aims were at most some form of self-administration for the Kurds in northern Iraq; he was not after broad autonomy or even the overthrow of Qasim. Nor was Barzani at first even supported actively by the small group of city-bred detribalized Kurdish radicals who had been the guiding light of the Democratic party of Kurdistan.

12. Harzva, "Kurt Sorunu," pp. 52–64, Açık Oturum, Ortadogu Devrimci Çemberi," nt, no. 1 (May 1970), pp. 63–84.

13. Stephen H. Longrigg, *Iraq 1900 to 1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 193–96, 324–27.

They objected to his traditionalist tribal approach and favored radical socialist organization instead. And throughout 1962 the radicals maintained a separate identity, eventually establishing their own rival front in the rugged area to the southeast of Barzani's territory.[14]

While Qasim claimed to see a foreign finger in triggering the Barzani insurrection, there is no evidence to substantiate his charges. The Kremlin, though critical of Qasim for suppressing the Iraqi Communist party, did not wish to see his anti-Western regime upset; Moscow, therefore, did not give unequivocal support to Mulla Mustafa. Arab states vacillated, torn on the one hand between feelings of solidarity with Baghdad against non-Arabs and, on the other, Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry which had burst forth once Qasim showed his independence of Gamal Abdal Nasser. The West remained aloof; it still generally regarded Barzani as a Communist on the basis of his 15 years in the Soviet Union. Only Iran was sympathetic to Mulla Mustafa, seeing him as a useful ally in the contest against Qasim. But Tehran was willing to do little of a practical nature to help the Kurds, and it appears that the Iranian government had little if anything to do with setting off the Kurdish insurrection.

Qasim's efforts to bring Mulla Mustafa to heel failed. Baghdad's military establishment never recovered from the shock of the revolution and the reorientation of supply from British to Soviet equipment. Moreover, the security forces were not free from pursuing other domestic enemies long enough to focus fully on the Kurds. In Qasim's years, the army was also committed to press Kuwait in the south. Thus, Baghdad could not exert its maximum force against the Kurdish irregulars who took advantage of their mountainous terrain in the north.

The stalemate with the Kurds irritated powerful factions in the army and contributed to some degree to Qasim's overthrow in February 1963. The Baath party regime which ran Iraq for the ensuing nine months also was unable to settle itself firmly in power. It first offered Barzani a compromise of limited autonomy in only one of the three major Kurdish provinces. But the Baath apparently from the first intended to try to crush the insurrection by force. It was only the inner strains that brought the Baath regime down after the end of the fighting season in the fall of 1963 that saved Barzani. His men had not performed well against the Baath offensive.

The Arif brothers who took over for the next five years also tried both conciliation and conflict to deal with Mulla Mustafa. The tactic of a ceasefire, declared in February 1964, almost succeeded. It provoked a split in Kurdish ranks between the tribal forces and the urban radicals, who accused Barzani of selling out by ending the fighting without a specific promise of autonomy. And this challenge led Mulla Mustafa to expel the Kurdish activists by force.[15]

Despite this purge of his forces, Barzani could not deflect conflict with the Arif regime. In Baghdad he was seen as the symbol of dissidence. There was abiding pressure on the central government to

14. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Kurdish Revolt: 1961–1970* (Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1973), p. 87.

15. Vanly, *Kurdistan Irakien*, pp. 222–24; O'Ballance, *Kurdish Revolt*, pp. 120–21.

reestablish firm control over the north. But the government's military campaign of 1965–66 failed disastrously. Tehran had by now broadened considerably its military supply to the Kurds in the context of severely deteriorating relations between Iraq and Iran. And when Baghdad overextended itself in the quest for a knockout blow in the Ruwanduz valley, its forces were routed by Mulla Mustafa.

This stalemate, in which the Kurdish forces could not descend from their hills and the central government's army could not leave the main roads, led Baghdad to offer a 12-point peace program in June 1966, providing for elections, amnesty, reparations, and some form of decentralized administration.[16] Yet this compromise was given little chance to succeed. The Arif regime collapsed in the wake of the Arab defeat in the Six-Day war against Israel in 1967.

The Baath party which now took over wasted little time in launching a major move to end Barzani's independence. Like its predecessors, however, the Baath regime found it difficult to gain the advantage; the government's drive stalled, and the campaign during 1969 proved indecisive. No doubt the slowness of the new regime to consolidate its position in Baghdad played a part in ordering the military standoff. And internal rivalries within the 15-man Revolutionary Command Council kept the government from devoting its full attention to action against the Kurds. In addition, the Baath forces were distracted by an escalating confrontation with Iran which led Baghdad to withdraw forces from operations in the north. Worsening relations between Iran and Iraq also led Tehran to increase markedly the flow of assistance to the Kurds. On the other hand, Moscow did not cut military aid as it had when the Baath took power in 1963, though the Soviets did press Baghdad to come to terms with Barzani rather than pursue military action.

In this situation, the central government concluded a 15-point peace plan with Mulla Mustafa in March 1970.[17] This accord provided for more far-reaching autonomy for northern Iraq than ever before. It also granted the Kurds the right of assured representation in the executive and legislative bodies of the central government which pledged the rapid economic development of the Kurdish region. Moreover, this compact authorized the Kurds to keep their heavy weapons for four years, until the accord was to be fully implemented.

This agreement marked the high-water of Kurdish gains. Not only was Baghdad forced to acknowledge its inability to crush Barzani's movement, Mulla Mustafa's opponents in the Democratic party of Kurdistan were obliged to recognize his paramountcy as well.

Yet, from this high point, Kurdish fortunes declined with startling suddenness. On the one hand, the Baath regime steadily solved its problems of internal divisions. At the same time, it moved to end its isolation in the post-Nasser Arab world and to strengthen its ties with Moscow. Indeed, in April 1972 a 15-year Treaty of Friendship was concluded between the USSR and

16. For the text of this program, see Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 274–76.

17. Iraq, Ministry of Information, *March 11 Manifesto on the Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Issue in Iraq* (Baghdad, 1974).

Iraq.[18] On the other hand, Mulla Mustafa could do little to strengthen his forces. The shah was apparently interested in keeping the Kurds supplied only for defense, not to the point of asserting independence. And it was difficult for Barzani to maintain his forces on a prolonged war footing.

With the end of the four-year term of the 1970 accord, therefore, the time was ripe for a renewed Baath offensive. Under these circumstances, moreover, the tide of battle quickly turned against Barzani, who for the first time faced a fully determined, well-equipped military operation. In response, Mulla Mustafa redoubled his appeals for outside assistance.

The changing fortunes of the Kurds posed a major problem for Tehran. As Baghdad's troops drove ever closer to the border with Iran, it became increasingly evident that in order to help Barzani effectively the shah would have to commit his own forces to the battle. This would have risked a major war between Iran and Iraq. At this juncture, however, Baghdad gave evidence that it would be prepared to satisfy other Iranian desires if Tehran would end its aid to the Kurds. It was on this basis, therefore, that the shah accepted Hayri Boumediene's offer of mediation in March 1975 and worked out a comprehensive settlement of all outstanding issues with the Baghdad government.[19]

This pact shut off the Kurdish lifeline to the outside world. It ended vital military assistance to the Barzani forces. Equally, it ranged the shah against the Kurds by committing him to close the border and deny sanctuary for those engaged in military operations against Baghdad.

In this situation, the odds were too great for Mulla Mustafa to buck. He took advantage of the grace period to flee to Iran to throw himself on the mercy of the shah. Many of his supporters fled with him. The rest surrendered en masse. Within days the rebellion was over and central authority was reimposed in the hills of northern Iraq for the first time in nearly 15 years.

Baghdad has sought to clinch its advantage for all time by making some population shifts to increase the numbers of Arabs in the region of the oil fields on the border of the Kurdish area. It has also widely disarmed the Kurds and stationed security forces broadly through the area. The Kurds maintain limited cultural rights, while being exposed to quick retaliation if they should step out of line.

Nonetheless, restiveness remains. There are reports of occasional instances of small-scale insurgency in the north, said to be fomented by Kurdish nationalists who slipped into the area from Syria.[20] Undoubtedly such dissidence will be limited as long as the Iranian border stays shut. But it is almost impossible to assure complete quiet as long as there are those outside who are dedicated to stirring up Kurdish separatist sentiment and who can exploit the sense of grievance at unequal treatment that persists in the Kurdish region.

18. For the text, see *New Times*, no 16 (1972), pp. 4–5.

19. Geoffrey Godsell, "Shah Tells Why He Made Peace with Iraq," *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 May 1975, p. 3.

20. David Hirst, "Disorders, Guerrilla Warfare Weaken Iraq's Ruling Party," *Washington Post*, 1 May 1977, p. K3.

In Iran

The breakdown of central authority in Iran left the northwest border area in almost continuous turmoil after the First World War. Kurdish tribes led by Ismail Aga Simko managed to set themselves up briefly as independent lords of the Mahabad area near Lake Rezaiyeh. This venture was the traditional tribal drive for local dominance and reflected little broader Kurdish nationalist aspiration. After the central government regained control of the rest of Persian Azerbaijan in 1922, Simko's move quickly collapsed. Further south a Qajar pretender also raised the Kurds in 1926 in an abortive effort to seize the throne.[21] By 1930, however, Reza Shah managed to impose order on the area and partially to disarm the tribes.

In the interwar period, Tehran attempted no consistent drive as the Turks did to break up Kurdish tribal organization. To be sure, Reza Shah's regime did not permit Kurdish to be used as the language of education or government. Yet, unlike the Turks, the Iranians did allow Kurdish books to be printed and Kurdish programs to be broadcast on the radio. Thus, the Iranian experience formed a half-way point between the absolute denial of Kurdishness in Turkey and the cultural and at times political permissiveness in Iraq.

With the occupation of Iran by the Soviets during the Second World War, the situation of the Kurds changed significantly. In the first place, the demobilization of the Iranian army weakened Tehran's control over this area and returned Kurdish tribesmen with their arms to the region. More important was the manipulation of the Kurds by the Soviets who saw in the encouragement of Kurdish separatism a way to consolidate their power in northwestern Iran.

Encouraged by Moscow, detribalized Kurds in Mahabad in 1942 took the initiative to organize the *komula*, a local organization dedicated to promoting Kurdish separatism.[22] The following year, Qazi Mohammad, the paramount religious figure of the region, began to agitate for formal recognition of Kurdish autonomy. The separatist movement also drew impetus from the general opposition to being incorporated in the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic being organized by the Azeri Turks of Iranian Azerbaijan. Not only was there strong ethnic antagonism between these groups, but the Soviet-inspired Azerbaijan Republic reflected radical social doctrines which caused concern among conservative Kurdish tribal leaders. Finally, the *komula* movement in Mahabad drew strength from the advent of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who reached there in flight from Iraq at the end of 1945 with several thousand tribal followers.

Early in 1946, again with Soviet help, Qazi Mohammad proclaimed the Kurdistan Autonomous Republic in Mahabad. This was a hastily constructed state, based on the detribalized *komula* elements in uneasy cooperation with the local tribal chiefs and Barzani's Iraqi refugees. It also suffered from a built-in territorial conflict with the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic over rich farm land and towns on

21. Hassan Arfa, *The Kurds* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 64–7; Longrigg, *Iraq*, p. 159.

22. William Eagleton, *The Kurdish Republic of 1946* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 33–40.

the edge of the Kurdish region. Moreover, the new Kurdish state did not extend far south of its capital and hence did not enjoy the allegiance of an important segment of Iran's Kurds.

The main problem for Mahabad was the growing power of the Tehran government. When the Soviets agreed to evacuate northern Iran in May 1946, the Azeri and Kurdish states in the north could not stand. Already in the case of the Mahabad Republic internal strains had undermined the loyalty of many of the tribes to the Kurdish cause. Traditional leaders were disturbed by the Communist orientation of some of the *komula* agitators; a coalition of tribal chiefs, through the intermediation of the American Consulate in Tabriz, offered their submission to Tehran. The Barzanis, too, were willing to negotiate with the Iranians and British for safe passage to return to Iraq. In this situation, the central government found little resistance to its advance in December 1946.[23]

Tehran now sought to end Kurdish dissidence once and for all. Qazi Mohammad and his closest collaborators were executed. After some days of talks, the Iranian army moved against the Barzanis; Mulla Mustafa and 500 followers escaped to the USSR. The government disarmed the Kurds and stationed the well-armed Third Corps of the Iranian army in the region. With the expansion of the road system and the spread of social services into the rural areas, the Kurds came increasingly into the tempo of modern existence. In this situation, the government's stringent security measures and efforts to break down the tribal organization effectively deprived the Iranian Kurds of potential for causing Tehran serious difficulties. Indeed, there is no evidence that in recent decades Iran has been troubled by significant Kurdish separatist activity.

THE FUTURE OF KURDISH SEPARATISM

Today, Kurdish nationalism is promoted primarily by detribalized Kurds living in the West or elsewhere outside of the core area. Kurdish student organizations in Europe and the United States encourage the development of a common ethnic identity. The Democratic party of Kurdistan also maintains a tenuous existence in exile, agitating in low key for the independence of the Kurds of Iraq.

There seems little likelihood that this agitation will succeed in securing recognition of the Kurds as a nation. The United Nations has characteristically refused to come out in favor of breaking up member states along ethnic lines. No major country now shows interest in taking up the Kurdish cause. While there was an outpouring of sympathy in the United States when Mulla Mustafa Barzani's revolt was finally extinguished, this reaction reflected humanitarian concern. It was also a product of the political debate in America over the operation of the intelligence community: the version of the Pike Committee report released in *The Village Voice* made much of the alleged betrayal of the Kurds as an exhibit in its critique of the Nixon administration's conduct of foreign affairs.[24] This highlighting of the Kurdish problem,

23. Ibid., pp. 104–5, 108–16

24. "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," *The Village Voice*, 16 February 1976, pp. 70, 85–7, Aaron Latham, "What Kissinger Was Afraid of in the Pike Papers," *New York*, 9 November, no. 40, 4 October 1976, pp. 50–68.

therefore, proved of short duration; it did not suggest that there were deep roots in the United States for support to the Kurds as a national movement.

Without consistent support from outside, including large amounts of military equipment, a Kurdish separatist movement clearly cannot survive. It requires modern weapons to take on the established central governments of the region which share a common determination to prevent the establishment of an independent or truly autonomous Kurdish state on their territories. With their own resources, the Kurds cannot produce the arms they would need. Thus, a military move for autonomy or independence no longer seems possible.

Although serious Kurdish ethnic conflict, therefore, now appears to be a thing of the past, economic inequalities and cultural traditions will assure that the Kurds have motives for asserting themselves. The intensity of their drive for recognition will undoubtedly vary in the different states of their residence. But the claim to the oil resources that their movements have advanced in the past are unlikely ever to be met. In this situation, it will be a long time before the standard of living in the Kurdish areas rises to the level of the surrounding regions. Thus, the sense of grievance that has lain at the heart of the separatist movement in the past is unlikely to weaken. And the Kurdish question will remain alive for future generations to resolve.

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Nation, Region, and Welfare: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Development Politics in South Asia

By JYOTIRINDRA DAS GUPTA

ABSTRACT: Problems of mass poverty in multi-ethnic poor countries require more complex understanding than conventional economic description. Given the importance of the distributive issues for development, political demands for the removal of social and economic disadvantage may find expression in regional movements based on ethnic ties. The social outcome of regional movements in south Asia suggests that the developmental worth of ethnic politics needs more careful assessment than the kind of theoretical prejudgment which has dominated studies of development.

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IT IS not difficult to guess why problems in the development of poor countries are usually stated in national terms. If development were viewed as an inter-country race where national units compete for respectable aggregate scores, then there would be no reason to worry about the inter-group situation within nations. Grand theories of development apparently accept this view and thus put a premium on analyzing the collective attainments of a nation rather than the relative gains or losses of specific groups in the population within nations.[1] However, the recent recognition of the persistence of mass poverty in countries that have attained respectable growth rates may succeed in reducing the appeal of national level aggregate analysis.[2] To some extent, it may direct more attention to the distributive issues that are often neglected when undue emphasis is given to the national level.[3]

The distributive issues of development include a much wider spectrum of problems than what is subsumed, in the development literature, in the concept of income shares. Most of the developmental literature is focused on the narrowly conceived economic questions pertaining to factor endowments and factor proportions, as these relate to attaining the ideal output.[4] While pursuing these questions, we tend to forget that in the absence of an articulated economy, the utilization of land, labor, and capital crucially depend on the coordination that, in a poor country, needs to be developed by the political system.[5] In this sense, development is likely to proceed from the combined, mutually reinforcing development of the polity and the economy. The logic of combined development becomes all the more significant when development is defined, as it is here, as the deliberate transformation of a population's living with priority accorded to the satisfaction of the poorest members' primary needs.[6]

The recent encounter with the poverty issue in developmental literature suggests that identification of mass poverty requires certain relatively simple economic indicators such as asset, income,

1. For an analysis of grand theories of economic development, see E. Wayne Nafziger, "A Critique of Development Economics in the U.S.," *Journal of Development Studies*, October 1976, pp. 18–34. Grand theories of political development are surveyed by Richard Sandbrook, "The 'Crisis' in Political Development Theory," *ibid.*, January 1976, pp. 165–85

2. The poverty literature in economics is rapidly growing. Besides the best known work, H. Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth* (New York. Oxford University Press, 1974), an interesting account of change of direction is presented by M. Haq, *The Poverty Curtain* (New York Columbia University Press, 1976)

3. For a discussion of such weights and their effects, see H. Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth*, p. 40 ff.

4. See S. Robinson, "Theories of Economic Growth and Development. Methodology and Content," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol 21, no 2 (1972), pp. 54–67.

5. This is elaborated in my paper on "Political Regimes and Rural Development," presented at the Conference on Political Aspects of World Food Problems, Kansas State University, March 1977.

6. The relation between basic human needs and development is discussed in International Labor Office, *Employment, Growth and Basic Needs* (Geneva: ILO, 1976). The logic of priority for the worst off is discussed in John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press, 1972), and A. K. Sen, *On Economic Inequality* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

or expenditure classes of a country's population.[7] The importance of ascertaining the true standards of living of the bottom 40 percent and devising the appropriate strategies for improving their lot, however, generally tends to be stated in simplistic terms—terms that can be described as "economism." Since the bulk of the literature addressed to these questions has come from economists mainly sponsored by politically cautious international organizations, which need to keep the governing authorities in poor countries in good humor, this kind of economism is not surprising.[8] Treating the poor as an income or expenditure class encompassing 40 or 50 percent of a country's population, and then rationally dividing it into categoric groups called target groups,[9] may be useful as an intellectual exercise but it is not satisfactory for exploring realistic policy alternatives.

POVERTY AND POLITICAL AGENDA

In order to appreciate possibilities of policy action, it is necessary to consider the place of poverty as a political issue on the agenda of the political authorities and to see how the issue itself is elaborated in the context of social and political activities in a poor country. The making of a political authority in a new state, the composition of this authority, its mandate, inheritance, and competence would tell us one part of the story. How authorities arrive at a sequencing of developmental action would, of course, depend on their sense of priorities and the impact of public pressures on the formulation of developmental policy. The responsiveness of political authorities cannot be understood without reference to how various segments of the poor, for example, convey their demand and secure the attention of policy-makers at various levels within a country in order to gain access to its resources. It is important to recognize in this connection that the distribution of poorer people in a country is unlikely to be uniform over all geographic and administrative regions, just as the incidence of poverty may also vary widely among social and cultural divisions.

It is in this context that the problem of unequal incidences of poverty among clearly identifiable ethnic groups and regions in a multiethnic state assumes a crucial importance for analyzing the emergence of political issues concerning poverty and their relative salience on the political agenda of a country at specific points of time. To define poverty in conventional economic terms by enumerating deprivations associated with a category of people is merely to summarize a selected set of static traits. In order to discover how historically accumulated processes of impoverishment, sanctioned by authoritative rules and enforced by political power, have engendered poverty among partic-

7. See, for example, a variety of papers on this issue in T. N. Srinivasan and P. K. Bardhan, eds., *Poverty and Income Distribution in India* (Calcutta, Statistical Publishing House, 1974), esp. pp. 264–80.

8. The largest bulk of this kind of literature has been produced or sponsored by the International Labor Office, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

9. The idea of 1 target group is explicated in Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth*, p. 91. For a critical account, see B. F. Johnston, "Food, Health, and Population in Development Strategies," *Journal of Economic Literature*, forthcoming.

ular segments of a society in specific locations, one needs to consider a number of complex relationships in a wider setting.

It is here that the structural interpretation of poverty and of its perpetuation assumes a special significance. But structural interpretations can take many forms, depending on whether one chooses to focus on inter-sectoral, inter-class, elite-mass, center-periphery, or inter-group domination of various types. The choice of a particular form or combination of forms would depend on the level and purpose of analysis.

SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE AND GROUP PERCEPTION

If the purpose of studying poverty is not simply to analyze its nature and causes but rather to seek ways of understanding how the poverty of specific groups of people in particular settings can be either alleviated or removed, then we must direct our attention to how it is actually perceived by those affected by it and those who can initiate and organize appropriate action to change the situation. In poor countries largely dependent on conventional modes of agrarian production, poor people are likely to be located in rural areas.[10] The mode of production and the factor of rural residence, when taken together, may give us a fair clue as to the place of the poor in a country's social structure—provided the social structure is not characterized by multiple lines of noneconomic cleavages. However, where economic divisions are complicated by the joint effect of ethnic and regional divisions, one has to examine how these divisions join economic poverty with other social disadvantages, thus compounding the effect of poverty. While political action to attack poverty in the first case may be facilitated by a polarization of the perceptions of economic interest, its effectiveness may be considerably reduced in the second case by the confusion of the lines of division.

The largest number of people suffering from abject poverty are located in southern Asia, an area which is also deeply divided by persistent lines of cleavage identified with religion, language, caste, and wide regional variation in addition to class division. When deliberate efforts for development began, after the new nations of this area gained independence, an unusual degree of political attention was demanded by the issues stemming from concerns for national coherence. Two catastrophic partitions in the subcontinent in about two decades, involving conflicts claiming millions of lives, provide a sharp contrast to revolutionary civil wars in other parts of Asia. If ethnic conflict demanded so much attention in south Asian politics,[11] its solution consequently required considerably more political resources than would have been the case without it. Assuming that scarcity of initial

10. The World Bank assumes an annual income equivalent to $50 or less as the standard. Eighty-five percent of all absolute poverty is in rural areas and the largest number concentrated in India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The World Bank, *The Assault on World Poverty* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 19.

11. For one account of ethnic politics in south Asia, see J. Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Language Demands, and National Development in India," in N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity, Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 466–88.

political resources is a normal characteristic of the early stages of political development, it may be fair to assume that resources used in integrational promoting reduced the pace of general material development. A close look at group rivalry in this area would suggest that a substantial part of public organizational energy, governmental or otherwise, has been directed to issues relating to the control of resources on behalf of ethnic formations. To the extent this deflects the necessary organizational energy away from material development, it may be assumed to have affected the levels of living of the poorer masses.

This raises an intriguing question regarding the role of ethnic mediation in the political process of a developing country and its impact on the development of better living conditions for the poorer people. Intellectuals from outside may conceptualize social disadvantage in terms of absolute poverty of an economic category of people, but in actual political life poorer groups may find it strategically more important to interpret their disadvantage in terms of specific ethnic groups. It is one thing to define a poverty situation and quite another to define a political situation where people steeped in poverty have to make realistic moves to alter their condition. Given a multi-ethnic society characterized by unequal distribution of advantage among ethnic groups, ethnic competition may provide a significant opportunity to utilize social ties which may be more readily transformed into bases of organized moves for the desired share of resources.

It is not surprising that ethnic groups have been repeatedly utilized as vehicles of lower-class aspirations in multi-ethnic societies. Whether the basis of solidarity has been one of a deprived caste group, disadvantaged religious group, a worse-off regional group, or any other, ethnic formations have provided a medium of mobilization which has taken many forms ranging from occasional movements to organized institutions. To dismiss ethnic mediation on ideal grounds invoking the norms of modernity or rules of revolution is a prerogative of observers with which nobody can quarrel. But realistic studies of political action addressed to the actual structure of group situations and opportunities in multi-ethnic political systems cannot ignore how people define their disadvantage and how they work out strategies for overcoming such disadvantage against groups perceived as immediate adversaries.

SELECTION OF ADVANTAGE

The question of strategy may be stated in clearer terms if we discuss a specific political setting and practice. In the processes of politicization in India during the colonial and postcolonial periods, the perception and expression of class disadvantage have followed several courses. Besides affirming the pure economic rights of the poor, affirmative politics for lower-class rights have often used ethnic mediation as a vehicle of mass mobilization and organization. Unless we opt for a theory of false consciousness, whereby we can dismiss any course of mass mobilization as long as it does not conform to our idealized definition of what ought to be true consciousness, we may be able to discriminate between the types of ethnic mediation which sought to advance the

levels of living of the disadvantaged and those which did not. Whether the expressed affirmative objective actually produced the desired result is, of course, the second question to consider. These questions are further complicated by the fact that a single ethnic movement may incorporate different degrees of class affirmation in different phases of time and regions of operation within the same country.

It is easy to define disadvantage in objective economic terms; but economically disadvantaged groups may have sound practical reasons to expand their perception of disadvantage to include ethnic factors. Historically, during the most intensive phase of the Muslim nationalist movement in pre-partition India, Muslim peasants in Bengal generally remained attached to Muslim nationalism rather than more class-oriented radical movements with predominantly Hindu leadership. It was evident that Muslim solidarity across classes mattered more to poorer Muslim peasants due to their insecurity regarding a lower-class movement led by people with religious ties to a distrusted community which also owned the larger share of land. Thus, communal solidarity based on Islam forged a political bond of security among the lower and upper classes of Muslims in Bengal. This precluded the possibility of peasant alliance across religious communities, including Hindu and Muslim poor peasants. Muslim nationalism gained the loyalty of the poor Muslim peasants of Bengal, although the national level leadership of this movement remained tied to large landholding interests of north India. In fact, in Uttar Pradesh, when the Indian National Congress stepped up its "mass contact" campaign in 1937 among Muslim peasants t build a mass alliance on the basi of class interest, Muslims of al classes treated it as a threat to their communal security and solidarity.[12]

It is not too difficult to understand why Muslim peasants would give priority to communal security over class solidarity, or that they were willing to perceive communal autonomy as a necessary step toward class welfare. The primacy of ethnic group security defined in political terms was not incompatible with the expectation of greater class benefits in the near future, once a Muslim state came into existence. Particularly in undivided Bengal, the promise of a Muslim homeland was interpreted by Muslim peasants—who also constituted the major part of the population of this province—as a promise of land reform and a higher standard of living. In fact, following the formation of Pakistan, the most rapid and extensive land reform took place precisely in that part which contained Bengali Muslim peasants.[13] Land reform in east Pakistan was facilitated by the fact that most of the landlords were not Muslims, just as it was considerably delayed in the western part, where their counterparts were.

In the politics of ethnic mediation of peasants' interests, especially in

12. The history of Muslim nationalism and its mobilizational variations in different provinces of undivided India is too complicated to be clarified by this condensed account. There are many studies of this phase of political history. To cite one, for example, P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

13. For an account of the politics of land reform in Pakistan, see Hung-Chao Tai, *Land Reform and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), esp. pp. 65 ff. To what extent it significantly improved the levels of the peasants is another story.

the eastern part of the subcontinent, the lower classes gained greater control of political and economic resources through the process of autonomy. To be sure, access to land was only a beginning toward realization of an improved level of living, and the complex series of steps needed to carry this initial gain forward were subsequently impeded by the mediating leadership.[14] However, the impact of the redistribution of rural assets on the rural poor has to be considered in the context of what they perceive as the sum of political and economic advantages resulting from ethnic autonomy. If these two advantages are valued together, then the evaluation of one to the exclusion of the other may be unfair. While evaluating isolated benefits, one should not wish away the fact that political situations in poor countries rarely offer the privilege of divisibility of issues which rational theorists of development normally enjoy.

REGIONALISM AND CONTROL OF RESOURCES

Among the various social divisions in contemporary South Asia, regional division has probably raised some of the most complicated issues concerning development. Regional loyalty and its impact on development, though important for most parts of South Asia, will be considered here in the context of post-Independence politics in India. Here we will select only one dimension, that of the relation between regionalism and its impact on the share of developmental gains of the poorer population. The choice of regionalism is dictated by the fact that its salience in Indian political development is commonly recognized by all political groups within the country. Theorists from abroad have treated it more according to their intellectual taste rather than what it means to the people in political practice. Conventional economic theories of development reveal a trained insensitivity to regions. They remain a secondary consideration in comparison with such abstractions as sectors and target populations. Political theories of development generally treat regionalism as a threat to national coherence, though some occasionally grant it a possible positive value due to its role of generating political participation through regional mobilization.

Regional demands for autonomy may be said to assume the existence of regions as coherent political units endowed with the right to represent the aspirations of their constituents and to manage their internal affairs as well as to make claims on national resources in competition with other regions. The political coherence of the regional units need not be expressed in terms of spatial or economic unity of characteristics as it is normally assumed in regional analysis.[15] Political regionalism in India, for example, has used the

14. By 1960, in the eastern part of Pakistan, only 3 percent of farms were of 12.5 acres and above and covered 19 percent of farm area. Compared to this, in the western part the corresponding figures were. 23 percent of farms were of 12.5 acres and above, covering 68 percent of farm area. For details, see S. R. Bose, "East-West Contrast in Pakistan's Agricultural Development," in *Economic Development in South Asia*, ed. E. A. G. Robinson and M. Kidron (London. Macmillan, 1970), pp. 135 ff. How more egalitarian access did not necessarily result in the welfare of the rural poor due to a complex set of causes is explored in the same author's "Trend of Real Income of the Rural Poor in East Pakistan, 1949–66," *Pakistan Development Review*, 1968, pp. 452–88.

15. In this respect, it is interesting to note the distinct discomfort of regional planners

logics of language, culture, religion, economic welfare, and administrative coherence as the bases of mobilization and group-rivalry within the nation. Despite occasional indications of secessionism, most of the regional movements never seriously went beyond claiming intranational resource shares.[16] In this sense, the political meaning of regionalism can probably best be understood as a search for an intermediate control system between the center and the periphery for competitive advantage in the national arena.

Large-scale mass movements have served as instruments of regional demands from the early years of India's post-colonial existence. Significant regional disparities were inherited by the new state. The uneven distribution of resources and the unequal development of such resources had already created political resentment during the later phase of the colonial period. After Independence a new structure of opportunity was provided by the parliamentary democratic, federal system of government as well as by the prior commitment of the ruling organization—the Congress party—to alleviate regional disadvantage. In spite of this prior commitment, however, the ruling leadership wavered in its response to regional demands; although, as mass pressure was mobilized, it gradually conceded the major demands. The ethnic dimension of these regional movements, particularly those addressed to the reorganization of states on the grounds of autonomy for language communities, has been noted and analyzed by many observers. But regional mediation has been generally treated in the context of its impact on the nation rather than in terms of what it has done for the disadvantaged people of the regions.

Regional autonomy demands had distressed the central authorities since the reorganized smaller states were presumed to be less effective in managing resources than the larger, original states were expected to be.[17] Moreover, the autonomy-seeking states were also expected to be centers of disaffection due to their promotion of ethnic mobilization.

In fact, the overall record of the reorganized states clearly indicates that both these fears were unfounded. Of the six major regional movements that attained statehood within the Indian Union, five have achieved the highest growth level in the country. Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Gujarat are respectively ranked as the most advanced states in terms of per capita income levels attained in recent years (see table 1). For the other two, if the 15 major states of India can be grouped into advanced, average, and backward states, then per capita income will place Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pra-

with political perceptions of regionalism. See, for example, L. S. Bhat, *Regional Planning in India* (Calcutta Statistical Publishing Society, 1972), ch. I

16. For accounts of phases of regionalism which challenged the nation in certain parts of India, see J. Das Gupta, *Language Conflict and National Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 191 ff., and P. R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 17 ff.

17. The item cited in note 11 traces some of these details. Andhra Pradesh was conceded in 1952 by splitting Madras separating the Tamil Nadu area, Bombay was split into Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960, and Punjab was broken into Punjab and Haryana in 1966. Several smaller states in other areas were conceded later.

TABLE 1

PER CAPITA INCOME: MAJOR STATES IN INDIA: AN APPROXIMATE AID TO COMPARISON* (RUPEES)

STATES	1950–51†	RANK	1960–61‡	RANK	1970–71‡	RANK
Andhra Pradesh	275	9	275	11	569	8
Assam	335	5	315	8	528	11
Bihar	181	14	211	14	426	15
Gujarat	381	3	362	3	778	3
Haryana	N.A.§	N.A.§	327	5	829	2
Karnataka	287	7	285	10	540	10
Kerala	304	6	265	12	590	7
Madhya Pradesh	236	13	288	9	550	9
Maharashtra	373	4	409	1	775	4
Orissa	252	11	211	14	496	14
Punjab	404	2	374	2	995	1
Rajasthan	256	10	318	6	600	6
Tamil Nadu	245	12	336	4	644	5
Uttar Pradesh	270	8	246	13	523	13
West Bengal	471	1	317	7	524	12

SOURCES: National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), 1967; State Government Reports, and Quarterly Economic Report, IIPO, 83 (April–June 1975)

* Note the difference of computation between column 1 and the rest.

† State income estimates at 1960–61 prices by NCAER

‡ State domestic product estimates at current prices by respective states

§ The figure for Haryana is included with Punjab, of which it was a part.

desh in the highest rank in the second and third group respectively. If we go beyond the level of income by state and consider other developmental indicators, then the ranking of these states will improve further. Both these states had lower ranks in terms of per capita income in 1950 when they were parts of one state.

Besides attaining higher relative income in aggregate terms, all six of these states have also demonstrated that instead of threatening the nation they could serve as the most valuable partners of the center. The intensity of ethnic loyalty within each of these new states declined after it attained autonomy. In some of these states, political attention turned toward the relatively more backward regions within the boundary of the state. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, autonomy demands emerged from its own backward area in the form of Telangana movement. This time the symbol of mobilization shifted to economic factors. The success of the use of the language symbol for mobilization prepared the ground for switching attention to other demands, based on aspects other than language.

REGION AND WELFARE

While it is evident that regional autonomy has been associated with developing the resources of these regions, improving their status within the nation, and contributing more to national development than those states, in particular, regarded by many as the integral center of the nation (such as the Hindi region, divided into several large states), we need to ask what regional autonomy has done for its own disadvantaged populations. The demands for regional autonomy were

successful in the face of determined opposition of the central political authorities, due in large measure to the ability of regional leaders to mobilize the support of the poorer masses. What did these masses gain in terms of their share of resources and development? What did the relatively backward areas gain within the regions, especially where intra-regional areal disparity is perceived as an important problem?

It is not easy to deal with the first question, due to the scarcity of evidence on important indicators.[18] The variation in the period of existence of the regionalist states poses another difficulty. Given these problems, one can still notice the uneven impact on the levels of living of the poorer population in these centers of regional movements. If we take the percentage of the rural population living below minimum subsistence levels as a good approximation of mass poverty in Indian states, then various estimates suggest that the number of absolute poor registered a significant increase from 1960–61 to 1967–68 in all of these six states except Andhra Pradesh, where it might have registered a small decline.[19] In 1968–69, the pattern of income distribution estimated for rural people indicates that, taking all households, out of the 14 states in India, Gujarat ranked first in inequality (Gini coefficient 0.466 compared to all India's 0.397), while Tamil Nadu and Punjab, combined with Haryana, shared the fourth rank (0.420).[20] Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra ranked sixth and seventh (0.370 and 0.354, respectively). Inequality among agricultural laborers was the highest in Punjab and Haryana and higher than the national average in Andhra Pradesh.

For a variety of reasons, neither measures of absolute poverty nor measures of relative inequality in terms of income may be the best way to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the state of living in rural India.[21] Nevertheless, in the absence of better instruments, they do tell us that regional movements were less effective in improving welfare of the poor than regional leaders led the masses to believe they would be. And yet, most of these states did experience relatively rapid development of material and human resources.

It would be easy to draw the conclusion that regionalism led to higher development at the state level, resulting in the enrichment of the regional elite without commensurate benefits for the masses. Perhaps the masses supported these movements in the hope that to be ruled by one's own people would mean a larger share for them in the region's developmental gain. It is tempting to infer that the masses were nothing more than pawns in the inter-elite competition for national resources and developmental shares.

However, such facile generalization about the impact of regional movements is not sufficient. That

18. The second question will not be covered here due to space limitation.

19. The relevant estimates are presented in P. K. Bardhan, "Incidence of Poverty in Rural India," in Srinivasan and Bardhan, *Poverty and Income Distribution*, p. 278.

20. These estimates are taken from I. Z. Bhatty, "Inequality and Poverty in Rural India," in ibid., p. 302.

21. For example, income and expenditure estimates do not give us much clue about non-monetary transactions. Also, public welfare expenditure varies from state to state and its impact may be an important element to consider, as has been shown by B. Dey, "Redistribution of Consumer Expenditure through Taxation and Benefits and Level of Living," in *Artha Vijnana*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1976), pp. 20–52.

the intention of the regional elites who dominated these movements was more to pursue their own gain than that of the poorer masses, and that they used mass support to build political resources for these ends, may not be unwarranted conclusions, given the nature of the Indian political system. But even if these conclusions could be justified, several questions would remain unanswered. In the first place, what they intended may not tell us much about what was attained—including unintended consequences. Second, the regional elite may be less homogeneous than many observers would like to believe. In a developing political structure of privilege with relatively open access to political institutions, the scope of intra-elite and inter-elite contests for coalitions with mass groups need not be ruled out. If so, for some of the contestants, the use of mass support for a durable constituency may be congruent with their self-interest as well. This still may not give the poor what they desire in the process of national development, but the improvement of agricultural wages, to take one example, may not be politically or economically irrational even under the assumption of elite enrichment or dominance.

Since the regionalist states generally were also the higher adopters of technological change in agriculture[22] and since the Green Revolution was disparaged as a rich farmers' revolution even before it reached full stride in the areas where it was adopted,[23] the temptation to write off the possibility of absolute gains of the poorer rural masses has been quite strong. The presentation of evidence here has taken into account the years marking the beginning of the so-called Green Revolution. Since Punjab has had the highest agricultural performance, its early record of productive growth, increased inequality, and displacement of rural labor has been mostly cited as the star evidence in favor of a theory of inevitable impoverishment. However, more recent evidence—this, too, covering the early seventies and hence five years after the inception of new technological ways—indicates that even with larger gains for rich farmers, it does not necessarily follow that the poorer farmers lost. For example, one of the recent studies shows that in Punjab, while bigger farmers gained more, an upward shift in the incomes of almost all the farmers in the state occurred simultaneously.[24] Early findings of impoverishment or the later studies

22 The ranking of states on the combined score for three improved agricultural practices (seed, chemical fertilizers, and cultivation practice) shows that out of 14 major states, Punjab ranked 1, Gujarat 2, Madras 5, and Andhra Pradesh 6. Haryana was included in the rank for Punjab. Maharashtra lagged with a rank score of 8. These refer to the initial period of adoption of improved practice. See Program Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, Government of India, *Regional Variations in Social Development and Levels of Living*, vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1968), p. 48.

23 The critical literature on Green Revolution is growing. For early criticism, see F. R. Frankel, *India's Green Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). The research was done in 1969.

24. The author states: "The proportion of farmers in the lower income categories increased. . . per capita income group of below Rs 800 per annum declined from 42.86 percent in 1967–68 to only 26.99 percent in 1969–70. . . " see S. S. Johl, "Gains of the Green Revolution: How They Have Been Shared in Punjab," *Journal of Development Studies*, April 1975, p. 185. A more systematic survey in this direction is by D. Lal, "Agricultural Growth, Real Wages, and the Rural Poor in India," in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26 June 1976, pp. A-47–A-61.

finding reduction of poverty may *both err in their enthusiasm;* but *at least taken together they offer a better sense of appreciation of the development of this and other similar regions than the studies which discovered what they preferred to find.*

CONCLUSION

The politics of regionalism designed to use ethnic mobilization for control of resources and developmental shares has clearly demonstrated in India that it is not necessarily the wild-fire that many theorists, policy makers, and bureaucrats had expected. It used the national framework of rules to expand the advantage of regions in competition with both other regions and the central political authorities. Given the inheritance of multi-ethnic social formation and severe inter-regional disparities, poorer masses supported regional formations because their expectation of material security and enhancement was combined with their expectation of political security and advancement.

Regional movements were not merely reflections of socially formulated demands. These movements, in fact, helped formulate not merely elite demands for control but, as they went along, mass demands as well. By making regional units more coherent and thus more comprehensible for the masses who shared the symbols of this coherence, it prepared the ground for more intensive mass demands—some of which took the form of subregional claims for autonomy as a means for redressing disadvantages at those levels or, in other cases, class oriented demands.[25]

Since these regional movements *were led by middle- or upper-class leaders, it is not surprising that they made relatively greater gains. But as we have shown before, this does not mean that the poor did not gain anything out of their role in these movements.* To say that the poor also gained or that the two gains are compatible is not to say that regionalism is synonymous with social justice. On the other hand, not to recognize the gains of the poor or the possibility of such gains in the process of productive development may mean underestimating the political skill and flexibility of elites. One does not have to like unequal development to recognize the political feasibility of unjust systems. In fact, a refusal to recognize the political power of unjust systems to buy mass support may be precisely the attitude which makes it difficult to change such systems. In this sense, if the regional modes of institutional arrangement in multi-ethnic countries cannot be wished away, these would need more politically perceptive attention than what has so far been conceded by development studies addressed to poverty alleviation.

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25. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, both these aspects attained prominence. The concept of a subregion, as used here, refers to a political bond which ties together identifiable parts of a region, as defined earlier in this paper, used for making certain claims on the regional or national authorities. Beside Andhra Pradesh, subregional political movements have also been prominent in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and elsewhere. Sometimes the literature on regional analysis divides states in India by physical, economic, or other criteria. Though the political concept of subregion needs to be distinguished from economic concepts of subregional clusters, the relation between the political and economic aspects of subregional movements demands careful attention.

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Police and Military in the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict

By Cynthia H. Enloe

ABSTRACT: Militaries and police forces are rarely neutral actors in ethnic conflicts. They are typically ethnically imbalanced as a result both of historical socioeconomic maldistributions of opportunities and of deliberate recruitment strategies pursued by central government elites. The modernization and professionalization of security forces is no guarantee of their communal or political neutrality. Lasting resolution of inter-ethnic and ethnic-state conflicts require a reorganization of police and militaries thorough enough so that vulnerable communities' security is substantially enhanced.

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A STANDARD definition of the state is that public authority which enjoys a monopoly on coercive power. In practical terms, this means that a state is a state—not just one contender for power among many jostling rivals—because it controls the country's police and military forces. A state regime that tolerates or is incapable of disallowing the existence of private armies or insurgent forces within its jurisdiction is thus something less than a full-fledged state. It is easy to slip into the assumption that the state in any society is the ultimate arbiter of inter-group disputes, a neutral umpire setting the rules of the competitive game and stepping into the fray forcibly if the rules are violated and civil peace thereby jeopardized. Following this conventional assumption, it is likewise easy to imagine the coercive arms of the state are also above the dispute, simply instruments of the statist umpire. In reality, such is rarely the case.

State authorities often align with some resident ethnic communities against others and view the perpetuation of unequal distributions of power among various ethnic groups as ensuring the state regime's own hegemony. In turn, the coercive arms of the state—the police and the military—are also likely in multi-ethnic societies to be designed and deployed with quite conscious attention to the communal composition that will be politically optimal for the nervous central government. When such an armed force is sent into an ethnic conflict, it will be seen by both the central elite and communal dissidents to be not merely a neutral actor; it will be recognized as a reflection of the current ethnic-political stratification.

Security, like income and influence, is usually unequally distributed in a multi-ethnic society. It is more accurate to analyze the police and military in any country afflicted with ethnic hostilities as being participants with a stake in the outcome, not simply as neutral instruments of a supra-ethnic state authority. The genuine resolution of any ethnic conflict, therefore, will have to entail a reassessment and reorganization of the military and the police. Lasting conflict resolution will require a redistribution of both influence and security. This is a concession that all but the most besieged state elites are unwilling to make. Consequently, most so-called resolutions of ethnic conflicts are half-baked, superficial, and short-lived.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MILITARY-ETHNIC PATTERNS

It was common practice in imperial systems for central regimes to rely on ethnic categories for building the state's military power. The optimal imperial military (usually army, though some imperial navies were also ethnically skewed) had to be both competent and politically reliable—not always an easy combination to achieve. Regimes found it to their advantage to recruit soldiers from those ethnic groups which were stereotypically portrayed as warrior races. It was all the better if such groups were the same communities that provided the imperial system with its civilian leadership. But if that pool was either not suitable or reliable, then the military recruiters were sent out to the more remote corners of the empire to enlist men from "backward" but "martial" ethnic groups.[1]

1. One of the fullest accounts of an empire's creation and use of the "martial race" concept

While they might not have been as sophisticated or as skilled as the empire's more central and cosmopolitan ethnic groups, at least the regime that recruited them could be certain that they were too numerically and economically weak and eventually too dependent on the government for their livelihoods to pose a serious political threat to the regime.

The military-ethnic pattern so common throughout imperial systems is a variation on the familiar divide-and-rule formula for forestalling state-destabilizing disaffection. But with the fall of the Ottoman, Ching, and Hapsburgh empires and with the shrinkage of the global colonial systems of the British, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Belgians, this blatant military-ethnic manipulation would seem to have disappeared. The military of the modern nation-state was to be just that, national. Allegedly, the new nation-state regimes would trade in the divide-and-rule recruiting strategy for a more modern citizen army formula.[2] The reformed state military—just like the state civil service and courts—would belong to no group in particular but to all citizens in general. Indeed, this assumption underpins the public ideology legitimatizing virtually every state military in the world today. This official portrait of the nation-state military is what allows a regime to send military units into communal strife under the guise of acting as a neutral, or a least supra-ethnic, instrument of authority.

It comes as a surprise that sending in the military, or particular units of tne military, exacerbates rather than blunts ethnic hostilities only to those observers who leave this official ideological portrait unexamined. For many postimperial militaries remain ethnically imbalanced. The persistence of ethnic distortions is the result of perpetuation of earlier imperial recruiting preferences. But it is also due to present regimes' continued reliance on communal categories for defining who is most competent to be a soldier and who is most politically trustworthy when equipped with a rifle, tank, or jet fighter. In other words, the waning of imperial forms of control has indeed made ethnic divide-and-rule formulas and ethnically-based military recruitment less legitimate and acknowledgeable. However, imperial states' decline certainly has not done away with the practice of using ethnic formulas for building state militaries. Moreover, the perpetuation of ethnicity's saliency in military recruitment, deployment, and promotions is not confined simply to the least developed countries.

In Third World countries such as Kenya, Guyana, Trinidad, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the Phillippines, Iraq, Laos, Thailand, Peru, and Guatemala, militaries fall far short of mirroring, even roughly, the multi-ethnic societies which they allegedly serve.[3] But such countries are not alone. In industrialized countries as well, militaries are

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is in the following study of Scottish soldiers in the British military: John Prebble, *Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt, 1743–1804* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975).

2. Samuel E. Finer, "State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 84–163.

3. Among the systematic studies of ethnic-military patterns in Third World countries are: J. Bayo Adekson, "Army in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Nkrumah's Ghana, 1957–1966," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 1976), pp. 251–72; A. R. Luckham, *The Nigerian Military:*

ethnically skewed. In the Soviet Union the military, especially in the officer corps, is disproportionately Russian; in Canada the military is far away from meeting its official goal of 28 percent Francophone; in Yugoslavia Croats have long complained about the military's preponderence of Serbs (though the most senior ranks are carefully balanced ethnically); in France, now militant Breton nationalists note bitterly that poor Breton peasants have rarely wielded influence over national security policy yet historically have provided successive Paris governments with human cannon fodder; and in the United States, from 1775 down to the present, blacks have been recruited only when white manpower ran short and then have been demobilized when their numbers in the ranks grew so large as to make security officials in Washington nervous about the military's "reliability."[4]

Modernization, as we now know, is just as likely to exacerbate interethnic hostilities as to mollify them. Similarly, modernizing a country's military has little to do with de-ethnicizing it. There is nothing incompatible between a man learning how to use the latest managerial techniques to keep troops supplied or being trained to handle the most sophisticated artillery weapons, on the one hand, and thinking of himself ethnically as Russian, Kikuyu, or Afrikaner, on the other hand. In fact, many civilian elites who are responsible for up-grading armed forces may shy away from equipping just anyone in the society with such valuable skills. Civilian officials will only feel comfortable if they know that the men acquiring such techniques and weapons are wedded to the existing state regime by bonds of communal loyalty above and beyond the legalistic obligations of national citizenship.

Consequently, the professionalization of most militaries' officer corps, the increasing reliance on advanced technology, and the elaborate divisions of labor between various branches and special units should not be accepted as evidence that any country's military is thereby less

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A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960–1967 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1971), Alasdair D. Drysdale, "Ethnicity and the Syrian Officer Corps: Some Theoretical Perspectives," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Louisville, 28 November 1975, Cynthia H. Enloe, "Malaysia's Military in the Interplay of Economic and Ethnic Change," in John A. Lent, *Cultural Pluralism in Malaysia* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1977), Valerie Plane Bennett and Donald L. Horowitz, "Civil-Military Relations in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The Case of Ceylon," in a special issue of the *Journal of Asian Affairs* on ethnicity in Asian militaries, edited by Dewitt Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe, forthcoming, 1977.

4. Industrialized countries' militaries have been far less systematically analyzed from an ethnic vantagepoint, but valuable information is contained in, *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, vol. 3A (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1969), Robin Alison Remington, "Armed Forces and Society in Yugoslavia," in *Political Military Systems: Comparative Perspective*, ed. Catherine McArdle Kelleher (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974), Warren Young, "Black, Brown and Khaki: The New Commonwealth Immigrant and the British Armed Forces," in *The Military, the Police and Domestic Order: British and Third World Experiences*, ed. Cynthia H. Enloe and Ursula Semin-Panzer (London: Richardson Institute, 1976), Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Red Army as the Instrument of National Integration," paper presented at the conference on the Role of the Military in Communist Societies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 21–22 November 1975, Jack D. Foner, *Blacks and the Military in American History* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974).

communal, better able to serve as neutral forces in an ethnic domestic conflict. Similarly, when analyzing the internal character of any military, the observer should not presume that the more senior an officer is, or the more technologically sophisticated a branch is, the more communally disinterested he or she is. Calling in the air force to help suppress ethnic dissidents in Rhodesia is calling in essentially the most racially white branch, calling in the air force in Peru is calling in the least Indian branch; calling in the air force in Israel is calling in the most European branch.[5]

POLICE-MILITARY ETHNIC RELATIONS

The police are any regime's first line of defense. Most police forces in the world today are arms of the central government. The British and American police forces stand out not because they are ethnically representative of their respective citizenries, but because administratively they are more decentralized forces than most. A police force's ethnic composition obviously will affect how it performs its role in safeguarding particular individuals or suppressing actions of particular groups. What groups predominate in the ranks and officer corps—as well as in the interior ministries—will be determined in part by the distribution of employment and education opportunities in a society. Police forces often have been ladders of mobility for less advantaged ethnic communities when the career of policeman has been shunned by those groups that enjoy greater access to more prestigious and financially rewarding jobs. But few regimes, especially once they have experienced their first unsettling taste of ethnic disaffection, are willing to leave police recruitment to chance. While far less blatant or politically celebrated than ethnic manipulations within the military, police force recruitments are often reflections of the current government's security officials' notions of which groups are most politically dependable, which most suspect. State regimes often design police forces with an eye to their own security, not to the security of the public at large.

The ethnic composition of the police may or may not replicate that of the military. When they are essentially the same—as in the African-dominated police and army in Guyana or the Afrikaner dominated police and military in South Africa —then replacing police units with army units in the midst of a communal riot may make little difference.[6] If ethnic violence or ethnically-based insurgency escalates to the point that the regime concludes that the police are no longer able to maintain peace and order, the army may be deployed to either supplement or replace the police. Should the police and army be ethnically dissimilar—or, as important, be perceived by the combatants to be ethnically dissimilar—then such a strategic decision could basically alter the dynamics of the conflict.

Thus, for example, in Malaysia's Malay-Chinese communal riots in 1969, in East Pakistan's violence on

5. I have tried to explore the ethnic dimensions in navies and air forces in chapter 5 of my *Ethnic Soldiers A Cross National Study of Militaries and Communalism*, forthcoming

6. Data on ethnicity in the South African military is included in Cynthia H. Enloe, "Ethnic Factors in the Evolution of the South African Military," *Issue*, vol 5, no. 4 (Winter 1975), pp 21–8.

the eve of its break from Pakistan, as well as in Ulster in 1972, decisions were made by the respective central regimes to transfer chief responsibility for quelling ethnic conflict from the police to the army. In each instance, the military units that were sent in were ethnically different from the police already deployed. In Malaysia the police were—and were seen by civilians to be—more multi-ethnic than the all-Malay Royal Malay Regiment.[7] In Pakistan, the police contained more Bengalis than the more heavily Punjabi and Pathan army units.[8] In Northern Ireland, the police was virtually an all-Irish Protestant force, whereas the British army units sent to the region deliberately excluded Irish regiments and thus were composed of English, Welsh, and Scottish soldiers.[9]

The consequences of these substitutions of army units for police were not uniform, but in each instance the switch did alter the basic political and communal dynamics of the conflict. In all three instances, as well, the deployment of military units with particular ethnic colorations changed communal participants' notions of which side the regime supported. In Malaysia the deployment of the Royal Malay regiment made Malaysian Chinese more anxious and alienated. In East Pakistan, the deployment of non-Bengali troops in surprise raids against unarmed Bengali civilians became the catalyst for outright civil war in 1971. In Northern Ireland, Ulstermen on both Protestant and Catholic sides of the barricades interpreted deployment of British troops as London's repudiation of the Protestant-controlled Ulster police and indirectly of the Protestant-controlled local regime as well.

At present one can see other communally tense situations in which governments are weighing the strategic effectiveness of replacing police with soldiers to repress intercommunal hostilities and protests of certain groups directly against the central government. In mid-1977 the Bhutto regime in Pakistan is under severe pressure from opposition groups charging the government with electoral fraud. Yet the regime is reluctant to send troops into one of the most opposition-oriented major cities, Lahore, because Lahore is a Punjabi metropolis and Bhutto's military remains heavily Punjabi. Thus, while the army has been relatively compliant in carrying out protest suppression in non-Punjabi regions, the government cannot be certain that it would be similarly obedient should it be ordered to fire on fellow-Punjabis.[10]

Sending in the military to quell ethnically-based conflict or political protest is, in a sense, a sign to the country at large and to the outside world that the central state elites have lost control of a situation. So long as a conflict remains merely "a police matter" it can be portrayed as something less than a fundamental challenge to the existing order. The

7. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "The Bayonet and the Truncheon. Army-Police Relations in Malaysia," in *Journal of Asian Affairs*, forthcoming, 1977.

8. J. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1974), p. 179. Richard F. Nyrop et al., *Area Handbook for Bangladesh* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 291–93.

9. For historical analyses of the ethnic-police pattern in Ireland, see, Stanley H. Palmer, "The Irish Police Experiment: The Beginnings of Modern Police in the British Isles, 1785–1795," *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 56, no. 3 (December 1975), p. 411; Arthur Hezlet, *The 'B' Specials* (London: Pan Books, 1972).

10. *New York Times*, 22 April 1977.

desire to maintain a low profile combined with an awareness that the military's dissimilar ethnic composition may prompt a regime to expand its police so that it has an increasingly coercive capacity.

Thus, in a host of multi-ethnic countries today, one can see the expansion and militarization of police forces. Just how that transformation is accomplished ethnically could have important effects on the impact of future police operations on resolution of ethnic conflicts. Where the militarized police units and special riot squads are deliberately designed by central governments so as to be ethnically cohesive and ethnically compatible with an already ethnically skewed central regime, such police expansion could undermine the police's effectiveness as an ameliorator of ethnic conflict.[11] The new heavily armored police units might indeed be more politically reliable in the regime's eyes; but they will be so ethnically lopsided that whenever they are sent into a communally tense situation their very presence will exacerbate the tensions.

MILITARY-ETHNIC CHANGE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The ethnic imbalances in the state militaries and police forces of multi-ethnic countries rarely catch the eyes of outsiders trying to analyze and offer solutions to communal conflicts. Journalists and social scientists focus instead on political parties and interest groups. But frequently they do become important to the local disputants themselves. The ethnic groups who are under-represented in state security forces see the military-police imbalances as reflections of their overall political vulnerability. For their part, the more powerful groups see their control of state coercive resources as a guarantee of their continuing hegemony.

The question of actually reorganizing the military and police as part of a serious attempt to resolve ethnic conflicts is often shunted aside for the very reason that it does come so close to questioning the basic political structure and redistributing essential political power. Or, if the question is dealt with at all in inter-ethnic negotiations, elites may consider it only on a superficial level. They may be willing to alter recruiting criteria for the ordinary ranks, they may promote a token minority officer or two; but they will not redesign the fundamental strategy of state security. That is, the Sudanese Arab-dominated government in its efforts to end the communally based civil war between the Arab north and non-Muslim black south might have been willing to absorb southern guerrillas into the regular army as a price of peace, but it was unlikely that it would offer a southern rebel military leader the defense portfolio or give southerners the power to administer security organs in their own region. Likewise, in the United States in the aftermath of the racial urban riots of the mid-1960s there was at least a formal campaign to recruit more blacks into city police forces; but no one in Washington's inner circles proposed that a black civil rights leader be given the post of FBI director or secretary of defense or chairman of the National Security Council.

11. For example, see Ahmad, "The Bayonet and the Truncheon"; Cynthia H. Enloe, "Ethnicity and Militarization: Factors Shaping the Roles of Police in Third World Nations," *Journal of Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol 11, no 3 (Fall 1976).

Changing the ethnic composition of the military may be least resisted if it is tackled at a time when inter-ethnic hostilities have not reached the point of open conflict. That is, it is most politically feasible at a time when the military does not seem crucial for central regime survival. Thus, in both Belgium and Canada, over the last several years, there have been official programs to increase the numbers and officer proportions of previously underrepresented groups, Flemings in Belgium and Francophones in Canada.[12] Both efforts are the result of recent politicized mobilization by the underrepresented groups, not of the independent foresight of the central regimes. Despite the Belgian and Canadian armed forces being free from any immediate role in domestic conflict, there is resistence to such reorganization. Military professionals in each country claim that linguistic difficulties inherent in such programs will weaken the defense capabilities of the state.

More prominent among instances of ethnic reorganization of militaries and police forces as part of conflict resolution agreements are those that occur during ethnically-based civil wars. If the reorganizations in relatively peaceful Canada and Belgium are difficult, those urged in the throes of a domestic war, when police and military are direct participants, are even more problematic. They are given serious attention by central elites only if the war looks interminable and thus serious concessions have to be made. So long as the regime believes that it will be able to suppress the ethnic dissidents before reaching the threshold of intolerable costs to the state (in manpower and budgetary funds), it is unlikely to make more than mere token gestures at increasing the dissident group's inclusion in the police and military.

In the Philippines there has been a civil war going on for five years. The conflict involves three sets of combatants: the south's native Muslims, organized into the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); the Christian-dominated government of President Marcos; and his Christian supporters in the south who are land-hungry migrants urged to move to the "empty" lands of Mindanao by the government. During the civil war the Philippines constabulary (the police fall under the defense ministry's jurisdiction) and the Philippines military have expanded dramatically in funding, manpower, and political influence.

At the same time as the state security apparatus has grown, Mindanao's Muslim community has grown more cohesive, thanks in large part to the development of an effective military-political organization of their own. Any lasting solution to the conflict that has plagued the southern Philippines will have to include agreements about the role of the military and police in the south and the part that Muslims can play in those forces.[13] Ever since they were besieged first by Spanish and later by American military forces in the colonial era, Philippine Muslims have defined their own problems in terms of their inability to provide for their own security. The influx of migrant settlers from the tenancy-burdened islands in the northern Philippines only intensified that

12. The recommendations for reorganizing Canada's military ethnically are included in *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*.

13. Lela Garner Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 49, no. 3 (Fall 1976), pp. 405–13.

sense of vulnerability. By the time the Marcos regime in 1977 reached a tentative agreement with the MNLF leaders to call a ceasefire and permit a referendum on the question of regional autonomy, Muslims were so numerically outnumbered by Christian settlers that they comprised majorities in only five of the south's 13 provinces. Not surprisingly, when the referendum was held in April 1977, MNLF leaders called for an electoral boycott by Muslims. The boycott's effectiveness, together with the Christian preponderance in most of the southern provinces, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the opponents by autonomy.

With that defeat, the fabric of the Marcos-MLNF agreement was revealed in all its flimsiness. For from the very outset, in addition to the obvious disadvantages Muslims would suffer at the polls, there were serious doubts about that section of the agreement which assured Muslims that hereafter they would be responsible for security in their home region. While MLNF leaders interpreted that to mean that Muslims would not only man, but direct local police units, Christian civilian and military officials presumed that Manila would retain effective control over all security forces in the south, even if there were more Muslims in the ranks. The Marcos government could scarcely afford, it was reasoned, to alienate the military and constabulary after they had lost so many men in the southern conflict and had become the mainstay of the Marcos martial law governing system.[14]

The Philippines' case is not exceptional. There have been numerous instances in which civil wars have become in effect wars between a central government and its armed forces controlled by one or two ethnic groups, on the one hand, and a disaffected ethnic group, on the other. In such instances—in Burma, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burundi, Iraq—the ethnic dissidents are likely to perceive correctly that they are not confronting merely a heavily armed, acommunal modern state security force, but a communally-aligned force intent upon using state authority and weapons to maintain the ethnic status quo. They are unlikely to consider their grievances genuinely satisfied until there is some guarantee that they will in the future be more capable of securing their own safety. If the dissidents are defeated, the central regime will not have to make such concessions, though it may be sensitive enough to persisting hostility to make at least some narrowly circumscribed moves to bring the defeated community into the state's forces. For instance, the Communist Chinese regime, some years after defeating the Tibetans, are now bringing Tibetans into the Peoples Liberation Army to serve chiefly outside Tibet, as well as into the PLA-directed local militias. Similarly, the Indian central government persuaded its dissident Naga community to come to terms after a prolonged military conflict and allowed for the creation of a Naga unit within the centrally-administered army. In Iraq, the government defeated the outnumbered, outgunned Kurdish minority and then absorbed more Kurds into the Iraqi army, though to be deployed particularly in the south far from their own traditional mountain territory. Such moves by central governments are not steps toward genuine inter-

14. Rodney Tasker, "Peace on Plebiscite Choice for Marcos," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 March 1977, pp. 8–9.

ethnic, ethnic-state harmony. They are more accurately seen as testimony to the central state's capacity to use a politically loyal military with superior resources to suppress ethnic protest or coopt it.

NATIONAL DISINTEGRATION AND MILITARY REBUILDING

During revolution and decolonization, old political structures are replaced by new, and the rationales legitimizing state authority are transformed. At these crucial times in political history, the military and police relationships with the public are redefined. Such a redefinition may include a new relationship with the country's several ethnic communities. Just how soundly and sincerely that new relationship is instituted by the new state leadership will determine how viable the policy will be in the decades that follow. In both the Soviet Union and China, the Communist revolutionary leadership moved sometimes ambivalently, sometimes simply cautiously when deciding how to relate the new state military to the minority ethnic groups, non-Russians in the former and non-Han groups in the latter. At first, Soviet and Chinese revolutionary strategists and state-builders allowed certain ethnic minorities to remain exempt from military participation and others to join in ethnic units composed of members of their own group. But gradually, each revolutionary regime felt more secure and thus made fewer and fewer concessions to ethnic minorities in their central security designs. China does not have universal military conscription, so though there are no longer communally identified units, pressures on non-Han males to enlist in a Han dominated military wax and wane as Peking's nervousness about the loyalties of minority peoples waxes and wanes.[15] In the Soviet Union universal conscription compels male youths of all ethnic groups to serve in the Red Army. There they experience not only military training but a program of cultural Russification. Whether this experience has had the effect of lessening Russian/non-Russian communal distrust is questionable. Such programs of forced intramilitary contact between ethnic groups may only intensify non-Russians' awareness of how low they stand in the country's ethnic hierarchy and the extent to which the political system created by the revolution remains a Russian dominated system.[16] Therefore, simply mixing the ranks ethnically does not ensure communal peace if the basic concept of security and the power to define state security policies remains biased against certain groups.

In Lebanon today there is a rather different sort of process of state-rebuilding taking place. The reconstruction follows not a revolution, but a civil war that thoroughly shattered the state's authority. The collapse of the state system was signified by the virtual disintegration of those two institutions which are the instruments-of-last-resort of any state: the police and military. Lebanon's pre-1975 police and military both were dominated by the Christian community, especially by its Maronite segment. There were Muslims in both forces, more in the

15. Peking's shifts in pressures on non-Han minorities are cogently analyzed in June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).

16. Rakowska-Harmstone, "Red Army", Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975), pp. 186–89.

police because of its lower prestige, but most were confined to the ranks.[17] As is so often the case in ethnically fragmented societies, the ethnic imbalances in the state security forces were more than simply a reflection of the communal problem; they were an active factor exacerbating the problem.

The Christian dominance of the police and military became an increasing source of irritation to Muslims in Lebanon in the 1970s for several reasons. First, the military had been kept deliberately small and passive in its mission so as to lessen its likelihood of setting off communal disturbances. Its political importance was perhaps greatest for intra-Christian communal politiking. Various rival Christian leaders over the years had sought to build factional bases of support within the officer corps. But as the Middle East international conflict spread, the Lebanese military proved inadequate precisely because of its combination of small size and communal imbalance. It could not and would not deter the incursions of the stronger Israeli military which crossed Lebanese borders in pursuit of Palestinian guerrillas. Muslim spokesmen protested that the Christian-run national security apparatus was unable to provide security for the country's inhabitants and displayed its bias against Palestinian Muslims and Muslims in general. When the security forces stepped in to end a Palestinian workers' strike, the image of a Christian armed force confronting a Muslim citizenry became even sharper. Now the ethnic inadequacy of the Lebanese military was not simply in its Christian-Muslim disproportions, but in its exclusion of the increasingly politically important Palestinian community.

The Lebanese police and military were ineffective in controlling the heightened intercommunal violence for two reasons. Their commanders and civilian superiors were reluctant to deploy them because they feared that involving either force in the conflict would impose too severe a strain on their men and eventually split the ranks. In addition, the forces were ineffective, even countereffective, since when they were sent into Muslim-Christian hostilities they were often perceived by Muslims as essentially Christian forces. Thus they only further deepened hostilities. Lebanese Christian elites refused to comply with the demands by Muslim leaders that the military be placed under the control of an intercommunal security council and that more Muslims be brought into the services, particularly into the officer corps. Ultimately, police and military both disintegrated, many of their members joining the private armies on both sides. By 1976 one local observer noted that, ". . . here we are with three armies, 2 police forces, 22 militias, 42 parties, 9 Palestinian organizations, 4 radio stations and 2 television stations."[18]

The Syrian army took over the role of Lebanon's state security force. Syrians correctly concluded that the first priority in rebuilding the Lebanese political system was

17. Abdo I. Baaklini, "Civilian Control of the Military in Lebanon. A Legislative Perspective," in *Civilian Control of the Military*, ed. Claude E. Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), Moshe Ma'oz, "Homogeneity and Pluralism in the Middle East: The Case of Lebanon," in Willem A. Veenhoven, *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 194–95.

18. Quoted in Norman F. Howard, "Tragedy in Lebanon," *Current History*, vol. 72, no. 423 (January 1977), p. 2.

to reconstruct the military and police on a basis that would permit a viable and multi-ethnic state. The man chosen by the Syrians and the Christian Lebanese president to be commander of this recreated force was another Christian career officer, though a man who did not take sides in the civil war. Rightist Christian factions insisted that the security forces be rebuilt in their prewar form, while the Muslims called for constitutional autonomy sufficient to permit Muslims hereafter to control their own security apparatus. It is not an overstatement to say that the ability of the various parties in the conflict to construct a mutually agreed upon police and military will be the key to whether a Lebanese political system can be rebuilt at all.

The Lebanese situation may seem to be communally-instigated political disintegration in extremis. But the importance of construction of a military and police that can win at least minimal legitimacy in the eyes of all ethnic constituencies is reconfirmed elsewhere as well. In Cyprus any solution to Greek-Turkish hostilities will have to include the formation of a locally manned security force to replace Turkish troops. In Rhodesia a principal obstacle to any political resolution is the Africans' strategically wise demand for and the white regime's refusal to permit the interior and defense ministries in any interim government to be transferred to Africans. Likewise in Spain, Basque nationalists are withholding their support for any reconstituted post-Franco political system until they are assured that the centrally controlled police force—which deliberately excludes Basques from paramilitary units posted in the Basque region—is so fundamentally reordered that the state can be trusted to not suppress Basque spokesmen. In Ulster, as well, many perceptive observers have come to the conclusion that so long as the British army has to be stationed there the *hostility* of Protestants as well as *Catholics* toward the British government will deepen. But the British troops cannot be pulled out of Ulster until some formula agreeable to both local communities can be found for reconstituting the police. Thus, the police hold the key not just to the maintenance of peace but to the very rebuilding of a viable political system in Northern Ireland.

CONCLUSION

The police and military frequently are the exacerbators, not the resolvers of conflict in multi-ethnic societies. State regimes that feel insecure because of the ethnic diversity of their constituencies often shore up state security by so skewing the ethnic compositions of their coercive arms that inter-ethnic distrust turns into the alienation of weaker groups from the political system itself. At the same time, such deliberate recruiting and promotion policies often encourage the favored ethnic groups to think of the state as their own special protective agency and thus to resist any demands by weaker groups for a greater role in the army or military.

The domestic regime's ethnic security strategies are often reinforced —not always unwittingly—by foreign donors or sellers of military supplies. Soviet military aid to Iraq reinforced the capacity of the regime to suppress Kurdish nationalists. American military aid and sales to regimes in Taiwan, Indonesia, and Kenya do little to offset the ethnic balances that have existed in those three militaries. British colonial military practices and now

aid and sales programs have helped reinforce ethnic imbalances in the militaries of Malaysia and Guyana. What holds true for military aid and sales programs also is evident in equivalent programs for various police forces. The expansion and militarization of police forces in various ethnically divided countries has accentuated their salience in intercommunal relations. Much of that expansion and militarization has been made possible by sales and donations from foreign patrons.

The resolution of inter-ethnic conflict demands that armies and police forces be examined not as neutral instruments that cope with problems, but as potential causes of the problems as well. Not all the ethnic imbalances in state security forces are the result of deliberate policy design—but more than a few are. Any lasting resolution of ethnic conflict may require that the distribution of political authority and influence in the society be basically reordered and that, as part of that reordering, the police and military be ethnically reconstituted at the top and the bottom. Resolution of inter-ethnic conflict and state-ethnic conflict will be tenuous if the security that is achieved is merely state security and not security for each of the state's resident communities.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 433, September 1977

Majorities and Minorities: A Comparative Survey of Ethnic Violence

By CHRISTOPHER HEWITT

ABSTRACT: Although violent conflict between ethnic groups occurs in many societies, its severity varies considerably. Some societies, such as Lebanon or Cyprus, have experienced protracted conflict which has taken many lives. In other societies, such as Switzerland or Finland, ethnic conflict has been of little importance in recent decades. The political, economic, and demographic situation in 19 multi-ethnic societies is examined to see whether any pattern of majority-minority relations is associated with high or low levels of violence. It is concluded that there is a difference in the characteristics of high violence and low violence societies. Violent multi-ethnic societies are marked by severe political and economic inequality, constitutional differences, and demographic instability. Peaceful multi-ethnic societies are characterized by economic parity between the ethnic groups, adequate political representation of the minority, and political decentralization. The existence of several "deviant" cases, with lower levels of ethnic violence than expected, is noted.

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THIS paper examines ethnic violence in 19 societies and considers some characteristics of the minority-majority relationship which may help explain such violence.

An ethnic group is one whose members differ from members of other groups with regard to one or more ascriptive characteristics (race, language, or religion) and whose members typically feel solidarity with other members of their group and different from members of other groups (a "we-they" feeling). This feeling of distinctiveness leads to interaction, especially intimate interaction, being concentrated within the group. No assumption is made that ethnic differences necessarily lead to the creation of ethnic groups nor that ethnic identities are fixed for all time. However, in all the societies which will be considered, the ethnic cleavages are salient, stable, and unambiguous. In addition, all 19 societies have the following characteristics:

1. They have at least one minority group which constitutes 5 percent or more of the population.

2. The ethnic cleavages are such that the population can be dichotomized into a majority and one or more minorities. Those societies which are so fragmented that every group is a minority and no group may hope to dominate or fear domination by the rest are excluded.

3. They are, or were, democracies with free elections and universal suffrage. Nondemocratic states possess their full share of ethnic problems, but many indicators of the minority situation which will be used in this paper, such as legislative representation, do not exist or do not mean the same thing outside a democratic context. Table 1 lists the countries and minorities which will be considered.

A preliminary survey suggests that perhaps as many as 40 societies meet the above criteria. The 19 societies were selected because information on their ethnic situation was available from case studies or official publications.[1] The exclusion of societies for which information was not readily available may bias the sample in unknown ways. However, the cases are widely dispersed geographically and include societies at various levels of development. The paper first examines the variation in ethnic violence between societies, then it discusses some factors which might be related to ethnic conflict, and in conclusion compares the characteristics of societies with different levels of violence.

ETHNIC VIOLENCE

Ethnic violence is defined as violence between groups drawn from different ethnic communities or violence over any issue that affects the situation of one ethnic community relative to the other. Ethnic based violence is an important and widespread phenomenon. One estimate suggests that worldwide 20 to 30 percent of all domestic violence in 1961–65 was between ethnic groups, and another source calculates that the sum of fatalities in ethnic hostilities during the 1945–70 period exceeded 10 million.[2] Of the societies considered

1. A complete list of all the sources used (over 200 books and articles) would take up too much space. I welcome any comments, corrections, or queries on the information given in this paper.

2. Ted Robert Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, *Violence in America* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), pp. 454, 457, Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), p. 3.

TABLE 1

ETHNIC VIOLENCE BY COUNTRY

MINORITIES	COUNTRY	DEATH/ MILLION WORST YEAR	DEATHS/MILLION WHOLE PERIOD (ANNUAL AVERAGE)	CHARACTERISTICS
Arabs	Zanzibar (1961–64)	45592.0	15273.10	brief rioting, then revolution
Christians	Lebanon (1946–76)	10606.1	684.30	civil war
Turks	Cyprus (1960–74)	500.0	100.00	civil war
Catholics	Northern Ireland (1945–76)	164.7	34.40	protracted terrorism, with rioting
East Indians	Guyana (1961–76)	171.3	13.34	protracted rioting with terrorism
Creoles	Mauritius (1957–76)	33.3	1.72	repeated rioting
Tamils/Moors	Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (1948–76)	29.2	1.56	protracted rioting
Arabs	Israel (1949–76)	24.5	1.46	intermittent riots
Chinese/Indians	Malaysia (1955–76)	15.9	0.72	one major riot
Malays/Indians	Singapore (1959–76)	9.8	0.54	one major riot
Muslims	India (1960–70)	0.7	0.58	chronic rioting
Blacks	U.S.A. (1963–68)	0.4	0.20	Chronic rioting, some terrorism
East Indians	Trinidad (1956–76)	0.9	0.05	brief rioting
French	Belgium (1945–76)	0.6	0.07	frequent rioting
French	Canada (1945–76)	0.1	0.01	intermittent terrorism
French/Italians	Switzerland (1945–76)	0	0	intermittent terrorism
Fijians/Europeans	Fiji	0	0	brief rioting
Swedes	Finland (1945–76)	0	0	—
Maoris	New Zealand (1945–76)	0	0	—

in this paper, only two experienced no intercommunal violence during the postwar period.

However, although very few multiethnic societies completely escaped ethnic violence, there is a striking variation in its incidence and character between countries. Table 1 indicates the type of violence that occurred in each country and gives two measures of its severity; deaths per million in the worst year and deaths per million for the period specified.

The calculations ignore ethnic violence between different communal groups than those noted and do not include violence leading to national

independence. Although the distinction between domestic and international conflict is frequently a subtle one, violence involving troops of two sovereign countries or cross-border terrorism is excluded. The result of these exclusions[3] is that only that violence attributable to the contemporary domestic situation of the minority will be considered.

Ethnic violence takes various forms: civil war, communal rioting, and terrorism. Civil war is marked by widespread conflict between highly organized and heavily armed military units. There is either a struggle for control of the state, as in Zanzibar, or the state fragments and its authority passes to ethnic factions who battle for territory, as in Cyprus and Lebanon. This type of conflict, threatening a revolutionary transformation of the preexisting state, is clearly the most serious kind of ethnic conflict, leading to very high death rates as well as widespread social disruption and property damage.

Communal rioting is of two types. The first involves clashes between civilian crowds rather than between organized military units. The violence is spontaneous and the weapons used are often homemade and primitive. Communal rioting, while it may involve incursions into the other group's areas, does not typically involve attempts to gain or control territory such as occur in civil war situations.[4] Nor is there any serious likelihood that the government will be overthrown by this kind of violence. In this kind of communal rioting there is a widespread willingness to attack members of the other community simply because of their ethnic identity.[5] Communal riots of this type occurred in 12 societies, although their severity varied considerably.

Another type of communal riot does not involve confrontations between rival crowds, but rather clashes between soldiers or police and civilians of one ethnic community together with some looting and property damage. Such confrontations have been significant in the United States, Israel, and Northern Ireland.[6]

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3. The most serious ethnic conflicts excluded by these criteria are language riots in India, Arab-Jewish conflict up to 1949, the EOKA campaign against the British, Partition and the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, Arab-Israeli wars, and Palestinian guerrilla activity.

4. Northern Ireland appears an exception to this generalization since for a period each side held "no-go" areas from which the police and the British Army were excluded. This may indicate that the situation was about to develop into civil war.

5. In Malaysia during the 1969 riots, Malays "set up barricades on access roads, stopped all vehicles, pulled out, slashed and killed Chinese occupants. Other groups hunted for Chinese within the kampongs . . . blocked the four-lane federal highway with logs, massacred Chinese [and some Indians], then burned their cars. . . [The Chinese] took revenge on hapless Malays found within the confines of Chinese neighbourhoods. Malays caught in the massage parlors . . . with Chinese prostitutes were unceremoniously put to death. Movie theatres were invaded, Malay patrons were sought out and with iron rods systematically and quite dispassionately beaten to death." Women and children were killed and mutilated including "one six-year-old Indian girl with both hands severed" admitted to hospital. Karl von Vorys, *Democracy without Consensus* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 332–33, 349.

6. Morris Janowitz's distinction between "communal riots" and "commodity riots" is similar to that made here, but the term "commodity riot" emphasizes one characteristic—looting—which was rare in Northern Ireland and Israel. Janowitz notes that interracial clashes in the U.S. gave way to commodity riots during World War II. "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence," in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America*, pp. 317–39.

Terrorism is defined as violence carried out by small but highly organized groups. It includes such acts as assassinations, bombings, and small-scale gunbattles. Although such acts are often committed in association with other kinds of violence, terrorist campaigns of any significance are not common. The activities of the Irish Republican Army and the Protestant Loyalist groups have been responsible for the great majority of deaths in Northern Ireland. Intermittent racial terrorism in the United States has had little social impact and claimed only a handful of lives. In Canada the separatist "Front de Liberation du Quebec" was responsible for a handful of kidnappings and bombings.[7] The extremists among the Jura separatists and their opponents set up vigilante groups, but there are no reports of deaths, only of property damage. Furthermore the area affected was only a small part of Switzerland.

In Trinidad, Fiji, and Belgium, political demonstrations or labor disputes not overtly ethnic in character have led to sporadic violence which had an ethnic aspect, but such violence tended to be brief and to result in very few deaths.

It is a mistake to concentrate too much on the details of the death "scores." Situations in which people are getting killed are unlikely to encourage accurate record keeping, and estimates of deaths from violence frequently vary widely. More importantly, once a certain kind of conflict situation has arisen the exact number of deaths which result is dependent upon various fortuitous circumstances. However, the ranking of countries according to the severity of their ethnic conflict suggested in table 1 is probably realistic, except in the case of Israel, which will be discussed in more detail later.

SOME POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE

A number of factors have been suggested to explain ethnic violence. They will be grouped under three headings: economic grievances, political grievances, and demographic characteristics. Table 2 summarizes the economic, political, and demographic situation of the minority in each society.

Economic grievances

Economic grievances exist when groups complain of, or make demands for, a change in the distributive system. There are very few societies where one community does not complain about its economic situation relative to the other. This situation is highly predictable, given that different historical experiences and cultural values usually result in economic differentiation, with each ethnic group concentrated in particular occupations, economic sectors, and geographic regions. In only three cases is there no significant economic difference between ethnic groups.[8] In all the other countries

7 In Northern Ireland, of the first 500 deaths, 385 were a result of terrorist activities. Michael McKeown, *The First Five Hundred* (Belfast. Irish News, 1972). In the United States, during the worst period of racial conflict (1963–68), 23 people were killed by white terrorists as against 191 riot deaths. Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America*, pp. 446–47. Most racial terrorism since then has involved black attacks on whites and resulted in 46 deaths Lester A. Sobel, *Political Terrorism* (New York: Facts on File, 1975), pp 174–77. Only six deaths resulted from FLQ terrorism. Ronald Manzer, *Canada: A Socio-Political Report* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), pp. 78–9.

8. In Fiji and Sri Lanka, the income of the majority community was close to the national average, but one minority had a much higher

noticeable differences exist. The extreme situation in which class and ethnicity coincide was approached by prerevolutionary Zanzibar.[9]

The extent of relative deprivation in each society is calculated by expressing minority income as a percentage of majority income and by comparing the proportion of white-collar workers in minority and majority populations. A statistic above 100 means that the minority has a higher income or a greater proportion of white-collar workers than the majority population. A statistic below 100 means that the minority is economically disadvantaged. No figures could be found for four societies, but other sources suggest considerable economic differences between minority and majority in these societies.

Political grievances

Ethnic conflict is frequently associated with grievances or demands of a political nature. The most general complaint is that one community is denied its fair share of political power—that is, a share which approximately corresponds to its proportion in the population. In order to measure the extent to which legislatures and cabinets are ethnically representative of the national population, their actual ethnic composition is expressed as a percentage of the "expected" composition. A figure of over 100 shows that the minority was overrepresented and constituted a greater proportion of the political elite than of the general population. The figures are averaged for all postwar elections and cabinets for which information was available.

In some situations a minority is so overrepresented it becomes politically dominant. In five cases the more numerous community was denied a majority of cabinet positions at some time during the postwar period. This outcome is not only contrary to the widely accepted theory of majoritarian democracy, but allows the ruling minority to monopolize the spoils of government if it so chooses. In Cyprus the Turkish minority while not dominant, was given a disproportionate number of legislative and administrative positions and veto power with respect to certain types of legislation. They were thus able to thwart the wishes of the majority.[10]

In several societies, ethnic groups have demanded territorial autonomy or self-government. For minority self-government to be possible, however, there must be a dispersal of power to states or provinces from the central government, and the minority population must be concentrated in such autonomous units. Nine societies have a three-level (national, state or provincial, local) system of administration, but in

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and one a much lower income. These societies are, therefore, classified as having significant economic differences.

9 One writer talks of "the pronounced tendency for race to coincide with economic class. Arabs . . . were the owners of the largest coconut and clove plantations and occupied many of the highest administrative positions in the Zanzibar civil service. Africans . . . were the unskilled manual and agricultural laborers, tenant farmers and petty agriculturists . . . race relations were conducted in the idiom of economic superior to economic inferior: employer-employee, master-servant, or landlord-laborer." Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 14.

10. On the details of the Turkish Cypriot veto powers and Greek Cypriot opposition to such powers, see Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus. Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 83–103.

TABLE 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETIES WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF VIOLENCE

	ECONOMIC SITUATION		POLITICAL SITUATION				DEMOGRAPHIC Situation	
	IN-COME*	OCCU-PATION†	LEGIS-LATURE‡	CABI-NET§	SELF-GOVERN-MENT**	CONSTI-TUTION††	SIZE‡‡	TREND§§
Zanzibar		240	181	245 U	low	C	22.7	
Lebanon		142	110	110 U		C	49.6	T
Cyprus	low		167	167 U		C	18.0	
Northern Ireland	85	73	63	0	low	C	34.9	PT
Guyana	83	100	89	65 U			49.4	T
Mauritius		200	104	84			32.4	
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	94		73	35			28.6	
Israel	66		50	0	low	C	12.5	I
Malaysia	207		72	67			49.0	
Singapore	low		146	160	low		22.6	
India	low		43	101	low		10.3	I
U.S.A.	58	34	10	13	low		10.1	I
Trinidad	low		97	31			36.5	PT
Belgium		97	108	120 U	high		44.5	
Canada	84	79	110	105	high		30.4	
Switzerland	96		77	114	high		31.2	
Fiji	100	91	126	164 U			49.5	T
Finland		114	110	209			8.1	
New Zealand	82	32	77	34	low		6.5	I

* Minority income as a percentage of majority income. Generally per capita or household income, but for Belgium and Switzerland regions or cantons are compared.

† Proportion of white-collar workers in minority group as a percentage of the proportion of white-collar workers in the majority group.

‡ Proportion of minority legislators as a percentage of the proportion of total population which is minority.

§ Proportion of cabinet which is minority as a percentage of the proportion of total population which is minority. "U" signifies that an undemocratic outcome occurred in that the minority formed a majority of the cabinet at some stage since 1945 or (as in Cyprus) had extensive veto powers.

** "Low" signifies that less than half the minority population lived in local areas which they controlled. "High" signifies that over three quarters of the minority population lived in "federal" units which they controlled.

†† "C" indicates that majority and minority differed about the constitutional identity of the state.

‡‡ Minority as a percentage of the total population. Average for whole period.

§§ "T" indicates that one ethnic group was transformed into the majority since 1945. "PT" indicates that such a transition is projected within a generation if current trends continue. "I" means that the minority is increasing relative to the majority.

six the minority is so geographically distributed that only a small proportion lives in ethnically homogeneous areas. However, in most societies, the greater part of the minority population lived in local government areas in which they constituted a majority, and which they controlled politically.

The most basic political conflict is that which is concerned, not with the distribution of political power

within a state generally accepted as legitimate, but with the very existence or identity of the state itself. In five societies there was strong support, concentrated within one community, for a change in the basic character of the state.

Minority size and rate of increase

The size and rate of increase of the minority relative to the majority is an important factor in ethnic conflict. First, since the size of a group is closely related to its "combat strength" one would anticipate that prudential considerations alone would make small minorities reluctant to challenge or provoke the majority. On the other hand, sizable minorities or majorities should be much more likely to risk violent confrontation when they perceive themselves to have a grievance.

Second, the ideology and institutions of majoritarian democracy with its "winner take all" emphasis is likely to generate the most intense conflict when a minority is close to, or shows signs of being transformed into, a numerical majority. In three of the societies considered, such a transformation has taken place since the end of the Second World War, and in two other societies it is predicted that the minority will become the majority within a generation if current trends continue.

Third, even where power is shared between groups rather than monopolized by one group, large changes will result in friction. If the original allocation is maintained, the growing community will be aggrieved at the injustice. If the allocations are changed, disputes over the changes are probable, and the declining ethnic group must accept losing constantly.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIETIES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE

A comparison of the ethnic violence rankings against the characteristics of the societies suggests that there is indeed a relationship.

High violence societies

Five societies—Cyprus, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Zanzibar, and Guyana—are in a class of their own as regards violence. The difference between their death rates and those of other countries is very apparent. These societies each possess a combination of those characteristics identified as likely to produce violence. In all five societies, there were noticeable economic differences between the ethnic communities. In three societies, the minority was politically dominant; in Cyprus it had veto powers and in Northern Ireland was completely excluded from any executive role. In each society, therefore, there existed substantial and visible inequities, both political and economic, between the ethnic communities. Furthermore in all these societies, with the exception of Guyana, constitutional issues divided the communities. "Enosis" or union with Greece was desired by most Greek Cypriots, and a plurality of Northern Irish Catholics similarly hoped for a united "Thirty-Two County Republic." Although at times these groups may have been willing to abandon their national aspirations, the other communities, Turkish Cypriots and Ulster Protestants, were not persuaded that this abjuration was genuine.[11] In Zanzibar,

11. See ibid., p. 177, for Turkish opinion that "the real aim of Greece and of the

Arabs emphasized a distinctive Zanzibar identity, loyalty to the Sultan, and a multiracial culture based on Islamic precepts. The Afro-Shirazis stressed pan-African racial solidarity, and after the revolution incorporated Zanzibar with Tanganyika to form Tanzania. Christian (particularly Maronite) Lebanese were conscious of a distinctive Lebanese identity linked to the West, with roots in a Phoenician past. Muslims have stressed the Arab character of the country and the Syrian Nationalist party which strives for a "Greater Syria" was involved in violence in 1949, 1958, and 1961. The current civil war began as a clash between Palestinians and Maronite militia units who saw the Palestinian guerillas as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty.

All five societies are marked by demographic situations which produce instability. In Cyprus and in Zanzibar a very small minority enjoyed a grossly privileged position which in no way corresponded with their potential military strength. Thus the African revolutionaries completely overthrew the Zanzibar Arabs in only a few days, and the Turkish Cypriots were in desperate straits prior to the Turkish invasion. The combination of weakness and privilege, once peaceful change was found impossible, made resort to violence by the majority predictable.[12] In the other three societies, the demographic balance was such that one community was frightened by the increase of the other[13] and responded to this threat in ways that provoked violence. The Lebanese Christians rejected any revision of the pact by which political positions were distributed. The Northern Irish Protestants discriminated against Catholics, so some have argued, because this resulted in high rates of Catholic emigration, thereby maintaining the Protestant majority. In Guyana racial violence was associated with the successful attempt by the Afro-Guyanese to seize power from the predominantly East Indian P.P.P. government while the East Indians were still a minority.[14]

Cypriot Greek leaders is to annex the Island of Cyprus to Greece." Protestant beliefs concerning the "real aims" of the Catholic Civil Rights Association (C.R.A.) were summed up in the slogan CRA = IRA.

12. "This was the immediate cause of the revolution—Africans overthrew the [Arab] Government by force, because there no longer seemed to be any way to create an African state by constitutional means." Lofchie, *Zanzibar*, p. 257. The fighting in Cyprus followed attempts to negotiate constitutional changes.

13. The ex-Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Terence O'Neill, said that "the basic fear of the Protestants in Northern Ireland is that they will be outbred by the Roman Catholics. It is as simple as that." Cited in Richard Rose, *Governing without Consensus* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 301. For a discussion of Catholic fertility and its political consequences, see ibid., pp. 364–67. In Lebanon, "such is the Maronite neurosis that not only is any mention of a new census taboo, but no new telephone book has been published for fear that it would contain more Moslem names than Christian ones." *Washington Post*, 30 September 1975, p. 1.

14. After the 1962 election was won by the East Indian Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.), the black Peoples National Congress (P.N.C.) and the unions "deliberately attempted to create sufficient disturbances to force the P.P.P. Government to resign." After strikes and demonstrations, the British imposed a proportional representation system which resulted in a coalition of the P.N.C. and one small multiracial party taking power in 1964. Joseph Landis, *Race Relations and Politics in Guyana* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 203. The P.N.C. has won all subsequent elections, despite the fact that East Indians are now a majority. Electoral malpractice is alleged, but surprisingly the majority community has not reacted to black domination by violence.

Low violence societies

At the other extreme, four societies—Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and Finland—experienced only mild conflict. In part this can be explained by the lack of serious grievances in these societies. The French-speaking Belgians held a majority of cabinet positions into the early sixties, but during this period ideological divisions between left and right crosscut each linguistic community, and so this imbalance was not salient. The constitutional issue was significant only in Canada, and until recently the goal of Quebec independence was supported by only a minority of the French-speakers. The French Canadians did, however, complain of economic discrimination,[15] and of being underrepresented in the federal administration.

Otherwise there appears to have been little to fight about. The only three societies where there is economic parity between ethnic groups are included in this category. Politically the minorities are fairly represented in legislatures and cabinets; in fact, they tend to be slightly overrepresented. The groups were not only equal, but also separate. The only three societies in which the minorities received self-government through federalism are included here, and in Finland while only one province had a Swedish majority, most Swedes lived in "communes" (the unit of local government) in which they were a majority. Demographic factors were generally conducive to peaceful relations. In Finland the proportion of Swedes has been declining steadily through intermarriage, while in the other societies the relative proportions of the groups have been very stable.[16]

Intermediate violence societies

In six countries, the level of violence has been intermediate between the two groups of societies previously discussed. The relationship between majority and minority in these societies is also intermediate in that they have neither the very bad characteristics of the high violence societies nor the good characteristics of the low violence societies. In all six countries, one ethnic group is economically deprived relative to the other, and in four countries the minority is noticeably underrepresented in either the legislative, the cabinet, or both. However, there are no disputes over constitutional matters in which one community is aligned against the other, and there is no case in which a minority is politically dominant. The demographic situation is stable except in India and the United States, where the minority population is growing at a noticeably faster rate than the majority. However, the small size of the minority

15. According to one separatist leader, the French Canadians are "Negres blancs." Pierre Vallieres, *White Niggers of America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). Liam de Paor, *Divided Ulster* (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1971), p. 13, says that "in Northern Ireland Catholics are blacks who happen to have a white skin." Table 2 suggests that both these comparisons are considerably exaggerated.

16. Kurt Mayer argues that ethnic harmony in Switzerland "to a large extent . . . rests on an underlying balance of demographic factors. . . . the basic demographic equilibrium has remained practically undisturbed for more than a century." "Cultural Pluralism in Switzerland," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 16 (April 1951), pp. 157–63. In 1798, 22 percent spoke French and 70 percent German, compared to 20 percent and 74 percent in 1960. In Canada at the first national census in 1871, French Canadians were 31.1 percent and in 1961, 30.4 percent.

in both countries means that this increase is not perceived as a threat by the majority. In Malaysia, Malay fears of being transformed into a minority have been reduced by their own high fertility.[17] It is perhaps coincidental, but it is interesting that within this group of countries violence varies according to the size of the economically deprived group; the larger the economically deprived group the greater the violence.

Societies with the "wrong" level of violence

Four countries are deviant cases in that they appear to have considerably lower rates of violence than they should have, given their characteristics.

In Israel, Arabs are economically deprived, they are underrepresented in the legislature and Israel is one of the two countries in which no minority individual has received cabinet office. It is also apparent that very few Arabs accept, and most resent, the constitutionally defined Jewish character of the state. One would expect therefore much higher rates of violence than those suggested in table 1. Two explanations can be given for this discrepancy. First, it can be argued that the violence measures are invalid since Palestinian guerilla activity is excluded as being international rather than domestic in character. Yet, since the Palestinians are struggling against the very existence of the state of Israel and assert that all Palestinians, wherever they live, form one nation, the "international-domestic" distinction is spurious. If Palestinian guerilla activity is included, ethnic violence is as high in Israel as in Northern Ireland or Cyprus.[18] A second explanation for the low level of violence between Israeli Arabs and Jews is that the expression of Arab dissatisfaction or hostility is vigorously checked by Israeli repression.

In New Zealand, Fiji, and Trinidad, the unexpectedly low degree of violence can be looked at in two ways. The pessimistic interpretation might be that the potential for violence is genuine but has not been realized yet. The analysis has not identified deviant cases but rather predicted where violence is going to occur. In Trinidad, for example, there have been several occasions already when severe conflict was narrowly averted. A more optimistic interpretation is that these exceptions would repay further study by suggesting some additional factors that serve to reduce ethnic hostility and conflict.

17 "That Malays in 1970 comprise over half the population calms Malay fears that higher Chinese and Indian fertility would convert them into a permanent minority." Alvin Rabushka, *Race and Politics in Urban Malaya* (Stanford, Calif. Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p 20

18. From 1951–56 one source lists 967 Israelis killed by Arab guerrilla activity, and from June 1967 to March 1971, 303 Israelis and 1,873 guerrillas were killed. Martin Gilbert, the *Arab-Israeli Conflict* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). The worst period of guerrilla activity from June 1967 to December 1968 resulted in 881 deaths, which gives an annual death rate of approximately 200/million. Sobel, *Political Terrorism*, p. 29.

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Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

FREDERICK C. ADAMS. *Economic Diplomacy: The Export-Import Bank and American Foreign Policy 1934–1939*. Pp. vii, 289. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976. $12.50.

Frederick C. Adams analyzes a key segment of interwar American diplomatic history through examination of the origins and development of the Export-Import Bank. Based on intensive combing of primary and secondary sources, this sophisticated study probes the relationship between private interests and public policy, traces the connection between economic diplomacy and economic and political objectives, and demonstrates the momentum of American intervention abroad.

Adams points up the significance of the Export-Import Bank with two introductory chapters which analyze U.S. efforts from 1919 to 1933 to find overseas markets and influence foreign events through private loans rather than political commitments or government loans. When this attempt collapsed in the Great Depression, officials in the Roosevelt administration, after brief flirtation with economic autarchy, established the Export-Import Bank in early 1934. The government now mobilized taxpayer dollars to finance foreign trade and promote diplomatic interests.

These dual objectives sometimes clashed when traders sought bank support for bilateral deals that would undercut State Department commitment to open multilateral commerce or for transactions that would make the U.S. government direct creditor of a foreign government. Adams demonstrates that at first the Roosevelt administration rejected such deals as contrary to America's long-term economic and political interests but in 1938 trimmed these principles to counter German competition in Latin America and Japanese aggression in China. The bank became a tool more of political than of commercial policy as the Roosevelt administration responded to German and Japanese economic and political challenges with bilateral, special trade deals which departed from traditional open door precepts. Similarly, State Department officials in 1934–35 attempted to pressure the newly recognized Soviet Union by withholding financial credits from the bank.

The Bank's activities in Latin America and China illustrated the dynamics of intervention. Officials found that protection of American interests required ever wider economic and political control within small Latin American states and more extensive schemes of economic assistance to China. Aid to China set the U.S. along a collision path with Japan, but although Roosevelt and other administration officials realized the grave implications of such intervention, they overrode Secretary of State Cordell

Hull's proposal to bring the issue squarely before Congress and the public. The creation and development of the bank was a milestone along the road to an imperial presidency.

Adam's deft analysis of these themes is an important addition to the history of interwar diplomacy and the long-range origins of World War II and the Cold War. It is diplomatic history at its best.

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ANNETTE BAKER FOX. *The Politics of Attraction. Four Middle Powers and the United States*. Pp. viii, 371. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $15.00.

The purpose of this book, according to the dust jacket, is to "explore the mutual attraction and interaction between the United States and four representative middle powers: Canada, Mexico, Australia and Brazil." (The author concedes that her use of the term "middle power" is not necessarily consistent with some contemporary usage, but feels that it better reflects the actual state of affairs in international politics.) This is to be accomplished by a detailed examination of a number of issues that have arisen over the last 60-odd years. These issues, each of which has a chapter devoted to it, include relations between the four powers and the United States in the interwar years, collaboration in World War II, postwar collaboration in defense, foreign trade, foreign direct investment, "global issues of foreign policy," and "neighborhood" issues. Each of these primary issues is further subdivided into eight divisions based on the following questions (the italicized words are the actual titles used): Were there *joint enterprises* in which the two governments mingled their efforts or resources in some relatively symmetrical fashion? Did the two governments *reciprocate* by exchanging benefits, *each incurring some* sacrifice for a common objective? In a particular case, how *specific* was the request and the response? What part did *distance*, viewed as remoteness or inaccessibility, play in the relationship? Did the government learn from their responses, did feedbacks result from *cumulated experiences* in cooperation (negative or positive) or in *spillover* in other areas? What *channels of communication* or institutions have been involved in a relationship? Were questions treated in an *administrative* (or bureaucratic) fashion, were problems to be solved dealt with on a relatively technical level, or did the issues become *politicized*? Were there connections between an issue and *domestic politics*, and how sensitive were leaders to each other's internal political needs?

There is no doubting the importance of the issues involved or the tremendous amount of research that went into this book. The author's facts are carefully marshalled, her sources are impeccable, and the style is clear and insightful. Whether Dr. Fox is successful in achieving her main objective, however, is questionable. It is the opinion of this reviewer that she has attempted to do too much in the space of one volume. The amount of material she covers could be spread over a number of valuable volumes, or she could have treated fewer states or fewer questions in more detail. As it stands, the result is extremely choppy and hard to follow.

Despite any imperfections, the book provides an excellent introduction to the subject and to the relations of the United States with four important partners, and it is an excellent sourcebook for a number of important issues. It is thus a useful addition to the library of anyone in comparative politics and international relations. In this regard it would have been very helpful if the editors had included a bibliography. Granted there is a one-page "identification" of the major periodicals used and some 58 pages of footnotes, but they are no substitute for a good bibliography in a work of this kind.

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C. W. CASSINELLI. *Total Revolution: A Comparative Study of Germany under Hitler, The Soviet Union under Stalin, and China under Mao.* Pp. 252. Santa Barbara: ABC—Clio Press, Inc., 1976. $19.75. Paperbound, $6.25.

J. BOWYER BELL. *On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation.* Pp. viii, 272. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1976. $15.00.

The two works under review together cover the entire revolutionary experience. *On Revolt* examines the beginnings—the uprisings which may or may not lead to a change in governmental authority. *Total Revolution* picks up where the other stops by examining the process of revolution—the transformation of societies after successful revolts. Both are comparative in scope, differing in their relative reliance upon primary and secondary sources. Consequently, each will appeal to a different audience.

Total Revolution is an examination of the ideology and techniques of three revolutions, those of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, with about 100 pages devoted to each. Because the author has based the bulk of his material on secondary sources, the book's appeal will be within the undergraduate market.

Specialists will be disappointed in the anti-revolutionary bias of the author which colors the analysis. For example, some sections of Mao's revolution read as if it could have been taken from a Kuomintang text on the evils of Chinese communism. A second drawback in this regard is the author's failure to inform the reader of his bias until the end, rather than the beginning, of the book.

The stronger sections of the work are the introduction and conclusion which stress similarities and differences among the three revolutions. The author is to be commended here for refusing to yield to the temptation to stretch the facts to fit the mold. In between the introduction and conclusion, the three revolutions are adequately summarized. Taken as a whole, *Total Revolution* will be of interest to teachers of undergraduates seeking readings in the field of comparative politics.

J. Bowyer Bell's *On Revolt*, on the other hand, will appeal to the specialist. The author, who has already established himself as an authority on the Irish experience, here examines eight struggles against the British Empire in the wake of the Second World War—Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Arabia, Ireland, Egypt, and the Gold Coast. The book is notable because it is based almost entirely on personal interviews with the principals, adding a psychological flavor to the analysis. The relatively large number of cases studied, however, precludes the inclusion of more than a minimum of background information, limiting the usefulness of the book for those with little prior knowledge of these subjects.

British strategy was to contain these national liberation struggles within the framework of revolution, in which a loss in empire becomes a gain in the Commonwealth nations. Consequently, the British were flexible, willing to negotiate with almost anyone except in the most extreme circumstances. On the study of rebellion in general, Bell concludes that the motivation and ideology of the guerrilla is more important than the geographical, political, and socioeconomic aspects which help or hinder rebels. After all, he points out, revolts do not begin because of optimum conditions but because of the simple commitment of individual men. Given his sources, such a conclusion is not unexpected and is certain to be debated by those who argue the contrary. The result, though, is one of the best analyses of modern-day struggles of national liberation.

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ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS. *Nemesis at Potsdam. The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans, Background, Execution, Consequences.* Pp. vii, 268. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. $11.95.

This is a solid legal brief which is better on the causes and execution of a major crime against humanity than on the legal and political remedies. It deals with "the displacement of some 16 million Germans from their homes in Central and Eastern Europe, a process which over 2 million of them did not survive." Mr. de Zayas feels that the whole experience should warn us against accepting "future population expulsions" while retaining our right to "support the Federal Republic's bid for the reunification of Germany and for an eventual revision of the Oder-Neisse frontier."

One reason for the Allies' acceptance of the principle of forced population transfers was their optimistic view of what Winston Churchill called the Greek-Turkish "disentanglement" after World War I. It had "produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since," except, he could not have included Cyprus, where such an exchange had not taken place. Such an exchange would, in this case, eliminate a minority which had helped to cause World War II, compensate Poland for her losses to Russia, and punish the guilty Germans. The weakest point in Mr. de Zayas's case is his belief that if the Allies had not accepted the principle, "probably no expulsion would have taken place—or at least no expulsion of this magnitude." There is little evidence of this belief from the other side, even for an originally reluctant Poland which eventually expelled 9 million Germans rather than the 2 to 4 million to which "the Western Allies had been prepared to consent." Was the flight partly caused by Nazi propaganda and bad consciences? Nobody really knows, nor whether this careful survey will really increase Americans' guilt as "accomplices in one of the most inhuman enterprises in the history of Western civilisation." Have the facts —"although not officially tabu"—never been "given adequate coverage in the Press?"

These hypothetical and insoluble questions, like the role of force and the Allies' need to get Russian help against Japan, are all underemphasized. "History will judge," but whom and on what grounds? This is a good book, but its historical-legal arguments, like the recital of the crimes of the Stalin era or the Gang of Four, may chiefly contribute, like most ideological isometrics, to restoring Anglo-Americans' crusading fervor and defense budgets "to make the best of today's very complex world order (or rather, disorder) and give them reason for increased vigilance with respect to the promises and commitments made at Helsinki."

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SANDOR HALEBSKY. *Mass Society and Political Conflict: Toward a Reconstruction of Theory*. Pp. v, 309. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $19.95.

The author is a political sociologist teaching in Canada. Dr. Halebsky's book critically analyzes political theories of mass society especially as these entail interpretations of political dissidence and radical political behavior. While the book's bibliographical journey in contemporary social theory is impressive, most attention is given to William Kornhauser's work. The political scientist will also be interested in Halebsky's examination of pluralist theory. Although very little new ground is broken in this chapter, it is a masterful summary of criticism, marshalled so capably that it cultivates our wonderment that pluralism has persisted in the textbooks. Numerous major empirical and descriptive inadequacies present in the attempt to apply the pluralist model to U.S. politics are pinpointed. In short, Halebsky's review and reanalysis makes the case for speaking of the "pluralist dogma."

Perhaps the intellectual core of the book and its most interesting discussion consists in the author's attempt to go beyond a criticism of the mass society political framework to suggest the inadequacies of a number of related and influential interpretations of radical behavior. The reader comes away with a

keen sense of the limitations of those analyses, so popular a few years ago, which have stressed the psychological, emotional, and irrational origins of political dissidence. Chapter 4 critically evaluates the deficiencies in social structural analysis that exist in the political theory of mass society. While the author is quite modest about his treatment of the importance of social structural factors, he is bold enough to set out some very challenging perspectives for the analysis of radical political behavior in the next chapter. From this discussion we acquire a clear sense of the book's contribution to the growing scholarly effort reassessing reductionist theories and illuminating the importance of the social-structure origins, cognitive nature, and rational properties of dissident support.

Chapter 5 provides an excellent selection of fascinating case studies of radical protest movements emphasizing the "cognitive negotiation of a sociopolitical environment." For example, there is a very timely discussion of the situation in Chile drawing upon the significant scholarly research of Alejandro Portes, Raymond Pratt, and others. The treatment of agrarian protest in the United States reminds the alert social scientist of the important study by Michael Rogin. But the fundamental accomplishment here is to correct the one-sided view of activist political protest to which so many American social scientists have contributed. The element of ideological bias is clearly delineated by Professor Halebsky, who goes on to suggest directions for both theoretical revision and the elaboration, as well as foci for research. The book is very readable and should be recommended to a wide audience including graduate students working in U.S. politics, comparative political studies, and political theory. In this reviewer's opinion, *Mass Society and Political Conflict* is a solid contribution to the study of political movements and protest and related problems and issues.

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LEONG SOW-THENG. *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1926*. Pp. xvii, 361. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976. $15.00.

Revolutions, we know, engulf nations suddenly, transform their institutions, values, and external relations, and at the same time leave residues in their wake which do not die and are not consigned to the "dustbin of history." Instead, they remain alive—sometimes in new dress and called by new names—to plague the new order as they did the old. Despite the sweep of revolution in China and Russia and the eventual joint declarations of socialist solidarity and friendship, relations between the two foundered on the residues of the past which ideology could not explain and nationalism did not allow to disappear.

There are moments in the revolutionary period when conditions seem ripe for solving the problems of the past and establishing relations on a new footing. Such a period in Sino-Soviet relations occurred between 1917 and 1924. The awakening of China and the demands of its people for the end of extraterritoriality, unequal treaties, and other practices which humiliated the nation and kept it from taking its rightful place in the family of nations seemed to coincide with the revolutionary promises and proclamations of the new Soviet government in Russia. The railways, the borders, and the buffer areas between the two all seemed to be subjects which could be treated in a new and satisfactory manner. The government in Peking used its limited power and prestige to tackle these problems. Not only did it face a difficult negotiating partner in the Soviet Union, but in addition it had to cope with the realities of its own land—war-lordism, opposition and rival governments, intrigue amongst officials, and an inability to control its territory—while seeking the support of other "friendly" states for the recovery of rights and territory. It is this skein of actors and events that Leong Sow-theng slowly and meticulously untangles as he sifts through the official papers of the Chinese Ministry

of *Foreign Affairs* for the period under review.

The author's reconstruction of events and intimate details of negotiations both with the warlords and the world powers is an important addition to the literature of the period. As Leong suggests at the outset of his study, it is meant to complement an earlier one by Allen S. Whiting (*Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924*) which was written before the papers became available to scholars. The two volumes together provide the most detailed account of the diplomacy of the two nations for this period that we are likely to see.

The intimate detail of this study places the key issues between any Chinese and Russian government in bold relief. Viewed from the perspective of the present, the Chinese have come to learn that the Russians are no less protective of their interests in dealing with another socialist state than when they dealt with its predecessor. The residues of the past continued throughout the Nationalist period and remain unsolved in the present. This study gives us rich detail on these issues and the thinking that influenced the government in Peking. In the clash between socialism and nationalism, the history of Sino-Russian relations suggests that the latter is more important than the former.

Yet, despite the rich detail that Leong provides, the study will be of limited value to all but a few students who specialize in the period. As a general survey of diplomacy for the period, it lacks a comprehensive perspective both of internal politics in China and the diplomatic conflicts abroad. Leong provides us with a brief account of the impact of the Russian Revolution on its territories in Asia and its assets in Manchuria, but he does not give us a complementary picture of the politics of China—the limited writ of the government in Peking, the rival government in Canton, and the general anarchy in the areas outside the immediate control of the official government. Nor does he give us more than a brief account of Japan's intrigues in China and its diplomacy toward the Allied powers on questions of the Far East. This is a monograph on the day-to-day diplomacy of the government. With it and the Whiting study in hand, future historians will be able to put the diplomacy of China and Russia into perspective and reconstruct the diplomatic history of the Far East during this period. Its most immediate value however, is its detailed discussion of the issues dividing the two countries in this formative period. Scholars studying the present Sino-Soviet disputes will do well to study this monograph, for it gives details underlying the conflicts which must be known if current studies are to probe their subject in depth. Given Leong's background and knowledge of this early period, it is hoped that he will continue his study into the present.

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EUGENIA V. NOMIKOS and ROBERT C. NORTH. *International Crisis. The Outbreak of World War I.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. Pp. xiii, 339. $23.00.

ARTHUR WALWORTH. *America's Moment: 1918—American Diplomacy at the End of World War I.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977. Pp. 309. $14.95.

These books are both about diplomacy in the World War I period, the first examining the outbreak of the war, the second American diplomacy between the Armistice and the Versailles Peace Conference. I shall review them separately, and then add some concluding comments.

Eugenia V. Nomikos and Robert C. North are professors of history and of political science at California State University, Hayward, and Stanford University, respectively. Their work provides a close narrative of the events between the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and the actual outbreak of fighting some five weeks later. The authors, relying primarily on the extensive collections of dip-

lomatic documents and memoirs now available, proceed chronologically. They review each stage of the deepening crisis from the viewpoint of each involved nation-state, showing how misperceptions, ideological commitments, habitual responses, and plain accidents led to a result which could possibly have been avoided.

In addition to the historical narrative, Nomikos and North attempt to develop a theoretical framework to explain how international crises evolve. In a companion volume, North, along with Professor Nazli Choucri, has examined the long-term antecedents of World War I. This work concentrates on the short-term crisis and also seeks to bridge the gap between long-run developments and the immediate events of a crisis.

In my opinion, this is a valuable book. The narrative portions of the work are most successful—they are clearly written and provide an effective summary of the events. The authors, incidentally, are inclined to lay most of the blame on Austria and Germany for allowing war to result, while also suggesting that Great Britain should have signaled her commitment to France and Russia more strongly to the Central Powers. The overall framework developed by Nomikos and North is also persuasive. It relies on various behavioral theories, none, I think, original in this work, to analyze the various governments' actions. The authors conclude with a short summary of how crises may best be managed. I am not, however, persuaded that they really do bridge the gap between long-range developments and the immediate dimensions of a crisis. Certainly there are few references here to the wider frame of reference.

Arthur Walworth has previously written a Pulitzer Prize winning biography of Woodrow Wilson. In this work, he provides a detailed account of the diplomatic negotiations just prior to the Armistice and in the short period prior to the opening of the Peace Conference in early 1919. Walworth has drawn extensively on the manuscript collection in the House Papers at Yale—indeed, this book is in many ways written from House's perspective—and on many other manuscript collections. In addition, he has talked or corresponded with a large number of the participants and draws from many personal memoirs, giving a most complete picture of the proceedings.

Walworth's approach teaches us a lot about the process of diplomacy—the human constraints, the importance of procedure, and the interplay between public positions and private negotiations. In particular, the author demonstrates how Wilson's Fourteen Points encouraged the surrender of the Central Powers, while inevitably arousing the private suspicions of the allied leaders. He shows how the war's abrupt end partially prevented the effective development of American aims for the peace and how the seemingly preliminary negotiations for the Armistice closed out certain options for the Peace Conference. Walworth's evaluation of Wilson's diplomacy is mixed, the president getting his worst marks for his inability to coordinate and work effectively with the American delegation—the State Department, the experts of the Inquiry, and the various other participants—and for his political innocence or stubbornness in disregarding domestic political considerations.

Unlike Nomikos and North, Walworth does not try to construct an analytical framework to interpret his narrative, although a subsequent volume on the Peace Conference itself could do so. Nevertheless, his careful study is equally effective in illuminating both the details of the specific diplomatic event and the general process of diplomacy.

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RICHARD SZAWLOWSKI. *The System of the International Organizations of the Communist Countries*. Pp. 352. Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Company, B.V., 1976. $32.75.

The System of the International Organizations of the Communist Countries

is a study of official Communist bloc transnational organizations. The primary focus is on the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), but the author also examines a number of lesser organizations, mostly tied to COMECON. Hence, this work deals almost exclusively with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Cuba and Mongolia are members of COMECON and are briefly covered; China, North Korea, and North Vietnam are hardly mentioned.

The author treats WTO and COMECON in separate chapters, noting the origin, development, organizational structure, and strengths and weaknesses of each. These two chapters and the conclusion are the most analytic parts of this book, while the rest—including two chapters on the minor organizations and an annex containing 22 documents, nearly one-half of this book—will serve as reference. This work is well documented, sometimes to the point that it has a catalog appearance, however, the author relies almost totally on Soviet and Eastern European sources.

Szawlowski's goals in writing this book are three: (1) to provide a comprehensive monograph on the subject, (2) to assess the functions and roles of the organizations mentioned, and (3) to project their future trends and importance. In the opinion of this reviewer, he accomplishes all three—though he is more successful with one and two. Some readers may find this book too descriptive and too historical.

The author affords some useful generalizations concerning WTO and COMECON, as well as the latter's "affiliated" organs: They were all created in reaction to Western organizations—the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and others. Stalin used them for cosmetic purposes, but when he died they became functionally more important. They are still dominated by the Soviet Union, but this reflects the Kremlin's overwhelming military and economic superiority. Decision making is informal—not according to provisions in their charters, but rather behind the scenes.

Despite the fact that WTO, COMECON, and most of the other organizations Szawlowski is concerned with were created as tools of Soviet foreign policy and are still manipulated by the Kremlin, he argues that they are important for a variety of reasons: they were successful in integrating the bloc economically and in other ways; WTO is militarily equivalent to NATO; COMECON has increased its industrial production 12 times since World War II and now accounts for a third of the world's output.

The author cites a number of problems that confront these organizations. Most, he says, relate to the fact that the Soviet Union's internal problems become injected into the politics of these bodies, while further integration presents a threat to the majority position of the Russian nationality. In addition, the success of Western Europe is a distracting force.

This book is recommended to students with an interest in Soviet and Eastern European politics and the international organizations of the Communist bloc. It is also a good reference. However, it will be more useful to the specialized scholar and libraries than to general readers.

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AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

DONALD APPLEYARD. *Planning a Pluralist City: Conflicting Realities in Ciudad Guayana*. Pp. 312. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1976. $19.95.

Appleyard, a professor of urban design at the University of California at Berkeley, was deeply involved in the planning for Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela. He was a member of a multidisciplinary MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies team organized to help draw up the blueprints for the model industrial city now growing on the bank of the Orinoco and intended to become the center of the resource-rich Guayana

region. The work of this team had a strong influence not only on the city that eventually took shape but also on a variety of academic disciplines because of the impressive body of literature generated on the planning of a new city and the implementation of those plans.

Appleyard is interested in "how the people and planners of Ciudad Guayana viewed the city and its plans." After a short introduction in which the author emphasizes the need to discard the persistent illusion that "professionals are value-free technicians," chapters follow providing a background description of Ciudad Guayana, its planning team, and the research methods, the inhabitants' general perceptions of the city and the surrounding landscape; the spacial extent and the complexity of the inhabitants' knowledge of the city, the perceptions and meaning of settlements and barrios; the perceived attributes of buildings and places and the communication of their social and functional meanings; the spacial structure of the city; the perceptions of plans and structural change. Chapter 10 attempts to distinguish among several perceptions of the city and concludes with some strategies for structuring a plural city. The final chapter focuses on the need for planners and inhabitants to become equally involved in the conception and execution of the plural city so that, in spite of differing perceptions, both groups come to view "their" city with pride and affection. The appendixes deal with the interviews, field surveys, and research methods.

This book will be primarily of interest to urban planners and designers. Its copious illustrations and nontechnical style, however, make this book eminently readable to those who may be interested in urban design but are not experts in the field. The book is less useful to those who are primarily interested in Venezuelan politics and how Ciudad Guayana was a product of conflicting goals and policies emanating from Caracas. Thus, in spite of the book's title, there are only the vaguest explanations of what Appleyard means by a "pluralist city," whether that involves architectural pluralism or social and political as well, whether he means pluralism in a North American sense or a Latin American.

There is even less of an attempt to explore what happened to the plans and their implementation in the highly political context of Venezuelan national affairs. For this reason, the present volume would be more valuable if read in conjunction with Lisa Peattie's *The View from the Barrio* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968) and Frank Bonilla and J. A. Silva Michelena's edited *A Strategy for Research on Social Policy* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967, and part of the three-volume series on *The Politics of Change in Venezuela*). Peattie provided the multidisciplinary team with the perspective of an anthropologist who was exceptional in that she actually lived in Ciudad Guayana, not in Caracas or the American compound, and was thus keenly aware of the ideas and expectations of the new city's inhabitants. Bonilla, a political scientist, familiarized himself with the inner workings of the Venezuelan system and how it impinged upon projects such as the model city.

To his credit, Appleyard was aware of the biases and limitations of looking at Ciudad Guayana solely as a planner, with the professional penchant for seeing his model of the projected city as a totality, from above and outside, while the inhabitants perceived the fast changing reality from the street level and from their daily experiences. Appleyard's awareness of contrasting and often conflicting perceptions evoked by the new city is an indispensable first step toward a greater comprehension of the web of interrelations that links planners, people, politicians, and those who ultimately make the final planning and implementation decisions in the remote national capital.

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MARGUERITE ROSS BARNETT. *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India*. Pp. vii, 368. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. $22.50.

The character of political life in South India reflects to a large extent what might be expected in a populous, heterogeneous, developing area with a somewhat different historical and cultural past from the larger nation—namely, a volatile, fluid, and complicated political matrix which is not easily understood. This book should make the task easier for the serious student and scholar alike.

One of the most interesting political events of the post-Partition era is the formation of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party and its rapid mobilization of support based on what the author describes as cultural nationalism. In this study, the author deals with three aspects of the DMK phenomenon. The first is the overall question which underlies the inquiry: to what extent can the DMK platform, symbols, and method of operation be said to typify what Clifford Geertz has termed "primordial loyalties" and, if they do, are these modes of behavior really as atavistic and detrimental to the formation of a larger nationalistic commitment as they would seem?

In order to answer this question, Barnett offers a meticulous, if not succinct, analysis of the origins of Tamil nationalism and its basis in Dravidian cultural identity. The interplay of these two concepts is shown through a thorough analysis of radical politics and the personalities who espoused the DMK ideology (Annadurai and Karunanidhi among others). What separates this study from many other recent analyses is the extensive personal research upon which the author bases her conclusions, including interview data from a two-year India residence, extensive use of vernacular and archival material, and judicial employment of structured questionnaires, included as appendixes, to elicit the perspectives of DMK leaders, local organizers, and the Tamil man-in-the-village.

The disintegration of the DMK into competing factions after its initial two-decade florescence is not seen by the author as an inherent failure of the appeal to cultural nationalism, and therefore a confirmation of the theory that such a political ideology is natural, devisive, but rather as a result of a divorce between its original humanistic-social reform concerns and the more narrow Tamil separatist demands. Barnett's conclusion that the transformation of Tamil cultural nationalism into Tamil chauvinism and parochialism was not inevitable, and that such movements are not inherent threats to Indian integration will surely be debated. However, henceforth such debates will have to take into account her cogent argument that separatist movements are not necessarily secessionist and that cultural nationalism may not necessarily be reactionary or counterproductive to the goals of national integration.

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ROBERT H. BATES. *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* Pp vii, 380. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976. $20.00.

This book illuminates the political and economic relationship between rural areas and industrial centers in a developing country. Through a well-documented and quantified study, highlighted by the example of Zambia's Luapula Province, Bates shows that the remote village has not been a passive resource for the new towns but an active force in conditioning both central planning and national politics. This neglected perspective is important if we are really to understand modernization in Africa.

Chapters on the colonial era and the nationalist movement reveal not only the pattern of rural-urban migration but the growing demands of villagers for rural development. Yet, despite the new African government's investment in agriculture far from the line of rail, the result has been the familiar story of failure based on bureaucracy, deficient infrastructure, lack of technical expertise, and the like. The co-

operative movement is still-born, while loans to individual farmers and other would-be entrepreneurs have been a costly fiasco. Success has occurred generally only near already developed markets, especially with cattle or some other established crop in high demand. The upshot is increased migration to town, and Bates is at his best discussing how villagers decide whether or not to join the exodus only after carefully estimating both the short- and long-term economic advantages of such a move. It is one of his major theses that calculations of "income maximization," much more than anything else, determine these decisions. Even those who do remain in the village without deep involvement in the cash economy use the same calculus. They make human investments by educating and pampering the children from whom they expect support, especially in old age. But the rural areas continue to lose in the new balance. migrants' families now tend to live with them in town, permanently, remittances home are down from the less settled colonial era, and village manpower grows short.

Yet it is not for want of trying that rural hopes are frustrated. Luapulans followed up a crucial role in the nationalist struggle by agitating for investment and against inflexible central planning. The result, reflected elsewhere in Zambia, is provincialism—thank goodness we no longer see tribalism in every conflict—a problem which the government first met by acquiescing in the demands of regional groupings and political parties, and then, when the fall in copper revenues made this impossible, by declaring a one-party state. The problems of rural development remain, but Bates's book will help us—and the Zambians—to understand and deal with it better.

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STEFAN DE VYLDER. *Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular*. Pp. v, 251. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $13.95.

Dr. de Vylder's study of Allende's Unidad Popular government from 1970 to 1973 is by far the best written and most objective account to be published to date about this exceedingly controversial period. Though obviously sympathetic to socialism, the author's scholarly and independent approach permits him to conclude that "the policy pursued by the Unidad Popular was doomed to failure." Unlike all other writers who have approached the subject from a strictly political and a priori point of view, de Vylder contends that the fall of Allende is attributable to internal developments, both economic and political, rather than to the so-called invisible blockade or the intervention of the CIA. He successfully demonstrates the validity of his thesis through the presentation of meaningful statistics and well-reasoned arguments which reach the medula of the problem and ignore what is merely superfluous and peripheral.

Decades ago Harold Laski attempted a theoretical treatment of the difficulties involved in a peaceful transition to democratic socialism. Salvador Allende had to confront this dilemma in practical terms, under the most disadvantageous conditions. his was a minority government which sought to impose radical change in the face of a well-organized opposition which eventually represented 60 percent of the electorate; the existing productive capacity and the whole economic structure was not yet propitious for state socialism; and the parties which composed the Unidad Popular were so far from being united that, as the author points out, the economy from 1970 to 1973 was neither planned nor free, neither capitalist nor socialist, in short, in Chilean terms, neither *chicha* nor *limonada*.

Not only did Allende face overwhelming obstacles from the beginning of his presidency, but also his own policies were destined to create chaos. Perhaps the UP's greatist strategic error was "the initial, exaggeratedly Keynesian manner

of stimulating demand," which led to the uncontrolled inflation, bottlenecks, and shortages of 1972–73.

Dr. de Vylder devotes special attention to the nationalization of the copper mines, expropriation and requisition of industry, and the ambitious program of Agrarian Reform, but his most important contribution is his overall view of the developments which took place during the period under study.

Although the author's treatment of the political background and foreground is basically accurate, it is unfortunate that he mars an otherwise scientific approach by several gratuitous and unsubstantiated comments on the present Chilean government. It is to be hoped that Dr. de Vylder will soon return to Santiago to write the second volume of what should prove to be the definitive work on recent political and economic history in that South American nation.

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WILMA FAIRBANK *America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942–1949.* Pp. vii, 233. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. $5.10.

At no time during the twentieth century were official Sino-American relations more intense throughout their range of expression—political, military, economic, and cultural—than during the period encompassing World War II and the Chinese Civil War. Yet, though much has been written about the controversial roles of American generals and diplomats who strode or stumbled across the Chinese stage during these crucial years, the cultural dimensions of U.S. wartime involvement have hitherto received little attention. Wilma Fairbank, wife of the distinguished Harvard sinologist and an accomplished scholar of Chinese art history, has now put matters to right in this engaging monograph.

A participant in the cultural experiment she describes, the author in 1942–45 served as a State Department officer in Washington; from 1945 to 1947 she was cultural attaché at U.S. embassies in Chungking and Nanking. This insider's vantage point, plus a healthy critical detachment, is displayed in her assessment of a wide range of American-sponsored projects, most of which involved the exchange of educators, technical specialists, and students.

As Fairbank candidly observes, even the best American intentions were often frustrated by the sensitive, difficult conditions prevailing in Kuomintang China. Wishing to extend the presumed benefits of advanced technology to China's book-starved universities, Americans arranged the importation of large quantities of microfilmed publications which languished, largely unread, in makeshift libraries ill-equipped to use them. U.S. experts in such disparate fields as livestock insemination and public information work found themselves frustrated by economic backwardness and political repression. Chinese professors and students taking advantage of educational opportunities in America were harassed by a clumsily authoritarian ministry of education; many undergraduates were hard-pressed to support their studies once they arrived here. In framing cultural policy goals, Washington bureaucrats themselves could not always distinguish between propaganda and propriety.

Numerous American participants and their Chinese counterparts, however, did benefit from programs spawned by cultural diplomacy. Fairbank amply documents these more positive relationships, not the least of which was the pioneer Fulbright China program launched in 1948–49. Several of its alumni went on to lay the foundations of modern American sinology; at least in this sense we are all legatees of the Sino-American cultural relationship of the 1940s.

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KENNETH W. JONES. *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab.* Pp. 360. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $14.00.

Historians of the past have been so absorbed in the reconstruction of the Punjab and its material development that the workings of the spirit of the Punjab people for long went unnoticed. The attitude was that they had been defeated and it was the providential work of the British to reconstruct the country and reunite its people. In the former task they succeeded, but in the latter their efforts left the Punjab more divided than ever.

In *Arya Dharm* Kenneth Jones looks on the Punjab's development from about 1850 from the Punjabi Hindus' point of view. The Punjab was a country of multiples; between its five rivers dwelt three peoples with separate and often conflicting ideologies and traditions. It has, since at least A.D. 1000, been a land of conflict and domination by one group over the others. Domination for the stronger, survival for the weaker has been the guiding principle for its component communities.

The nineteenth century saw a new factor added to the equation—the British and Western ideas. Politically, this was mainly a new case of domination, but the ideas, cults, and techniques which the British brought with them were novel and alarming. The starting point of this study is the position of the Punjabi Hindus as a minority community. It found itself already threatened by erosion from the proselytizing religions of Islam and Sikhism, to which was now added the activities of the Christian missionaries. It was in any case a truncated community, lacking an effective Brahmin head and almost completely Rajput muscle, a virtually headless and armless body of commercial and agricultural castes with vulnerable "depressed-class" nether limbs.

Into this situation Mr. Jones sets the rise of the Arya Samaj. The British provided peace and opportunity for the urban Hindus; the consequent prosperity revived self-confidence, but this, to develop, needed an ideological as well as a financial foundation. So the Punjabi toyed with the synthesizing Brahmo Samaj of Bengal for a time. Then they found a leader more to their taste in the combative and uncompromising Gujarati Brahmin, Swami Dayananda, who was himself looking for a Hindu community ready to consider large changes in its outlook and style. The Punjab provided an anvil of apprehension for the hammer of his dogmatism; the Arya sparks flew upward from 1875, at first sporadically only, but from 1900 in molten showers. The great obstacle within the community was tradition-bound conservatism linked with fear of outside bodies. This accounted for the slow early progress of the cult and then its split into the College (Western-accepting) and Vedic (pristine Hindu) parties, symbolized respectively by the D.A.V. College in Lahore and the Brahmacharya Gurkul at Hardwar.

Mr. Jones makes clear the social predicament of the Hindu community and then traces the rise of the Samaj by means of a close study of its large pamphlet and journalistic literature and such papers as the early leaders have left. It is a work of detailed and thorough scholarship requiring a knowledge of Urdu and Punjabi as well as English. It is also a pioneering study, for work on the Samaj has hitherto been mainly confined to Samajists themselves, like the late Harbilas Sarda. The social implications of the Samaj outlook and its consequences are also portrayed in detail. The net result was to make some sections of Hindus in the Punjab what had hitherto been deemed almost unthinkable—aggressive and proselytizing bodies. But when one communal cheek is smitten, the other is rarely offered as well. So militancy provoked in turn an already too combative Punjabi Islam, a determined Sikhism, persistent Christian missionaries, and finally a suspicious administration. Mr. Jones skillfully describes the growth of general militancy as the price of reviving Hindu vigor. This dilemma, which led in the end to Pakistan and the Punjab massacres, is well described without any hint as to how it could have been resolved.

Mr. Jones has carried this well-documented and well-argued work down to 1914. The tensions which were later to become lethal were by then well

established. This book, with its careful scholarship and detached treatment, is a valuable study which may become a standard work. It is much to be hoped that the author will continue this study down to Partition and then round it off with a study of the position of the Samaj in independent India and abroad.

PERCIVAL SPEAR

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GEORGE N. KATES. *The Years that Were Fat: The Last of Old China*. Foreword by John K. Fairbank. Pp. xii, 268. Reprint, ed., Cambridge, Mass.. The M.I.T. Press, 1976. $8.95.

George N. Kates was approaching 40 and had earned a doctorate at Oxford when an encounter with Chinese poetry in translation led him to immerse himself in traditional Chinese culture. His book describes his recreation of the lifestyle of the scholar-gentry class in the years before World War II

Kates's interest was antiquarian, for the former ruling class of Chinese politics and culture had lost its foundations with the end of the imperial civil service and the concommitant evisceration of Confucian scholarship at the beginning of the century. Yet the story of this dying way of life illuminates the changes that have since taken place in modern China.

The author attempted to live as a traditional scholar, copying both the physical surroundings and the intellectual activities of a learned leisure class. In addition to intensive study of Chinese language and literature, Kates explored the remnants of imperial Peking, both material and spiritual. In his book he vividly describes the physical arrangement of the old imperial capital and traces the history of its major landmarks, many of which are now familiar sights to American television audiences. He fondly recalls the fabric of the everyday life of the upper class—the sounds of street vendors, the process of curio buying, wedding and funeral processions, the celebrations of the lunar cycle.

Kates lovingly analyzes the Chinese character, as he perceived it. He delineates the Confucian ideal of the gentleman, with his life of balance and tranquil decorum, and contrasts it with the "little man," with his concern with things material. His own surroundings convinced Kates of the extent to which "ordinary Chinese manners were based upon the virtual impossibility of ever achieving solitude . . ." (p. 19). What Kates found perhaps most noteworthy a characteristic of every Chinese he had met was a sense of "belonging to an order of things loftier, by far, than any introduced to China from the West" which engendered "a doctrinaire conviction of superiority as by birth" (pp. 138–39). Such insights are a valuable feature of the book.

But Kates's vision, like that of the class whose lifestyle he approximated, is both insular and complacent. He expresses no real concern or interest in the actual circumstances of the ordinary people of Peking or the vast hinterland of agricultural China. He assumes that all Chinese occupied their position in life with the same contentment he found in his: "Man made no protest at what seemed to him his place in this destined order of things" (p. 99).

His sojourn within the walls of Peking coincided with the invasion of North China by the Japanese and the firm establishment of a revolutionary base by the Chinese Communists. Yet Kates indicates an awareness of the former alone, and this only when it finally necessitated his departure from his beloved city in 1941; the latter would complete the destruction of the elite way of life that he had briefly shared. The myopia of the upper class is epitomized by Kates's recollection of a particularly satisfying view from the garden of one of the Manchu palaces: "One knew that a million and a half souls lived beyond these high walls; and yet from the waters of the lakes one saw only the distant hills, and the sun could set behind them as if in the open country" (p. 81).

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BLAIR B. KLING. *Partner in Empire: Dwarkanath Tagore and the Age of Enterprise in Eastern India*. Pp. xxi, 276. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $12.50.

Dwarkanath Tagore, renaissance prince of Calcutta in the 1830s and 1840s, tried to bridge Bengali and British civilizations as landed aristocrat, quasiofficial representative to the British including visits to England in 1842 and 1845, and organizer of joint Anglo-Indian business enterprises in Bengal. Blair Kling's study, as its subtitle suggests, focuses primarily on Tagore's entrepreneurial activities including coal mining, steam navigation, commercial banking, insurance, newspaper publishing, tea plantations, salt manufacture, and sugar refining. Most of these enterprises, however, remained small, sometimes collapsed, and generally fared poorly. Kling's analysis of the inhibiting factors is comprehensive: poor management, inefficient use of technology, excessive reliance on indigo exports which fluctuated sharply in value, lack of government assistance, lack of commitment by Bengalis to commercial ventures, and a reference group of British businessmen in Bengal who were ostentatious and short-sighted speculators. No wonder the "Age of Enterprise," as Kling describes it, had little substance. In 1845 Bengal had a total of 150 steam engines with a total 6,000 horsepower of which 4,800 were in steamers, packets, and tugboats—hardly an industrial revolution.

Dwarkanath's personal concern with industry hadn't the compelling attraction of his landed estates. These provided his real wealth, the backing for his entrepreneurial adventures, and he did not ignore them. By contrast, in Bombay, the Gujaratis and Parsis attended business with deep concern. For them it was the core of their wealth and crucial to their self-esteem, not merely an experimental adventure in international cooperation founded on landed wealth.

Bengal lacked such an indigenous business community. Tagore was almost alone among the Brahmins in business and he attracted little outside support. He apparently established no ties with the rising Marwari businessmen immigrating to Calcutta from northwestern India. He hoped for future developments in partnership with the British rather than with other Indians. But, despite his many overtures to enlist British partners, those who joined his enterprises were the less wealthy and less industrious. When the British did invest more heavily in Calcutta enterprises after 1850, they came not as partners but from a base of control in London and with financial and technological resources which swamped the Bengalis.

Kling proposes no theoretical framework for entrepreneurial study and presents few comparative examples from other parts of India, none for other parts of the world. His focus is the man and his era. Perhaps that is enough. The ambivalences of that man—landlord, religious reformer, philanthropist, industrialist, cosmopolite—and the contradictions between the societies he tried to unite—he dined with Queen Victoria at Buckingham Palace but was exiled from his own home by his womenfolk for taking food with Europeans—formed an inhospitable background for perseverance in commerce and industry. That part of his career, pursued as only one of many interests, finally failed.

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CHARLTON M. LEWIS. *Prologue to the Chinese Revolution: The Transformation of Ideas and Institutions in Hunan Province, 1891–1907*. Pp. ix, 317. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $15.00.

Both the specialist in modern Chinese political history and the generalist desiring to supplement the standard textbook accounts will welcome this useful volume. The great service which Charlton Lewis's study provides is to link together in 10 economical chapters

many of the most prominent issues in late Ch'ing history. His coherent narrative carries the reader from the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion to the founding of the republic, making connections along the way to numerous major topics, such as the introduction of modern schooling, the radical reforms of 1898, anti-missionary activities, Western imperialism, secret societies, early industrialization, and constitutional reform, all of which have been treated elsewhere in more specialized studies. The approach is primarily chronological narrative but with a different topical focus in each chapter. Although the story is far too complex to be treated definitively in so short a space, the author is to be complimented for weaving so many strands together without binding the reader in tangles.

The move from capital-centered history to the analysis of China at a regional or provincial level is one of the main trends in contemporary scholarship. This book embodies that general trend, although it is not a provincial study to the extent that its title would imply. Rather, it is a broad survey of events at the provincial, regional, national, and even international levels unified by special reference to the activities of men from Hunan. For more attention to the structure and substance of social change at the local level, and a different view of revolution, one should turn for comparison to the just published work of Joseph W. Esherick, *Reform and Revolution. The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei* and the forthcoming work of Angus McDonald (both University of California Press)

At the center of *Prologue to the Chinese Revolution* is the transformation of the Hunanese elite from staunch supporters of Confucian orthodoxy in the 1860s to avid modernizers in the decade after 1900. A related theme is that of popular or sub-elite politicization as manifested in the activities of the Ko-lao hui and related organizations. Much of the author's analysis proceeds from a Levensonian calculus of intellectual tensions. The scholars of Hunan are seen to be first opposing foreign influence, then advocating reform, then drawing back as the radical leadership of K'ang Yu-wei strained the Confucian sanction to the breaking point. Increasingly the provincial elite relied upon political and military power to maintain their privileged positions as the traditional model of moral leadership lost force. Missing here is a clearly drawn definition of the provincial elite, its structure, its internal dynamics, and the bases of its power. Lewis gives much attention to the activities of the most radical sector of the literati, those who were repressed following the conservative coup of 1898 and who, operating from Japan, pursued first a counter-coup strategy based on loyalty to the emperor and then turned increasingly to anti-Manchu revolution. These events are ably chronicled, but the social forces behind them often remain obscure.

Mr. Lewis has written his account in a clear and direct style with no effort either to impress or amuse. He has worked long with the topic and is clearly in control of a vast body of evidence as the heavy annotations attest. Numerous valuable nuggets are to be found in the text which students and teachers will want to dig out for their notes: a description of the organization of a secret society (the Ko-lao hui), an account of the Ta-t'ung Insurrection of 1900, or appendixes translating manifestos from the Ping-Liu-Li Uprising in Hunan in 1906, and much more.

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JOHN D. MARTZ, and ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA. *Electoral Mobilization and Public Opinion: The Venezuelan Campaign of 1973*. Pp. xi, 339. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976. $17.95.

At the outset of this volume, the authors assume that contemporary Venezuela has evolved into a highly com-

petitive, democratic, and representative political system. Such characterization is based on a series of elections commencing in 1958 and culminating in 1973. The electoral campaign of 1973 thus serves as the focus for study.

This book divides into three parts. The first establishes the political setting, with attention to historical background, party tendencies, elections, and patterns of campaigning. The second deals with the electoral process, specifically candidate selection, campaign organization, strategies and tactics, ideologies, and programs. The third looks at various styles of campaigning, patterns of communication, and electoral consequences. An introductory essay synthesizes relevant sources which analyze political campaigns; it concludes with an outline of assumptions about campaign efficacy, mobilization, and implementation.

The study's methods focused on an assessment of public opinion during the 1973 electoral campaign. One method incorporated personal observation, interviews with political leaders, and information accumulated over many years of personal experience in the country. The authors devoted considerable time to campaign travels throughout Venezuela. A second method utilized a nationwide survey of opinion, drawn from a national sample.

The authors search for new theoretical formulations for the broader study of democratic politics, but little new theory is advanced. Although this study exemplifies the democratic patterns the authors envision for the rest of Latin America, this reviewer would be interested in questions which analyze party politics and electoral campaigns in a context of significant economic and social issues and problems which affect national life.

Given the parameters of their study, however, the authors have combined a tight framework with empirical study and scholarly analysis. Whatever one's predispositions, this study by Martz and Baloyra should interest all political scientists. It is clearly written. It is enhanced by detailed information about parties, political leaders, and the electoral process. It is enriched by insights into and understandings of the complexities of Venezuelan political life.

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ERGUN ÖZBUDUN. *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*. Pp. vii, 254. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. $13.50.

Turkey provides a fertile field for the investigator of comparative politics and historical political development because of the erratic, often unpredictable nature of its political responses. Thus, the apparatus of the Ottoman Empire was largely discarded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in favor of European-model institutions, yet Ataturk governed in the autocratic personal manner of the early sultans in his political style. The organization which he founded—the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP)—was abruptly voted out of office in 1950 by the new Democrat party as Turkey moved toward a two-party system. In the next two decades, this became a multi-party structure as what Professor Özbudun labels the traditional center-periphery cleavage was replaced by functional cleavages, the new bases of the system. As a result, the RPP was ideologically transformed, in his words, into "a social-democratic party with homogeneous membership, coherent socioeconomic policies, and a populist political style." The change accounts for its success in the October 1973 elections, when it regained its majority in the National Assembly at the expense of the Democrat-vide Justice party which had dominated Turkish politics for two decades.

Professor Özbudun charts these changes in Turkish political action with clarity and thorough competence. His objective is to examine the ways in which participation is affected by socioeconomic modernization, with Turkey as a case study. However, the restrictive

time span—essentially confined to the 1960–69 election cycle, although the data is used to assess the 1973 elections —and emphasis on urban-regional and regional development contrasts within the country make the book equally valuable to students of recent Turkish history.

Along the way, the author reaches some unexpected conclusions. Thus, voting participation in rural Turkey has not increased with individual or village modernization. Instead, rapid modernization has produced a decline in participation, further confirming the political shift in Turkey from traditional center-periphery to functional divisions. Also the urban vote, particularly in the *gecekondu*—squatter settlements of Turkish cities—proves to be less radical, better organized, and more realistic in its responses to material inducements as offered by the RPP. Examined from the participatory viewpoint, the *gecekondu* disprove the often-held assumption that, like slum-dwellers elsewhere, they comprise a destitute, illiterate, socially-disorganized mass.

Within its restricted compass, this is one of the best studies of Turkish politics in many years.

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PETER SCHRAN. *Guerrilla Economy: The Development of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, 1937–1945*. Pp. ix, 323. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976. $25.00.

Peter Schran has written an intensive study of the economics of an industrially backward, agriculturally poor area of China occupied by the Chinese Communists during the Chinese-Japanese War. The area's special significance is that it was the haven for the Chinese Communists after their forced evacuation of south central China and their 6,000 mile trek to the Northwest. A second significant service of the study is that the development pattern was used as prototype for reconstruction of all China subsequent to the Communi[st] victory in 1949.

The study commences in 1937, whe[n] a united front agreement with th[e] Nationalists probably saved the Com[munists] from extinction. As a result o[f] this agreement: (1) the Nationalis[t] blockade was relaxed, allowing the export of salt, the primary income producing commodity, and the import of much needed industrial products; and (2) the Communist Army was provided with arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies in addition to 500,000 to 600,000 yuan per month for pay and allowances.

Guerrilla Economy discusses various aspects of development including: (1) Communist government operations; (2) labor organization, motivation, and incentives; (3) forces involved in development, such as agricultural workers, salt producers, women, cadres, and soldiers; (4) production factors of agriculture, salt, manufacturing, mining, road construction, and transportation; and (5) external relations regarding balance of trade, financial aid from the Nationalist government, budget deficits, inflation, taxes, and the struggle for self-sufficiency.

According to Schran, Communist development of the Shen-Kan-Ning border region resulted in: (1) virtual elimination of landlords and a deterioration of the economic condition of public officials; (2) an improved standard of living for peasants, workers, and soldiers; (3) accumulation of surplus; and (4) perhaps most valuable in the long range, education and training of cadres for assignment to guerrilla areas in Japanese-occupied China.

Schran has managed to compile a wealth of economic data included in 58 tables in the text and appendix. He does warn, however, that much of the information is inadequate, incomplete, unreliable, and not determinable with accuracy.

What is regrettably not included is a substantial analysis of Chinese Communist military and political operations and policies. Beyond a short discourse on the "mass line" and mass organiza-

tions, little is offered on political goals and methods. Military operations are not included in the study. Thus, the title may mislead one expecting to find a dissertation on politico-military relationships and guerrilla operations.

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C. MARTIN WILBUR. *Sun Yat-Sen. Frustrated Patriot*. Pp. viii, 410. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $16.50.

Sun Yat-sen may be the most perplexing figure in modern Chinese history. Although deprecated, even scorned, by some of his compatriots, he has been loved and revered by the great majority of them. This, despite the fact that Sun's dreams ran far ahead of his accomplishments and his public career consisted of an almost unbroken succession of failures and disappointments. It can be argued, indeed, that for the historian the history that Sun himself made was in some respects less interesting than the history his fellow countrymen made for him. How did such a loser, in one sense, become such a winner, in another? If the Communist movement had, at any point prior to World War II, been defeated and extinguished, the best guess is that Mao Tse-tung would have been neither loved nor regretted by the general run of Chinese. Why is it that, seemingly irrespective of who won in the end, Sun Yat-sen's place was secure?

These questions suggest, if nothing else, that the frustrations Sun Yat-sen himself encountered are easily matched by the frustrations experienced by the historian who would understand him, the appeal he had for his followers, and the grip he has held over history. C. Martin Wilbur's study is focused on the former category of frustrations—Sun's. Our frustrations, the second category, are left more or less intact.

Sun Yat-sen is a large subject, and Professor Wilbur has wisely confined himself to selected aspects of his career, in particular Sun's incessant fundraising efforts, his equally unending quest for support from foreign governments, and his relations with the Soviets during the last years of his life. The information Wilbur furnishes on these topics is intriguing. Wilbur is a digger, and he has ferreted out an enormous quantity of factual detail, using every important available body of source material except the Japanese (which he acknowledges is extensive). I do not think it unfair, however, to say that by and large the data accumulated tend to be used to confirm an overall picture of Sun and his career which we already had rather than to revise this picture in any significant way. How much this is attributable to a failure on the part of the author to pose new questions and how much it is owing to the unavailability of certain critical documents still secreted in KMT and Soviet archives is a puzzle that we will have to look to future studies of Sun to solve.

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MARVIN HERSCHEL BERMAN. *The Treatment of the Soviet Union and Communism in Selected World History Textbooks, 1920–70*. Pp. i, 284. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1976. No price.

KIKUKO KAMBAYASHI. *The Expansion of Treatments of Japan in High School Textbooks in American History, 1951–1972*. Pp. i, 272. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975. No Price.

These are numbers 26 and 27 in the University of Michigan Comparative Education Dissertation Series. Berman's study sought to determine how secondary-school world history textbooks treated content about the Soviet Union and communism during the years 1920 to 1970. It attempted to define the changes that occurred in this treatment over successive periods of time. Specifically, the investigation analyzed content from the standpoint of (*a*) amount of attention

given, (*b*) direction, and (*c*) accuracy. In focusing on the Soviet Union and communism, the study has dealt with a controversial and complex content area that has rarely been examined in the present context.

Kambayashi's study poses questions about the treatment of Japan in American high-school textbooks, particularly in the past 21 years. Answers were sought through a determination of the frequency with which textbooks have mentioned Japan and the amount of space given to Japanese-related subjects. It was sought through an examination of the varied aspects of Japanese society and Japanese-American relations presented in textbooks. Are references increasingly related to the military? Do they now more than formerly concern peaceful relationships between the two nations? Are economic and cultural encounters more frequently and freely treated? Finally, are there differences in the interpretations of various topics? The latter question was studied through a comparison of high-school textbook presentations of Japanese-related subjects with the views of recognized authorities on contemporary Japan, in terms of accuracy, comprehensiveness, and objectivity.

Changes and the trends in the treatments of 11 selected topics, representing a series of Japanese-American historic encounters, were determined in both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The findings, based on a study of 64 American high-school history textbooks published since 1951, were compared with those of previous studies to determine the degree of change over seven decades.

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STUART D. BRANDES. *American Welfare Capitalism 1880–1940*. Pp. ix, 209. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. $12.95.

This is a valuable book, despite what sometimes seems the author's determination that it not be read. The nine chapters on the areas in which American welfare capitalism developed present much original and illuminating information, drawn from research into dozens, even hundreds, of companies which attempted to incorporate their employees' lives into a comprehensive scheme. Inasmuch as the contemporary corporate liberal state owes much to these experiments, it is a book which ought to be read by more than just historians.

The nine principal topics are housing, education, religion, recreation, profit-sharing and stock ownership plans, medical care, pensions, social work, and employee representation. The motives behind the plans are also numerous. Dr. Brandes does not emphasize the "cultural lag" argument, the idea that welfarism was a feudal leftover in modern guise; this movement does not really flourish until rather late in the American industrialization process. But he does see altruism as a major ingredient, the shock of some employers at the human misery they had wrought along with their goods. Then there was the matter of efficiency ("When I keep a horse and find him a clean stable and good food I am not doing anything philanthropic for my horse," as one boss put it), there was public relations, including the hope of forestalling governmental intervention; and of course, the hope of outflanking increasingly bold labor organizers.

The book cannot be faulted for not fastening on a single cause. The welfarism movement was not so cute an ideology. But the book does suffer from the lack of a definition of just what welfare capitalism was. Dr. Brandes's "any service provided for the comfort and improvement of employees which was neither a necessity of the industry nor required by law" does not do. It is so broad that it includes the pre-industrial paternalism which does not concern the book, any form of patronization, and even the brutal employer with occasional fits of generosity. In fact, Dr. Brandes does not tarry with bosses who at Christmas passed out Golden Eagles on the shop floor. But the lack of a satisfactory definition means that his carefully gathered data often wander quite randomly.

And so, lacking a general interpretation, the book's data are framed by the most extraordinary banalities: "of course, employees had become old and unproductive in the nineteenth century, so the problem was not entirely new . . ." (p. 103); "One did not have to go back to the Roman Empire when slaveowners attempted to revitalize an inefficient economy by granting a share of profits to slaves as an incentive for increased production . . ." (p. 83), and so on. It is a pleasure to review a book in the social sciences that is not fouled by jargon. But these efforts at erudition that are more leaden than airy are not an improvement. Unhappily, every chapter seems to begin with one of these exercises. But it is worth the while to grimace, take a deep breath, and read on. There is a lot in the book that is worth knowing.

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JOSEPH H. CARTWRIGHT. *The Triumph of Jim Crow: Tennessee Race Relations in the 1880s*. Pp. vii, 286. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976. $13.95.

The author, associate professor of history at Murray State University, has produced a first-rate book from his dissertation at Vanderbilt by extending the usual treatment of his topic on southern states. This is done by describing black political participation and white attitudes toward blacks and tracing the processes of change through the interaction between whites and blacks. In one decade, race relations changed from better to worse. The strength of Cartwright's account follows from his demonstration of the ultimate futility of white benevolent paternalism resting on an optimistic belief that many blacks would rapidly acquire educated standards of propriety, work habits, and property ownership, and of how separation of the races occurred without equality. While blacks were found to hold the balance of power in many state and municipal elections and to be wooed by Democrats and Republicans alike, in the end white anti-black sentiment transcended party and all the rather impressive black political participation in the state went for naught.

In a prelude, Cartwright documents the entrance of blacks into Tennessee politics. In seven succeeding chapters, the topics discussed included: Bourbons, blacks, and New South politics; black militancy and the Republican party; black legislators of the 1880s; urban reform—the nemesis of black power; separation without equality; sources of opposition to Negro voting; and suffrage restrictions and the decline of black political influence.

Cartwright has achieved his goal of adding a new dimension to race relations in the South by examining intensively in the relatively short time period of the 1880 decade the changing dialogue between blacks and whites. The reader comes away with an added appreciation of the complex processes which led to the shift of white attitudes toward black voters from benign paternalism to overt hostility. He will also learn what seemed to be Tennessee's greater potential for civility being thwarted. "The choice made in the eighties," Cartwright concluded, "gave rein to the intimidation and hostility which often would make later Negro attempts at voter registration acts of nearly revolutionary proportions" (p. 258).

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RICHARD N. CURRENT. *The History of Wisconsin. Vol. II: The Civil War Era 1848–1873*. Pp. vii, 659. Stevens Pt., Wisc.: The Society Press, 1977. $20.00.

This volume of a contemplated six-volume history of Wisconsin, is a well-documented, thoroughly researched, excellently written book. The bibliography is extensive, the index is accurate and ample, the essay on sources is scholarly, and the brief appendix lists the governors during the period discussed in the book.

The author begins with the state's

geography, its scattered settlements, the coming of the railroads with their heavy indebtedness and their attempts to people the land. Migrants came from many places and by numerous means of travel. Newcomers did not find Wisconsin as advertised and thousands left for areas west.

In the decade preceding the Civil War, wheat was the greatest crop with forest products second. Oxen, the animal labor source, were easily contained within rail fences. Cattle and hogs frequently roamed wild.

Led by Milwaukee, several towns saw small shops expand into large companies as the kinds of business endeavors multiplied. With industrialization came noise and pollutions and the diminution of some species of animals and birds. Nature's resources were exploited as profits were earned.

Wisconsin was early settled by numerous social, national, and ethnic groups. Native-born Americans were usually favored, but German immigrants gained pre-eminence in business and prosperity in farming.

Wisconsin had its race problem: the majority whites with Indians before the Civil War and with Negroes after 1865. In spite of rising intellectual life, as evidenced by the growing number of colleges, secondary schools, newspapers, libraries, lyceums, and so forth, violence lay beneath the surface and often erupted.

The Democrats controlled the state in the 1840s, but the newly formed Republican party won control in the 1850s and continued in power until the 1870s.

The author stated that, although the badger state aided the North more than some states, there was an unusual amount of sympathy for the South present in the state. The Badgers in Blue did their part in preserving the Union at a cost to the state of $12,000,000. The net result of the war, says Professor Current, was that the rich beame richer and the poor became poorer.

In the postwar years, immigrants poured into the state; farm crops increased, industry remained rudimentary, labor's real wages decreased. Communities served their people more than earlier, women entered the state university and colleges, but the social caste spirit continued strong. A number of citizens left the state to gain power as carpetbaggers in southern states.

If the other volumes in this series are as fine as Dr. Current's volume, this will be a most successful state history.

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SEYMOUR J. DEITCHMAN. *The Best-Laid Schemes: A Tale of Social Research and Bureaucracy*. Pp. xiv, 483. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1976. $14.95.

The Kennedy victory of 1960 brought to the presidency an individual determined to demonstrate American superiority in world politics. To assist in this task, he "brought with him intellectuals . . from Northeastern Universities." This intellectual power would be employed to solve the serious problems facing American foreign policy, most alarming of which were the rapidly spreading "wars of national liberation." This study is an account of the Defense Department's endeavor to enlist social scientists to study the causes of these insurgencies and to develop strategies to defeat what was perceived as the "new communist threat."

Seymour Deitchman, as director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDRE) participated in the planning of these programs and in this study explains why they failed to achieve the results that were so confidently predicted. As director, he coordinated the initiating and implementing of all the various programs and agencies involved, the most controversial of which was Project Camelot. Deitchman presents a clear and detailed description of these complex and bureaucratically intertwined programs. However, this is incidental to his primary aims of, one, explaining why the programs failed and, two, defending Camelot-type research.

The failure of these programs is attributed to the exposure of Project Camelot and the balleyhoo that ensued. In Deitchman's opinion, this reckless as-

sault was inextricably linked to the emerging opposition to the Vietnam War—"Camelot news gave many social scientists a cause celebre . . . to add to their growing dissatisfaction with American behavior overseas." This led to an across-the-board attack on all ODDRE projects by the press, Congress, and social science community. However, as a result of the emotionalism of the Vietnam issue, this criticism, in the author's view, lacked a clear understanding of Camelot-type research and its potential utility for policymakers. For example, he argues that "the background and reasons for DOD's activities were barely explored" by the press. "Most of the stories had a few of the facts and wove them together with half-truths and surmise," resulting in "distortions or misinformation." This activated congressional concern, culminating in the 1969 Mansfield Amendment that severely restricted all such DOD social research. This congressional over-reaction forced ODDRE programs into the "political arena," where "no amount of explanation would help." Finally, the social science community is censured for not taking "the trouble to investigate sufficiently to get the facts straight, much less understand the background of events that led to Camelot."

This explanation of the rise and fall of DOD social research is accompanied by Deitchman's tacit defense of such programs. He flatly rejects the criticisms of Horowitz, Silvert, and others. There is no questioning of the legitimacy of U.S. counterinsurgency strategies or of the role of social science in developing such strategies under DOD auspices. In sum, this is a very thought-provoking and important study. Whether this persuasive defense of social engineering is accepted depends on one's view of the boundaries of social science research. This reader remains unpersuaded.

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ELMER R. RUSCO. *"Good Time Coming?" Black Nevadans in the Nineteenth Century*. Pp. xix, 230. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1976. $13.95.

This study of the Negro population in nineteenth-century Nevada would have made a useful article, but neither the subject nor the sources used seem of sufficient weight to justify a book. In 1860 Nevada's population included only 45 blacks, and at its peak in 1880 the Negro population never exceeded 400. Only Carson City and Virginia City ever housed more than 50 blacks or developed distinctive Negro social institutions.

Professor Rusco uses as his basic source the original U.S. census returns from 1860 to 1880, which show that the great majority of Nevada's blacks were at the bottom of the social hierarchy. About one-quarter of the Negro population was female and worked as housewives or domestic servants while the men were unskilled laborers in the towns. Blacks were drawn to mining districts of the state, but because of white prejudice very few found employment as miners. Outside the towns, a few blacks became small farmers or ranchers, but more worked as hired hands. Barbers represented the largest group of self-employed blacks—over 10 percent in 1880—and the more successful, together with a handful of restaurant owners and saloon keepers, constituted a small black bourgeoisie. One physician and one lithographer-artist were the only black professional men resident for an appreciable period in nineteenth-century Nevada, although the black Methodist churches regularly sent ministers to the state. In the absence of a local black press, Rusco supplements census data with material from two black newspapers published in San Francisco which had Nevada correspondents and with such Nevada sources as throw incidental light on the Negro population.

Besides a detailed analysis of the occupational structure, Rusco has chapters on the political position and social institutions of Nevada's blacks. When Nevada became a state, blacks could not vote, hold office, serve as attorney or in the militia, sit on juries, or marry

whites. Their children were also excluded from the public schools. Between 1865 and 1882 most of these racist laws were repealed, but this change was more a reflection of federal legislative policy than an indication of a change of heart among Nevada's whites. Black community leaders agitated against these laws and won the support of a few white liberals, but the tiny black minority had no political power in a Republican dominated state.

Rusco is so preoccupied with the details of state politics that he unfortunately fails to identify many of his protagonists. His short chapter on black churches and freemasonry would have been improved if he had made use of standard sources on black Methodism which identify many of the ministers resident for short periods in Nevada and which indicate the problems facing black church leaders.

Rusco's concluding chapter on Nevada's blacks after 1880 is disappointing: he charts the decline of the Negro population by two-thirds up to 1900 and illustrates the vicious harassment that accompanied it, but fails to provide an adequate discussion of the state's economic and political developments which might have enabled the reader to make sense of what he describes. This book has some merit for the 20-year period on which Rusco concentrates, but his focus is too often parochial and his judgments sometimes naive.

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ARNOLD H. TAYLOR. *Travail and Triumph. Black Life and Culture in the South Since the Civil War* Pp viii, 325. Westport, Conn Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977 $15.95.

Arnold H. Taylor's *Travail and Triumph* makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing reevaluation of the black experience (or more appropriately experiences) in the United States. It appears at the height of the current fascination with exploring the Afro-American past, as witnessed in the phenomenal appeal of Alex Haley's *Roots*. Taylor focuses on blacks in the South where most have lived and continue to do so. Drawing upon folk literature and music, oral history reminiscences, and a large body of scholarly monographs, he pieces together the stories of notable and uncelebrated blacks who labored after the Civil War to maintain their self-respect under a rigid caste system. Thus, as Taylor asserts, Afro-Americans "responded variously to their social and physical environment and have frequently seized the initiative in shaping their individual lives and in developing a viable community life and a rich expressive culture."

Although blacks played an assortment of social, economic, and political roles, white southerners severely restricted the options available. Domination of economic and political resources, control of the legal machinery, and the use of violence and intimidation enabled whites to guarantee black subordination. While blacks were forced to react to the system of white supremacy, they did not do so merely as passive victims. Instead, Afro-Americans created institutions that provided opportunities for self-expression and for sustaining challenges against some of the worst forms of human oppression.

A book that deserves to reach a wide audience, *Travail and Triumph* nevertheless contains weaknesses. In ambitiously striving to survey many areas over a long time period, Taylor occasionally spreads his narrative too thin, particularly in covering the impact on Afro-American institutions of two world wars, the Great Depression, and the New Deal. Also, some generalizations appear to be based more on intuition than on available evidence. For instance, it is not clear how the author knows that had "there been a well organized, amply financed emigration project, the South would have lost much of its black population to Africa" between 1890 and 1910

Overall, Professor Taylor has produced a well-written and carefully balanced synthesis based on the most

recent scholarship. His account compels the reader to admire those blacks who kept alive a tradition of human dignity and courage amidst the agony of surviving in the apartheid South. Inheriting this legacy of freedom, the civil rights movement, as Taylor correctly concludes, turned travail into triumph.

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CHARLES M. WOLLENBERG. *All Deliberate Speed: Segregation and Exclusion in California Schools, 1855–1975*. Pp. vi. 207. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977. $10.00.

California has the largest non-white population of any state and probably the most diverse mixture of ethnic minorities. The state also has the oldest public education system in the Far West. As this is being written, a judge has just indicated that the Los Angeles school board's desegregation plan is too limited to meet constitutional standards. Thus, integration efforts in the nation's second largest school district remain stymied.

The problem of stopping discrimination against non-white children in public schools is not something unique to the last 20 years, although many Californians may think so. Segregation has roots dating back to statehood. Exclusion from public schools (unthinkable now) was an early practice that had to be overcome. This book puts segregation/integration into historical perspective. Wollenberg has produced a timely narrative which is highly readable. This is social history at its best as he concentrates on the interrelationship between schools and the courts. It is must reading for everyone concerned with the complex problems of busing and neighborhood schools, because most of the issues and arguments in the current debate over integration have been raised before.

Starting in 1854, when California was a Jim Crow state, blacks were successful in obtaining a colored school in San Francisco. In 1872 the Oakland school board opened its regular schools for the first time to blacks, and a black parent noted that "prejudice that has been so long in existence will be blotted out." A century later Wollenberg concludes that schools and courts by themselves cannot eliminate segregation and racism. In 1874 the "separate but equal" doctrine for schools was applied statewide, although integration continued in San Francisco, Oakland, and a few other northern communities.

The main ethnic groups had different problems and experiences. In San Francisco a Chinese public school existed from 1859 to 1871. There was a language barrier which missionary schools and after-hours instruction attempted to solve. The Japanese arrived in large numbers at the turn of the century. To achieve access to public schools, the Japanese community leaders turned to Japan where public opinion was aroused about their unfair treatment here. A diplomatic crisis was created, and President Roosevelt intervened. Today, Chinese and Japanese are not classified as culturally disadvantaged. As for American Indians, theirs was a tragedy and the federal bureaucracy (BIA) was largely responsible. Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, the largest minority in the state, were by far the most segregated group in public education.

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SOCIOLOGY

DAVID H. BAYLEY. *Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States*. Pp. xvi, 217. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $10.95.

Bayley's observations of police operations in Japan and his interviews with officers yielded rich details about the police in that country. There is also evidence that the author is knowledgeable about the police in the United States. However, the emphasis is on the Japanese police, and this sometimes results in uneven documentation that leaves

doubt about the adequacy of the portrayal of American police. For instance, pride may indeed be a major element in the development of a community spirit among Japanese police; but it is less clearly demonstrated that shame is the basis of community spirit among American police. Likewise, the case for a link between enforcement of laws against victimless crimes and greater corruption and demoralization of American police requires more discussion of the American situation.

The Japanese police are more favorably rated than American police in almost every area of comparison. Corruption and unnecessary use of violence are less among Japanese police. The unassuming posture of the Japanese when on patrol is not as provocative to loitering youths and hoodlums as the arrogant gait of American police. While Japanese police emphasize the acceptance by citizens of moral values, American police emphasize law enforcement. And Bayley concludes that the Japanese people receive higher dividends for their investment in their police than do the American people.

Few weaknesses are reported in Japanese police organization, policies, or practices The extensive control exercised by the Japanese police over its members' lives is noted as a possible defect, since it might restrain internal criticism. But internal control is also seen as effective in reducing police deviance. Further, American police organization is no less inhibitive to internal criticism. One wonders whether positive functions could not also be found for features of the American police for which Bayley mentions only negative consequences. Unfortunately, the sketchy treatment of the American police was not conducive to careful analysis of this sort

In general, differences in attitudes and behaviors for police in the two countries are said to result from differences between the organizations and from the cultural contexts in which the organizations operate. In most cases, the data presented in support of the claimed differences are convincing; and the explanations of many differences are well reasoned and consistent with theoretical expectations. Thus, the claim that the high standard of police conduct in Japan results in part from greater supervision by senior officers is acceptable. So, too, is the further explication of this phenomenon in terms of the acceptance of supervision by junior Japanese officers because such supervision is common in Japanese work situations.

However, there are times when the attachment of causal significance to differences between the two police organizations is questionable. For instance, Bayley reports that Japanese recruits are allowed entry at two levels depending upon qualifications, whereas there is only one level of entry for American police. Also, Japanese recruits receive about six times the formal training received by American recruits. But the claim that these characteristics of the Japanese police result in greater discipline and responsibility than is found among American police would be more convincing if the author had pointed to studies showing a relationship between the relevant variables.

The constraints on American police behavior suggested in this book should encourage greater understanding of police failures and provide valuable ideas for reform.

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FORREST P. CHISMAN. *Attitude Psychology and the Study of Public Opinion* Pp. xii, 253. University Park. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. $13.50.

Modern political scientists seem to spend far too much time and effort studying things which were from the beginning essentially unimportant, and they now have been analyzed so many times that we are left with reviews of minutiae. Forrest P. Chisman, the author of *Attitude Psychology and the Study of Public Opinion*, did not choose to follow

this trend. He selected an important topic and to some extent he has broken new ground despite the fact that he admittedly essentially reviews and analyzes the data and ideas of others.

His book is basically a critique of modern public opinion research. He reviews what he calls the marriage of modern social science research techniques and traditional theories about public opinion, and he concludes that the marriage has not been as fruitful as other scholars have reported. Chisman reviews the works of V.O. Key and the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, and he finds that these studies are not able to identify what motivates the voters and they do not satisfactorily explain the relationship between public opinion and government decision making.

He finds this distressing because most researchers have found that public opinion influences governmental actions. Indeed, V.O. Key, who published the seminal works in this area, based much of his thinking on the notion that members of the public influence the government by transmitting their views to the politicians and by electing officials whose views reflect their own. Chisman contests this finding and he thinks Key and the other scholars should be looking into the effect that the government and elite groups may have in shaping public opinion.

He also contests the other major contention of public opinion scholars that they can identify motives of voters. Traditional research claims that attitudes on issues have little influence on votes and that party preference rather than issues is the major determinant of votes. Here Chisman argues that the scholars may not have been studying enough issues and attitudes and he also questions the scholars' method of analysis.

All in all, Chisman takes on the big people in the field and he does it fairly persuasively. He occasionally gets a bit hard to follow in making his own argument, but he seems to have a valid point. And most importantly in the light of current trends in the literature, he understands what is worth studying and what is worth contesting. His subject is an important one.

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FRANCESCO CORDASCO, ed. *Bilingual Schooling in the United States: A Sourcebook for Educational Personnel*. Pp. xxviii, 387. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. $16.50.

No nation has ever witnessed a proliferation of information about bilingual education comparable to the avalanche published in this country during the past decade. The 23 pages of bibliography on the subject listed in Cordasco's *Bilingual Schooling in the United States*, for example, includes only a fraction of the titles revealed by computer searches. Unfortunately, much of this literature, perhaps the major portion, is too specialized, scattered, or abstruse to be useful to the general reader or practitioner.

These facts help explain why Cordasco has performed a signal service to all interested in this branch of education by assembling some of the best articles, selections from the most distinguished seminal works, and portions of notable documents that have stirred language loyalists' blood. His qualifications for this task were striking. He has prepared several sourcebooks or introductions to sourcebooks in related subjects and he himself is a prolific author. More publications, in fact, are listed under his name in *A Bibliography of American Educational History* than any other writer's.

Cordasco keenly recognized the problems inherent in the preparation of an anthology. For example, it obviously could not offer a continuous and systematic survey of an area as extensive as the story of 350 years of American bilingual education. One reason was that only fragments of a history of this kind had ever been written. At best, Cordasco could only offer glimpses of a history.

Comparable problems arose in the sections devoted to typology, linguistic perspectives, and "educational practices, techniques, and programs." Cordasco attempted to surmount these difficulties by welding together disparate selections in a comprehensive introduction and employing cogent commentaries as connective tissue within the book.

As we have suggested, the cultural background, presented in brief compass, is the volume's outstanding feature. The sections on constitutional law and pedagogy related to bilingual education are reasonably adequate. An expanded section on constitutional law, however, might have furnished a more penetrating view of the judicial process, showing how desegregation cases and cases relating to bilingual education were inextricably intertwined, the former offering precedents for the judicial entry into the programmatic aspects of school administration that judges later employed in their mandates to school systems on bilingual education. The literature on pedagogy in the subject is relatively sparse and is frequently more appropriate for local than universal use. Cordasco attempted to resolve this problem principally by describing federally funded programs and suggesting how they could be administered and staff trained to implement them. Partly as a result, his selections for "programs, practices, and staff development" may prove more useful for administrators than the teacher aspirants or teacher novices to whom he addressed this volume.

Cordasco has compiled a superior anthology; he has disclosed the need for narratives of broader scope in such areas as the history of bilingual education, and he has produced a compendium that scholars and researchers will consult when they prepare more comprehensive works. These are impressive contributions to a subject now attracting increasing attention in our universities and schools.

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JOHN DARBY. *Conflict in Northern Ireland: The Development of a Polarised Community.* Pp. ix 268. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1976. $18.00

The subtitle of this book indicates its emphasis and thus suggests the work's principal limitation. It deals primarily and in great detail with the many aspects of social life in Northern Ireland that keep two religiously labeled ethnic groups invidiously distinct. It does not give more than passing consideration to the British and international governmental and corporate game plans served by such polarization.

Particularly from the 1920 British act establishing the Northern Ireland entity to the fall of the Northern Ireland Executive in 1974, Darby provides a painstaking description of historical, demographic, governmental, political party, religious, educational, and other social organizational and customary factors making for the maintenance of the two communities. It is a complicated game board with complex possibilities for playing the pieces and groups of pieces, but Darby tells us little about the power manipulators in the multinational corporations and governments of London, New York, Washington, and elsewhere whose strategies include efforts on that game board!

Darby's localized perspective probably owes much to his former position as research and publications officer of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission, a governmental agency. He does provide, however, fascinating insights into characteristics of the human material used by the undiscussed manipulators. For example, he details how the many changes in party names, personnel, and rhetoric modified but little the "terms of political loyalties" on both sides. He also recognizes that "all the major Irish churches have used their influence, where possible, to enforce a sectarian ethos on the general community," that "many clergymen have involved themselves and their churches in the creation of a sectarian state," and that "the churches

are the main obstacles to educational change" toward non-sectarianism. Thus, the "vast majority of Northern Ireland's pupils, apart from those in some branches of further education, are being taught alongside their co-religionists by teachers of their own religion and have minimal educational contact with children from the other main religious group." In consequence, these "differences manifest themselves in the contents of curricula, the loyalties and values which are assumed and the extracurricular activities offered by the school."

Perhaps the most frustrating chapter in the book is the last one, entitled "Theories about the conflict." It is very properly academic. In it, Darby carefully explains how confused and naive the Marxians are and then presents a selection of academic and popular theories to explain the situation for none of which he makes much of a case! "Northern Ireland is at least as remarkable for its peculiarities as for its general characteristics." That is much more convenient than proposing a theoretical analysis of such a controversial situation.

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ALVIN W. GOULDNER. *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology.* Pp. xi, 304. New York: The Seabury Press, Inc., 1976. $14.95.

The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology is another of the many recent studies of the philosophy of social science—in this case by a self-styled "Marxist outlaw." Gouldner puts Marxism, along with academic sociology, under the scrutiny of the Socratic dialectic he lauded in *Enter Plato*. Having applied this critical theory in *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* and *For Sociology*, Gouldner now sets out to demystify Marxism in this and two additional volumes to be entitled *On Marxism* and *Revolutionary Intellectuals*. The danger of creating a grammar of false speaking through neglect of the central dialectic principle of constant critique animates Gouldner's determination to put to rest the notion of an "end to ideology." In crudest form, Gouldner's point is the now-standard Marxist argument that only ideology can combat the oppressive tendencies of technocracy.

Ideology originated, according to Gouldner, with the self-conscious public—with the people or the masses. It confronted the tragic vision of the Old Regime, put thought in its proper social context, and elevated doubt to a level of respectability. Like science, however, it became corrupted by an instrumental reason drained of social context and, thus, by a self-serving managerial syndrome uncritical of social consequences. Ideology and science became reductionist—and technology emerged. Technocracy's original liberating effects (through technical invention and confrontation of negative-control bureaucracies with positive-control consumerism) have long since given way to the stultifying elitist objectivism and scientific snobbery of the administrative-professional classes. All these outdated, progressive-turned-regressive, now-false ideologies must therefore give way to today's updated ideology of peace, ecology, and so forth—because the context has been altered by the dialectic process. Quiet science, especially quiet social science, is no science at all, merely an elitist buddy system.

Intellectually, this is all Marxist enough, with progressive insight arising from the strife of worldly ideas. But Gouldner is much more inclined to doubt than to revolution. In his view, critical Marxism confronted traditional ideology on the matter of lack of concern for social reality, only to degenerate into scientific Marxism, that is Stalinism. Contemporary Marxism is only beginning to examine its own contradictions: rivalries of partly with class, class with nation, and socialist nation with socialist nation. Above all, however, Marxism shares the major tension of

every progressive social grouping, namely, the conflict of an egalitarian ideal and an elitist organization.

Gouldner's critical egalitarianism has led some European and American commentators to see him as a Maoist or Guevarist despite his editorship of *Theory and Society* and his sociology professorships at Amsterdam and Washington University in St. Louis. But he lacks the analysis of a Mandel, the lucidity of a Mills, or the fire of a Carmichael or Fanon, because his interests are resolutely intellectual. He seeks to prove that critical theory can lift science, even social science, above the level of group-reinforced assurance (he quotes Thomas Kuhn) and likewise raise Marxism above the stultifying assertiveness of Stalinism (he cites Jurgen Habermas and other Marxist Humanists). There is much jargonizing about demystification, recontextualization, and paleosymbolic levels in Marxism. History and philosophy rather than sociological data and revolutionary rhetoric predominate, for Gouldner is less Marxist outlaw than Marxist academic.

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ALAN J. LEE. *The Origins of the Popular Press in England, 1855–1914*. Pp. 310 Totowa, N.J Rowman & Littlefield, 1976. $18.50

Though Lee concentrates overwhelmingly on England, he briefly compares trends there with those in France and the United States. The study, however, does not consider Scotland, Ireland, or Wales, for reasons the author explains in the beginning. The book also includes a number of statistical tables which offer a wealth of information ranging from provincial newspapers to metropolitan dailies, from price distribution to concentration of ownership to newspaper proprietors in the House of Commons.

Lee shows how the press changed in style, content, readership, aim, and ownership from the golden age ushered in by repeal of the stamp duty in 1855 to the outbreak of World War I. Liberals, according to Lee, believed that numerous small newspapers should persuade people of the essential correctness of liberalism, that they should educate and uplift the masses. The golden age when this hope seemed close to realization was in the 1870s and 1880s. During that period, the number of provincial newspapers increased, liberal papers were in the majority, journalism had become an accepted profession, and the journalists concentrated on politics and political essays in their newspapers.

But during this same period, many changes occurred to wreck the dream and usher in the modern unpolitical newspaper of the twentieth century. The most important of these changes included the New Journalism, manifested by such developments as new printing techniques (larger headlines and shorter paragraphs); the descriptive parliamentary sketch; human interest stories; and the emphasis on news at the expense of opinion and commentary, brought on by the telegraph and the creation of the news agency.

Instead of vehicles for education, newspapers became purely commercial enterprises. Other developments prompted the changes reflected by the New Journalism. The ever-increasing reading public, the laboring classes, preferred newspapers to entertain rather than instruct. Sophisticated technology and advertising contributed to the alteration in the nature of newspapers. Increasing concentration of ownership in the hands of a few decreased the number of circulating newspapers. By 1910, for example, three proprietors accounted for 90 percent of the London evening circulation. In this process of concentration, the Liberals had necessarily participated, but the Conservatives had gained considerably at their expense.

The work is sound and amply documented, marred slightly by a few errors. Lee means H. S. Woodfall in connection with *Junius*, not William Woodfull. Several words are repeated next

to each other, such as "they they." These are, however, minor errors in an otherwise clear and scholarly work.

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KEVIN LYNCH. *Managing the Sense of a Region*. Pp. vii, 221. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1976. No price.

Lynch, professor of city design at M.I.T., is probably our most eminent urban design theorist. He has been engaged in an important effort, reflected in a number of thoughtful books, to reorient urban design toward a stronger concern with environmental and perceptual consequences of city form. Well under half of this book is a stimulating essay on how regional planning agencies should plan the sensuous form of the metropolitan city. It examines who ought to manage the "sensory quality of the environment," for what purposes, and how. It offers advice on administrative and legal implications of sensory management, modes of action, and strategies of analysis and action for regional agencies. Most of the book consists of four technical appendixes and a bibliography of considerable value.

Lynch's work has been highly valuable in expanding our conception of urban living. However, I believe this book is flawed in terms of specific advice on how to improve urban living. The fundamental problem is that planning itself is intellectually rootless. Lynch has commented elsewhere that the planning profession is breaking apart, because there is "no truly comprehensive theory" of how to plan. We do not have much idea of how to manage the form and evolution of regions, cities, or neighborhoods. We can barely forecast and control land use or transportation, much less the sensory environment. Lynch's book is aimed directly at the technical problems involved in creating a valid evaluation framework, which does not now exist.

Second, we do not know how to incorporate into the planning process the adjustment of conflicting values. Every planning decision has social, economic, and political consequences. Planning theory barely begins to face up to the political realities of making such decisions. For example, bicentennial fever has made historic preservation a national goal. While admirable in itself, few values exist in splendid isolation. Historic preservation may drive up housing costs, affecting the housing opportunities of the poor. Lynch does not discuss the possible costs of his proposals or what other values must be traded off against them.

Third, he wants to place environmental management in the hands of regional planning agencies. We may live at the regional level, but I doubt that we practice politics there. I do not believe that the rush to regionalization by federal and state governments is necessarily sound. I am not convinced that the user can control his environment at the regional level, even if the environment must be controlled there. Environmental management may, in fact, generate enormous political conflict for regional planning agencies largely removed from their political constituencies.

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DUNCAN MACRAE, JR. *The Social Function of Social Science*. Pp. xi, 352. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976. $15.00.

The history of social science is the history of competing frameworks of analysis within each discipline. This book aims for something altogether different. MacRae's intention is to act as midwife at the birth of a new discipline—policy analysis. Such a discipline would have to integrate social science research and to subject it to a variety of ethical perspectives from the point of view of social policy. Through a properly secured valuative discourse, MacRae believes, ethics

can combine and co-exist with scientific knowledge, especially with social science, which is still quite close to the moral concerns of everyday discourse.

MacRae develops his argument in two directions. The first part of the book sets out to establish a "normative meta-ethics" in the context of recent critiques of the possibility of rational ethical discourse. The influence of logical positivism is shown in the claims that values have no place in social science. In contrast to such claims, MacRae is much happier with the more moderate position of critical rationalism. As Weber demonstrated, it can be argued that the social sciences are concerned with values in three senses. First, their topic is a social world imbued with value by its participants. Second, the scientist can investigate whether given values are consistent. And, third, he can examine the consequence of their pursuit.

For MacRae, the question is whether valuative assertions can be expressed in a logically organized discourse rather than be treated as a mere carrier of individual emotional states. Despite the context-boundedness (indexicality) of valuative discourse, suggested by ethnomethodology, MacRae is prepared to believe that indexicality is partly remediable by recourse to the norms of scientific communication. The normative meta-ethics that he proposes borrows science's norms of logical clarity, consistency, and generality as the basis of its discourse. Only the norm of replicable, empirical testing is excluded for obvious reasons. The basic data of valuative discourse, maintains MacRae, are particular shared ethical convictions.

The second part of the book discusses the implicit ethical systems to be found in a number of social sciences. The author's aim here is to show a method through which the generality of such systems can be increased, while decreasing inconsistency. At the same time, this comparative work can increase mutual awareness of the cross-relevance of causal factors between different disciplines. Welfare economics is given a great deal of attention because of its obvious links to an ethical position. Pareto's criterion of "optimality," in treating preferences as a given, reflected logical positivism's insistence on abstaining from value-positions. According to MacRae, it left economists in the untenable position whereby any discourse about the societal good which was not circumscribed by given preferences of individuals was rendered impossible. This position, he maintains, is reflected in Arrow's implicit reduction of social values to personal tastes. By contrast, he wants to distinguish preference from general welfare. Without such a distinction, MacRae maintains, there is no space in which to construct a critique of, say, education or advertising.

The authors' rejection of the ethics of personal preference is reflected in the subsequent analysis of other social sciences. Political science reveals failures of the political market, especially in terms of the welfare interests of groups rather than individuals. Psychology suggests the processes through which preferences are changed—sometimes a justified change—while sociology's stress on the institutionalization of norms shows the social character of preferences and undercuts the calculative model implied by economics.

MacRae concludes his review of the ethical presuppositions of the social sciences by suggesting a form of "act-utilitarianism," focusing on the consequences of action, as a guide to social policy. Such an ethical perspective, he argues, must depend on at least four circumstances: (1) the adoption of a meta-ethical framework for ethical discourse; (2) the subjection of the perspective to the realities of the world, as revealed by social science research; (3) the ability of discourse to analyse its own activities, and (4) the existence of political institutions, which encourage people to seek and use information, and university institutions, which incorporate valuative discourse within disciplines while establishing policy analysis as a legitimate subject in its own right.

Paradoxically, despite its attempt to establish a new discipline, this is a work

which operates on a relatively narrow canvas. As MacRae acknowledges, he follows Bernal in arguing for the link between science and human welfare but not in placing science in the context of a particular social system. This is the book's major weakness. A focus on the prospects of ethical discourse in the academy means that analysis is limited to the level of ideas as mediated by academic traditions and institutions. Consequently, the cogent critique that MacRae makes of the "assimilation of valuative discourse to the unsystematized and undebatable tastes of the consumer" (p. 69) founders precisely because its development would require the socio-historical analysis from which he deliberately elects to abstain. Perhaps the real choice that confronts the analysis of state policy is between MacRae's proposed valuative discourse based in the academy and Habermas's treatment of the impact on everyday communication of the state's attempt to legitimate itself in the context of economic crisis. If so, then this apparently trail-blazing book begins to look rather uncritical if not somewhat insular.

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MONICA B. MORRIS. *An Excursion into Creative Sociology*. Pp. ix, 212. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $10.00.

Monica Morris's primary concern in this book is to demystify the new sociologies that have emerged in recent years—ethnomethodology, phenomenology, symbolic interaction, existentialism, existential phenomenology, and the sociology of the absurd. For Morris, while these are "creative" sociologies, their cumbersome language, heavy, programmatic statements, and ethereal levels of abstraction lead students quickly to discouragement and frustration. She offers, therefore, her book "as an appetizer, a fancy-tickler," essentially an excursion into the commonplace, the ordinary, the everyday, the taken-for-granted *Lebenswelt* world that is the phenomenological stuff of creative sociology.

The book is divided into three parts: Part I, "Moorings," Part II, "Meanderings," and Part III, "Reflections," all suggest in their titles the sense of movement and flow which is central to the creative perspective. The two chapters of Part I focus on the emergence of creative sociology as a kind of dialectic opposite to the traditional discipline with its characteristic emphasis on external social systems, structure and function, and fixed reality. Durkheim becomes the proto-positivist (the externality of social facts) while Weber, according to Morris, with his concern with subjective meaning—*Verstehen*—and the ideal type, serves as the intellectual fountainhead for the creative sociologies of the future. Running through these early chapters are the characteristic creative concerns with subjectivity, meaning, interpretation, response, acting, cognition, awareness, symbolic construction, flow, movement, drama, fragility, uncertainty, ambiguity, struggle, illusion. In addition, Morris traces the contributions of Husserl, Breantano, Heidegger, James, Merleau-Ponty, Satre, Scheler, Schutz, Weber, Lyman, and Scott (to mention a few) and their contributions to the emerging creative sociologies.

In Part II, Morris devotes three chapters to what are essentially illustrations of the creative approach in a variety of settings. Hence, in chapter 3 ("The Drama Is in Us, and We Are the Drama") she discusses the works of the subjective dramatists—Pirandello, Ionesco, Beckett—as illustrative of the creative view. They write plays that have no beginning or end, no solidity, no problem or solution. As in the existential phenomenological view, reality varies with the situation, forever dynamic and in process. It is the dialogue, the encounter, the transactional circumstance, the dissolving moment, and the emergent one that serve as the subjective doorway to social reality. Similarly, in the following chapter Morris examines language from the cre-

ative perspective. Here too, the sense of reality, the structuring of society, the meanings "that persons, things, and actions convey are not determined once and for all time, but are sought, created, confirmed and reconfirmed in each social situation." Reality, argues Morris, from the creative perspective, has no objective meaning apart from the language which structures it.

In the later portions of the book, Morris devotes a chapter to aging as seen from the creative view—a field in which she has considerable professional expertise—and finally concludes with a discussion of the detractors and defenders of the new sociology. A very brief final chapter, characteristically called "The River Flows On" (after "Moorings," "Meanderings," and "Reflections") attempts to summarize the distinctions between the naturalistic-positivistic-external approaches to sociology versus the subjectivistic-internal-creative views.

Morris has produced a finely written, scholarly book which, for the most part, succeeds in introducing the serious reader to the varied perspectives of the subjective sociologies. It must be read, as Morris clearly suggests, as a "fancy-tickler" and not as a powerful and detailed intellectual advocacy of the position.

I have some major reservations. While interesting, the chapter dealing with the existentialist dramatists does in no way verify the teleological or methaphysical claims of the creative sociologists. Some would argue that the dramatists are just as wrong as the sociologists. I found the struggle to find elements of Marx's thought as essentially creative to be painfully contrived because so much of Marx and the scientific and material view of history is positivistic-external. Indeed, I found the very title of the book subtlely presumptuous because, for a creative sociology, there must be its uncreative antithesis—the external, structural, functional scientists.

However, the validity of the claims of creative sociology are not at issue here. The book admirably carries its readers into the shadow world of action and transaction, or meaning and value, or process and flow. As such, *An Excursion into Creative Sociology* will prove to be an extremely useful and relatively painless journey into the creative perspective.

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MARSHALL SAHLINS. *Culture and Practical Reason*. Pp. v, 252. Chicago: Unisity of Chicago Press, 1976. $17.50

Is human life a response to material conditions; it is the means of satisfying natural needs; or is it ordered by those conceptual and symbolic systems which anthropologists call culture?

In this rich and fluent work, *Culture and Practical Reason*, Marshall Sahlins argues for the primacy of culture over material conditions and utilitarian interests. Human biology and geography set limits of variability in human life, but beyond these limits, variety may be explained only by the cultural systems which give order to ideation and practice. It is not the practical reason of a universal and natural reality which determines the nature and content of culture, but, on the contrary, culture which organizes human practical relations with the natural environment.

Sahlins's masterful argument against practical reason makes insightful observations both within and across traditional boundaries of inquiry. This synthetic study in self-reflective. Sahlins takes as the anthropological object both anthropological theories themselves and the society of which they are a part. He shows the opposition between practical and cultural dominion to be discernible in the history of anthropological theory (between Morgan and Boas), to have continued into contemporary anthropological thought, and to be visible also among Marxist analysts and within the writings of Marx himself. Sahlins makes valuable reference to recent French anthropology and semiology (for example, Baudrillard and Sebag). His tour makes stops not only in Fiji, where he analyses local cosmology, social organization, and ceremonial, but also in bourgeois America, where he explores some manifestations of the "pensée

bourgeoise"—its color symbolism, its code of dress, and its relations with animals, including its scared dog. He suggests that a theory of man which gives primacy to practical reason is consistent with a society in which the economic sphere and its symbolism permeate all others; yet in bourgeois society as elsewhere, this theory, the "self-concept of capitalism," is illusory.

The dominant concern of this persuasive work is theoretical. It raises a number of epistomological and other issues.

1. Anthropologists' descriptions and analyses of both culture and practice are based on theoretical paradigms and on observations of native acts and their environments. Further resolution of the argument between culture and practical reason may lie in exploration of relations between paradigms and their observational counterparts. In this way, also, we may avoid the illusions of reification.

2. The importance of the role of culture in human life is indubitable. Yet the interaction of material constraints—biological and environmental—and culture still remains a fruitful realm for exploration. Such exploration need not result in the reductionism which Sahlins rejects, but would promote an examination of what he notes as constraining processes. We still know little of the physiology of symbols and culture, and our statements about culture and environment are seldom more than post hoc explanations.

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MILTON SILVERMAN. *The Drugging of the Americas: How Multinational Drug Companies Say One Thing about Their Products to Physicians in the United States, and Another Thing to Physicians in Latin America.* Pp. 161. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $8.50.

For years pharmaceutical companies have pleaded against stringent regulation of their marketing practices. With or without such laws, the companies protest, the moral responsibility of drug manufacturers to promote only the safest and most appropriate drug practices would be upheld. In his latest book, Dr. Milton Silverman, a distinguished science writer and pharmacologist from the University of California, San Francisco, has provided evidence that this claim is false.

This is a brief book containing nine chapters, seven of which review classes of drugs ranging from antibiotics to steroid hormones. Twenty-eight prescription drugs are compared as to disclosure of indications for use, contraindications, warnings, and adverse reaction given in standard pharmaceutical reference works in the United States and Latin America. The findings are very clear. the drug companies, most of them based in the United States but some in Europe, greatly exaggerate claims of efficacy to Latin American health workers while minimizing or totally ignoring the hazards of using their products.

The second chapter, for example, discusses information distributed in the United States and Latin America on four antibiotics: chloramphenicol, tetracycline, amphotericin B, and gentamicin. The author offers a very brief discussion of the drugs' clinical background and the differential labeling in the various countries: nine pages of tables follow delineating the presence or absence of statements on indications, contraindications, warnings, and adverse effects in industry-developed reference materials. Chloramphenicol is shown to possess eight qualified indications in the literature prepared for use in the United States, while in Mexico it is presented as indicated therapy in 13 problem areas. Conversely, 11 contraindications or warnings are listed in the United States and only three in Mexico. Several Latin American countries surveyed omit altogether reference to the possibility of the now well-documented and lethal disturbance of bone marrow. The succeeding chapters are similarly constructed and describe findings on drugs in the following categories: oral contraceptives, nonsteroid antiarthritics, steroid hormones,

antipsychotic tranquilizers, antidepressants, and anti-convulsants.

The final chapter, entitled "The epidemiology of drug promotion" tries to make sense of this glaring breach of business ethics in the practice of overselling potentially harmful drugs. The author finds the explanation chiefly in the companies' fear of losing a competitive edge in countries where regulatory laws are not enforced or nonexistent. For one firm alone to make prudent disclosure would, it is feared, doom it to extinction in the local market. The solution seems to require enactment of regulations in countries where they do not presently exist, and public pressure in the homelands of the manufacturers.

This book speaks to an issue urgently requiring attention. Its appearance, the probing in Latin America that its research necessitated, and the media attention its release could stimulate may do more to affect policy than any other action conceivable.

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BARBARA B. SOLOMON. *Black Empowerment Social Work in Oppressed Communities*. Pp. 438. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $15.00.

"Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to whites," the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reported in 1968. Since those days of national shame, professional groups have quickly forgotten hastily made commitments to address the special concerns of blacks who live in destructive racial environments. Barbara Solomon and Columbia University Press offer small but tangible effort to redeem that pledge made by social work.

Black Empowerment is a product of a social work teacher's search for "a theoretical framework for practice in black communities . . . by black and white social workers . . . " (p. 3). According to Solomon, blacks lack power, are negatively valued by others, and the insidious "consequence is an overriding sense of one's powerlessness to direct one's own life in a course leading to reasonable personal gratification" (p. 13). Solomon first builds a case for the separateness of the black community (an "ethnosystem"); demonstrates how blacks are negatively valued by views about genetics, the family, through peer groups, and in schools and other social organizations; and concludes with strategies for enhancing power for blacks as the client reidentifies "his own self-worth, competence, and ability to affect his social and physicial worlds" (p. 343).

Unfortunately, *Black Empowerment* fails to achieve its purpose. As a potential textbook it is much too obtuse in its statement of fundamental principles. For example, "empowerment," a key concept in Solomon's thesis, is defined as "a process whereby persons who belong to a stigmatized social category throughout their lives can be assisted in the excerise of interpersonal influence and the performance of valued social roles" (p. 6), and a journey through Solomon's paradigm in search of the definition of empowerment renders the concept still more elusive and the reader confused (chapter 1). As a handbook for practitioners, its prescriptions lack specificity. For example, one of the skills Solomon says is needed as a "non-racist practitioner is the ability to feel warmth, genuine concern, and empathy for people. . . " (p. 308). Another necessary skill is an "ability to collect . . . verbal and non-verbal clues [through] implementation of an inductive process." "An example of this inductive process," Solomon explains, "can often be seen in social planning efforts" (p. 304).

The book's most serious shortcoming, however, results from a poor theoretical foundation for its basic thesis: power. Solomon makes no use of the considerable political and sociological discussions of power, nor does she give much attention to black writers who have recently applied these theories to the black situation. *Black Empowerment*

suggests that the client, rather than society, is the object for practitioner efforts—precisely in contrast with the findings of the Commission on Civil Disorders and the complaint of contemporary critics of the black experience. What solution does empowerment offer, for example, to Eldridge Cleaver, who observed, "It's no secret that in America the blacks are in total rebellion against the system. . . They don't like the way America is run. . . " (*Soul on Ice*, p. 134)? It seems that something more than empowerment is needed to redeem the grievance of black America.

Black Empowerment possesses some redeeming features. The case materials are lively and give sensitive insight into the lives of socially stigmatized blacks. The experimental exercises at the conclusion of the introductory chapters are provocative and would appear useful learning tools. The most redeeming feature of *Black Empowerment*, however, is the professional group to whom it is addressed: social welfare workers. When, after 99 years, the National Conference on Social Welfare elected its first black president, James Dumpson said, in his presidential address, that the major barrier to an open society was "racism, and both social work practice and social work education reflect and reinforce this racism. . . " Considering the fact that social work is least likely of all professions to avoid the implications of racism, Barbara Solomon's book should be read carefully by all social welfare workers.

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ECONOMICS

BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. *Private Property and the Constitution*. Pp. vii, 303. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $12.95.

The clause of the Fifth Amendment, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," has not stirred much intellectual interest among students and practitioners of constitutional law in recent decades. Governments now take or impair the use of private property in diverse ways for untraditional public purposes. Environmental laws provide the most conspicuous examples. For ecological reasons, a state, for instance, forbids the development of private property for profitable purposes. Courts increasingly are faced by novel "just compensation" problems presented by distressed litigants.

In this excercise of legal scholarship, Professor Ackerman of the Yale Law School undertakes a reconsideration of compensation law in the context of vast changes about property and its uses posed by activist governments. In a word, compensation law is muddled. Conceptual and analytic conflicts abound. The author seeks to untangle these through closely reasoned arguments.

Ackerman constructs two quite different ideal models or approaches to compensation clause problems. One is the perspective of the Scientific Policymaker, the other that of the Ordinary Observer. Elements of each approach, but especially the second, exist in the present legal culture.

The first half of the book presents the Scientific Policymaking model. Oversimplified, the judge who takes this path uses a specialized legal vocabulary and is guided by an overarching view (Comprehensive View), "a relatively small number of general principles describing the abstract ideals which the legal system is understood to further" (p. 11). Two Comprehensive Views are elaborated. One, labeled Utilitarian, aims to maximize social utility; the other, Kantian, emphasizes that people should not be treated simply as a means to some higher end but as ends in themselves.

The Ordinary Observer approach is set out in a parallel fashion. It is less grounded in theory and lacks a Comprehensive View. The Ordinary Observer "is an analyst who (*a*) elaborates the concepts of nonlegal conversation so as to illuminate (*b*) the relationship between disputed legal rules and the structure of social expecta-

tions he understands to prevail in dominant institutional practice" (p. 15).

The author argues that coherence in compensation law lies in choosing between these two ideal models and in their further development. Possibly a combination of the two will emerge as dominant.

The work is distinguished by the use of the contributions of, among others, legal scholars, philosophers, political theorists, and economic analysts. A hundred pages of notes enrich the text.

The book is addressed to specialized audiences—to sophisticated lawyers and judges prepared to think hard, to legal scholars, and to law professors socializing the present generation of students. Ackerman's extensive use of philosophical argument should delight students of political and legal theory. The book would not appeal to Ordinary Laymen.

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BRANKO HORVAT. *The Yugoslav Economic System: The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making*. Pp. v, 286. White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts & Sciences Press, Inc., 1976. $20.00.

Western economists have maintained their fascination with the continuously unfolding sequences of actions by the Yugoslav authorities in the development of their economic system. They should be interested in this book which examines the centrally planned, decentralized, and self-governing phases in the evolution of official policy up to the end of 1974. Horvat's contribution is a revised, enlarged, and up-dated version of his *Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post-War Period. Problems, Ideas, Institutional Development*, published by the AEA in 1971.

The method of presentation is as follows. The book opens with a discussion of the three economic reforms. It then examines the ideological and technical debates in each of these three phases which revolved around policy formulation, institutional change, and economic performance in the areas of planning and growth, agriculture, industry, the market mechanism, monetary institutions and policy, and the public finances.

Horvat indicates that the pace of economic change has created a "tradition of no tradition, a tradition of change." Institutional development and policy construction were undertaken within a definite ideological perspective. Given this framework, an important test of institutional and social choices was their success in contributing to the achievement of economic and social objectives. Poor economic performance as well as changing Yugoslav fortunes in international relations led to the recurring reevaluation and reformulation of public policy.

There were persistent themes in the policy debates. Whose preference functions should be dominant in determining the allocation of resources? Should policy goals and the details of policy be formulated in a centralized or decentralized way?

Should the market and/or administrative directives be the instruments with which to pursue public policies? What mix of policy instruments should be used to coordinate economic activity so that growth with full employment, price stability, and balance of payments equilibrium could be achieved?

Written by a superbly qualified scholar in the field, this book is worthy of the attention of both specialists and nonspecialists in Eastern European affairs. It surveys comprehensively the ideological and technical dimensions of the literature which focused on the institutional development of the Yugoslav economic system, the character of its policies, and the nature of its performance. Within Horvat's ideological framework, it evaluates the performance of the Yugoslav economy and, in the process, conveys the different lines of change of the economy and, in the process, conveys the different lines of change of the Yugoslav as contrasted with other Eastern European economies. Finally, it gives important insight into the way in which Yugoslavia handled the growth prob-

ems which have been common to all economies at a similar state of economic development.

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MICHAEL N. DANIELSON. *The Politics of Exclusion*. Pp. viii, 443. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $17.50.

Professor Danielson has developed an excellent case about the exclusion of a substantial proportion of the American people from the new, plush suburbia. The groups that are barred from the recently developed communities include lower-income families, the elderly, blacks, and other minorities. Political autonomy granted by the state legislature to the suburbs resulted in discriminatory housing policies. Consequently, blacks are separated from whites, the poor from the rich, the elderly from younger families, and minorities from the mainstream of society. Suburban political independence facilitated the formulation of rigid restrictions in the local zoning and building codes in addition to the authority for planning and land use.

American cities have experienced, during the twentieth century, a major but quiet political revolution. Political bosses and the controlling political machine have been discarded in favor of local community responsibility. Consequently, the pattern of annexation in vogue a century ago has been exchanged for local autonomy. While this social change may be applauded as progressive democracy, the sad commentary is that it has created a wide array of housing practices that are outrightly discriminatory. Political exclusion, according to the author, is responsible for the emergence of lily-white suburbs and somber black inner-cities.

In a preliminary view, it would seem that suburban political autonomy is a much-desired blessing, but a deeper analysis points to the contrary. On the one hand, the new suburban community has assumed local responsibility for a wide array of services, such as police and fire protection and education as well as health needs. These practices would make it appear a desirable democratic process. On the other hand, local community control, in reality, implies the allocation of power for formulating local codes for zoning, building, and planning authority that are grossly discriminatory. Thus, suburbia has been empowered to prevent blacks and minorities from buying new homes, and, furthermore, it has blocked the poor from acquiring subsidized or scatter-site housing.

The key to exclusionary practices lies in the tax base. More than 80 percent of the suburb's revenue is derived from property taxes. The cost of education is about 60 percent of all expenditures. Tax considerations, therefore, are of primary importance for the politics of exclusion. Large, expensive homes that yield high tax rates are preferable to popular-priced, inexpensive houses, mobile homes, or subsidized housing projects that have a low tax yield.

The author examines and documents effectively the basic factors that result in exclusionary practices. Particularly interesting items are the land-use controls, as structured in zoning ordinances, and the interplay of civil rights organizations, local and business groups, and the housing industry. The evidence is even more startling when the various roles played by the federal, state, and local courts are revealed, particularly when they intervened to adjudicate the injustices of political exclusion.

This is an impressive text that is chuck-full of interesting information. Yet, some questions may be raised. In the first place, if, as the author maintains, most whites approve of exclusionary practices and blacks are not interested in moving to suburbia, how can the problem be resolved? Moreover, any formulated law may be tantamount to legislating against the mores.

Second, an assumption is made that scattering the blacks and the poor would benefit society. Is dispersion really a solution to resolve the problems of poverty and minority discrimination? Up-

ward mobility seems to be overlooked by the pervasive focus of open housing.

Third, the missing element in the book is the European experience with providing mass housing for all social classes following World War II. How did the European countries resolve the problem of excluding the poor from the fashionable neighborhoods of the rich? How were the New Towns developed?

Finally, suburbs do not remain young and beautiful forever. When they get old, they experience difficulties similar to the troubles suffered by the inner-cities. (See "Older Suburbs, Feeling Age, Seek Downtown Renewal," *The New York Times*, 15 January 1977, pp. 1, 45.) Does the aging of New Rochelle in Westchester and Freeport, Long Island, predict the future deterioration of suburbia? How did the older suburbs resolve their political exclusion problems?

In conclusion, Professor Danielson has written a highly commendable text on open housing and the problems of political exclusion. The book covers the housing developments across the country, from New York to California and from New England to the Southwest. Extensive case material provides for both broad generalizations and illustrative case studies. The best example is the case of the Urban Development Corporation of New York. The text is a much-needed documentation of the study of suburbia. Undergraduate as well as graduate students will find it an interesting exploration of suburban growth and development. Both the urbanologist and the urban researcher, the scholar studying prejudice and the researchers investigating human behavior, will find the text a useful resource for exploring the inconsistencies of the American housing pattern.

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MICHAEL LIPTON. *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development*. Pp. 467. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. $15.00

While it seems clear, as both Trotsky and Veblen argued, that there are advantages to backwardness, a growing literature points in the opposite direction, to the disadvantages of backwardness. Michael Lipton's book is of this latter persuasion, though he provides several challenging twists to the argument. In this technical but lively and readable volume, Lipton sets out to show the reader that a profound distortion has crippled development efforts in the Third World. The distortion is "urban bias," a pervasive ideological commitment that equates development with urban growth and investment in industrial capacity. In other words, and here is where the disadvantages become apparent, development is defined in terms of the attributes of already developed societies.

Urban bias means, concretely, that scarce resources invariably get disproportionately allocated to the urban, industrial sector, even though more benefits could be had if rural development got anything like its fair share. Plainly put, Lipton argues that capital (and capitol) intensive investment aggravates rural squalor and underemployment while at the same time only dubiously moving poor countries toward increased well-being. Much of the book is devoted to a careful analysis of why urban bias is bad economics and why dramatically increasing the peasantry's share of investment monies would be to everyone's benefit. Directly and boldly, including a serious and provocative analysis of early Marxist theory (and practice), Lipton argues that the tribute wrung from the peasantry, directly and indirectly, is both morally and economically unjustified.

Space does not permit going into detail or even doing anything like justice to this complex, thoughtful, and thought-provoking book. Anyone interested in development, social change, or, broadly, the sources of what are sure to be explosion after explosion in the Third World should read this book. It's not the last word, but the words are well chosen.

This being said, let me also register a few disappointments. First, I was

sorry to find no attempt to come to terms with Baran's seminal *Political Economy of Growth*. Lipton dispenses with Marxian analyses so easily because he avoids, in this readers's estimation, some of the best.

It is also curious, given his emphasis on rural development and peasantry, that Lipton pays no sustained attention to Maoism or to post-revolutionary China. Here, it would seem, one would have a chance to assess efforts to counteract urban bias, though the Chinese would no doubt prefer another label for the enemy. This is part of another reservation I felt· much of Lipton's argument rests on the peasantry and their character—their presumed commitment to traditions and social relations that sap developmental energies. Lipton does not share this presumption, and he may be right, but he does not make as strong or compelling a case as he might.

Finally, allow me one petty complaint: I have long since learned to live with footnotes coming at the end of the book. I still do not like it, but I have adjusted. I am not yet resigned to the same treatment of tables presenting data crucial to the analysis at hand. It is more than aggravating, it undermines the care with which an argument can reasonably be scrutinized.

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HORST MENDERSHAUSEN. *Coping with the Oil Crises French and German Experiences*. Pp. vii, 110. Baltimore: The John's Hopkins University Press, 1976. $7.50.

EDWARD R. FRIED and CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, eds. *Higher Oil Prices and the World Economy: The Adjustment Problem*. Pp. vii, 283. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975. $9.95.

The current high price of oil is the result of an economic response to the political problems which surfaced in the October 1973 Middle East War. Oil suddenly became a scarce commodity with the ensuing problems for oil importing countries of allocating the short supply and paying the higher oil bill. Just as the October war had international political implications, paying for the war in the form of higher oil prices has had international economic effects. These two books, with different degrees of emphasis, attempt an analysis of the political and economic repercussions of OPEC's scarce oil policy. Tacitly or explicitly, the proper management of such problems is counseled as well.

The extent to which the economic and political aspects of the oil crises can be separated is highly questionable. It is a laudatory feature of each of these books that both dimensions are incorporated in the analysis. However, each places primary emphasis on a single facet: where the authors in the Fried and Schultze volume concentrate on technical economic features, Mendershausen leans heavily on political and institutional aspects. This is not to say that a balanced view can be obtained by reading both of these books, because they are not of equal intellectual stature.

Horst Mendershausen promises a case study of the French and West German experiences in dealing with the problems presented by scarce oil. Two-thirds of the book (66 pp.) is devoted to locating the oil policies of these nations within the broader historical and institutional framework The remaining pages show how France and West Germany pursued different policies in adjusting to the altered oil environment. Some prescriptions for current policy can be found between the lines. While insights are provided, Mendershausen's promise is ultimately unfulfilled. What has been written is a thin brochure that reads like an extended *Newsweek* article.

The book edited by Fried and Schultze is much more substantial and, hence, more likely to be the subject of dispute. All of the authors in this collection share a Keynesian-liberal perspective in their economic approach to the oil crunch. Keynes believed that in the halcyon days of economics the discipline would be regarded as a mundane science (art?) like dentistry. In this spirit, the authors

identify by econometric models the amount of economic decay caused by higher oil prices, and the corrective government policy is straightforward. Numbers and analysis abound which are surely correct from the Keynesian view. Fortunately or unfortunately, other economists would view the problem differently and have different policy advice.

It is not possible to do justice to each author in the Fried and Schultze book. Overall, the short-run impact of the sudden jump in the price of oil is examined for the economies of various countries. A general conclusion is that higher oil prices act like a government tax increase for oil importing countries, which tends to reduce the level of world income. Keynesian economics is well-equipped to manage such problems. In addition to the decrease in aggregate demand, higher oil prices represent a transfer of wealth from oil importing to oil exporting countries. The results in this book suggest that the real losers from the transfer are the underdeveloped countries exclusive of OPEC and wage earners within developed countries. The potentially explosive political implications of this result are explored only peripherally.

There is much to recommend in the Fried and Schultze book. Perhaps most importantly, it illuminates the direction in which U.S. economic policy will move when confronted with increased prices for natural resources. In this regard, the fact that one of the editors, Charles L. Schultze, is now chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors should make the introductory essay mandatory reading. The short-run Keynesian perspective will undoubtedly give some people cause for concern.

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JAMES O'TOOLE. *Energy and Social Change.* Pp. vi, 185. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T Press, 1976. No price.

JOHN HAGEL III. *Alternative Energy Strategies: Constraints and Opportunities.* Pp. vi, 185. New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1976. $17.50.

Two books, both dealing with energy scarcity, are reviewed here. First the book by O'Toole, *Energy and Social Change*. Unfortunately, energy and social change are not what this book is about; instead, it is the outcome of a confused mind representing wishful thinking that the energy scarcity, without affecting the quality of life, would somehow be transformed into abundance and OPEC would break down by 1985. Equally outlandish is the contention, unsubstantiated by even a shred of evidence, that the technology for making commercially available the alternative forms of energy exists and that the banks would be providing the necessary capital for its development. Nobody has ever claimed that banks can provide long-term risk capital, nor has anybody claimed the presence of technological feasibility to provide alternate energy at current prices. Billions of dollars being drained out of the economy to pay the ever escalating price of oil has adversely affected the quality of life, and many more billions needed to develop the alternative energy would deprive the economy of investment needed in its other sectors representing actual loss or the potential loss in the quality of life.

The loss in the quality of life would only be exacerbated by the author's suggestion for the reversal of the capital-for-labor substitution which has been at the core of all human development to the present time. Similar would be the consequences of the author's suggestion of substituting cotton and wood for such energy-intensive products as synthetic fibers and plastics, respectively. Also, it is ill conceived for the author to suggest that the United States specialize in service industry and import the energy-intensive products. Such specialization will only add to this country's dependence on other nations and weaken the national security—a situation the United States is attempting to remedy by developing domestic energy sources.

Equally misleading, superficial, and faulty is the analysis and comparison of energy consumption trends among na-

tions, especially between the United States and Japan. The latter country is nowhere near the level of economic development attained by the United States and the energy/production ratio is known to be increasingly a function of the degree of economic development attained. Lamenting the past glory of the United States, as is evident from this quote—"Americans were once the world's inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs"—does not serve any useful purpose either. The book hardly scratches the surface as far as the social effects of energy scarcity are concerned. Sometimes one wonders about the usefulness of such books either in exploring the dimensions of the energy problem or in deriving solutions.

The analysis in Hagel's *Alternative Energy Strategies*, in contrast, is more thorough and more systematic. The book is well organized and the author evaluates the technological as well as the commercial feasibility of alternative forms of energy. He also discusses at length the prospects for the resolution of their respective problems in near future. This is followed by a discussion of the problems that could emerge from the ever escalating oil prices, with and without restriction on the supply, and total embargo of the type imposed by the Arabs in 1973. This leads to a discussion of the comparative dependence of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan on imported oil. However, significantly missing from this discussion is the analysis of the effects of the energy shortage on the developing countries, the countries which are economically least able to bear this burden. This aspect of the problem is also important because these countries are reacting to this situation by organizing international cartels for other commodities which may ultimately result in restructuring the terms of international trade.

While Hagel's book is informative and well organized, all the data used are secondary. It presents a good enumeration of facts as they are known today. However, the book breaks no new ground. A more interesting analysis would involve the projections of future energy demand and supply, the price elasticity of oil and other forms of energy and their cross elasticities, and the derivation of viable policy alternatives and their implications for the United States and the global economy. Disappointingly lacking in the study is any discussion of the role played and likely to be played by the oligopolistic structure of the industry.

The author, at times, seems to confuse the price elasticity of demand for oil and for the energy and to ignore the second order energy effects of substituting capital for energy (since the capital so substituted has energy inputs as well). The book, in a way, attempts to underplay a sense of urgency in resolving the energy problem. The available statistics show that at the 1974 energy consumption rate of 6.1 billion tons growing at 3.5 to 5.0 percent per annum the world's published-proved oil reserves of 97.1 billion tons would be consumed in approximately 12 to 13 years. On the whole, Hagel's book is pleasant reading, and for those not familiar with the energy problem in its various facets informative as well.

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RICHARD A. POSNER. *Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective*. Pp. v, 26[illegible]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. $15.00.

What is the future course for antitrust? Should it be strengthened? weakened? maintained at its present level? In addressing this issue, Professor Posner has a mixed answer. In one important respect, the application of the law to oligopolistic conduct, he wishes to strengthen policy. He would make Section 1 of the Sherman Act applicable to unified pricing without the need for the prosecution to prove, as at present, that the competitors acted together as one by agreement.

To obtain this change, Posner would have the courts more readily accep

economic evidence of pricing and marketing conduct and especially evidence on monopolistic price performance as proof of illegal joint action (pp. 55–77). As a remedy for illegal collusion, the author would have the courts impose stringent financial penalties, penalties so stringent that the oligopolists would find it more in their interest to price at the competitive level than to recognize their interdependence and price abnormally high.

With oligopolists pricing competitively, there is, Posner reasons, no need for the smaller independents which have served to moderate the pricing of their larger rivals. Thus, antitrust policy designed to prevent big business from eliminating or controlling its smaller competitors by restrictive practices becomes obsolete. Hence, Posner favors repealing every provision of the antitrust laws except Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Mergers and restrictive practices would be banned only when they are "unreasonably anticompetitive" (p. 216).

Incidentally, with Section 2 of the Sherman Act gone, there would be no antitrust policy applicable to structural monopoly, but, according to the author, none is needed. If a monopolist performs poorly, other firms will come in. He doubts the existence of real barriers to entry, saying, for example, "Economies of scale do not create a barrier to entry, they only dictate the level of output that the new entrant must achieve in order to minimize his costs" (p. 92), an untenable position and pure sophistry.

For implementation, Posner realistically turns not to Congress but to the courts. The latter should follow his suggestions for strengthening policy toward collusion but shun the others. Society has no interest in knowing what firms can win when the contest turns on using the brass knuckles of economics. Society does have an interest in knowing which can survive when the contest turns on price, quality, service, and terms of trade. If the independents can compete on these terms, why exclude them from the economy?

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HENRY J. PRATT. *The Gray Lobby.* Pp. ix, 250. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. $15.00.

WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH and FRANCIS P. KING. *Pension Plans and Public Policy.* Pp. x, 311. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $15.00.

These two books complement each other well. Both focus on the needs of the elderly and on mechanisms to meet those needs, especially mechanisms of the federal government. Pratt's book, primarily an interest group analysis, examines the manner in which the federal government has responded to demands from the elderly. Greenough and King concentrate on the substance of public policy, describing the evolution and character of pension plans for private and public employees. They conclude with descriptions of pension programs in seven other industrial nations.

Pratt, a Wayne State political scientist, uses the shorter historical perspective, beginning with the 1920s. He stresses the factors that affect public policy for the elderly, especially the impact of organized groups. He finds that despite the notoriety of the Townsend Movement, senior citizen groups were only peripheral factors in promulgating and shaping the Social Security Act of 1935. The Gray Lobby continued to be a relatively inconsequential stimulus for public policy until the 1960s. From an examination of representative organizations for the elderly, Pratt posits the factors that have increased the clout of these structures in recent years. Periodically, he links his findings to prior landmarks of interest group research, such as writings of David Truman, Mancur Olson, James Q. Wilson, and Robert Salisbury. In general, Pratt views his research as compatible with previous studies of interest group influence, as well as studies of collective behavior. But he also suggests modifications to both areas of research.

Pratt finds several notable factors in this policy area. It is one in which Congress not the president was the persistent initiator of new proposals. Despite the tepid sponsorship of the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations, the 1961 and 1971 White House Conferences on

the Aging were major stimulants to federal action. The most sweeping policy change, enacted in 1972, which tied Social Security pensions to the cost of living, was an apparent by-product of the short-lived presidential aspirations of Wilbur Mills. There has been considerable interchange of leadership between governmental agencies and organizations for the elderly.

The Gray Lobby is highly readable, although some readers may be irritated by the use of "analyst" when footnotes show it is an affectation for "I." A reference to Banfield and Wilson (p. 70) who are not mentioned in the source cited (Greenstein's 1963 ed. of *The American Party System and the American People*) is the only documentation error I found. The likely intended source is the research on party activists by Katz and Eldersveld, Wolfinger, or Cutright and Rossi. These flaws notwithstanding, the topic and Pratt's coverage of it deserve a wide audience.

Greenough and King, officials of T.I.A.A.-C.R.E.F., systematically present the basic facts about the growing financial needs of retired Americans and trace the main features of private and public pensions over the past century. This presentation is interlarded, but not overloaded, with numerous tables which are comprehensible to the ordinary lay reader. Some statistical evidence is startling, for example, 7,000 citizens are now at least 100 years old; 57 years after the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching closed its "pension roles [sic]" to new members, it was still paying benefits to 625 persons or 10 percent of the plan's total beneficiaries; as of 1967, only 12 percent of income of those 65 and older came from private or public pension plans, a reduction of retirement age from 65 to 60 would increase pension costs by 51 percent, a reduction to age 55 would increase costs by 123 percent. These and other data suggest that retirement is no longer a short-term experience for many persons, that many retirees are primarily dependent on Social Security benefits, and that early retirement to free jobs for younger workers is an expensive alternative.

In the course of examining features of Social Security benefits and private and public pension plans, frequent reference is made to the 1974 Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA). The book is not a jeremiad, but it points to weakness in these programs: frequently insufficient reserves have been set aside to cover benefits (public employee plans have, if anything, the worst record on this count); we continue to call it insurance, but Social Security is not that; double dipping, that is, retiring on one plan and then qualifying under a second pension plan, is increasing although it is contrary to the goals of pension plans and it diverts additional resources to some retirees while others have no or inadequate pension coverage. Except for ERISA, there has been little long-range policy planning. For instance, governmental pensions which initially were generous to compensate for low career earnings are even more generous today although earnings have become competitive with private employment.

The crunch will be unavoidable in the early twenty-first century. If some steps are not taken to build reserves, to inhibit if not eliminate double dipping, and to regulate Social Security costs, we can expect either a taxpayers' revolt or economic suffocation from the tax burden. This is a fate that should perturb all of us. The consequences of continuing to muddle through are staggering. For this reason, *Pension Plans and Public Policy* is one of that handful of books that should be required reading for responsible citizens.

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WILLIAM H. READ. *America's Mass Media Merchants*. Pp. ix, 209. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $10.95.

Multinational corporations (MNCs) have, in recent years, elicited considerable scholarly interest notably among political scientists, sociologists, and economists, and there has been a veritable outpouring of studies examining such varied questions as the MNCs' management and decision-making structures, their power and influence in na-

tional and international politics, and their social and economic impact on the development of the Third World. Little attention, however, has been paid to American mass media communications systems as transnationals or the implications of their global reach. As William H. Read writes, "That the U.S. is a traditional and giant trading country is no surprise to anyone. But seldom do we think of media as being among America's biggest exports. The sale of Boeing Aircraft to China, wheat to Russia, and the multinational corporate structures of IBM and ITT were prominent symbols of American trade in the quarter century after World War II. To these can be added news services, some magazines, films and TV programs" (p. 3). By focusing on this relatively unchartered area, the ubiquitous penetration of foreign countries by American major media, *America's Mass Media Merchants* fills an important gap in our knowledge.

Read's chief purposes are (1) to present a detailed morphological analysis of eight printing media (the Associated Press, United Press International, the New York Times News Service, the Washington Post-Los Angeles Times News Service, International *Herald Tribune*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *Readers' Digest*) and two visual media (motion pictures and television) and (2) to evaluate their influence on foreign mass media, the social and cultural fabric of the world (with special emphasis on the Soviet Union, the Third World, Canada, and Western Europe), and international politics. Read's overall conclusion is that "we may expect American mass media to be links in a world of even more interdependence, considerable dependence and very little integration" (p. 154).

Although the book has been published by a university press (the author is also a Fellow of both the Center for International Affairs and the Program on Information Technologies and Public Policies at Harvard University), it is not strictly speaking a scholarly work. Rather, *America's Mass Media Merchants* is basically a solid and well-documented piece of journalism with ambitions limited to descriptive and monographic objectives. Sorely lacking is an explicit theoretical framework in the absence of which useful insights and informative data are lost in a rather rambling, disconnected, and too frequently anecdotic discussion.

Another source of uneasiness for this reviewer is the author's tendency to raise numerous issues while providing too few and generally unconvincing answers. For example, Read is sensitive to the charge of "cultural imperialism" resulting from the intrusion of American values and mores in foreign environments. But at the same time he dismisses the notion of "information sovereignty" as an unacceptable alternative to the free flow principle. Nevertheless, the book explores interesting and unduly neglected problems and is a lively addition to the literature on MNCs.

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PREFACE

One of the major problems confronting the scholarly field of public policy is to improve communication among those who are involved in policy analysis. Unfortunately, knowledge from policy studies is not very cumulative. Not only does much of our scholarship on public policy fail to speak to policy makers, but the analyst who studies health policies often fails to have effective communication with others in the health area, and he generally fails to communicate with his colleagues who work with education, housing, defense, or social control policies. Hopefully, this issue of THE ANNALS can make a modest contribution to facilitating communication among those who work in different policy sectors. Most of the papers in this issue were presented before the 1976 annual meeting of the Social Science History Association. The Social Science History Association operates through a number of networks, and the Network on Social Theory and Social Policy organized the session, at which most of these papers were presented.

The paper which appears as the first essay in this issue, by network cochairmen Jerald Hage and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, presents a theoretical framework for coding policy studies. An important part of that essay is a set of variables for coding or categorizing the different components of policy studies. They label their variables general variables, which transcend space and time and present a scheme that permits the analysis of numerous policy sectors across time and across societies. In addition, the essay proposes a number of hypotheses concerning the way in which a society's structure —for instance, centralization versus decentralization—influences the performance of various policy sectors. Thus a decentralized delivery system in education, health, and other aspects of social policy should be more innovative but less efficient than a centralized one.

While the essays in this issue were prepared independently of the Hage-Hollingsworth essay, several of them do reflect similar conceptual concerns. And most of the essays are illustrative of how the Hage-Hollingsworth framework can be useful in understanding specific policy sectors. For example, several authors focus on such consumption policies as health and education, and illustrate some of the processes which Hage and Hollingsworth suggest at a theoretical level. Odin Anderson and Lawrence Mead in their separate essays suggest that higher inputs into the health delivery system—for example, more expenditures, more physicians—are not likely to result in more outputs in the form of better health. And short of restructuring the system—resulting in more centralized controls—health care costs will continue to escalate. Yet, a more centralized delivery system may reduce costs and may distribute health care resources more equitably.

The importance of structural variables in shaping outcomes is also a theme in the essay by Neal Gross as well as that by Burkart Holzner and Leslie Salmon-Cox. Both essays point out that in the 1960s there was a

serious effort to shape educational outcomes by pouring more money into the educational delivery system. But without an adequate theory of educational change and without proper concern with structural variables, many of the programs floundered, and the desired educational goals were not achieved.

Ted Gurr and Denis Szabo in their separate essays focus on another policy sector which receives treatment in the Hage-Hollingsworth scheme—that involving social control policies. Just as the essays on health and educational policies point out that simply increasing inputs does not necessarily affect outcomes, so Ted Gurr points out that simply increasing crime control inputs—more police, more money—does not necessarily influence the rate of crime.

Consistent with the Hage-Hollingsworth emphasis on using general variables as a means of studying societies across time and space, John Woolley, in his cross-national study of the effectiveness of central banks, focuses on two such general variables: concentration of power (centralization) and complexity. The papers by Henry Teune and by Aron Katsenelinboigen and Herbert Levine deal comparatively with the structural variable of centralization. The Teune essay points out that most western democracies are facing a fiscal crisis, but whether the fiscal crisis erupts at the local level, as in New York City, or at the national level, as in Great Britain, depends on how centralized the system is. The Katsenelinboigen and Levine essay, focusing on centrally planned economies, points out that there is in all industrialized societies a constant tension between the emphasis placed on market considerations and planning, regardless of whether the economy is capitalist or noncapitalist. Western societies increasingly place more emphasis on planning while the countries of Eastern Europe are becoming more concerned with market considerations, thus causing a certain amount of convergence in all industrialized societies on the centralization continuum.

Most policy studies are not very much concerned with normative considerations, and this is true with the Hage-Hollingsworth essay as well as with most of the essays in this ANNALS issue. An exception is the essay by Lawrence Joseph, which demonstrates some of the shortcomings in policy analyses which are not normatively oriented. A major task which should be on the agenda of those who study public policy is to integrate more effectively empirical analysis with normative considerations.

J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH

ANNALS, AAPSS, 434, Nov. 1977

The First Steps Toward the Integration of Social Theory and Social Policy

By JERALD HAGE AND J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a theoretical framework as a first step in the constructing of a body of theory for understanding certain types of policy outcomes. While the framework operates at a somewhat general level, it does not apply to all policy problems. Nevertheless, it does permit us to code most policy studies and offers some potential for developing generalizations which transcend a number of policy sectors. The essay combines general variables with an interest group approach to the study of public policy. By knowing the relative power of specific interest groups, we are able to increase the predictability of what policy outcomes will prevail. The type of analysis presented herein should help to establish more clearly the constraints under which policymakers operate and to clarify the consequences that are likely to follow when certain kinds of policies are adopted.

Jerald Hage is Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin. His publications deal with the impact of organizations at the societal and subsocietal levels on rates of innovation, efficiency, and participation. He is presently involved in a four nation cross-national and cross-temporal study of the interrelationships among the variables discussed in this essay. The author of numerous scholarly articles and books, including Techniques and Problems of Theory Construction in Sociology (1972), *he is presently Co-chairman of the Social Science History Association's Network on Social Theory and Social Policy.*

J. Rogers Hollingsworth is Professor of History and Chairperson of the Program in Comparative World History at the University of Wisconsin. His recent publications, research, and teaching have concentrated on the study of comparative public policy, and he is presently involved in the study of inequality in health and education in the United States and Great Britain. He has held a number of postdoctoral fellowships and, with Professor Hage, he shares the Co-chairmanship of the Social Science History Association's Network on Social Theory and Social Policy.

This paper was supported by funds granted to the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to the provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The second author also gratefully acknowledges support for this report from the German Marshall Fund of the United States; the Law, Science and Medicine Program of the Yale University Law School; and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.

WHEN one reflects on the poor communication between those who engage in theory construction and those who are policymakers, the complaints often center on the abstractness of those whose concerns are essentially with basic science. The theoreticians are accused of being too remote from the complexity of reality. Seldom does one hear that the real reason there is such poor connection between theory and social policy is that there has been too much attention paid to practical problems and not enough to the development of theory. Yet, in the area of policy studies, this would appear to be the case. There is no end of various studies about public policy, with the concerns and objectives of policymakers clearly in mind, yet, few substantial sets of findings have emerged from the plethora of policy studies. The Baconian hope of the inductive approach has not worked. Instead, we are left with a bewildering array of specific studies, seemingly unconnected with one another. Health policy researchers rarely communicate with those who work on educational policy. And even within each of these broad policy areas, policy research is so highly specialized that the recommendations of different policy researchers are contradictory in nature. Regrettably, there has been little systematic building of the general knowledge so essential for the solution of social problems.

Obviously, the social sciences are not completely without a body of theory. In this respect, the economists have been more successful than those in other social science disciplines. In different disciplines the Marxists and functionalists have provided a model that helps us to understand why certain outcomes are taken, but they do not cast much light on why there are variations in outcomes among societies. Neither has much been done as yet to focus on the causal connections between policy means and the utilities achieved, even though one could argue that it is implicit in both Marxist and functionalist approaches. The Marxists argue that useful outcomes are not achieved because of the domination of certain interests groups and the functionalists assume that what is desired is achieved. Both perspectives leave much to be desired.

The purpose of this essay is not to dwell on this lament, about which most of us can agree. Instead, we are interested in laying down a theoretical framework as the first step in constructing a body of theory useful for understanding certain kinds of policy outcomes, although it is clear that the framework will not apply to all social problems. However, we should not be discouraged if we do not provide a framework which addresses all problems faced by industrial societies. And while our framework is clearly not a theory, we intend to show how a number of hypotheses can be developed within this perspective so that at least the potential for theory construction is made clear. Throughout, the emphasis is on the approach to solving practical problems, not on the correctness of the solution to a specific social problem.

The essential intellectual thrust of the paper is to suggest that if we are to construct a theory appropriate for understanding policy outcomes, then we have several tasks before us. First, we must create some minimum set of general utilities that will allow us to classify or

code the bulk of the various policy studies. Unless this is done, each study remains an isolated and specific historical case. Second, we must translate the means used to achieve specific utilities into some set of variables. The crux of a theory about social policy should be some form of causal analysis relating means employed with ends achieved. Without this, there is little opportunity for the accumulation of knowledge. And while the point is perhaps obvious, it is nevertheless often not honored in policy studies. In contrast to our approach, most policy studies have focused on the intended or preferred utilities, rather than outcomes actually achieved. Our approach is to emphasize the means employed and the outcomes achieved, which may or may not be intended. Even so, we do suggest that certain interest groups have specific preferences for certain utilities across societies and time, though our argument is that more is to be gained by examining accomplishments than intentions.

There is some overlap between predicting which policy will be adopted and what actually happens as a consequence of adopting certain policies, but they are not identical. Policy studies have too often emphasized the former, but if theory about social policy is to be useful, the latter also deserves considerable emphasis. It is partly because so many policy studies have tended to focus on who wins the power struggle, rather than on why certain outcomes emerge, that we are still without a body of theory about social policy. The paradox has been that policy studies have remained too close to the wishes of policymakers and thus have not spoken to their needs.

A GENERAL SCHEME OF UTILITIES

Our first assumption is that most policy debates revolve around one or more general utility. Usually these have been conceived in relatively specific terms, but in point of fact, there appears to be a comparatively small set of general variables that can be employed to classify particular utilities. Some schema is needed in which the categories are mutually exclusive and reasonably exhaustive. What has made the development of such a schema particularly difficult is that one needs a conceptual framework that can describe all of society, for any single policy issue could be relevant to any particular aspect of society. Clearly, the generating of such a schema is an impossible task. Our solution to this difficulty is to develop four lists of social utilities that tap major parts—but not all—of society and reflect common values that are usually articulated in policy debates. The scheme represents a mini-max solution between the desire to cover all aspects of society, an attempt which would fail for being too complex and cumbersome, and the desire to cover so few aspects of society that it too would fail for being too simple and sketchy. Instead of offering a scheme of several types of policies such as Theodore Lowi, Oliver Williams, and several others, we intend to look at different kinds of social utilities that represent different parts of a society. And while our emphasis is on national policies, the proposed list could be adapted easily to state or local policies or to an organizational level of analysis as well.

The underlying theme of our approach is as follows. Policies are

FIGURE 1

SOCIAL OUTPUTS

1. Level of education and scientific output.
2. Level of artistic and cultural production.
3. Level of societal security and social order.
4. Level of population.
5. Level of economic production.
6. Level of leisure activity.
7. Level of health and well-being.
8. Level of charity and religious activity.

implemented or adopted because they are designed to achieve some objective. Thus, one needs some minimum list of objectives or desired outcomes. We have found it useful to think of these as parts of society because the objective always has some behavioral referent. The goal may be to reduce unemployment, to get "more bang for a buck" in the defense area, to integrate blacks and whites, to reduce crime, or to increase equality in the distribution of income. Because these represent changes in the nature of society, variables must be specified which describe these changes. We believe that there are four major kinds of utilities that also represent most internal changes in society. These are output, performance, control, and structural utilities. (See figure 6 on p. 12.)

Output utilities

The first and most typical kind of utility that forms the substance of many policy debates is the output of various institutional sectors. We can conceive of societies, political units, or institutions as delivery systems that produce something. These outputs represent resources that societies or its members want. They are either private or public goods, to use the economists' language. New policies come into debate frequently when some interest group or coalition becomes dissatisfied with the amount of production of a particular resource.

In figure 1 is a list of eight social outputs. While it can be debated whether there are indeed eight, ten, or some other number, the critical point is that this list was systematically derived.[1] And regardless of whether this particular list is exhaustive, we believe that the approach is a correct one. We need some such list of the typical outputs corresponding to the major institutional sectors, delivery systems, or resource production systems of societies in order to make progress in the codification of existing policy studies. They also represent some of the major values found in most societies. Most people want knowledge and beauty, protection and affection, work and play, physical and spiritual well-being. The terms usually used for these particular values are many and varied. However, they represent the ideas that are reflected in the eight types of outcomes. Societies may differ in the relative importance attached to a particular value or output or in the means used to achieve an objective, but the objectives are the ones commonly desired by people in industrializing societies.

Another important desideratum in any list of outputs is that it should reflect the major disciplines in the social sciences; that is, political science, economics, sociology, and demography. Thus the population output is included as well as education, health, and well-being. Security represents the concern of political science, while obviously economic production is that of economics.

1. Jerald Hage, *Techniques and Problems of Theory Construction in Sociology* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972).

FIGURE 2

EXAMPLES OF INDICATORS FOR SELECTED OUTPUTS

Level of Education and Scientific Output:
—percent literate;
—percent of population 5–17 in school;
—percent of population 18–24 in school;
—number of scientific journals and publications.

Level of Societal Security and Social Order:
—gains or losses in territory;
—gains or losses in the proportion of military equipment from foreign sources.

Level of Economic Production:
—production by sectors of economy; i.e., agriculture, manufacturing, service.

Level of Health and Well-Being:
—age specific death rates by cause of disease;
—age standardized death rates by cause of disease;
—proportion of population 60 and over covered by pension funds;
—proportion of population below some stipulated level of poverty.

Several of the outputs tend not to be considered very often and yet, increasingly, public policies are being developed relative to them. Artistic and cultural production have recently been the concern of the American government. Thè use of leisure time, including the regulation of vacation time, is an important part of the French government's policy. For example, it has had a long-time policy of building sports and vacation facilities. The Soviet government has at various times tried to discourage religious activity, while in contrast, the American government has encouraged religious activity via its policy of allowing charitable deductions to religious organizations.

From a functionalist viewpoint, these eight outputs can be seen as making a society more or less self-sufficient. The resources speak to a variety of human needs, albeit not all. Some of the other human needs are met in other indicators, especially the structural ones. From a social planning viewpoint, these outputs correspond to the major ones that many societies monitor.[2] For most industrializing and advanced industrial societies, the real problem is to achieve balanced growth in these outputs and to decide what their relative importance should be.

Operational indicators or measures of the output variables are suggested in figure 2. The list is suggestive, not exhaustive, and is provided to concretize the discussion. These indicators are appropriate for societal analysis, but one would need different ones for organizational or institutional analysis.

Several important points about the measures need to be made. First, for several of the outputs, actual output or achievement measures do not exist, and so utilization rates are employed. There are not acceptable international academic achievement tests except for literacy rate, so that school attendance is accepted as a proxy. Likewise, a good measure of charity is not readily available, so that activities,

2. Eleanor Sheldon and W. Moore, *Indicators of Social Change* (New York: Russell Sage, 1968).

such as donations, are substituted. Except in time of war, the measurement of external security poses problems. Again we are forced to a fall back position of relying on the size of the military; that is, on a utilization indicator. Second, economic production is restricted in meaning and in measurement of primary and secondary activity, and only those services, such as transportation, banking, and commerce that are business related are noted. This is because many of the other services fall within the province of other productive outputs—particularly health, education, and well-being. Similarly, security and order are not all the measures of political performance that political scientists would like to focus on, but they do capture some of the most important elements.

An enduring debate in most societies is over the relative importance of these outputs, the traditional guns versus butter problem so often discussed. Historically, there have been those who preferred to maximize national security or education, while others have preferred to emphasize economic production or health care. Swings in the evaluation of these objectives are usually associated with swings in votes for particular programs in the legislature or even candidates in elections. For example, there is presently in Great Britain much discussion about whether public spending should be reduced. This debate is really one about the relative importance of various welfare outputs versus other economic outputs, as well as the best means for maintaining growth in all of them.

In the long term, most people agree on the desirability of all of these. It is in the short-term that the debates about priorities are waged. Typically, a period of too much emphasis on some of these objectives will be followd by a period when other outputs will receive higher priority. A change in a policy —a new program or technology— will usually be advanced on the basis of what it can do relative to one of these outputs.

Thus, the discussion about airpower during the 1920s was a debate about the need to increase or maintain national security, that is independence. The long-term debate about different methods of financing health care has centered around the need to reduce mortality and morbidity rates, especially among the poor. There has been a continuous debate about the level of research funds necessary to produce more technological knowledge. The National Endowment for the Humanities and the Arts administers government programs designed to increase the output of artistic creation. The many controversies over whether to reduce taxes or to expand the money supply have been very much concerned with expanding productive output. Just as the economists have developed equations, such as the Cobb-Douglas production function, which allows them to make practical suggestions, it is possible to do something similar for other outputs in other sectors of the society.

Almost everyone wants these outputs. However, they become increasingly controversial when an increase in one kind of output requires a deemphasis on another output.

Obviously, all policy debates do not focus on outputs. They involve other kinds of outcomes as well. Utilities that are more likely to activate certain interest groups are those that reflect the measure of how well and in what ways particular outputs

FIGURE 3

SOCIAL PERFORMANCE UTILITIES AND EXAMPLES OF INDICATORS

Innovativeness or Adoptiveness:
—number of new academic disciplines created in a year;
—number of products created in one year.

Social Achievement Index:
—percent of growth in education and science outputs in a year;
—percent growth in security and order outputs in a year;
—percent growth in economic production in a year;
—percent growth in health and well-being in a year.

Efficiency:
—capital/output ratios in various sectors of economy;
—index of productivity in industry.

Level of Membership Participation:
—percent of population actually voting,
—membership in voluntary organizations.

are achieved, and this involves our second category of utilities. We choose to call these societal performances, and there appear to be four basic ones: innovation or adaptiveness, societal achievement, efficiency used to achieved societal objectives, and achieve participation. (See figure 3.)

Thus each program or policy can be discussed, not only in terms of a particular output, but, more importantly, each program may be evaluated in terms of these performances or considerations. Thus the demand of more "bang for a buck" is a statement that reduced cost is a desired utility as well as an increase in national security. Discussions about educational programs, such as the open classroom, bilingual education, and special education, concern the quality of education and the desirability of emphasizing individual needs and differences. This is quite different from programs designed to maximize the quantity of information learned, such as in discussions about the reading ability of grade school children. Similarly, some policies are adopted because they will increase the motivation or participation of particular groups. One purpose of community control is to improve the participation of parents in the schools, though it often had the opposite effect on the motivation of the teachers. Headstart-type educational programs have become institutionalized, not because they really make a difference in eliminating or reducing the differences between low and middle income children, but because they made parents happy; they liked their increased participation in education. This underscores what we have noted earlier: one must look at what is achieved or accomplished rather than what is intended. Frequently, satisfaction of the participants, whether providers or customers, is a critical utility even if nothing else is achieved.

In the 1960s, the problem of a technological gap in France led to the adoption of a wide variety of programs and policies designed to increase the rate of technological change (innovation) in science and new product development in industry. These goals were so important to the French policymakers that they made this the number one goal in

the Fifth Plan, subordinating all other objectives. To facilitate these objectives, they not only allocated a relatively large proportion of funds to research and development, but created a number of specialized organizations designed to coordinate the entire research effort.

In the short run, some of these four performance utilities are usually somewhat in opposition to one another. For example, increasing cost efficiency often reduces innovation and vice versa. As a system emphasizes increased motivation or participation, there is a decrease in the quantity of what can be produced and vice versa. In general, innovation, quality oriented, and motivation/participation producing policies are internally consistent, as are quantity oriented, cost reduction, and consumer oriented policies. Problems result when policymakers try to combine all of these performances in the same policy. Needless to say, this is true only within certain limits. And, there are a few policies that appear to improve performance in all areas simultaneously. When this occurs, such policies are non-controversial but this is usually a short-term phenomenon. Conflicts occur when choices must be made among alternatives. The quality versus cost debate is a fundamental one that usually activates opposing sides. At historical moments, the advocates of quality performance will win out; at other times, the advocates of efficiency will be victorious.

Control utilities

Still a third category of utilities is social control or coordination. (See figure 4.) In general, the more effective the communication among groups in a society, the lower the rate of conflict, and the lower the rate of coercion. Conversely, the less effective the communication among groups in a society, the higher the rate of conflict and the higher the rate of coercion. Thus the Scandi-

FIGURE 4

SOCIAL CONTROL AND COORDINATION OF UTILITIES AND EXAMPLES OF INDICATORS

Rate of Communication:
—degree of ethnic diversity,
—degree of religious pluralism;
—number of miles traveled per capita per annum,
—number of telephone calls per 100,000 people,
—number of radios and television sets per 100,000 people,
—number of telephones per 100,000 people.

Rate of Coercion.
—number of police per 10,000 population,
—number of penal days per 1000 population,
—number of arrests per 10,000 population;
—percent of G.N.P. spent on police.

Rate of Consensus/Conflict:
—percent of labor force involved in strikes,
—number of violent disturbances;
—number of mass strikes or demonstrations

Rate of Conformity/Deviance:
—total lesser crimes per 100,000 population,
—total major crimes per 100,000 population,
—total number of riots per 100,000 population.

navian countries, with a homogeneous and small population, have fairly effective communication among social groups, low rates of crime, and much higher levels of expenditures on police.

In the United States, the law and order programs in the late sixties were designed to reduce riots and crimes and the level of deviance in society. Labor legislation in the late forties, as enacted in the Taft-Hartley Act, was designed to control one source of conflict, in this case industrial strikes. Policies that attempt to exert control or require coordination are always more likely to be controversial and involve struggles of power. These struggles activate not only groups who disagree on whether or not there should or should not be control or coordination but also the mechanism to be used. Thus, in the struggle over what to do about products that cause cancer, there has been a debate whether to outlaw cigarettes completely, raise taxes on them (essentially the punishment approach), or to improve communication by providing information that cigarettes are harmful to one's health. The same type of debate and essentially the same two approaches have come up in relation to laws regarding seat belts, food additives, guns, and other matters.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect about the distinction between communication or coercion is that they reflect two very different policies about how crimes can be reduced and criminals handled. One approach is rehabilitation and the other is incarceration with stiff punishments perceived as deterrents. At the nation-state level, governments differ as to whether they desire to control their population through coercion or allow for the integrating bonds created by communication to act as the mechanism of social control.

Structural utilities

The fourth kind of social utility refers to structural changes. (See fig-

FIGURE 5

SOCIAL STRUCTURAL UTILITIES AND EXAMPLES OF INDICATORS

Level of Complexity (distribution of knowledge).
- —percent of labor force in managerial and professional occupations;
- —percent of labor force in trade and professional associations;
- —percent of population in cities of 50,000 and over,
- —percent of population in cities of 20,000 and over.

Level of Centralization (distribution of power):
- —level of society at which personnel are appointed (national or local governmental level or private sector),
- —level of society at which funding occurs;
- —level of society at which standards are set.

Degree of Stratification (distribution of rewards).
- —Lorenz curve on income among social groups;
- —Lorenz curve on leisure time among social groups

Normative Equality (distribution of rights):
- —similarity of educational opportunities among social groups;
- —similarity of legal rights and political privileges among social groups;
- —similarity of unemployment rates among social groups;
- —similarity of life expectancy among social groups.

ure 5.) Again there are two major kinds. The first has to do with giving more power to various groups and the second has to do with redistributing either wealth or privilege. Actually all of these structural policy utilities are likely to be redistributional ones, but the power versus wealth distinction seems worth maintaining. Also we find it worth distinguishing between wealth in a narrow sense of the term and privilege or rights. Many of the policy debates in the United States during the sixties were concerned with the problem of equal rights (normative equality) whether voting rights, educational rights or employment rights.

There are numerous other policy issues that might be mentioned. The idea of universal military training or the draft is an argument that the cost of the military should fall equally on everyone. Women's rights clearly involves the same utility. Programs designed to provide legal services for the poor have the same objective. While having power or wealth affects one's privileges very much, most policies are designed to change the rights of groups directly, without changing the distribution of income or wealth. Tax laws, however, often activate interest groups concerned with how to redistribute wealth, and with various aspects of the stratification system.

Another policy debate, one current in the United States and in many European countries, is over the amount of centralization of the government. The concept of revenue sharing involves an effort to decentralize the governmental process, and in Great Britain, there are serious discussions about decentralizing governmental activities in Scotland and Wales. Antitrust legislation and the current proposals to break up the American oil companies are concerned with the amount of concentration of economic power in large corporations.

At first glance the degree of complexity, which is measured by the percent of the labor force in managerial and professional occupations as well as other measures, would appear not to be a focus of policy debates, but it is frequently a critical one. Most typically such debates develop when policymakers decide to allow certain occupations or professions to exist and to establish various policies regarding the distribution of the labor force among various categories. For example, Great Britain, has, until recently, largely resisted any attempt to develop professional business schools and has also limited university enrollments, arguing that the labor force could not absorb people with these qualifications.

Structural policies generally generate much more conflict than those involving the other three utilities because they affect the basic or fundamental interests of various groups—power, wealth, privilege, or prestige. The basis of conflict often is between the haves and the have-nots. They are more difficult to implement successfully because they require changes in people's behavior.

As our discussion has moved from policies involving changes in outputs to policies involving changes in the basic structures of societies, our discussion of four kinds of utilities has moved from values that are all shared in common to the separate interests of various groups. The difficulty in creating and implementing a new policy increases as we move from changing output policies, to policies designed to increase per-

formance, to those designed to change control and coordination, and finally to those involving a change in a society's basic structures. The debate grows larger, the conflict increases, and the likelihood of some compromise diminishes: thus the worthwhileness of distinguishing these four kinds of utilities. They represent most of the kinds of domestic policies that are debated within contemporary societies. (See figure 6.)

So far we have treated each of these utilities as if they were independent. Yet, as anyone knows, this is usually not the case for the parts of society are interrelated. To change the level of one utility usually requires a change in another. The community control of an educational delivery system, which is a structural change designed to decentralize the educational hierarchy, had, as we have noted, as one of its objectives the increased motivational support of the parents, a change in performance. Similarly, the open classroom achieves its greater quality of education (a performance utility) by decentralizing power (a structural utility) in the classroom and eliminating rules. Thus the multiple utilities mentioned in a debate are frequently implicit hypotheses about how variables cluster together. It is seldom that policy debates involve cleavages about only one or two utilities of the same type, such as guns versus butter, the quality of education versus the number of people to be educated, or who should pay for medical insurance. Most debates also involve other types of utilities, and they raise a basic research question: How are changes in any single utility reflected in changes in other utilities? As we pose this question, we begin to move towards the problem of what social means are used to achieve particular ends, our topic for the next section. Before we do so, however, we should consider some utilities that are not included.

Obviously, these four kinds of utilities do not represent all of the familiar kinds of policies. Little has been said about ecological policies since the protection of the physical environment is not an explicit utility in this scheme. However, various aspects of the policy debates about the physical environment involve the impact of air pollution on morbidity or mortality rates. Debates about garbage and refuse relate to the beauty of various leisure-time places, such as beaches, parks, and wild-life refuges. Thus, even in a policy debate restricted to physical or biological utilities, there are frequently implied social utilities as well. In other words, many ecological debates revolve around quality—in this instance quality of life—and efficiency, that is, the cost of environmental protection.

The nuclear energy debate also would appear to be primarily a technological controversy beyond the scope of this scheme of social utilities. Yet, one of the debated points is the cost of nuclear energy and whether, in fact, nuclear energy really will be less expensive than other sources of energy. Again a seemingly technocratic decision has social implications and thus social utilities.

But we would be the first to admit that this scheme of social utilities is not effective for capturing physical and biological utilities and that some policy debates, such as nuclear and biological engineering, do not center around these kinds of utilities. By emphasizing social utilities, however, we are focusing on the majority of domestic policies and the

FIGURE 6

A TYPOLOGY OF VARIABLES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIETIES

SOCIAL RESOURCES (LEVEL OF INVESTMENT)	SOCIAL STRUCTURE (DEGREE OF DISTRIBUTION)	CONTROL & COORDINATION (CONTROL PROCESSES)	SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (AMOUNT OF EFFECTIVENESS)	SOCIAL OUTPUTS
Investment in education and science	Degree of complexity	Rate of communication	Innovativeness	**level of education and scientific output**
Investment in artistic and cultural production				**Level of artistic and cultural production**
Investment in national security and government administration	Degree of centralization	Rate of coercion	Social achievement index	**Level of societal security and social order**
Investment in family				**Level of population**
Investment in: manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and commerce	Degree of stratification	Rate of consensus/conflict	Efficiency	**Level of economic production**
Investment in leisure				**Level of leisure activities**
Investment in health and well-being	Degree of normative equality	Rate of conformity/deviance	Level of membership participation	**Level of health and well-being**
Investment in charity				**Level of charity and religious activity**

areas where sociology, political science, economics, and history have much to contribute. Hopefully, our scheme is broad enough to cover many social policies and yet has the potential to be coded in sufficient detail to be of interest.

A SCHEME OF GENERAL MEANS

There has been so much attention paid to the issue of why a particular decision outcome should be made that we often lose sight of the question of whether the right decision was made. We need to know if the open classroom really does increase individualized attention, if increase in the level of participation in industry actually does lead to greater motivation on the part of the workers, or if greater access to medical care does lower mortality rates. Admittedly these are difficult questions to answer; skeptics might say that they are impossible to answer.

The problem with many policy studies is that they have not properly coded the means used to achieve certain goals. Again, we shall argue that the means employed to achieve particular utilities usually represent variation on very few themes. If this is correct—and much research remains to be done—then we have a way of forming hypotheses to be tested. Once this occurs, a set of findings may emerge which will better enlighten us as to what consequences will follow when certain types of policies are adopted.

In addition, the problem with numerous policy studies is that they have focused too much on what interest group or coalition won and not enough on the task of determining the causal connection between the particular policy advocated and the specific utility desired. This is understandable for numerous reasons: the fascination of looking at power struggles, the substantive importance of the problem in its own right, the difficulty of measuring outputs, the use of the case versus the comparative method, the lack of some way of translating the means into general variables that may be tested.

Just as we have suggested that there are eight outputs or objectives, we also wish to suggest that there are several basic categories of social means used to achieve these objectives. This should be considered only as a framework, a way of proceeding, and not as a theory that has been developed and tested, although there are bits and pieces of various middle-range theories and empirical generalizations which have been verified. Our objective is to indicate how one might begin to codify a number of policy studies or debates and how one might focus research so that its findings can accumulate more rapidly into meaningful understanding of social policy.

Our starting point is the very simple observation that a policy is a means designed to achieve some end. As with the development of a scheme for describing outputs, we need to be concerned about a vast array of possible means to achieve certain objectives and our solution is essentially a similar one. We intend now to focus on a number of aspects of society.

It would appear that there are essentially three kinds of social means: inputs or resource expenditures, structural, and control variables. We have already described two of these variables. The major means used to achieve some structural utility is usually to change some structural variable, and the same can be said for the achievement of control. In other words,

we are not suggesting that the means and the ends are the same, but that for some problems, the means and ends fall within the same category of utilities. Already, there is considerable literature in organizational research which suggests that increasing either communication or coercion will reduce conflict or deviance —but only under certain circumstances. We would now like to know more about the conditions under which these findings may be applied to the nation-state level and again under what circumstances. The organizational literature—and some of the historical as well—indicates that as the per capita income and levels of urbanization rise, the nature of social control changes. As the society becomes more rigidly stratified, effective communication across various strata decreases, necessitating new kinds of controls. The most important point is that policies should be seen as a means to achieve a particular end relative to some segment of the population. The variables in the typology of figure 6 represent an attempt to provide a code for at least some of the essential elements in the policy. Admittedly it is not a complete code by any means, but at least it helps to focus attention on some basic and fundamental elements. The individual researcher may wish to add more general variables, and this is all to the good. But if these more general and ubiquitous elements could be included, we could begin to codify our research and accumulate some knowledge.

Note that in the next two instances we have hypotheses of a causal nature.

> The greater the decentralization, the greater the destratification.
>
> The greater the decentralization, the greater the normative equality.

An important part of policy research should be the determination of how valid these hypotheses are. We probably will find that they are true only under certain conditions or only when other variables are involved as well. But the fact remains that policy debates carry these kinds of implicit causal connections. They need to be made explicit and examined in the light of historical research.

So far we have mentioned structural and control means and have said nothing about input or resources expenditure means. These are listed in figure 7. Investments in education, health, and economic output are very typical means used to achieve certain objectives and probably need little discussion. How to make enough available resources to achieve particular objectives forms the substance of numerous congressional debates.

And this leads to a critical observation: typically inputs or resource expenditures are used to achieve more outputs of one kind or another. If a society wishes to expand university enrollments, it builds more buildings, makes available scholarships or training programs for the students, and so forth. If it wishes to expand economic production it does essentially the same thing by increasing investment one way or another. If it wishes to increase its national security, it may build a larger military force by adding manpower or acquiring more powerful weapons. If it wishes to improve the health of its population, it builds more hospitals and makes health care more accessible. The parallel suggests that something analogous to economic theory might be generalized to these other production or delivery systems.

But several observations are in

FIGURE 7

SOCIAL RESOURCES AND SELECTED INDICATORS ON INVESTMENTS

Investment in Education and Science:
—expenditures per student for education,
—expenditures per capita for research;
—number of teachers at different levels of education,
—number of scientists in research institutes, industry, etc.

Investment in Artistic Production:
—expenditures for art,
—number of artists.

Investment in National Security:
—expenditure for the military;
—number of personnel in the military.

Investment in Manufacturing, Mining, and Agriculture:
—capital investment in agriculture;
—capital investment in manufacturing;
—managers and industrial workers;
—farm owners and workers.

Investment in Family:
—expenditures for leisure time activities (sports, entertainment, vacations);
—number of people in leisure time industry.

Investment in Health and Well-being:
—expenditures per capita on health;
—number of medical personnel,
—expenditures per capita on welfare and social security.

Investment in Charity:
—expenditures for religious activities,
—expenditures for charitable activities other than religion, health, and education;
—number of people in charitable activities.

order. First, the lack of growth in output may simply result from a shortage in one of the inputs. Second, and more critical, investing more money and manpower may not be the solution. Growth in expenditures of various resources can occur only at certain and, as yet undetermined, rates. The Congress has often increased expenditures in certain crash programs without considering how fast the production system can absorb the increase. The increase in one input without an increase in other inputs may prevent the desired outputs. For example, building hospitals may make no sense without supplying more personnel. And building hospitals and adding personnel may not change morbidity and mortality rates unless accessibility to medical care is changed. Thus a crucial aspect of any policy is a balance in growth of the various inputs designed to have an impact on an output. Third, it is not only inputs that affect outputs, but structural variables as well. A society may make available a great deal of research money, including scientific manpower and equipment, but still not achieve any advance in scientific and technological breakthroughs because the structure of the research organizations does not facilitate innovation. Thus, there is considerable evidence which suggests that the United States has surpassed most European countries in scientific and technological research because the

scientific and technological enterprises have been structured differently in the United States.[3]

Special schools, teachers, and audio-visual aids (input variables) might be made available for the ghettos but not utilized because the familial structure and its values do not encourage participation in educational activities. The United States spends more money on health care, has more physicians, and the most advanced medical technology in the world and yet has a higher mortality rate than comparable industrialized countries. While some of the problem is due to insufficient funds for the poor, probably part of the answer also lies in the way in which the health delivery system is structured, being too decentralized and fragmented.[4]

In a very broad sense these three different kinds of social means represent three different approaches to the problem of how to achieve some objective. Typically the solution is seen as one of providing more resources. Thus, the American government felt that if somehow it sent enough troops and spent enough money it would win the war in Vietnam. A critical resource which American policymakers frequently worry about is technology or individuals with the right skills. Thus the United States lavished not only money but made technological development a key part of the equation in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

It is after a failure with the resource approach that policymakers begin to think about policies that might change the structure of society. Sometimes the structure of society can be changed by the expenditure of money, but usually this occurs via taxation and welfare payments. Thus, the war on poverty attempted to channel more funds to those below the poverty line. But it also created a series of new organizations designed to increase normative equality: legal services were provided to decrease discrepancies in the way in which the poor and affluent were treated by the law; headstart was designed to reduce differentials between middle and working class achievement in schools; there were programs designed to help communities organize to effect changes in the distribution of power as well as privilege. How effective these new organizations were in achieving their objectives is, of course, another question.

There is also a dialectic between control and structural variables in reducing crime or demonstrations. One can increase the number of police as a way of controlling demonstrations or riots, but this does not necessarily speak to the causes of the problem. Thus, much of the discussion of the causes of black riots in urban cities in the United States centered around the problem of control versus the causes of the riots, with some groups more concerned about the former and some about the latter.

Trying to code not only the utilities achieved, but the means used to attain them, forces us to begin moving toward the problem of evaluating the efficacy of particular policies. Most debates center around why a particular policy will be effective, but there is still too little known about this. Nor can there be until

3. Joseph Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

4. Robert Alford, *The Health Care Crisis, Interest Groups and Ideological Barriers to Institutional Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975)

there is more research that questions the relationship between means and ends. Fortunately, policymakers appear to be open to the idea of sponsoring this kind of policy research.

What are some limitations of this proposed classification of means? Perhaps the most critical weakness is that it does not speak to the problem of who should carry out the policy. A major debate frequently occurs as to whether a policy should be carried out in the public or the private sector. Another common policy issue is whether new organizations should be formed or whether existing organizations should be used. The strategy of the war on poverty and of ending the economic depression in the 1930s was to create new organizations with new missions. However, the scheme in figure 6 does not handle this complexity very well.

Another major kind of means frequently discussed in policy debates is the change of values or of attitudes. Some have argued that the best way of achieving racial integration is to change people's attitudes. From the vantage point of this scheme, policies relying upon the alteration of individual attitudes are considered to be policies of no action. This does not mean that they might not work, but only that they are not included with the scheme.

Some might think that interest groups, key actors in any policy debate, have been left out of our strategy. Not at all. Interest groups can be categorized by what values or objectives they desire and what means they prefer. Therefore those who are interested in including the perspectives of the opposing sides can do so quite readily. The basic dimensions of structure also provide a way of categorizing the various interest groups as well: professionals, managers, upper and lower income consumers, and so forth. An illustration of this is included in the next section, where we try to provide some rough guidelines as to how means and ends are interrelated.

This, then, suggests the necessity of knowing which means or policies relate to which utilities. Speaking broadly—and speculatively—our orientation is as follows:

(1) Inputs or resources are the most important determinants of outputs. Essentially these are complex production functions, where the problem is to find the right balance between inputs for sustained, moderate growth in output. Future research needs to focus on what is the right mix of manpower, money, authority, and technology. Governments can foolishly spend money in certain sectors when other sectors are not well enough developed to achieve the desired ends.

The economists have of course traditionally emphasized land, labor, capital, and technology. Within this scheme, technology could be understood, not only in the narrow sense of machines, but also in the broader sense of trained manpower or human capital. In our opinion, the superiority of the Israeli Army is explained by its highly skilled manpower which has allowed for the exploitation of the military equipment, rather than a superiority of equipment per se.

(2) Outputs may also be substantially affected by the structure of the delivery system. This is an aspect that is often not emphasized by economists and is perhaps one of the more controversial parts of our framework.

(3) In contrast to output utilities, performance utilities are most likely to be influenced by structural vari-

FIGURE 8

HYPOTHESES RELATING CENTRALIZATION TO PERFORMANCE

ables of one kind or another. The organizational literature offers considerable evidence to this effect, especially in the way in which the levels of complexity and centralization influence rates of innovation and satisfaction.[5] Extrapolating from this literature, we would expect these findings to be valid at the nation-state level as well.

(4) Despite the importance of structural variables on performance utilities, input variables do have some residual effect on performance variables.

(5) Control utilities are primarily affected by control variables, and secondarily structural variables. Here the key distinction is between which variables are being controlled and which are doing the controlling. Conflict and deviance are the former and integration the latter. However, the causes of conflict and deviance lie in the structure of society, maldistributions of power to make decisions. When control breaks down, then one sees the structural causes in the increases of conflict and of deviance. And if the structural maldistribution becomes great enough, control breaks down. Thus the interplay berween these two sets of variables is a subtle process, and to understand its interplay requires a dynamic perspective.

(6) Structural utilities are influenced by both structural and resource variables. It is our contention that one of the key problems for a society is to keep a structural balance between complexity, centralization, stratification, and normative equality. When problems of equality arise it is because these structural attributes are not in equilibrium.

To provide some measure of the efficacy of these very general and vague guidelines, we offer specific hypotheses as to how structural variables relate to performance utilities, controlling for the impact of various inputs. (See figure 8.)

(1) The greater the centralization of the delivery system, the greater the efficiency but the less the innovation.

5. Michael Aiken and Jerald Hage, "The Organic Organization and Innovation," *Sociology* (January, 1971), 63–82, Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, *Social Change in Complex Organizations* (New York Random House, 1970), Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan, and Jonny Holbek, *Innovations and Organizations* (New York. John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

(2) The greater the centralization of the delivery system, the greater the standardization of service across regions and the greater the equalization across social classes.

What is critical is that both positive and negative consequences are hypothesized. Most policies have negative or undesirable impacts, but the importance of various costs and benefits vary from group to group in the society. It is this that provides the dynamic to policy debates and that causes the oscillation in programs.

Insofar as various utilities have negative relationships, then there are, almost by definition, inherent negative side effects. Perhaps a few brief examples will suffice. An obvious one is that as a society maximizes some outputs, it tends to minimize others. For a long time, many American policymakers had almost a blind faith that greater investments in military hardware would lead to greater growth in the industrial sector. Yet, increasingly, there is contrary evidence for this view; certainly, the problem is vastly more complicated than was previously assumed. How much one can invest in one delivery system as opposed to another is, of course, an unknown, but the dilemmas are becoming clearer.

This is also related to the problem of insufficient means. A lopsided investment in one sector, even the economy, can lead to a lack of growth. An overemphasis on the public sector can lead to a diminution of the private. Too many educated people may lead to an inflated bureaucracy or societal instability. While the balance between sectors is also an unknown, the problem is a critical one if we are to understand social change, and it flows automatically from our framework of viewing societies as producers of scarce resources.

We have suggested that the performance utilities of quality and quantity are negatively related, that innovation and efficiency are often incompatible, and that efficiency and participation are problematic as well. To what extent and in what ways various policies have contributed to fluctuations in these performance utilities over time would appear to be a fruitful area for research.

In the area of structural utilities, the problem of the consequences of structural variables is somewhat unclear because structural changes are rarer and less well researched. If there are various causal relationships between the structural and performance utilities, then changing the former should result in a change in the latter, a change that is usually unanticipated.

The more we think about society or its various production systems as a set of variables that are causally connected, the more we should appreciate that we cannot easily change one variable without its having some consequences for other ones. In examining these connections lies the beginning of the pinpointing of adverse effects.

We have noted in our discussion of inputs that a very typical problem is the achievement of balanced growth in the resources needed to produce particular outputs. Unfortunately, most policymakers tend to take too much of a piecemeal attitude toward problems. As a result, we usually do not understand whether the failure of a policy results from the structure of the delivery system or from an inadequate quantity of inputs. Beyond this, policymakers usually have little understanding of how much of a

change is required to produce a desired effect. Only economics has risen to this level of sophistication. And while we are a long way from having a substantial body of theory in the social sciences, we need to apply the same approach to thinking about other production systems. To do this we need to have studies that focus more on the relationship between inputs and outputs.

Policymakers, at some time or other, are bound to make wrong choices for a variety of reasons. But if policy studies rarely examine the consequences of policy choices, we are unlikely to reach an adequate understanding of why unintended consequences occur.

The research strategy that we propose takes as its model the comparative quasi-experimental design.[6] One country, with or without an explicit policy, scores higher on a major variable and another scores lower. In this way, the impact of the variables on the utility or utilities can be comprehended and estimated. An analysis of policies over a long time span allows for considerable opportunity to control the impact of certain variables and to estimate the effects of changes in the input and structural variables.

The source of our approach is a paradigm from the complex organizational literature which we apply to the nation-state level. Whether our specific hypotheses are correct or not is less important than our main point: All policy debates involve utilities and means to achieve them. Therefore, our task is to discover the general variables for coding both the utilities and the means, to develop hypotheses, and to test them.

Objections to the scheme

It is always wise, when proposing a new analytical framework, to consider the various objections that might be raised against it. This is useful because it more clearly delimits the benefits and the costs of a particular research strategy. We have already noted one objection: namely, the framework does not handle all the various subjects that policy studies concentrate on. This is a fact and needs to be quickly admitted, but there are other objections as well.

Some might argue that their major interest is knowing who won a major policy debate, and why, instead of understanding the causal connection between policy means and social utility. Therefore of what value is a theoretical framework designed to focus on the latter question? While we would be the first to defend peoples' rights to study the policy problem they want, our framework is not irrelevant to this question. The utilities proposed in our scheme represent major values of particular interest groups. Indeed, interest group scholarship needs a set of hypotheses about which values are likely to be pursued by what social or political groups. Once this occurs, the study of interest groups may move to a more theoretical level of analysis, and empirical research on interest groups may verify hypotheses across time and across societies.

We believe that certain interest groups are likely to advocate certain utilities, especially the performance and structural ones, in preference to others. For example, providers of services are likely to prefer innovations, while administrators are

6. Jerald Hage, "Theoretical Decision Rules for Selecting Research Designs: The Study of Nation-States or Societies," *Sociological Methods and Research*, vol. IV (November, 1975), 131–63.

likely to prefer efficiency and quantity of service via some system of standardization. Higher income groups are likely to prefer innovations and high quality service, while lower income groups tend to prefer equality of service via standardization. The source of conflict over who pays and who evaluates is very clear. Whether these hypotheses will hold in most policy areas across time remains to be seen, but these are suggestions which show how the standard interest group approach is compatible with this scheme of means and utilities. (See figure 9.)

We also need to understand better whether the centralization of a delivery system—that is the decision made at the national level—affects the relative power of various interest groups. Again this is an attempt to move from the more traditional micro study of the relative power of certain interest groups and to discover if these are related to the various structural variables given in our framework.

Another objection to this scheme is its very generality. How does one capture all of the richness and important detail of a particular delivery system with a relatively few variables. The answer is that one does not. But one does gain a simple benchmark, a point of reference that allows for comparisons between countries or between policies within the same country at different time points. It may still be true that cer-

FIGURE 9

HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DOMINANT INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY OUTCOMES

tain important variables have been left out. But at least in broad outline, we will know what the features of particular policies are, their general objectives, and consequences. We would be the first to point out, however, that more detailed information is useful, for without it, one may miss some critical insight. At the same time we would argue that these few general variables make the meaningfulness of detail more apparent and permit more detailed information to form more fruitful and subtle questions: what kinds of innovation, what kinds of communication, what kinds of centralization are natural questions, when one has a general framework such as we have provided.

This scheme, while being very general and not providing much detail, does allow the detail to be placed in sharper focus and demands additional questions that allow for a more refined analysis. Our assumption is that the detail will always be added in policy studies, but what has been missing are the more general statements and hypotheses.

Another objection relates to the problem of measurement. Can we really measure effectively the level of centralization, rates of innovation, levels of efficiency of health and educational delivery systems over time and across societies? In our research we have encountered a wide variety of measurement problems in defining innovation and efficiency in both education and health. While the problems are difficult, our research suggests that we can solve them. Moreover, the work on social indicators has been tackling some of the measurement problems.[7] The difficulties will not get easier by our avoiding measurement problems. One must begin somewhere, and this is all that we can claim to have accomplished. Indeed, the whole interest in social indicators is a recognition that we should start to deal with some of these problems with the hope that gradually some progress can be made.

In one sense the measurement problem is not an adequate critique of the theoretical framework. The real question is not whether all of the utilities are measurable but instead whether they are worth measuring. On the latter point, we would clearly argue, yes. In fact, one purpose of a scheme like ours is to include and make us aware of things that we might be able to measure. Even the quality of services may not be measurable but we would not want to drop it from our scheme because we want to remain sensitive to this variable as a potential cost or benefit of some policy.

Finally, one might ask how does such a general scheme relate to the interests of historians, even those interested in a more scientific approach to the study of history. Historical data are indispensable in order to confront our research strategy. To answer the questions which interest us, one needs longitudinal as well as comparative data. The advantages of time series data as a quasi-experimental technique are well known, but they have seldom been applied to the nation-state level.[8] By using longitudinal data, we should be able to under-

7. Sheldon and Moore, *Indicators of Social Change*.

8. Donald Campbell and J. C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-experimental Design for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Edward A. Suchman, *Evaluative Research. Principle and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs* (New York. Russell Sage, 1967).

tand better how changes in one variable are related to other variables than we can with our cross-sectional strategies.

CONCLUSION

This paper started with two tasks set against a fundamental question. If we are to make theory relevant to practice we must first develop some theory, certainly more than the Marxists and the functionalists have done. To do this, we need as a starting point a scheme that gives us a set of utilities or policy objectives and outcomes, and one that provides a way of coding the means employed to achieve outcomes and objectives. The proposed scheme does this within a single coherent typology of general variables. Though it does not cover all policy debates, it covers a majority of them, and in the process, we have remained faithful to the concerns of both the Marxists and of the functionalists.

To make the scheme more complex and interesting, we have made a number of suggestions. First, we have argued that the various classes or categories of variables may be related in particular ways. Second, we have suggested which utilities are likely to result in the most conflict and what the likely coalitions among groups are likely to be. Third, we have indicated how to study the more traditional problems of who wins and why at the same time that we are studying the consequences of groups using particular means for certain specified objectives. Fourth, we have briefly sketched how the typology raises interesting questions about negative side effects and the problem of the sufficiency of means. Fifth, we have tried to indicate how the scheme allows one to ask more subtle questions and to add more substantive detail in a systematic way. Sixth, and finally, we have noted that the scheme does not solve the historical problem of the specific recommendation for the concrete cultural context. It merely allows one to codify findings in a general way.

Behind all this is a series of assumptions about policymakers. They need to be told what has worked elsewhere, and this requires the ability to codify various policies tried in other places. Policymakers need to be told why policies have worked and this requires the knowledge of some causal connection. They need to be told for whom a policy works and under what circumstances; they need to be told about policy side effects and how much input is required. The answer to these problems requires some general model of societal change which helps us understand which groups will oppose certain kinds of policies and why. Again, our scheme tries to unite an interest group perspective with a general variable approach. Finally, policymakers need to be given recommendations that are viable within their system of thought. The fact that this has not been done in the past is one reason why policy studies have had little impact on policy decisions.

There is no doubt about our concern for bridging the theory and practice gap. What there may be doubt about is whether this framework and our general overarching ideas will, indeed, build the right kind of theory. This remains to be seen.

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Are National Health Services Systems Converging? Predictions for the United States

By ODIN W. ANDERSON

ABSTRACT: A review of the emerging literature on cross-national health services systems and first hand studies by the author reveals that health services systems in many countries are converging in their egalitarian objectives, organizational forms, methods of paying providers, scope of services, and costs controls. Cross-nationally facilities and personnel are quite similar, indicating the importance of medical technology as a shaping force. Organizational forms, methods of payment, and sources of funding differ widely because these are mainly social and political expressions, but these too, are converging. Countries will continue to exhibit differences in structuring inherent in their economic and political styles, from the United States to the U.S.S.R. It is proposed that the range of difference will narrow, but not converge. Several issues are examined cross-nationally: equity, scope of services, financing and cost controls, organizational structure, and planning. Finally, predictions of developments in the United States are made from experiences in other countries, and from the social, economic, and political style of the United States.

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IT IS frequently remarked that the United States is the only industrialized country in the world that has not enacted universal health insurance and does not have a national health policy. It is supposed to follow, then, that countries that do have universal health insurance also have a national health policy and are coping more adequately than the United States with the issues of equal access, adequate funding, adequate controls on quantity and quality of services. These assumptions are, at best, only partly true. What other countries have accomplished is to eliminate the fear of high cost episodes to families which would endanger their financial solvency, and to a higher degree, but far from equitably, spread the cost over income groups so that the better-off are likely to contribute more than the worse-off. These are, of course, basic accomplishments, but, currently, other countries are almost forgetting them in their concern with health service expenditures encroaching unduly on other internal problems facing the nations. This country is encountering all current health problems simultaneously—rising costs, increased use, equal access, equal distribution, and proliferating technology, while it is contemplating some form of universal health insurance. Other countries enacted universal health insurance when the cost trends were rising slowly and egalitarian issues were not being pressed as ardently as now. The basic objective was to finance as demanded, and when that proved too costly, later, as needed, and now, as can be afforded, the latter basically a political decision. As for a national health policy, other industrialized countries do not have one either in any specific sense of goals and methods to achieve them with what resources, by what standards of achievement, and at what cost. Perhaps the USSR comes as close to an explicit national health policy as any industrialized country with methods and goals spelled out in five year plans.[1]

The universal objective everywhere is to equalize access to services and to take the burden of costly episodes off families. These measurable, essentially social and political, objectives are obscured and obfuscated by the utopian objectives of raising health levels when their indicators are so crude they show little, if any, measurable effect in industrialized countries since their conquest of infectious and communicable diseases has turned the leading causes of death upside down since the turn of the century.

INTRODUCTION

I intend by this introduction to approach universal health insurance in an international context, issue by issue, historically and currently, and, in both, cross-nationally. I will draw on various disciplines: history, economics, political science, sociology, and even ethics, without referring to them as such—the privilege of the synthesist.

Each discipline, except possibly history, is too specialized; it deals with too few variables (only the measurable kind) for an overview of human behavior in relation to a particular human enterprise, from healing to war. The synthesist thus needs

1. Odin W. Anderson, "Health Services in the USSR," *Selected Papers*, no. 42 (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1973) and Igor V. Pustovoy, "Health Care Planning in the USSR: Its Role in Improving Medical and Preventive Services (Michael M. Davis Lecture, Center for Health Administration Studies, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1975).

to be arrogant, because this source material does not come in neatly documented packages, and he necessarily formulates his conceptual framework on a high level of abstraction.

In recent years there has been a burgeoning interest in health service systems in various countries. The studies on them have been usually case reports of single countries, but the emerging approach is comparative. Also, the studies are largely descriptive, setting forth the current organizational structure and expenditure sources with little attempt at developmental histories or analysis of the effect of particular social, economic, and political conditions.[2] Still, the trend is toward increased interest and sophistication in both case studies and comparative research.[3] In addition, there are comparative studies of patterns of use of services which are useful for systems operation comparisons.[4] All these studies are drawn on directly or indirectly in the course of this paper, as is the historical literature on social, economic, and political history in Europe and North America. Hence, I will not document this aspect, but simply suggest that obviously my conceptual framework is primarily tuned to liberal-democratic and social-democratic societies where the industrial revolution resulted in the destruction of the mercantile state, and the emergence of pluralistic interest group power centers and mixed private and

2 See, for example, John Fry, *Medicine in Three Societies: A Comparison of Medical Care in the USSR, USA, and UK* (New York. Elsevier, 1970), Alan Maynard, *Health Care in the European Community* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), M Kaser, *Health Care in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (London. Croom Helm, 1976), Karl Evang, David S Murray, and Walter J Lear, *Medical Care and Family Security Norway, England, and the U.S.A.* New York. Prentice-Hall, 1963) *See also* "Health. A Major Issue," *Scandinavian Review* (1975) Selected experiences from Scandinavian countries may be found in this article

3 Perhaps a starter was Henry E Sigerist, *Socialized Medicine in the Soviet Union* (New York: Norton, 1937), retrospectively, a rather romanticized version, but followed later by Mark G Field, *Doctor and Patient in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), Gordon Forsyth, *Doctors and State Medicine; A Study of the British Health Services* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), Odin W. Anderson, *Health Care Can There Be Equity? The United States, Sweden, and England* (New York Wiley, 1972), Spyros Andreopoulos, ed, *National Health Insurance Can We Learn From Canada?* (New York: Wiley, 1975), Romuald K. Schicke, "Die Stellung des Arzte in Systems der Gesellschaflichen Sicherung in der Bundesrepublic Deutschland, in England und in den USA und ihre Bedeutung fur dre Versorgung mit Gesundheitsgutern," (Diss., University of Hamburg, 1969), Christa Altenstetter, "Planning for Health Facilities in the U S. and in West Germany," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly Health and Society*, 51 (Winter 1973), pp. 41–71. Ray H. Elling, "Health Planning in International Perspective," *Medical Care*, 9 (May–June, 1971) pp. 214–34, John H Babson, *Health Care Delivery Systems. A Multinational Survey* (Bath, England Pitman Medical, 1972), Theodore J Litman and Leonard L. Robins, "A Comparative Analysis of Health Care Systems: A Socio-Political Approach," *Social Science and Medicine*, 5 (December 1971), pp. 573–81, William A Glaser, *Social Settings and Medical Organization. A Cross-National Study of the Hospital* (New York: Atherton Press, 1970)

4 *See*, Robert Kohn and Kerr White, eds., *Health Care An International Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), Ronald Andersen, Bjorn Smedby, and Odin W Anderson, "Medical Care Use in Sweden and the United States," *Research Series*, no. 26 (Center for Health Administration Studies, University of Chicago, 1969); A Mizrahi and A. Mizrahi, *L'enquete de 1970 sur les Consommations Medicales* (Paris: Centre de Recherches et de Documentation sur la Consommation, 1976), Tapani Purola, Esko Kalimo, and Kauko Nyman, *Health Services Use and Health Status under National Sickness Insurance* (Helsinki. Research Institute for Social Security, 1974).

public sectors. These economic and political changes shaped the health services in western countries; other traditions have shaped the systems in countries in the orbit of the USSR sphere of influence.

This paper will be then in large part conceptual, but still I hope it will have sufficient grounding in actual historical developments so that further research will fill out this framework without modifying it in substance. Further, there are now probably a sufficient number of detailed descriptions of national systems and litanies of woe that inferences can be made as to what is in store for the United States. Finally, I will try to show that regardless of the economic and political context, there is a strain toward similar concepts of organizing, funding, and controlling personal health services systems.

I will review a series of issues which appear to be generic in all health services systems. They are: (1) equity; (2) scope of services; (3) organizational structure and finance; (4) cost and quality controls, and (5) planning. The management of these issues in other countries which are chronologically ahead of the United States may reveal what the United States will experience as this country moves into some form of universal health insurance.

Before embarking on these issues, it is useful to note that in general the various service components comprising a modern personal health services system are quite similar across industrialized countries, certainly similar enough for the purpose of this paper. Hospitals, physicians and specialties within them, nurses and pharmacists are easily recognizable cross-nationally; and in substance they perform more or less the same tasks. It can be reasonably assumed that these types of facilities and personnel have been shaped by medical science and technology into some division of medical-scientific labor congruent with this knowledge and technology. Very wide variations emerge in how these facilities and personnel are related to each other in organizational structures, how they are paid, what autonomy they enjoy, how the entire system is financed from what sources in what proportions and what rights and method of access are given the general public. These considerations emerge largely out of the economic and political traditions regarding property rights, private market versus political bargaining, and the role of the government. Personal health services have never been purely a private profit marketplace enterprise in any country. Even where hospitals are privately owned, and physicians are autonomous contractors for their services, society has expected them to provide care to all seekers regardless of means. Undoubtedly, this expectation frequently has not been fulfilled, but the basic value persists. Eventually, the concept of equality of access found expression through governmentally sponsored health insurance, the presumed ultimate custodian of the public's welfare.

THE ISSUE OF EQUITY

Equity has been the underlying value for the development of the welfare state after the inequities of the industrial revolution became political issues; i.e., loss of income because of unemployment, disability and old age. Later, health services became unpredictable and costly for the household, and were therefore merged with the income transfer concept of the welfare state. Simple income transfer is not the

only issue in the provision of health services. A complex service by high status professionals is also involved. The welfare state measures taken by industrial societies cut across ideology from liberal-democratic to communistic.[5] The problems are inherent in industrialism; ideological differences appear in the means and rights accorded the public. Health services appear to have aroused more ideological controversy than simple income transfer because of basic values of professional autonomy and range of choice by the public, as well as others.

Equity eventually became defined as equality. In Great Britain, for example, it was thought equitable in 1911 to introduce for workers under certain incomes a general practice plan excluding their dependents. It was reasoned that workers should be kept healthy so that they could be more productive for both society and their dependents. If hospital care were needed, all could receive it at the voluntary hospitals which were subsidized by the rich for the working class. Publicly supported hospitals were built for the paupers, by definition, the unworthy poor as contrasted with working and, therefore worthy, poor. Private hospitals and private beds in the voluntary hospitals served the small upper class. This system was politically endured until the 1940s, as the concept of equality began to find political expression in universality and the National Health Service.

In the United States, an emergency charity health services for the poor and a private system for the mass of the public were regarded as equitable until the drive for some sort of universal and national health insurance surfaced. Again, the concept of equity changes to equality. Similar developments with differences only in degree took place on the continent. In the Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, health services, particularly hospital care (including physicians' services in the hospital), were regarded as a total community service by at least the turn of the nineteenth century. The hospitals were, and are, owned by the local county governments. Reasons for the different concepts of equity in time and place are not easy to elucidate. They flow out of the class system, of the political views and time, and appear to change as suffrage is expanded to all adults.

When universal health insurance systems were established, the underlying rationale was that of protecting the household from costly and unpredictable medical care episodes, equity through sharing risks. Universality was, therefore, taken for granted. This principle was easy to accept, but other equity issues came to the fore, such as how to share the cost from general revenue and/or employee-employer payroll deductions, making health services a part of the cost of production. The more egalitarian proponents strove for a progressive income tax, the more pragmatic for payroll and sales taxes, which are by their nature regressive. The USSR simply applied part of the surplus income from her state enterprises because she owns all the means of production and distribution. As can be imagined, in the western democracies there is a mixture of sources of funding, with a standoff, by and large, between per-

5. See, Harold L. Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality, Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures* (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1975) and Morris Janowitz, *Social Control of the Welfare State* (New York Elsevier, 1976)

sonal and progressive income tax, payroll taxes and sales taxes. The United States and Great Britain are the extremes among western countries with the United States relying largely on payroll taxes and Great Britain on the progressive income tax. The mixture of funding sources is likely to continue.

Another issue that has emerged quite recently in universal health insurance is that of equal distribution of services geographically as well as equal access, by the elimination of cost, to the household at time of service. Universal health insurance or service was inaugurated at a time (except for the USSR) when the health services infrastructure was already in essence established. Naturally, there were more hospitals and physicians in Paris, London, Stockholm, Berlin, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia and Toronto than in the hinterlands. Further, there were differences even within cities. These disparities in distribution have been improved, only in part, since the inception of universal health insurance. Equal distribution is now a political issue and has recently been expressed through great interest in planning. If the method is only to increase services in underserviced areas to bring them up to the level of well-serviced areas, such areas would not complain except perhaps about the higher taxes that would be required. If the method is to reduce services in well-serviced areas and increase them in underserviced areas, a political issue of the first magnitude arises between sectional interests. The latter method is now in effect in Great Britain through the central budgeting process, and it is so incremental (a few percentage points more or less over a twenty-five year period) that it will take a whole generation to notice, by which time everyone will be accustomed to relatively equal distribution.

THE ISSUE OF SCOPE OF SERVICES

Universality is now taken for granted in all countries, but the scope of services is still debated. All countries except Great Britain in 1946 and the USSR, since its first five-year plan beginning in the thirties, have been selective in their scope of services paid for or provided through the universal health insurance system. Health services, by definition, included all professionally recognized services: hospital, physician, nursing, dentistry, and drugs and medicines. Great Britain included everything as part of the euphoria of World War II togetherness and the continuing tradition of noblesse oblige. The USSR introduced universal coverage for ideological reasons inherent in communist philosophy. The United States started with universality for an age group, those sixty-five years and over, and hospital and physicians' services, with relatively high deductibles. Canada started with a service component, hospital services, excluding physicians' services in hospitals, for all citizens. Scandinavia started with hospital care for all citizens including inhospital physicians' services. Australia started with prescription drugs. In general, it can be said that industrialized countries have, by and large, started universal health insurance with hospital and physician services, later trying to add drugs and medicine, dental care, home care, and long-term care. There has been and continues to be an understandable fear by government to overcommit its taxing power and available resources.

The strain is toward comprehenveness so that in time all recog-zed professional health services ill likely be covered in some form. : appears that people everywhere re loathe to pay for any services lirectly, even though they may be elatively small charges over a period, such as deductibles and coinsurance, with the insurance system paying for higher magnitude costs. People do not equate costs of health services with life and casualty, or automobile insurance. So far, the United States appears to be the most insurance, rather than service, conscious nation, but the trend toward comprehensiveness persists in this country as well.

THE ISSUE OF FINANCING AND COST CONTROLS

The problem of financing and cost controls are discussed separately from organizational structure, because they were grafted on to the existing health service delivery structure in all countries as some form of universal health insurance was established, particularly on the continent and among the commonwealth countries. The existing delivery structure was taken as a given; the primary problem was regarded as financing. Great Britain is a partial anomaly in that she regionalized her hospitals and established salaried specialists in the hospitals in 1948, a new departure, but even so, one gets the impression that the basic structure remained, although the ownership shifts exclusively to the central government. The tripartite organizational and budgeting structures of general practice, hospitals and their salaried specialists, and the local public health services reflect historical interests and patterns which are embodied in the National Health Service. It is only recently that Great Britain has abolished the tri-partite structure in order to facilitate utilization of all services within single regions. Even so, general practitioners still have a separate budget in the national system.

Funding sources in the western industrialized countries remain diverse because parliamentary governments must pay due regard to the sensitivity of the body politic to taxing methods, who is to be taxed, and how much. All systems generally started with payroll deduction as an easy source of income, thereby keeping it separate from general revenue usually based on personal and progressive income tax. In the early days, the personal income tax did not even exist. Further, taxation at the employer-employee level was regarded as a cost of production. In economies like that of the USSR, of course, health services are financed from the profits of state enterprises. It is not reflected in the employees' incomes, but simply regarded as a service naturally financed through public funds from state surpluses. In other countries, the continuing private-public sector economies, although increasingly blurred, are then naturally reflected in the politics of financing health services, as well as other transfer types of payments. As long as there is private ownership of the means production and distribution, there will likely be a plurality of funding sources: employer-employee, general revenue, sales taxes, and possibly some direct payment at time of service. General revenue will probably continue to split between progressive personal income tax and various forms of sales taxes. It seems reasonable to predict that the progressive income tax as a source

of revenue will encounter increasing political hostility at the polls. Indirect and relatively invisible sales taxes at whatever level (production, wholesale, retail) are increasing.

The persistence of a plurality of funding sources may slow the tendency to complete financial control by the central governments even though any tax from any source needs legislative authority. The continuing costs of personal health services are so great that there will be scrounging around for any source to tap whatsoever. Again, Great Britain stands out as a great exception among parliamentary democracies, although there is still a remnant of a payroll tax which helps to support a very small part of the National Health Service. It is reported that the employees have the illusion that this small proportion constitutes the total expenditure for the National Health Service.

It may be that a plurality of funding sources may result in a higher total national expenditure because this total does not become politicized in national policy issues. Great Britain, of course, has an advantage in cost controls by the government's power to set an annual limit to expenditures through treasury policy backed by Parliament. The safety valve here is the small private sector of voluntary health insurance for top level employees and civil servants who want it or can induce their employers to pay for it. This small sector, estimated at 5 percent of total population, and even less than that of expenditures, is now under attack as being inegalitarian. Egalitarianism thus becomes an end in itself, regardless of possible consequences to the flexibility of options in a democratic society.

A persistent but exceedingly unpopular cost control is small charges at time of service to deter casual use of services and goods. All systems apply charges for drugs and medicines, others for dental care, and still others for out-of-hospital physicians' services. Among parliamentary democracies, Great Britain has the fewest and smallest charges. One of the principles of the National Health Service was a free service financed by the general revenue. The issue of site and amount of charges is a constant political issue out of proportion, it seems, to the magnitude of the charges. The trend appears to be the elimination of charges altogether as a deterrence to services.

The private sector in health services delivery, financing, and ownership is an interesting subject area to trace out the history of private sector and public sector interrelationships. All industrialized countries among the parliamentary democracies have permitted the private sector to operate to some degree, the extent to which it can do so reflecting the political philosophy and economic circumstances of the country. Mention has already been made of the private sector in which employees and employers are taxed through payroll deduction to finance health insurance, some allowance being made for private ownership of facilities and autonomous professionals with whom the government contracts.

The heart of the private sector in health services is the opportunity of the citizens to buy services and insurance outside of the mainstream of national health insurance. It seems that there are three types of arrangements in the parliamentary democracies for private sector activity: (1) The private sector can be a safety valve for the mainstream national health insurance system, allowing citizens who wish to avoid the queue

or see a specialist directly, if the sole entry point is a general practitioner. The British private health insurance arrangement is an example. Even so, the National Health Service is used without charge for major medical procedures which private insurance does not ordinarily cover. Private health insurance buys convenience and reportedly more personal attention from specialists than the National Health Service is established to provide; (2) a second type is as a partner with the government, whereby the existing private insurance agencies act as financial agents for the government in dealing with providers. This arrangement presumably pluralizes power by diffusing financial negotiations throughout the system. West Germany is an example, with its legally private sickness insurance societies since the time of Bismarck. Increasingly, however, as costs become politicized, the government begins to bear down hard on the financial agents to control costs, because such costs are ultimately social costs which affect national accounts; (3) a third arrangement is one in which the private and public sectors have competing systems and citizens can enroll in one or the other. Australia is approaching this type at the moment and Denmark had it, but most governments do not look with favor on competition. The drive is toward monopoly largely under the rationale of equality. There is fear that a two class system will emerge, one for the better off and another for the worse off. In any case, there are vestiges of the private sector in all parliamentary democracies from private ownership of facilities and autonomous, entrepreneurial doctors to separate private insurance arrangements. So far, it seems that the private sector is definitely on the defensive as governments try to control all costs of health services as a matter of public policy. Still, if government health insurance, as defined by upper income groups, is underfinanced and inconvenient, the private sector may expand unless it is proscribed altogether. This is clearly a political question of government legislating consumption which will test the power of the egalitarian drive in parliamentary democracies.

THE ISSUE OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

As stated previously, the structure of the delivery system has become a political issue only recently. The health service components have arranged themselves in relation to one another and to funding sources incrementally and largely as determined by the providers. It seems that the general public did not question the emerging arrangements. This is no longer true. The questioning has started; the results are still to be seen.

The classic pattern among parliamentary democracies has been the general hospital for acute diseases, and long-term hospitals for tuberculosis and other chronic diseases. General hospitals have had variable ownership, wholly local government as in Scandinavia, partly local government and private nonprofit ownership as in Great Britain before the National Health Service and on the continent and in North America currently. Long-term hospitals, with few exceptions, have been publicly owned. Among private hospitals, ownership is variable, usually by secular community boards or by churches. The latter

situation makes nationalization of hospitals more complicated, as, for example, in the Netherlands.

Physicians are autonomous contractors in all systems, in line with the continuing concept of the liberal professionals accorded the prerogative of diagnosis and treatment. What has changed with increasing government intervention is the professions' entreprenurial prerogative to determine the method and amount of payment unilaterally and the organizational arrangement of practice. Ineluctably the physicians' scope has been narrowed to discretion in diagnosis and treatment, and remains intact. In a larger sense, the physician as expert continues to have a dominant role in advising on medical equipment and resources. The trend is toward a salaried service and diminution of fee-for-service method of payment. The latter is regarded as too open-ended for cost control.

For hospitals the emerging pattern is fixed prospective budgets, within which they must operate for a given period. Also, the trend is toward a reduction of the self-determination. Increasingly, hospitals are being formally classified into so-called district or first-line hospitals and high technology medical centers, with presumably rational and systematic referral procedures between them.

The desired trend for physicians' services, outside of the specialty work in the hospitals, is toward health centers where physicians practice as a group and share equipment and supporting personnel. As funds become more limited, high technology and associated high costs are driving health service organizations to emulate the industrial model. Rationalization is the slogan for an enterprise which defies rationalization according to criteria worked out for automobile manufacturers and life insurance companies.

These trends cut across all countries from the United States to the USSR. The particular stage in the development of a rationalized structure on the industrial model will reflect the political and economic character of each country. In all likelihood, the United States will continue with a more open decision-making system than that characteristic of other countries. In the parliamentary democracies, Great Britain will continue to be the most rationalized and structured system approaching the USSR system structurally, but retaining the British style in cross-interest consultations and polite application of guidelines and directives. This style reflects the civic culture. The USSR is the current acme of the centralized planning, financing, and control, with norms and directives sent down through the several layers of administration to the point of delivery. What I am then suggesting is a convergence of health services systems toward a rationalized model with viable boundaries as to regionalization, service unit quotas, and visible and arbitrary budgets. The convergence will not be complete, because of national differences mentioned, but the drive is there. Automobile factories look the same in all countries, but health service systems will differ because they cannot be rationalized along the industrial model to the same degree, regardless of the effort put forth.

THE ISSUE OF PLANNING

The concept of overall planning of the health services according to cer-

tain criteria is quite new among parliamentary democracies, even in Great Britain, which has had a rational system according to such criteria since 1948. The USSR has, of course, had a planning concept since the Revolution in 1917, because planning is central to the communist style and method. The systems have evolved incrementally until, suddenly, there is a cost explosion which frightens governments into searching for methods to contain it.

This method is overall planning. Indeed, the United States is unique in that a health planning act has been legislated before the enactment of national health insurance. The United States is considering national health insurance at a time when health costs are rising; other countries enacted national health insurance when health costs were relatively stable. National health insurance did not cause increased health care costs though it probably exacerbated them. Costs would have risen anyway, given the increasingly costly technology and rising incomes.

Because it is the most expensive component, the service component receiving major attention in planning is the hospital. The prevailing view everywhere is to slow, or even stop, the expansion of the hospital component and expand the primary physician services and other out-of-hospital services. The Swedes and the Russians appear to lead the way in accumulating data on facilities and personnel, and according to certain norms of need, age being the most important one, projecting these components five, ten, and more years into the future. Great Britain is paying great attention to planning, also with the usual variety of need/demand standards of the conventional kind. That country, however, is placing much emphasis on equalizing distribution of facilities and personnel as an integral part of its planning for equality of access to public systems. Canada and the continental countries are seriously trying to engage in planning and regionalization, but so far detailed planning is still not legislated. The prevailing method, which can be called negative planning, is for the government to control hospitals and other facilities through regulation. The dominant concept everywhere is to limit supply,.since it does not seen practical to limit or control demand any other way. There is also increasing control in costs through regulation.

The current status of the art and science of health services planning is very crude. The relationship of need to demand in facilities and personnel and their financing are difficult to specify in a scientifically valid way. Hence, quite arbitrary criteria are established which can be tested against public and professional tolerance as to convenience and quality. The criteria are then essentially political; that is, what is the balance, even temporarily, between the interest groups? Until recently, all systems experienced a euphoria of expansion; no interest group really gave up anything except by feeling relatively deprived compared to other groups. In the next decade there will be hard bargaining by interest groups in all countries, government being in the strongest position as the major source of funding.

As part of the planning context, there is increasing interest in interrelating professional health services and social services. There is a gray area blurring the boundaries of the

health services system in which it is difficult to determine whether a patient has primarily a medical problem, which should be handled by technical health personnel, or a more diffuse social problem with a health component, which health personnel want to unload on the social services. No country appears yet to have resolved this interrelationship. Professional status and prerogatives and budget allocations are involved. In the long run I would predict that medical care will become increasingly high technology, and the uninteresting and unrewarding patients, medically, will be channeled to the social services, including the already beseiged nuclear family. More needs to be known about the interrelationship of family structure, ill and incapacitated members, and the helping professions. At the moment the social system does not show signs of being able to absorb gracefully the increased chronic illness problems. The storehouses are here called nursing homes; indeed, they started with mental hospitals.

The extent to which rational planning is possible is still to be tested. Given the paucity of validated performance indicators, as I have mentioned, I do not see how rational planning is possible, even if the planners have power and there is conformity to the plan. Planning will be successful; that is, acceptable, if a health care system is generously financed and proportioned. If the health system is tightly controlled and tightly financed, there will be restiveness among both the public and the health professionals. Each country will find its own equilibrium, and it is likely that the acceptable balance in the United States will continue to be more costly than that in Great Britain. Other countries among the parliamentary democracies will range themselves in between.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

From a review of the experiences of a number of health services systems across countries, it can be reasonably generalized that we have learned the following:

1. Universal health insurance effectively protects the family from high-cost medical episodes.
2. It can be inferred that access to services becomes more equalized across income classes by eliminating large charges at time of service.
3. The equal distribution of services geographically is not achieved by universal health insurance alone, unless there is a policy built into the health insurance implementation. Even then, equal distribution is very difficult even to approximate. There is a limit to which any government is able and willing to allocate resources geographically, particularly personnel.
4. The overall costs of a health services system are not controlled by any particular organizational structure or funding methods. It appears that the amount a society is willing to spend on health services is almost purely a political decision independent of the structure of the delivery system. Given a public policy of stringent cost control, it is, however, easier to control costs in a centralized funding system than in a decentralized one.
5. Professional freedom to diagnose and treat continues in governmental systems as a prerogative of the professional and the expert. This will continue, although the profes-

sional will be increasingly challenged as to the need for certain expensive resources. The profession will remain in a dominant position as long as the public fears pain and death as much as it does today.

6. As an aspect of professional freedom, patient choice of physician is possible and continues, although in more constricted circumstances than in pure private practice. Systems need to control intake in some way by limiting their entry points.

7. Pluralistic funding is probably more expensive in total than centralized funding is because it is more difficult to exercise cost controls; and cost, as a national political issue, becomes more diffused in a pluralistic funding system than in a centralized one.

8. Although small charges at time of service persist, particularly for out-of-hospital services, these charges are very unpopular among the public. They will probably be eliminated in time.

9. The comprehensiveness of the service offered or paid for by national health insurance continues to expand. The trend appears to be in the direction of a health service rather than health insurance for major contingencies. The public appears loath to pay out-of-pocket for any health service.

10. The private sector is diminishing in scope and power as a countervailing force; in fact, in Europe, it was never regarded as a countervailing force or competitor. The private health insurance sector, when one existed before universal health insurance, was always regarded as deficient with respect to scope of benefits and proportion of the population covered, especially self-employed, low-income, and aged. Still, politically, the private sector was never given criteria by which to measure a politically satisfactory level of achievement. Health services objectives appear to be inherently utopian, in which case government responsibility and control is the ultimate step. After that there is nowhere to go, although the desire for utopian objectives persists.

11. The trend for hospitals is regulation of expansion and construction and fixed annual budgets with little room for negotiation. The trend for physicians outside of the hospital is toward regulated or negotiated fixed fee schedules. Inside the hospital the standard payment method has been salary by hierarchy. The fee-for-service method of payment continues to be popular among physicians and unpopular among administrators, but it is amazingly tenacious, indicating something inherent in a professional and personal service.

12. All systems continue to be acute illness crisis-oriented; thus, the major portion of the resources go to acute illnesses and sophisticated technology, and the health professionals are more interested in crisis care than long-term medical care management of chronic illness.

13. There seems to be a lot of lip service to, but little action in, preventive care, except for the traditional maternal and child health programs. The now burgeoning interest in changing life styles—smoking, overeating, overdrinking—conceivably could reduce pressure on the health services. This still is largely rhetoric with faddist overtones, and I do not believe life style changes can progress sufficiently to lessen impact on the personal health services.

14. It appears that the public is interested in more health service than public authorities are willing

finance in relation to other national priorities. It would seen that the public needs to be given more knowledge of relative costs and tradeoffs. Public budgets are too murky for this type of citizen education.

15. The interest in the industrial model is pervasive, but industrial engineers and management technicians have not yet entered the health services in full force. Health services administration will be too soft for full application of the industrial model. The health professionals will resist and sabotage such efforts, and, in my mind, quite legitimately.

16. Systematic planning is in its infancy. Validated norms have yet to be established and the possibility of local conformance to a general plan has yet to be tested. There is a lot of internal negotiation at present.

17. The seeming trend toward national health services to integrate families, personal health services, and social services, and treat families as units is a move from an individualistic-atomic model, characteristic of parliamentary democracies and pluralistic systems, to collective-organic models, products of the emerging welfare state, democratic socialism, and communism. The role of the individual, family, private and public sectors, and the state will have to be thought through in another context.

18. Finally, systems do not learn from one another; they copy each other incrementally, in the context of each country's economic, social and political matrix. Medical care techniques are picked up rapidly, but health services systems evolve. There is no correct system in the sense that there is a well-functioning automobile factory which can be dismantled in Italy and reassembled or copied process for process in the USSR.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE UNITED STATES?

What is likely to happen in the United States? I am of the opinion—not wholly without evidence—that it is easier to predict what will happen than to recommend an overall policy, which is not politically feasible, although medically desirable. Accordingly I will predict rather than recommend.

As stated earlier, the United States is facing a full range of problems simultaneously, while considering universal health insurance. This is evident in the legislation and the debates. Lacking a policy consensus politically and a clear concept of what to do, the United States is entertaining legislation which runs the gamut from a British-type national health service to a private enterprise insurance concept of covering high-cost contingencies. The British-type enters into the very structuring of the system through the centralized funding mechanism. The contingency-type simply pays for high-cost episodes and lets the delivery system evolve in a more or less market context. This is why, I believe, there has evolved the range of delivery types in this country which is not true elsewhere. Given the plethora of interest groups active, it is clear why there will be some initial legislation between these two extremes. I would hazard a guess that the mass of the public is more concerned with high-cost episodes and relative conveniences of access at night and weekends than it is with reorganization of the system. The latter is a very technical problem which may well elude the general public, but high out-of-

pocket costs and difficulty of access are salient.[6] This does not preclude the need, of course, for organizational changes to meet the public's dissatisfaction.

The following predictions are made:

1. *Pluralistic funding will continue because of the reluctance to have public costs reflected in the national budget and the progressive income tax.*

2. Universality will be hotly debated, and it is a toss-up whether or not there will be blanket coverage or more chopping off of age groups such as children. The aged are a precedent.

3. Private carriers will likely be intermediaries in the current Medicare arrangement in order to slow the growth of a federal bureaucracy.

4. It is very likely that at least some type of catastrophic insurance will be the easiest to pass. Medicaid will likely be federalized. The states find the burden onerous.

5. Simultaneously, there will be attempts to control the supply, particularly hospital beds, through regulation and the involvement of the Planning Act (PL 93-641).

6. There will be continuing attempts to monitor physician decisionmaking in hospitals through Professional Standards Review (ganizations (PSROs), but the me(cal profession will control it.[7]

7. The Planning Act PL 93-6 will create Health Service Areas local interest group bargaining, l it will be loosely structured. Fede sanctions will be gentle.

8. The private insurance sect will continue to flourish even in th event of universal health insuranc because, traditionally, in the Unite States (as in Great Britain), financin will be tight. We inherited Britain' public niggardliness. The resu may be a bulging of the private sec tor unless it is proscribed, an ur likely possibility.

9. Finally, the health system wi continue to have a high technolog emphasis disease by disease: rena dialysis is a good example. Prioritie will be spontaneous rather tha planned.

In sum, the American public is no familiar with a universal govern mental system, and is unfamilia with restrictions on resources an access, like queues, and it does no have the civic consciousness t discipline itself collectively. Th next ten years will provide ampl opportunity for social research i the health politics of the America political system.

6. *See*, Ronald Andersen, Joanna Kravits, and Odin W. Anderson, "The Public's View of the Crisis in Medical Care: An Impetus for Changing Delivery Systems?", *Economic and Business Bulletin* (Fall 1971), pp. 44–52.

7. Odin W. Anderson, "PSROs, the Med cal Profession and the Public Interest, *Health and Society* (Summer 1976), p 379–88.

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Health Policy: The Need for Governance

By LAWRENCE M. MEAD

ABSTRACT: Health policy must accept public control of the health care system, and the resulting political dilemmas, if the health cost crisis is to be resolved. Public governance is one way of achieving order and rationality in health—that is, controlling the health sector and allocating social resources to it optimally. These goals are not achieved now, because of a system of insured, fee-for-service financing, in which actors need not balance the overall benefits of care against their cost.

In theory, control could be achieved by either delegating care and spending decisions to health professionals or by market allocation. But for fundamental as well as practical reasons, neither of these mechanisms has restrained costs adequately.

Hence, explicit public control seems inevitable. Federal health policy has moved toward it. Success will depend on resolving the resulting political tensions. Governance requires continual wrestling with provider and patient interests in which there can be no clear standards for the correct course of action.

Public control should be structured to facilitate resolution of these tensions. Public utility approaches tend to accord the providers too much autonomy; radical political reforms, too little. European experience suggests that a combination of central budget control with decentralized administration may be the best way to achieve order and rationality in health.

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THE American health care system is facing a serious cost crisis. In response, public policy is moving to assert control over providers and limit the share of national resources devoted to health. Other mechanisms which might have controlled costs, such as delegation of responsibility to the providers or the market, have failed to do so. Hence, explicit public control of the health system seems inevitable.

INTRODUCTION

This paper discusses the problem of governance implied by control. Health policy has drifted toward intervention while seeking to evade the dilemmas of governing the health system publicly. Unpleasant tensions must be resolved on a continuing basis. The providers must be controlled, yet allowed to function; the public must be given care, yet prevented from consuming more resources than it really wants or needs.

These problems have no simple solutions. American politics has typically sought to avoid them. The advantage of the alternative approaches to control is that they avoid the need to grapple with governance. But now that public control seems inevitable, success will depend importantly on our ability to deal with governance wisely.

Some qualifications should be stated. This interpretation looks at the health cost problem, not other health or policy issues. The problem is addressed from the viewpoint of political theory and political development. Other interpretations could be equally valid. Since the argument is general, there are no specific policy recommendations, though some implications for policy are clear.

The health system is treated as if it were undifferentiated. The cost crisis and the trend of policy are addressed from a federal, not a state or local, perspective. The problems of the various kinds of providers and the different third-party payment systems, public and private, are treated as broadly similar. At the general level of this argument, these assumptions are useful and defensible. However, it is recognized that actual public policies based on the analysis would have to be much more complicated, varying with the level of government, reimbursement system, or type of provider.

CRISIS AND RESPONSE

The attention of health policymakers is concentrated on the rapid rise in health costs. Spending has exploded since the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. In fiscal 1950, the nation spent $12 billion on all health expenditures. In 1965, the figure was $38.9 billion. In 1976, the figure was $139.3 billion, or a growth of more than $100 billion in eleven years. In these same years, public spending for health grew from $3.1 billion, to $9.5 billion, to $58.8 billion. The lion's share of the last figure was federal and state government funding for Medicare and Medicaid. Most serious of all, the share of total national resources, or GNP, going to health almost doubled, from 4.5 percent in 1950 to 8.6 per cent in 1976.[1] The enactment of national health insurance (NHI)—now on the political agenda—could raise the figure as high as 11 percent.[2]

1. Robert M. Gibson and Marjorie Smith Mueller, "National Health Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1976," *Social Security Bulletin* vol. 40, no 4 (April 1977), p. 4.

2. Joseph P. Newhouse, Charles E. Phelps, and William B. Schwartz, "Policy Options and the Impact of National Health Insurance," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 290, no. 24, (13 June, 1974), p. 1354.

The cost explosion has forced government to intervene increasingly in the health system. When Medicare and Medicaid were enacted, the federal government claimed only to act as paymaster for private health care expenditures, without controlling the providers or overall spending. At the insistence of health interests, the preamble of the Medicare law carefully stated that, "Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided. . . ."[3]

At the outset, both Medicare and Medicaid were conceived in expansive terms. Providers were usually reimbursed for services on the basis of their costs or usual charges. Federal funding was open-ended; that is, limited only by the number of patients claiming reimbursement. The range of services covered was wide.[4] Eligibility was broad, with Medicare covering most of the elderly, and Medicaid, at least potentially, most of the needy.[5]

As soon as spending soared, flaws in this basic design became apparent. Cost-based reimbursement encouraged provides to dispense unnecessary services and raise prices, since their income expanded in proportion to the costs claimed. The presence of public funding, like other third-party payment, encouraged patients to demand, and providers to prescribe, more health care than would be the case had the patient paid for services out-of-pocket. And open-ended funding allowed spending to increase without any overall limit.

Federal responses have tended toward greater regulation, but stopped short of outright cost controls. Medicare's cost-based reimbursement rules for hospitals and nursing homes and Medicaid's eligibility rules were tightened. In both programs, there were increasing requirements for peer review procedures to deny funding for care judged medically unnecessary. At the state level, Medicaid programs used their discretion over eligibility, benefits, and reimbursement to exclude many needy from coverage, cut back services provided, and, in many instances, replace cost-based reimbursement of doctors and nursing homes with fee schedules.[6]

The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act added a number of innovations: denial of some reimbursement for new health facilities built in defiance of state health plans, a cut in reimbursement rates for long-term institutional care under Medicaid in states without approved utilization controls, vesting of utilization control responsibility in new peer review bodies (Professional Standards Review Organizations), and experiments with funding of services through prepaid group practices (Health Maintenance Organizations).

However, the cost spiral goes on. During fiscal 1974–76 alone, na-

3. *Social Security Act (as amended through 4 January 1975) and Related Laws*, sec. 1801.

4. There were, and are, important restrictions. Medicare provides hospital care, but only limited long-term care and no prescription drugs. Medicaid covers hospital, nursing home, and physician care, but less essential services are at the discretion of state programs.

5. Medicare covers people drawing Social Security old age, survivors, or disability benefits. Under Medicaid, welfare recipients are usually eligible, but states decide which of a number of other groups to cover. Eligibility thus varies widely but can extend to cover most of the needy

6. Robert Stevens and Rosemary Stevens, *Welfare Medicine in America: A Case Study of Medicaid* (New York. The Free Press, 1974), pts. II–IV.

tional health expenditures rose by over 30 percent and Medicare/Medicaid spending by more than 50 percent.[7] In response, HEW has combined Medicare and Medicaid in a single health financing agency with a stronger mandate for cost control, and it has proposed to limit hospitals' revenue increases to 9 percent per year. Politicians and health administrators increasingly say that national health insurance will be impossible without much firmer cost controls.

These developments show both a trend toward public control and an ambivalence about it. The underlying dynamic is clear. In this, as in other areas of policy, government intervention is driven by economic *scarcity*. As health expenditures grow, apparently without limit, they come up against resources increasingly limited by sluggish economic growth and other demands. Since other mechanisms have not limited health spending to what seems socially desirable, government has no choice but to seek control through authority.

Some officials and academics now recognize that the government should have exerted controls right from the inception of Medicare and Medicaid. The attempt to fund expanded services through the existing health system without reforming or reorganizing it was bound to fail. For in a system without strong market restraints on prices, much of the new funding was lost to inflation rather than going into increased supplies of services.[8]

Public debate, however, is couched in terms of more limited objectives. Most federal policymakers confine the government's role in health service provision to distributing benefits to the population and eliminating obvious abuses by the providers. Liberals want to provide insurance coverage for all Americans as a basic right, and for this cost control is necessary.[9] Others focus on the more egregious faults of the reimbursement systems, notably over generous rates and the high incidence of fraudulent reimbursement claims.[10] Legislative amendments have attempted to deal with these problems ad hoc without admitting any larger agenda. There has been no attempt to guide or restructure the health system in more general terms.

GOVERNANCE

While doubts can be raised about public controls on several grounds, the main reason we shy away from it is probably fear of the political costs involved. Public control involves more than the imposition of curbs on the providers and the level of spending once and for all. It requires a process of governance to administer these controls on a continuing basis.

7. Gibson and Mueller, "National Health Expenditures," pp. 4, 11, 13.

8. Howard N. Newman, "Medicare and Medicaid," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 399 (January 1972), pp. 114–24, Rashi Fein, "On Achieving Access and Equity in Health Care," in *Economic Aspects of Health Care*, ed. John B. McKinlay (New York: PRODIST, 1973), pp. 39–41.

9. Edward Kennedy, *In Critical Condition. The Crisis in America's Health Care* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1972); Karen Davis, *National Health Insurance: Benefits, Costs, and Consequences* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 31–57, 68–9.

10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance," Medicare and Medicaid: Problem, Issues, and Alternatives," 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1970

The problem in general

Governance poses difficult political problems which, in their nature, have no self-evident solutions. Governance, like any form of social control, faces basically two challenges—order and rationality. The authorities must first control society and, second, do so in ways favoring the social good.

Difficulties arise because there is disagreement about how to achieve these goals. The questions central to politics are how much public control is necessary and what form it should take. Groups argue on practical, constitutional, or ideological grounds that they should be exempted from control, or that control should be exercised in their interests. In part, the differences arise from genuine disagreement about what serves the general interest; in part, they arise from partial interest. Groups are driven toward self-serving proposals, not only by self-interest, but by incentives inherent in the collective nature of government. Since government and policy are "public goods" in the economist's sense, not market goods, how much every individual or group benefits from them has little connection to how much each pays for them in taxes or other costs. Therefore, each can gain by seeking to sway the common policy, with its common costs, in a self-serving direction.[11] There is little incentive to support policies serving the general interest, as the benefits of these will be available in any case.[12]

The labor of governance is the continual struggle to resolve these disagreements in ways favoring the public, to the degree that the public interest can be known. Sheldon Wolin has written: "This is the basic dilemma of political judgments: how to create a common rule in a context of differences? The dilemma cannot be overcome, but what is possible is to lessen the crudities of the judgment."[13] The struggle is shared by public officials who have to make choices and by the public, which must review its choices directly or indirectly. The effort is burdensome because it is never-ending and the stakes are high.

Worse, there are no clear criteria for success or failure. What serves the general good cannot be known separately from the political process. Every approach to allocation attempts to distribute resources optimally among social needs. An optimal solution is at least conceivable if market mechanisms are used. A market aggregates and ranks preferences that are openly and sincerely declared by individuals through their buying and selling decisions. But if choices are made by government, the competition to influence policy, just mentioned, inflates claims and conceals true preferences. Now needs cannot be accurately known, and an optimal allocation is impossible even in theory.[14] Although empirical projections of consequences can shed some light on the different options, the choice among them depends centrally on

11. Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Wiley, 1951)

12. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

13 Sheldon S Wolin, *Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (London. George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 61.

14. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*

value judgments that for practical purposes are arbitrary.

This, in turn, leads to a moral problem. Choices must be made without clear guidance among values all of which imply moral imperatives. Should the policymaker spend more on health services for needy people or more on national defense so that the entire country will be secure? There can be no clearly best course of action. All options are both good and bad depending on the values they serve and deny.[15] Morally, *the statesman's cross is the knowledge that he cannot be blameless whatever his choices.*[16]

These intellectual and moral dilemmas are perhaps the deepest reasons why health policy has sought to avoid direct public control of the health system. American politics has great reluctance to impose ironclad control over groups or individuals through authority. However, the argument below is that governance must be faced. Order and rationality have not been achieved in the American health system, and there is no good prospect that nongovernmental mechanisms can attain them. The scarce commodity in health policy is not so much resources as governance and the political fortitude it requires.

The problem of order

From the viewpoint of order, one fact about the American health system cries out: the providers are not clearly accountable to society. Both the market (for reasons to be discussed below) and government leave them remarkably free to determine the price and supply of health services by themselves.

The reimbursement mechanisms give society no firm control over the incomes of providers or the share of national resources they consume. Cost-based reimbursement, which applies uniformly to hospitals and extensively to other providers, means that income rises in proportion to costs claimed. This gives providers an incentive to raise costs and ignore waste and inefficiency. Some third-party reimbursers, including Medicaid programs in some states, have imposed fee schedules on providers other than hospitals. However, the providers are always free to withdraw from these systems and take more patients who have more liberal reimbursement or pay out-of-pocket. Further, the fee schedules are often keyed to prevailing prices for health services in an area and are thus vulnerable to increases as the general health price level rises.

Our health system's freedom from public control is unusual compared to other advanced countries. Abroad, the health system is more often socialized. If reimbursement funds remain private, they are usually closely supervised by the government. The United States shows lower levels of management and organization in health than in other sectors of American society.[17] And what is most remarkable, the general public supports, to some extent, the idea that the medical profession's

15. Guido Calabresi, "Comment," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed. Laurence R. Tancredi (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, 1974), pp. 48–55.

16. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 115–28.

17. John Fry, "The Agonies of Medicine in the USA," *International Journal of Health Services*, vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer 1973), pp. 502–3.

unusual autonomy is an essential freedom.[18]

In American political thinking, both the drive for control and the resistance to it are deeply rooted. On the one hand, the increasing regulation of health care responds to a gut feeling among politicians and the public that the extravagant privileges of doctors and hospitals must be curbed. "*Vox populi*, made strident by sky-rocketing rates for health care, is declaring, 'There ought to be a law!' And there will be —certainly at the state level—and perhaps also in the form of congressional enactment."[19]

But on the other hand, there is a fear of control stemming from the nation's deep-seated suspicion of governmental authority. There is intense uneasiness when government tries to regulate private interests in ways they view as authoritarian. Inevitably, compromises are made and firm control slips away. To obtain consensus is more important than to strictly achieve the public interest.

Some initiatives for control, such as the health planning movement, have been so vitiated by these fears that the planning agencies have never acquired real authority. The Comprehensive Health Planning (CHP) agencies set up in each state by federal statute in 1966 had very limited powers to limit the building of unneeded new hospitals and other expensive health facilities. The Health Services Agencies (HSAs) authorized in 1975 have somewhat greater but still minimal, authority. Some proposals for health planning seem, not to assert and justify public authority, but to argue against it and insist that health planning must remain in the hands of "voluntary" (i.e., private) or state agencies heavily influenced by provider interests.[20]

Even health academics, who understand the cost crisis, are reluctant to recommend statist solutions. There is a tendency to prefer the present evils of "continued inflation, frustration, and inequitable distribution" of health resources if the only alternative is an "inordinate concentration of power."[21] There is a preference for forms of government control which would preserve elements of the present, pluralist, semiprivate system, such as private health insurance companies.[22] And yet there is no denying that the problem of order must be solved. Somehow, the providers must be brought under control. Behind many of the frictions and inefficiencies of the American health system is the fact that the medical profession resists unambiguous accountability.[23] Until this resistance is broken—probably by government—a moderation of the cost crisis will be difficult to imagine.

18. Fein, "Achieving Access and Equity," pp. 41–9.

19. A. J. G. Priest, "Possible Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts in the Health Care Field," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol. 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), p. 841.

20. *See*, for example, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Report of the Task Force on Medicaid and Related Programs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 75–82; Lester Breslow, "Political Jurisdiction, Voluntarism, and Health Planning," *American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 58, no. 7 (July 1968), pp. 1147–53

21. Anne R. Somers, "The Nation's Health: Issues for the Future," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 399 (January 1972), pp. 171–3.

22. Davis, *National Health Insurance*, chap. 8.

23. Nathan Glazer, "Perspectives on Health Care," *The Public Interest*, no. 31 (Spring 1973), pp. 115–25.

problem of rationality

ɔntrol, however achieved, should ɹsed to direct the health sys- rationally; that is, for the so- good. The system behaves ir- ɔnally now chiefly in that the e of national resources going to ˌth services is probably too great. rapid rise in total spending for lth, government health spend- and the percentage of GNP ıg to health has already been ıtioned. It is not clear that in- ɪses on this scale have served public well. The level of re- rces now devoted to health prob- / exceeds what is necessary, at t from a medical viewpoint.

he occupancy rate for hospital s dropped from 82.3 percent in 5 to 76.7 percent in 1975 because struction of new community hos- ıls boomed while the overall d for hospitalization dropped.[24] eral public financing for con- ıction and service reimburse- ıt promotes building of hospitals expensive treatment facilities ırdless of need. Federal policy made half-hearted attempts to ɔ this through the health planning slation mentioned above and the ıirement that new facilities ob- "certificates-of-need" from state ınning agencies before purchase ·onstruction.

here may also be too many tors. In the last ten years, the nber of medical schools and lical graduates has increased rply. There are now a third as ıy doctors in training (roughly ,000) as in practice. Between 0 and 1975, the number of doc- per 100,000 population rose ı 148 to 174. By 1985, the number will probably be 210 or 218—higher than in any other country except Israel and the USSR. Traditionally, federal policy has subsidized medical education in the belief that there was a shortage of doctors. Now that policy has been questioned, and in October 1976 Congress ended the practice of encouraging the immigration of foreign medical graduates.[25]

It is now recognized that the health resource problem is more one of distribution than quantity. There are too many doctors in suburban areas, too few in rural or inner-city locations. There are too many medical specialists, especially surgeons, and too few primary care physicians. The better-off receive too much health care; the needy, too little. Some needy have very poor access to care, while others, in states with generous Medicaid programs, have better access than some of the better-off.[26]

Most fundamentally, there is little evidence that health services have much to do with the health of society. Most other industrialized countries have lower morbidity and mortality rates than does the United States, even though their health systems are less affluent or technically advanced.[27] In the past, health rates responded to better nutrition, the growth of income, and public health measures against infectious diseases. Today, when the chief threats

Hospital Statistics, 1976 ed. (Chicago. rican Hospital Association), p. vi

25 Paul Starr, "Too Many Doctors?," *The Washington Post* (13 March 1977), p. C3, Lawrence Myer, "New U S. Problem: Too Many Doctors," *The Washington Post* (6 July 1977), pp. A1, A12.

26 Nathan Glazer, "Paradoxes of Health Care," *The Public Interest*, no. 22, (Winter 1971), pp. 67–9.

27. Robert Maxwell, *Health Care: The Growing Dilemma*, 2d ed. (New York: McKinsey and Co., 1975), p 14.

to health are the degenerative diseases (heart disease, cancer, and stroke), health depends much more on the life-style of the patient than on medical care.[28]

There is excessive spending, in part, because the problem of order discussed above has not been solved. Until control of costs is achieved, choice about spending is impossible. The public did not clearly desire or chose the present level of health spending. Even spending for Medicare and Medicaid has not been subject to public control. Both programs quickly exceeded the cost projections made at their inception.[29] Both have open-ended funding, so that aggregate spending levels are not set by governmental decision.

Further, in all reimbursement systems, third-party payment makes collective decision about spending difficult. Third-party mechanisms have the effect of depressing the marginal cost of care to the patient below its actual costs to society. This motivates patients to consume resources with little concern for social costs. The total consumed probably exceeds what people would choose collectively, as citizens, if government set the overall level.[30]

However, even if society did take collective decisions on spending, the level of resources would probably still exceed what is necessary for adequate services. Third-party mechanisms have been set up on the supposition that the demand for care would be limited by levels of morbidity and morality in the population, even if the marginal price of services was zero. In practice, the demand for care seems to be nearly inexhaustible when price is removed as a barrier. Once urgent health needs are met, people bring increasing numbers of minor, chronic, and psychosomatic problems to the attention of physicians.[31] It is mainly because of increased demand, not restricted supply, that the United States has seemed to have a shortage of physicians.[32]

This suggests that, at bottom, the population is asking for help in dealing with existential anxieties about death and the human condition which are not strictly speaking medical problems at all.[33] Need for health services per se may be limited, but the need for caring in a broader sense is unlimited. Society has an increasing tendency to delegate the caring function to doctors and other professionals.[34]

There are several reasons why the proportion of resources going to health must be limited, perhaps even to levels below what is spent now. One is that unlimited spending is inefficient. As health care

28. Victor R. Fuchs, *Who Shall Live? Health, Economics, and Social Choice* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 30–55; Ivan Illich, *Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health* (New York: Random House, 1976), pp. 13–36.

29. Senate Committee on Finance, "Medicare and Medicaid," pp. 29–44.

30. Clark C. Havighurst and James F. Blumstein, "Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSRO's," *Northwestern University Law Review*, vol. 70, no. 1 (March–April 1975), pp. 9–20, 25, 25 n.; Martin Feldstein, "The Welfare Loss of Excessive Health Insurance," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 81, no. 2, pt. 1 (March–April 1973), pp. 251–80.

31. Maxwell, *Health Care*, p. 5.

32. Michael Lynch, "The Physician Shortage: The Economists' Mirror," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 399 (January 1972), pp. 82–8.

33. Illich, *Medical Nemesis*, pp. 37–208.

34. Fuchs, *Who Shall Live?*, pp. 64–7, 144; George Teeling-Smith, "More Money into the Health Sector: Is this the Answer?," *International Journal of Health Services*, vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer 1973), pp. 493–500.

becomes more expensive relative to the incremental health improvements acheived, diminishing marginal returns set in. After a point, the social gain of investing resources elsewhere than in health clearly become greater. Limits have to be imposed and tradeoffs struck, both among different health needs and between the health sector and the other needs of society.[35]

A more philosophic argument is that public policy should not encourage the public's increasing dependence on health services. The fact that Americans now commonly regard easy access to comprehensive health care as a necessity can be viewed, not as a fortunate thing, but as a species of unfreedom. The modern hospital bids fair to become, like the medieval cathedral, an institution in which society vests extravagant hopes for salvation and consolation. A rational health policy should disabuse the public of this illusion. The share of resources going to health should be stabilized or cut so that more of the burden of coping with illness and death can be returned to individuals.[36]

Why, then, do we resist placing firm limits on health resources? For the same reason we resist imposing control on the providers: we do not wish to govern people. Health policymakers never wish to be responsible for denying benefits to individuals, even if this were to the advantage of society. Democratic government can impose sacrifices on large groups of people much more easily than on small ones, where suffering would be visible in individuals.[37] We fear the impersonality of a solution to the allocation problem by either bureaucratic or market means. Once decisions are taken about funding on broad social grounds, there is no guarantee that any given individual will obtain care.[38]

But again, the need for governance is imperative. If nothing else, unlimited demand for health spending puts an intolerable strain on public discourse. Demands that grow out of biological need tend to be private and urgent. They take no account of the needs of others or competing claims to resources. Public demands for welfare, housing, employment, etc., are all of this kind. Health needs, which grow out of physical suffering, are the most coercive of all. Such needs, if expressed without limit, overburden public discourse with moral imperatives, even if the economic costs of meeting them can be borne. It becomes difficult to discuss compromise or other priorities openly. But some detachment from particular needs is essential to wise decisions in public. Hence, some limits on health demands are necessary, not only for economic or cultural reasons, but to preserve the civility of the political process.[39]

APPROACHES TO CONTROL

The order and rationality problems in health come down to the fact that there is no person or mecha-

35. Fuchs, *Who Shall Live?*, pp. 5–7, 17–29, 127–8, Maxwell, *Health Care*, pp 7–13.

36. Illich, *Medical Nemesis*, pp. 209–75

37. Havighurst and Blumstein, "Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs," pp 20–5.

38. David Mechanic, "Human Problems and the Organization of Health Care," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 399 (January 1972), pp. 1–11; Clark C. Havighurst, "Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1970), p. 793

39. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), chap. 2

nism with the authority to limit health spending and force tradeoffs against other social priorities.

There is for all practical purposes no one in the system of insured-fee-for-service health care who has and can consistently act on an incentive to conserve resources; neither patient, nor physician, nor institution, nor insurer, nor regulator. nor government faces in any true sense the cost of each procedure at a point where it can be effectively weighted against its benefit.[40]

The financing system is a web of transactions among patients, providers, and reimbursers all of which serve immediate, private interests. Control requires the construction of an Archimedian point somewhere within or outside the system, where the social interest in restraint will reliably be brought to bear and the necessary tradeoffs forced.

What mechanisms might be used? There are basically three: delegation to the health professionals, the market, and direct public control.[41] Until recently, public policy has chiefly relied on the first two. They have the advantage, so attractive to American politics, of avoiding the need for governance. But, in fact, the structure of the health system, as well as experience, suggests that these approaches cannot provide the firm control needed. If public control is inevitable, so are problems of governance. In this light, the attempt of the other approaches to avoid open control becomes, not a virtue, but a serious problem for public policy. The attempt perpetuates the belief that governance can be avoided just at the time when it must be faced.

The professional solution

The chief basis of current health policy is still the belief that the medical profession can be *trusted to make decisions on health service provision for the public.*[42] *While* some changes to Medicare and Medicaid have tightened cost-based reimbursement and placed other restrictions on the providers, others have given them more responsibility, notably the Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) set up since 1972. The PSROs are peer review bodies of doctors supposed to uphold the quality of care and prevent unnecessary care for both Medicare and Medicaid within a region.

The basic problem with PSRO, and the whole idea of professional control, is that medical professionals are attuned to improving the quality and quantity of care, not to preventing unnecessary care or controlling costs. Order and rationality in the senses used here require that decisions be taken from a macro viewpoint that favors society as a whole. The medical ethic, however, stresses micro decisions, favoring the welfare of individual patients. Everything necessary is to be done for the patient at hand; aggregate costs or other social consequences get much less attention.[43] Philosophically, the medical ethic is nonpolitical and nongovernmental. It deals in private moral conceptions, such as the doctor's virtue and duty,

40 Havighurst and Blumstein, "Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs," p. 19.

41. Paul M. Elwood, Jr., "Models for Organizing Health Services and Implications for Legislative Proposals," *Organizational Issues in the Delivery of Health Services*, eds. Irving K. Zola and John B. McKinlay (New York: PRODIST, 1974), pp. 67–95.

42. Senate Committee on Finance, "Medicare and Medicaid," p. 2.

43. Havighurst and Blumstein, "Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs," pp. 25–30, 38–60.

not public ones, such as justice, utility, or the proper role of institutions.[44]

In terms of structure, as well as attitudes, the medical profession has difficulty governing the health system. Control would require an authority structure; that is, organization among health professionals that allowed leaders acting in the social interest to make decisions binding on all. Not surprisingly, peer review bodies like utilization review committees and PSROs control costs best when they are able to reverse individual doctors' care decisions and have authoritative standards to work from.[45] Similarly, the most efficient hospitals seem to be those where the doctors are most highly organized and, hence, accountable to an administrative structure.[46]

Typically, however, medical societies and health institutions impose little structure on providers. They have no clear goals or authority patterns to which physicians are accountable.[47] Poor organization is perhaps the basic reason why American health care is more expensive compared to that of other countries.[48] The failure of the system to govern itself in the public interest implies, of course, that restraint must be imposed from outside.

The market solution

One way to accomplish governance in the public interest could be the market. According to economic theory, if consumers had sufficient information and resources and providers were truly competitive (among other conditions) the market would allocate resources among health services and among health and other needs both optimally and automatically.

The advantage of the market is that explicit public governance is unnecessary. Government need only maintain the conditions for a free market. The providers are held accountable to social need by their need to offer services consumers are willing to buy. The consumers are prevented from spending more on health than is socially rational because, one way or another, they have to pay the full marginal cost of care. The tradeoff of benefit and cost is forced, as it must be, but the burden of it is dispersed to the individual patients and providers, rather than concentrated in public decisions. Order and rationality are achieved by the Smithian "invisible hand" rather than by the visible, and much more invidious, hand of government.

No one pretends that the health system is significantly subject to the market now. Providers are not competitive because entry into the field is limited by licensure or certificate-of-need and price competition is limited by medical societies and third-party reimbursers. The producers, not consumers, seem to control demand, because patients usually defer to providers' decisions

44 Albert R. Jonsen and Andre E Hellegers, "Conceptual Foundations for an Ethics of Medical Care," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed Laurence R Tancredi (Washington, D C Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Science, 1974), pp 3–20

45 John Holahan and Bruce Stuart, *Controlling Medicaid Utilization Patterns* (Washington, D C. The Urban Institute, 1977), pp 29–114.

46. Milton I Roemer and J. Friedman, *Doctors in Hospitals Medical Staff Organization and Hospital Performance* (Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971)

47 Richard W Scott, "Some Implications of Organization Theory for Research on Health Services," in *Organizational Issues in the Delivery of Health Services*, eds. Irving K Zola and John B McKinlay (New York· PRODIST, 1974), pp 3–27

48. Nathan Glazer, "Perspectives on Health Care," pp 62–7, 71–3

about what care is needed.[49] Cost-based reimbursement frees both providers and recipients from the need to weigh true costs and benefits in their decisions about which health services to consume.

Market-oriented reformers say the market has failed to control health costs only because it has not been tried. If the restrictions just mentioned were broken down, the market could succeed. There should be expanded licensure of providers, and price competition—including advertising—should be fostered. Cost-based or retrospective (post-service) reimbursement, which gives providers no incentive to economize on services or expenses, should be replaced by prospective reimbursement. Hospitals would be reimbursed only for the average costs of all hospitals (the rates would be different for different regions or types of hospitals) and other providers would be paid capitation fees per patient served per year.[50] Since income is fixed in advance of costs or the number of services provided, providers have an incentive, not to inflate costs, but to restrain them, as they would under market conditions.

There would be heavy reliance on Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), group practices aimed at community care, which would economize on service provision because of prospective reimbursement (capitation fees per enrollee) and competition among themselves.[51] Heavier cost sharing requirements would be imposed on health insurance, forcing patients to pay a greater proportion of cost out-of-pocket and hence be more conscious of cost-benefit tradeoffs.[52]

The more pessimistic view, adopted here, is that the market solution is implausible for practical and more fundamental reasons. Obviously, if medical and provider interests have used public regulation to shield themselves from the market, they probably have the influence to prevent the market from being forced upon them. To enforce the market would take, perhaps, a greater exertion of state power than public governance. Hence, the political attraction of the "invisible hand" would be lost.

More important, the market model assumes that consumers are able to economize for themselves; that is, know their own preferences and confine spending to care which is worth its cost. In health, however, the patient almost always knows less than the provider about what services he needs and how much he is likely to profit by them.[53]

For these reasons, no society has trusted health care primarily to the market. The market presumes that individuals are self-reliant and able to choose for themselves. In fact, health problems are so threatening and imponderable that people seek to give up their independence and make themselves dependent on some authoritative individual or institution which will make deci-

49 John Holahan, *Financing Health Care for the Poor. The Medicaid Experience* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1975), pp. 5–6, 70, 111–12, John Holahan, *Physician Supply, Peer Review and Use of Health Services in Medicaid* (Washington, D C : The Urban Institute, 1976), pp. 37–46.

50. Fuchs, *Who Shall Live?*, pp. 100–2.

51. Havighurst, "Health Maintenance Organizations."

52. Mark V Pauly, *Medical Care at Public Expense A Study in Applied Welfare Economics* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

53. Kenneth Arrow, "Government Decision Making and the Preciousness of Life," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed. Laurence R. Tancredi (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, 1974), pp. 33–47.

sions for them.[54] The institutions on which they rely must be the health professions, government, or some combination. And since, as we have already seen, the professional model probably cannot achieve cost control, the weakness of the market solution leads directly to public control.

Public control

In the above analysis, the health system is already based mainly on governance, not the market. The providers govern patients for their own good. Public control would simply extend this principle at a higher level, with government controlling the providers for the good of society. Control would basically involve firm limits on provider reimbursement and on overall spending for health.

The basic idea behind public control is that the political marketplace can allocate resources rationally, where the economic market and delegation to the providers have failed. The political process will aggregate, express, and rank public preferences more accurately than individual buying and selling decisions can do because of market imperfections.[55]

1. Struggles Over Governance

Public control is no panacea. It makes governance possible, not inevitable. It casts an institutional structure around the health system which it cannot evade, so that cost control is at last conceivable. But this structure only provides an arena for the struggles over governance described theoretically above. The burden of dealing with the providers and the public's demand for care must still be faced. The economic problem of cost control is internalized and becomes a political problem.

Though order could now be enforced on the providers, they would seek to influence it from within. They would seek to capture the regulatory agencies and escape cost controls,[56] as they virtually captured the Social Security Administration in the early years of Medicare.[57] They might in fact dominate the political marketplace as they now do the economic one.[58]

Whether they succeeded would depend critically on whether politicians and the general public could sustain an interest in health questions after the publicity surrounding initial enactments had passed. Interest group pressures for higher spending arise because the groups' interest in more spending for themselves always outweighs their interest, as taxpayers, in reduced spending. Cost control depends on the mobilization of the general public, which, alone, is more conscious of the cost than the benefits of government.[59]

54. Kenneth Arrow, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care," *American Economic Review*, vol. 53, no 5 (December 1963), pp. 941–73, Kenneth Boulding, "The Concept of Need for Health Services," in *Economic Aspects of Health Care*, ed John B. McKinlay (New York. PRODIST; 1973), pp. 17–19.

55. Vincente Navarro, "A Critique of the Present and Proposed Strategies for Redistributing Resources in the Health Sector and a Discussion of Alternatives," Medical Care, vol. 12, no. 9 (September 1974), pp. 721–42.

56. Clark C. Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities by 'Certificate of Need'," *Virginia Law Review*, vol. 59, no. 7 (October 1973), pp. 1178–1215.

57. Theodore R. Marmor, *The Politics of Medicare* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1973), chap. 5.

58. Theodore R. Marmor, "Politics, Public Policy, and Medical Inflation," (Unpublished paper), 1975.

59. Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget is Too Small in a Democracy," World Politics, vol. 12 (1960), pp. 541–63

Similarly, to achieve rationality through public control would require dealing with contradictory public attitudes toward spending. No doubt, the level of the health spending necessary to limit the health share of resources in the long run would be lower than people wished to face in the short run. There would be the danger that too severe limitations would divert resources into uncontrolled sectors of the health system or (assuming all sectors were controlled) into a black market for illicit services.[60]

A solution depends on effective leadership by health policymakers and deference to that leadership. Rationality requires that people subordinate immediate interests to the longer-term social benefit. Leaders persuade them to, essentially, by a combination of appeals to long-term consequences and personal relationship. The voter's trust of the leader gives him short-run reassurance and makes him willing to sacrifice short-term interests for the larger good.[61]

Any realistic approach to public control must accept wrestling with governance and eschew unpolitical solutions. This requires that an uneasy balance be struck and maintained between provider interests and the public pressure for accountability.

2. The Public Utility Approach

At one extreme, one step removed from cost-based reimbursement, is the public utility model of determining payment rates for providers. The idea is to use economic analysis to pay the provider, like other utilities, only the rate he needs to stay in business assuming efficient operation.[62] It is supposed that analysis can separate true costs from the unnecessary costs due, heretofore, to inefficient cost-based reimbursement. The result may be a reimbursement rate paid prospectively or an incentive rate, under which the provider keeps part of the saving if costs are kept below income.

However, such rates have not shown significant cost savings compared to standard cost-based methods.[63] The reason seems to be that the provider and his costs still set the agenda for payment rates. The public, not the provider, still bears the burden of economizing—of adjusting costs and income to each other. This puts the provider in a strong bargaining position. The regulators are dependent on him for cost information, and they have great difficulty telling necessary costs from unnecessary ones.[64] Further, they cannot compare him to other providers easily because there is no common accounting system and no agreed classification system for units and quality of care.[65]

The basic illusion is the idea that the cost problem can have a techni-

60. Somers, "The Nation's Health," pp. 168–71.

61. This was Jeremy Bentham's ultimate solution to the problem of rationality in representative democracy. *See* Lawrence M. Mead, "Bentham's Theory of Political Development" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1973), pp 475–82

62. Priest, "Possible Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts," pp. 844–47.

63. John Holahan, et al., *Altering Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Methods* (Washington, D.C: The Urban Institute, 1977), pp. 70–93.

64. James F. Blumstein and Michael Zubkoff, "Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health Sector," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 3 (Summer 1973), pp. 415–18.

65. Priest, "Possible Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts," p. 841–42; Sylvester E. Berki, "The Pricing of Hospital Services," in *Public Prices for Public Products*, ed. Selma Mushkin (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972), pp. 351–70.

cal, rather than a political, solution. It is the attempt to set rates objectively that shifts discussion toward concrete costs, where the provider dominates. For effective cost control, government must play a more authoritative role. Reimbursement must respond not only to the provider's costs but government's needs, meaning other claims to resources. Rates must not only reflect provider costs, but *define* them, by setting an income exogenously, within which costs must live. Such rates will look arbitrary alongside rates calculated with reference to the provider alone. But then some of the provider's costs will look unjustified to government.[66] As in all governance, no uniquely right solution is possible. Rather, there is mutual adjustment between incommensurable perspectives. The outcome cannot be fully rationalized by either.

3. The Radical Politcal Approach

At the other extreme are radical critics of the health system who would sacrifice the providers completely to public accountability. From this perspective, the cost crisis is only a symptom of a larger evil: a network of provider and other interests dedicated to profit and exploitation rather than the service of society.[67] Some critics also argue dialectically that fundamental contradictions, such as technology and dependence on public funding and regulation, are driving the system toward collapse.[68] The solution to control and allocation problems is to expropriate the providers. There should be complete public control of the health system, not only at the level of government,[69] but through democratization of provider institutions.[70] This will lead to a dispersal of the medical monopolies and the return of care to popular control.

Despite appearances, this solution is no less unpolitical than public utility regulation. There the providers were insufficiently constrained; here, their independence is completely abrogated. The political problem is then supposed to disappear. The provider interests are no longer distinct from society. They are merged into a political marketplace—"the people"—as seamless as the ideal economic market of the market reformers or the simulated market of the utility regulators.

In fact, providers could not function without some autonomy. They have to be able to make an income and invest for the future, even though these activities can appear to exploit the public in the short

66 The effectiveness of "arbitrary" cost controls is shown by the sharp reduction of health sector inflation during fiscal 1972–74, when the health system, like other sectors, was subject to price controls. *See* Gibson and Mueller, "National Health Expenditures," p 3

67 Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich, *The American Health Empire. Power, Profits, and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1970); Robert R. Alford, "The Political Economy of Health Care. Dynamics Without Change," *Politics and Society*, vol 2, no. 2 (Winter 1972), pp. 127–64, Howard S. Berliner, "The Origins of Health Insurance for the Aged," *International Journal of Health Services*, vol 3, no. 3 (Summer 1973), pp. 465–74.

68. Sander Kelman, "Toward a Political Economy of Medical Care," *Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 3 (September 1971), pp. 30–38, Eric H. Helt, "Economic Determinism: A Model of the Political Economy of Medical Care," *International Journal of Health Services*, vol 3, no. 3 (Summer 1973), pp 475–85

69. Illich, *Medical Nemesis*, pp. 221–75, Alford, "Political Economy of Health Care," p. 164

70. Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, *American Health Empire*, chaps. 10–19, Navarro, "Critique of Present and Proposed Strategies," pp. 737–40

run. Rationality requires that some separation be made between what seems immediately moral and what is necessary for the longer-term social good. As a practical matter, the providers have to be governed by an uneasy combination of regulation and incentives, meaning freedom to operate in the market or make money from public reimbursement.[71]

Once this is admitted, simplicities disappear and moral and intellectual relativism returns. Control comes to mean a mix of fiat and freedom, not wholly understandable from either a governmental or market perspective. Such antinomies are in the nature of governance. No approach to public control which does not embrace them can hope to succeed.

4. Top-End Budget Control

Public control must provide an institutional structure within which issues of governance can be wrestled with fruitfully and resolved in the public interest. Control will very likely take the form of central control of spending, coupled with decentralized administration and delivery of services. Most Western countries seem to be gravitating toward this kind of system, through gradual reform of insurance funds and administrative arrangements.[72] The reason for the gravitation may be that this structure aids governance, or the political crafting of solutions to the problems of order and rationality.

A fixed budget would be set for federal reimbursement programs by the federal government, coupled with restrictions on the spending of private insurance systems, should any remain. Then, allocations from the budget would be made downwards through the administrative system on the basis of need or population—to states, local health agencies, and providers. In each locality, the agency or local medical society would adjust reimbursement or capitation rates to keep service provision within the budget, or some other means of rationing services would be used.[73]

The essence of the system is to reverse the flow of spending decisions in the health system. With existing, largely retrospective reimbursement, providers and patients make the initial decisions, and the burden of matching costs with resources is borne by higher levels. With top-end budgeting, spending is first determined at the top level, and the burden of economizing—of reducing costs to income—is devolved to lower levels and the providers. The effect is to force cost-benefit tradeoffs at every level and improve the efficiency of service provision.[74]

Centralized budgeting facilitates a solution to the problem of rationality. The essential spending decisions are sited at the point in the system

71 Anne R. Somers, *Hospital Regulation The Dilemma of Public Policy* (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, 1969).

72 Christa Altenstetter, "New Dimensions in Comparative Health Analysis: The Importance of Organizational Arrangements for Policy Performance" (Paper presented to the International Conference on Changing National-Subnational Relations in Health Opportunities and Constraints, National Institutes of Health, May 24–26, 1976), Anne R. Somers, "The Rationalization of Health Services: A Universal Priority," *Inquiry*, vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1971), pp. 48–60.

73. Fry, "Agonies of Medicine," p. 504, Maxwell, *Health Care*, pp. 30, 35, 45–46, Milton I Roemer, "Nationalized Medicare for America," *Trans-Action* (September 1971), pp. 31–36, David D Rutstein, *Blueprint for Medical Care* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974).

74. Maxwell, *Health Care*, pp. 30–31.

at which health costs are most salient politically and health benefits least so. At the center, the general public pressure for lower taxes is strong, while the specific groups and individuals who might be denied services may be less visible. Federal budget cutters can claim not to know how limited funding will affect particular sufferers, because the allocation of funds to services would be made at lower levels. This eases the moral problem democratic government has denying benefits to people.

At the same time, decentralized administration eases the problem of order by siting the regulatory authorities at the local level, where they are less distant and impersonal. The structure, of course, should be responsive to the local population as a whole, and not simply provider interests. This requires that health planning agencies be an integral part of state and local government and accountable to it, not separate corporations as they often are now.[75]

Decentralized administration also eases the considerable bureaucratic problems of a large public organization. Since public regulation is, by definition, outside the market, the agencies that enforce it face no automatic incentives to be efficient. The agencies that run Medicare and Medicaid have been notably ineffective at cost control.[76] Bureaucratic inefficiency is one of the strongest arguments against a nationalized health system and in favor of the present pluralist system.[77]

A decentralized structure diminishes the amount of information any one agency has to process—the major problem for any bureaucracy.[78] The attempt to administer an entire national health system centrally would create insufferable planning and coordination problems.[79] With decentralization, the organizations involved are smaller and more numerous, more akin to present arrangements.

CONCLUSION

This discussion has concentrated on the problem of governance inherent in public control of the health system. Only a limited attempt was made to argue an abstract case for public control, as against the other proposed strategies for cost control. Whether public control, taken in the round, is preferable to the other approaches is an important issue. The question may be unanswerable in the abstract.

It may also be irrelevant. Since other means of restraining costs have failed, there is no practicable alternative to some form of public control. The discussion of the alternatives in abstract terms eventually becomes, in itself, an evasion of governance. Government does not choose its actions as much as respond to necessity. Public control is the *last* option, whether or not it seems a good one. Commitment eventually drives out deliberation.

75. Navarro, "Critique of Present and Proposed Strategies," pp 735–37

76. Senate Committee on Finance, "Medicare and Medicaid," chaps 14–15, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, *Report of the Task Force*, pp. 53–70, 119–26, Sylvia A Law, *Blue Cross: What Went Wrong?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), chap 4, Lawrence M. Mead, *Institutional Analysis. An Approach to Implementation Problems in Medicaid* (Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute, 1977), pp. 83–97, 114–34

77 Harry Schwartz, "Health Care in America. A Heretical Diagnosis," *Saturday Review* (14 August 1971), p. 35

78 Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 112–210

79. Davis, *National Health Insurance*, p 26.

Public officials ultimately say that public control must succeed, whether or not commentators say it will.

The more necessary public control seems, the more, in fact, it is likely to succeed. Control entails struggles over governance. Success requires that these struggles be resolved in the general interest. In the nature of governance, what serves the general good cannot be known in advance of the political process. However, a widespread sense of scarcity is necessary to support the social interest in economy against provider and patient pressures for more and more resources. From this vigilance, and ultimately from this alone, can come the political resolution to wrestle with health governance over the long haul.

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Toward a Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Social Policy

By MARTIN O. HEISLER AND B. GUY PETERS

ABSTRACT: Most conceptual models of the policy process have relied upon single factor explanations of policy outcomes. While enhancing clarity, these models have tended to oversimplify greatly the real complexity of the formation of public policies. In this article, a plea for a more complex conceptualization of the policy process is made, with an expressed need for considering the factors of time, policy area, level of government, and nation. By considering these factors, some of the apparently contradictory evidence in current policy studies may be better integrated. This will be especially important in reemphasizing the role of politics, as opposed to resources, as a component of explanation of policy choices.

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SOCIAL policies in advanced industrial Western democracies increasingly face a legitimacy problem, as policies often do not yield the results initially expected of them. Moreover, policies often are difficult or impossible to control or redirect through the political means that had been used to launch them. Many citizens in these societies feel that they are paying more and more for results that satisfy them less and less.

To comprehend this set of circumstances, some students of politics have attempted to develop various models which explain the different processes by which policies are formulated and particular results are produced. While some of these models have been helpful in rendering intelligible the very complex realities of policymaking, all too frequently they obtained clarity at the price of oversimplification. There has been a tendency to reduce explanations to single factors—such as ideology, political structures, or the available resource base—thereby reducing vital, dynamic processes to simple mechanistic models of social reality.[1] Similarly, when comparative analyses have been made, they have often been along a single dimension—for example, between local government units within a single country, or across time in a single political unit. As a result, the analytic and theoretical dividends that might have been yielded by more comprehensive and sensitive comparisons have been lost.

In this paper, we propose a multidimensional, multivariate orientation that may assist in capturing more of the complexity of policy processes and provide more comprehensive and dynamic explanations of the forces producing particular levels and types of policy outputs. Our insights are drawn from the analysis of data on the political and socioeconomic structures and social policies from Belgium and Sweden for the period 1870–1974, and from Brussels and Stockholm for the period since World War II. These two countries are typical of a class of societies that have recently come to be characterized as advanced industrial, although the form and content of their social policies differ as do the patterns of political and socioeconomic development they have followed.

THE NEED FOR COMPLEX MODELS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF HEALTH POLICY

In the realm of social policy, it is sometimes difficult to identify patterns of policy development and influences on policy outputs above the level of generalization of a single case. While case materials are often indispensable as sources of useful information, they are, however, insufficient as an approach for putting the objects of their concern into a theoretical framework. Nor do they permit us to engage in the systematic consideration of such potentially important factors as structural changes in the polity and economy, cross-cultural diffusion, country-specific traits, and even local and regional variations. We believe that a four dimensional framework—entailing comparisons across (1) time, (2) countries, (3) levels of government, and (4) issue areas—will permit the identification of the most important factors shaping social policy outputs, i.e., decisions, programs, expenditures, and the like.

1. This has been especially true of the "resources" model discussed below. *See* Thomas Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago. Rand McNally, 1966).

Health politics is an especially fruitful subject for analysis through such a framework. There are substantial variations, currently, in the scope and type of public involvement, the role of provider groups, the levels of government involved with health policy, and different patterns of historical development of policies. Health has some similarities with other consumptive social policies, education, for example, but also differs substantially in many respects. While both policy areas depend on professionals for implementation, education is most frequently directly provided by government, while in the provision of health care the government frequently acts as a third-party payer to physicians. The degree of professional development and exclusivity also help insulate health care more from public pressures than education. Finally, even in a country such as Belgium, where a majority—albeit a gradually shrinking one—of pupils has attended parochial schools since the inception of the country in 1830, some form and degree of public financial responsibility for the education of all children has come to be accepted. While public health and hygiene have become universally assured rights in Belgium, just as they have in other advanced industrial societies, the provision of health care remains divided among a number of sources: (1) the individual, with or without privately or employer-provided insurance; (2) the "mutuals" organized by political parties (from which some parties derive substantial political payoffs and thus even the Socialists are loath to turn it over to the public sector); (3) local governments; and (4) the central government, though it plays a very modest role. In Belgium, unlike Sweden, therefore, the proposition that individual health care has come to be seen as a fundamental, universal right would be difficult to support.

Thus, we might strive to understand the provision of health services—especially in terms of the levels of expenditures—in the context of a multidimensional approach to politics. Among the most important of these are the nature of the policy itself, the structures through which policies are formed, the magnitude of demands for services, the extent of needs for services, and the resources available within the system. The major existing models of policy formation lack these capabilities. Specifically, they are unidimensional and generally static. By proceeding in an eclectic spirit, we preserve the basic features of those existing models but limit their explanatory-predictive claims through contextualization and also strive to impart a dynamic element to them. In this way, we strengthen these models by bringing each into closer relationship with a portion of the universe it sought to explain.

WHAT FORCES SHAPE SOCIAL POLICY? THE MAJOR ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES IN THE LITERATURE

In discussing health as an area of social policy, it seems reasonable to assume that politics and government will play important roles in the decisions surrounding health care. Further, it would stand to reason that variations in political structures and political processes should produce variations in health policies. However, during the past ten to 15 years, students of public policy in highly industrialized Western societies have been confronted by several important bodies of work, each arguing that politics has become

relatively unimportant in the formation of policies and the determination of policy outcomes.

Some have argued that policy formation in postindustrial democracies has become depoliticized and relatively free of the ideological conflicts that characterized the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.[2] In its most carefully delineated version, the "decline of ideology" thesis is

> both time-bound and space-bound. [It] is time-bound in that it embraces ideological politics in the post-war; [i.e., post-World War II] period only. It is space-bound in that it applies primarily to advanced, industrial, Western societies.[3]

The argument about the decline of ideology arose from a reading of recent history which suggests that the major socioeconomic divisions that gave rise to ideological conflicts between class-based parties have been muted through the redistributive policies of the Welfare State. With the institutionalization of the Welfare State and the erosion of programmatic opposition to it, or so the decline of ideology writers have argued, the period since the end of World War II has been relatively free of political conflict over major social policy questions.[4] Viewed in this light, the "decline" thesis is tantamount to saying that conflicts between socioeconomic, class-based parties are no longer salient in the politics of advanced industrial societies.

While this conclusion is substantially supported by empirical inquiries into the factors that shape policy at the national level,[5] the proposition can be quite misleading if not specified and qualified. In fact, the decline theorists have adduced evidence to support their position only with regard to one among several forms that can be assumed by class-based activity in the most visible policy arenas: ideological clashes among class-based parties and interest groups in legislatures and at the cabinet level in executives.

The waning of ideological clashes does not necessarily signal the end of the importance of either ideology or socioeconomic classes in determining public policy.[6] Class distinctions may still retain their significance with regard to fundamental decisions involved in the allocation of material goods, burdens, and status, and in the way in which various social policies are implemented. In fact, it may be precisely in the implementation of policies that class politics may be most important. Much of the decisionmaking power for which we would have looked pre-

2. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, Ill : Free Press, 1960), Martin O. Heisler, "Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages. The Growing Importance of the Output Side in Belgium," in *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies*, ed. Martin O. Heisler (New York: David McKay, 1974), pp. 178–220, Mostafa Rejai, ed., *Decline of Ideology?* (Chicago: Aldine/Atherton, 1971).

3. Mostafa Rejai, "Political Ideology: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," in *Decline of Ideology*, p. 18.

4. Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960); Rejai, "Political Ideology."

5. B. Guy Peters, "The Development of Social Policy in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom," in *Politics in Europe*, pp. 257–92; B. Guy Peters and Timothy M. Hennessey, "Political Development and Public Policy in Sweden: 1865–1967," in *Comparative Public Policy*, eds. Craig Liske, William Loehr, and John McCamant (New York. Halstad, 1975), pp. 127–51.

6. Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 60, no. 1 (March 1966), pp. 5–16; John Westergaard and Henrietta Ressler, *Class in a Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

viously in the executive and legislature, now seems to dwell with the bureaucratic implementors of policy so that we must now examine political allocations being made in different locales.

Further, class-based responses to differential allocations may also be important in a system in which the clash of class-based parties is no longer a major factor in shaping policy decisions. As we suggest in the next two sections of the paper, the relative importance of social class and significance of these and similar political factors associated with policy formation varies with the polity's developmental stage and the level of government at which politics and policy come into play. In addition, the specific policy or issue area may also be a crucial variable in this regard.

In contrast to those who see socioeconomic factors displacing politics, we see a direct relationship between the historic mobilization of large segments of populations and the politicization of particular socioeconomic and political issues on the one hand and the subsequent adoption of redistributive policies that benefit the newly mobilized groups. This transitional stage[7] has generally encompassed the substantial broadening of the franchise, the organization of workers, and the politicization of such social policy issues as social insurance, making educational opportunities available to the children of classes previously excluded from schooling, and other social policy questions.[8]

The mobilization and increa demands for public intervention number of social fields tended tc reflected in the rapid and subs tial expansion of the public sec In most societies this was n noticeable at the level of the cer government, since the pressures redistribution of wealth that acc panied the mobilization of pr ously largely passive segments of population could be best addres in the largest policy arena availa Further, redistributive policies Western societies often entailed leveling of differences between relatively more modern and afflu center and the less develo periphery.

Following from the political heaval of the transitional stage, modern or postindustrial stage characterized by a broad conser on social policy goals, and there widely extended opportunities political participation. At this st the political system may appea have become little more tha bureaucracy for the implementa of the already agreed upon progr This stage coincides with the cline of ideology and political v ables may take a backseat to so economic influences in the shap of social policy outputs.[10]

The relationship of politics policy outputs at the national le has been analyzed in a substan body of literature. The most wic known literature of this sort, h ever, is based on data from in mediate and local levels of gove ment. No extensive discussion that literature is necessary here that task has been performed others so well. However, we sl

7. B Guy Peters, "Public Policy, Socioeconomic Conditions and the Political System A Developmental Analysis," *Polity* 5, (Winter 1972), p. 278

8. *See*, for example, C. David Klingman, *Social Change, Political Change, and Public Policy Norway and Sweden 1875–1965* (London Sage Professional Papers in Contemporary Political Sociology, 1976).

9 Peters, "Public Policy, Socioecono Conditions," p. 278.

10. Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and So Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (N York: Wiley, 1975).

point out some of the findings in the literature which analyze some of the factors on which politics and policies are dependent.

Three alternative models

We begin with the basic question: What forces help most in explaining the magnitude of government expenditures for such social policies as education, public health and hygiene, and welfare? From a naïve stance, we can intuit several possible influences: the development of mobilized political interests on such policy-related issues, the manifest need for such expenditures, and the availability of resources or wealth (or the level of economic development). If we explore the extant literature, we find, in fact, three general models—one advancing each of three kinds of policy impetus noted here.

Even while some writers were advancing the decline of ideology hypothesis, arguing that political factors had become less important influences on policy in advanced industrial societies, others were suggesting that great influence was exerted by political variables—in the form of input or structural features—on policy outputs, particularly at the subnational level (i.e., that of intermediate and local governments). For some writers, the policy influence and explanatory power of political variables extended to outcomes, as well as to outputs.[11]

Using this model, one might hypothesize that the rise of left-of-center parties in a political system would increasingly tend to be followed by redistributive income policies (e.g., markedly progressive income taxes, high death duties, direct state assistance, or subsidies for the least well-off); or it might be suggested that political stability or political violence affect social policy outputs or outcomes in predictable and theoretically meaningful ways.[12] In this same vein, a number of writers suggested (in the late 1950s and through the 1960s) a strong and causal association between political democracy on the one hand and socioeconomic democracy—egalitarian distributions of income and wealth—on the other. Finally, some scholars have demonstrated a relationship between organizational and structural characteristics of the political system (e.g., unionization or vote/seat equality) and changes in policy.[13]

It is probably indicative of the weak position of this model, particularly among students of local level policy outputs, that it is often advanced in defensive tones. Thus, in a recent study of policy outputs in nearly 200 Belgian municipalities, the authors present their main conclusion in the following terms:

> At minimum, . . . these results suggest that political factors should not be dismissed. We conclude that it may be a bit premature to sound the death knell of the impact of the political process on public policy.[14]

11. *See*, Robert C. Fried, "Comparing Urban Policy and Performance," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 6, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 307 ff.

12. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, vol 53 (March 1959), pp. 69–105; Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 28 (April 1963), pp. 253–64.

13. Klingman, *Social Change, Political Change, and Public Policy*.

14. Michal Aiken and Roger Depré, "Politics and Policy Outputs: A Study of City Expenditures Among 196 Belgian Cities" (Paper presented at the 8th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Toronto, Canada, August 1974), p. 24.

We agree with these sentiments, but will point to the need to better understand the temporal context of this model.

In our own research on policy development in Sweden and Belgium, we find the political to be especially useful in explaining the transition from a traditional political and policy system to the modern welfare state. Prior to the period of transition, the public sector in each country was quite small and levels of political mobilization (e.g., enfranchisement) were quite low. During the period of transition (roughly 1907–35 in Sweden and 1919–46 in Belgium) political variables reflecting socioeconomic class and other ideological differences are more useful than other types of variables in explaining expenditures in social policy in both countries. Thus, our data-based research supports general assumptions concerning the importance of the rise of Socialist parties and public responses to the Great Depression in the rise and successful institutionalization of the welfare state.

We also find that politics continue to have a strong influence upon policy outputs at the local level, as patterns of social expenditures in Brussels and Stockholm are definitely influenced by political factors in the postwar era. We cannot duplicate the long time span of the national data at this level, but it does seem clear that the level of government must also be considered when making generalizations about the influences of various factors on social policy outputs.

A second model, the "needs" model, has also received considerable attention, particularly from students of local or urban policy.[15] It posits a direct relationship between demographic and ecological pressures or needs, and policy outputs.

For example, this model holds that the most powerful explanatory variable for the level of education expenditures is the size of the school-age population, or, for social security programs and pensions, the size of the over-65 age group.[16] In this model, policy outputs are seen as essentially mechanical responses to the objective needs of the society. For, if outputs are directly tied to the levels of needs, then policy responses might not require specific allocative decisions in each instance. In the most extreme version of this model, a specific environmental change would necessitate a certain type of response on the part of the political system; e.g., an increase in students producing increased hiring of teachers in order to maintain a certain ratio, or a certain level of unemployment freeing certain types of funds for compensation.

The needs model would seem to complement the political model, if the two patterns of policy formulation are considered through a developmental logic. For, a part of many decline of ideology or depoliticization arguments is the notion that routinized technocratic or bureaucratic procedures have come

15. Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Theories of Public Policy: Resource-Policy and Need-Policy Linkages Between Income and Welfare Benefits," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, vol. 15 (November 1971), pp 722–40; Robert R. Alford, "Explanatory Variables in the Comparative Study of Urban Administration and Politics," in *Comparative Urban Research: The Administration and Policies of Cities*, ed. Robert T. Deland (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1969), Noel Boaden, *Urban Policy-Making* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

16. *See* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ***Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programs*** (Paris: 1976), pp. 49–51.

to supplant political modes of policymaking. The institutionalization of the need-related pattern may have come about by political means, but politics quickly become secondary to routine. This notion, implying as it does, a conception of politicized policymaking as a less-developed stage than routinized, technologically formulated policy, does not seem as tenable now as it did even a few years ago. Further, a decline in a particular form of political activity relative to policy does not necessarily signal a net decline in the politics of policy, but perhaps only a shift in locus; in this case, to the public bureaucracy.[17]

In our research, the needs model is definitely most applicable during the postindustrial period following World War II. The relationships for both countries between indicators of need—such as shifts in the demographic structure of the country—and expenditures on social purposes are quite strong, although rivaled in Belgium by the indicators of partisan politics. Interestingly, the needs variables are not particularly strong in explaining health expenditures, as compared to other types of social expenditures, which points to the importance of another of the dimensions of this comprehensive framework—the differences among policy areas.

Finally, the "resources" model posits a direct relationship between the socioeconomic resource base of a political system (national or local) and levels of expenditures. Like the needs model, the resources model involves an essentially mechanistic notion, arguing that governments which command greater resources are more likely to spend greater amounts.[18] At a more general level, this model posits that richer or economically more developed societies would develop more extensive social programs.

The patterns of policymaking in Sweden and Belgium indicate that the resource base is most important in explaining levels of social policy output in conditions of low policy output and low political mobilization, as during the traditional periods of development in each of these countries (from 1870 to 1906 in Sweden and to World War I in Belgium). In both of these countries, the availability of economic resources was clearly most important in explaining levels of expenditures during these periods, as might be expected from the low levels of political mobilization of those who were the major beneficiaries of the policies—the working classes. When they were mobilized politically, the resource base ceased to be the dominant factor in explaining why the political system spent its money the way it did, and the electorate became an important explanatory variable.

During the past decade much of the effort in empirical policy studies have been devoted to promoting one or another of these models in competition with the others. There has been a vigorous debate between those who see needs variables as the major influences on expenditures, and those who argue that political variables are more important. While in the early stages of empirical exploration and the pursuit of theoretical points of departure such debates

17. Martin O. Heisler, with Robert B. Kvavik, "Patterns of European Politics: The 'European Polity' Model," in *Politics in Europe*, pp. 27–89.

18 Some have also assumed that this would involve spending a larger *proportion* of total wealth as well as a larger amount. *See* Bernard P. Herber, *Modern Public Finance*, 3d ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard P. Irwin, 1975), pp 366–77 for a discussion of several approaches to this question.

may have been justified, their continuation now seems sterile and pointless.

THE CASE FOR A MULTIDIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK

Were the fundamental hypotheses of each of these models validated, it would be difficult to ascertain the net theoretical gain. Political allocations are made on the basis of estimates of resources and needs. Consequently, if the political model is supported by research findings, it would not show much more than the results of superimposing certain values on estimates of resources and needs. Indeed, the identification of needs and the marshalling of resources—in the context of any of the models—is substantially a value-determined process. Thus, situations in which levels of needs or resources seem to explain policy outputs better than do political variables may be showing nothing more than the outcomes of earlier political balances. This possibility is, in fact, one of the strongest arguments in favor of incorporating a cross-time or developmental dimension in policy analysis.

Instead of putting these models against each other, it seems more constructive to ascertain their utilities and limitations in the context of more complex theoretical frameworks. Thus, it may prove helpful to know under what circumstances the importance of certain political variables in shaping policy outputs and outcomes is greater or less. The importance may vary by one of the four dimensions already suggested: time, level of government, political system, or policy area.

The compelling argument in favor of such analyses is that existing public policy models tend to be rather simple, unidimensional and static, while the processes and structures involved in policymaking are extremely complex and dynamic. Thus, attempts to identify the "key" variables or the "best" model in a quest for a general theory seem less useful at this time than the identification of conditional relationships.[19] Surprisingly, until recently, relatively few students of policy outputs have sought more complex, multidimensional models. Alford and Boaden suggested that needs, resources, and political commitments ("dispositions to act") were all important in the shaping of policies at the local level.[20] However, they did not fully integrate into their more complex framework two of the dimensions we deem crucial: time and multiple levels of government.

Most comparative studies of policy outputs and outcomes are cross-sectional;[21] and, consequently, they have not contributed much to our understanding of the dynamics of policy. Also, comparative studies of policy outputs are usually restricted to a single level of government, although only a foolhardy student of policy would assume that other levels should be ignored. What is called for is not a design that strives to incorporate everything (since that would probably render multicase studies unmanageable and unwieldy), but, rather, a design that alerts the investigator more interested in one level of the intervening or contextual potentials of other levels—and a design that permits the pursuit of both empirical and theoretical possibilities across levels.

19 Fried, "Comparing Urban Policy and Performance," p. 320.

20. Alford, "Explanatory Variables"; Boaden, *Urban Policy-Making*.

21 Fried, "Comparing Urban Policy and Performance," p. 330.

Since in public policy studies, as well as in most of the social sciences, cross-national comparison is now widely regarded as another facet of systematic social scientific inquiry,[22] it seems unnecessary to stress the importance of this dimension for the study of social policy. Nor does it seem necessary to enter a plea for the fourth dimension of comparative policy analysis—comparison across policy areas. Recent contributions to the literature, indicate that this dimension is likely to be discussed even more in the future than it has to date.[23]

What we are proposing is an integrated framework for discerning the relative importance of political and other influences on social policy at different levels of government, in different developmental phases within advanced industrial societies, and in different policy areas. With such a model, we should be more capable of identifying the import of politics for social policy in particular settings; and we should also become more sensitive to the varied and often indirect political responses triggered by operating social policies.

Finally, it seems necessary to remind students of public policy that policy outputs and outcomes are quite different things, and that influences shaping the former do not necessarily have commensurate importance for determining the latter. As we have argued elsewhere, converting laws, rules, decisions, regulations, and even authorized expenditures into real consequences for, or impacts upon, the society or any other targets of policy (e.g., the environment or another polity), is neither a routine process nor one free of politics.[24] Indeed, one of the interesting developments over time in the role of politics in public policy in highly developed societies is that it seems to have moved from that portion of the system in which inputs are converted into outputs to that segment where outputs are converted into outcomes. Put into simpler terms, the decline of ideology in partisan, legislative politics may have been followed by the rise of politics in the implementation of policies—administration.[25] And it is important that we distinguish analytically the difference between achieving an output and the implementing of policies which bring about outcomes.

Sketching a comprehensive framework and translating it into an operational or testable model are two different things. Thus, at a highly abstract level, it is both desirable and possible to ask for designs of policy studies to include time-series analyses that permit developmental insights, the estimation of rates and directions of change; to test the relative explanatory power of a variety of independent variables; to compare policy formulation, outputs and outcomes in several countries, at more than one level of policymaking, and for several issue areas; and so on. In practice, it may prove very difficult to collect the resources—funds, time, human skills, or, for that matter, extant or obtainable data—to

22 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 65 (September 1971), pp. 682–93.

23. Richard Rose, "Comparing Public Policy—An Overview," *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 1 (1973), pp. 67–93, Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn T. Adams, *Comparative Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America* (New York: St. Martin's, 1975).

24. Heisler with Kvavik, "Patterns of European Politics," in *Politics in Europe*; B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, (New York: David McKay, 1977).

25. Peters, *The Politics Bureaucracy*.

undertake such a study. Even two relatively similar countries, like Belgium and Sweden, yield very different amounts and kinds of data. As difficult as it may appear, a more complete understanding of the policy process may require cross-time, cross-national, cross-level, and cross-policy areas. The realities of the policy process may be sufficiently complex that less elaborate attempts at analysis can only be very partial and incomplete representations of that reality.

Some lessons for policy analysis and health care?

Throughout we have been advocating the use of a number of dimensions of comparison in attempting to understand the differences among social policies adopted by governments. Let us now take a brief look at the types of questions which each of the dimensions will raise in studying health care in particular, and the relationship of health care to other social policy areas.

Time. The concern of governments with health care has varied across time. For example, although a number of administrative and more overtly political decisions are currently being made about the health system in Sweden, the degree of politicization of the issue of health is by no means as great as during the 1970 Seven Crown Reform. Likewise, health has rarely been on the public agenda in the United States, but since the adoption of Medicare and the current concern over a national health insurance program, this situation has clearly changed. One of the interesting questions which arises then is why this change, and how, in fact, do issues manage to become a part of the agenda for action by the government.

Countries. Sweden and Belgium are, as noted, rather similar along a number of political and economic dimensions, but have chosen rather different forms of public involvement in health care. Sweden has opted for a national system of health insurance and a system of county(*lan*) operated hospitals. The situation in Belgium is much more complex, with a number of political and private actors involved. What is the source of these variations among countries, and what difference does it make for the health consumer? A focus on cross-national differences will provoke questions of this sort and thus lead to a more complete understanding of the influences on health policy.

Levels of Government. As pointed out above, health policy and programs are a concern of both the national and local governments in Sweden, while in Belgium health is primarily a function of the municipalities, along with a number of private actors. The Belgian central government contributes to the level of health expenditures, but relatively little to the actual provision of health services. Thus, we must again be sensitive to the differences within countries to the role played by several layers of government, and we must seek to understand their interaction in making and implementing health policy. We must also be sensitive to the impacts which vertical integration or decentralization may have on the type and quality of care rendered. This may especially be evident in Sweden, where the competition among the counties over hospital construction leads to much greater use of hospitals as a treatment site than is true in other countries.

Policy Areas. Finally, we must be sensitive to the variations in policy-

making patterns across issue areas. For example, health and education have some similarities because of the presence of strong provider groups and the direct delivery of services, while other social policies depend upon transfers, or the services of professionals with less prestige, social workers, for example. Likewise, certain social policies may be substitutable, with health care being supplemented for less expensive social programs such as food distribution, which might have the same effects on such health indicators as infant mortality. Health care is, however, generally more palatable to middle class taxpayers than giveaways of food, and the use of medical services is more easily controlled than money given in transfer payments. Thus, as well as looking at the ostensible purpose of health care; that is, health, we must also look at its other characteristics which may make it a preferred response to other programs producing perhaps the same benefits.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps this essay has raised more questions than it has answered. The ideas involving the extension of policy-related studies across time and across systems are not in themselves particularly novel, but their relationship to other bodies of literature, and to events in advanced societies today makes the pleas for more detailed policy analysis more compelling than ever. Several points can be distilled from this type of analysis.

First, there is the question of the nature of redistributive politics in the advanced, industrial societies of today. We have already seen that at the national level there is apparently little political activity directed toward those ends. At the same time, we know that a massive amount of political activity is occurring. It appears that the redistributive issues of today are of a different sort from those of the period during which the welfare state was created. In the first place, they are frequently not class-based, but instead based upon regional or ascriptive groupings. This is true even of countries, for instance, the United Kingdom, which have been regarded as both homogenous ethnically and as having class-based politics. In the second place, these issues concern redistribution from producers to consumers, or from some to all. The prime examples of issues of this type are consumer protection and environmental protection, but health care also has these characteristics. And, although the impact of these issues may be redistributive, they are frequently carried out through regulative or even self-regulative mechanisms.

Second, although local politics remains viable, even in mass democracies there is a tendency toward nationalization of local politics. Many of the crucial issues of our time, such as those mentioned above, become more apparent in some localities than in others, and are frequently the source of local politics. Because of the problems of financing and the problems of spillovers, however, there is a need to force the decisions to the national level. Further, the tendency of local governments to spend money more rapidly than national governments means that centralized regimes have been forced to seek more adequate means of controlling public expenditures; as a consequence, they have been forced to take up local issues and politics into national politics. A number of significant changes are presently taking place in the form

and size of subnational governments in both Sweden and Belgium, and the policy-related consequences of these changes are not yet clearly discernible. In both countries, the number of local governments has been drastically cut through consolidation. Economies of scale may affect the provision of such services as health care; and the role of politics in local level policy determination may also shift, although neither direction nor magnitude is evident. Belgium is also undergoing a federalization process that will result in three large regions—the Flemish, the Walloon and Brussels. However, the effect of federalization on the provision of social services and the politics of policy is less than clear. It is quite possible, however, that these developments will slow, though probably not reverse, the tendency toward the nationalization of social policy—at least in Belgium.

Finally, there is a great need to conceptualize and understand more fully the process of implementation as a fundamental political process. In a bureaucratic polity, this is of necessity one of the more important loci of political choice; and it is at the same time the one which is least understood by most students of policy. Likewise, it is the one which is least amenable to research, involving, as it does, a number of rather small decisions, which total, however, to the operational meaning of policies.

If we return to the concept of the "decline of ideology" from which this discussion emanated, it appears that one type of ideology has declined, but that ideological resurgences of another type, or, in fact, of a number of different types, may occur. The issues currently politicized in many advanced industrial societies are not those of class, but rather are considerably more complicated. They involve a number of complex allegiances and interests, which crosscut for the average citizen. Politics has become less predictable and, at times, rather confusing. So, labor unions and industrialists may find themselves allied against environmentalists seeking to close a plant. Likewise, new social issues, such as abortion, divide many stable political groups organized around old ideological questions. Our task, then, is not only to keep track of the sides, but also to develop the theoretical and analytical means of understanding the changes in the political world.

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Theoretical and Policy Implications of Case Study Findings about Federal Efforts to Improve Public Schools

By NEAL GROSS

ABSTRACT: The billions of dollars appropriated by Congress to promote equality of educational opportunity and to facilitate educational reforms in recent years have stimulated thousands of school districts to introduce major innovations into their curricula, modes of operation and organizational arrangements. The benefits derived from these change efforts, however, have generally been disappointing. The poor record of educational innovations has stimulated inquiries designed to determine conditions that serve to facilitate and block planned organizational change in schools. Major impediments to eductional change, largely overlooked in conceptualizations of the process of organizational change were identified in six longitudinal case studies of efforts to institute major innovations in school systems. Their theoretical and policy implications are examined. The findings of the studies press for a major reformulation of the theoretical scheme most frequently used to account for the fate of organizational innovations—overcoming resistance to change (ORC). The studies indicate that ORC is truncated and simplistic because it ignores important stages in organizational change, and overlooks conditions internal and external to the organization that can have an important impact on the fate of innovations. Seven policy implications of the case studies are specified, including the need for Congress to abandon the categorical aid approach to educational problems in favor of more functional tailor-made solutions, and to institute procedures to assure that those who administer educational policies will facilitate, not inhibit, the accomplishment of its objectives.

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A number of the findings and ideas considered in this article are examined in greater detail in a forthcoming volume, tentatively titled *The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change*, edited by Robert E. Herriott and Neal Gross.

OF THE several ways in which empirical inquiry may lead to the reformulation or elaboration of a social theory, one of the most important is through its identification of important facts that the theory ignores or that are contrary to its basic assumptions. In Robert Merton's words, "When an existing conceptual scheme commonly applied to a subject-matter does not adequately take these facts into account, research presses insistently for its reformulation. It leads to the introduction of variables which have not been systematically included in the scheme of analysis."[1]

The first objective of this paper is to consider the implications for conceptualizing and analyzing the process of planned organizational change of findings that emerged from six well-documented case studies of attempts to institute major innovations into American public schools. I shall initially describe a number of major impediments to the change efforts which have been generally ignored in theoretical formulations of the process of organizational change. I will then consider what they imply for the reformulation of conceptual schemes designed to account for the fate of organizational innovations. Its second objective is to explore the implications of the findings for federal educational policy. Each of the change efforts was designed to achieve objectives that reflected national educational priorities, for example, equality of educational opportunity and improvement in the education received by disadvantaged children. Each was intended to overcome shortcomings of previous innovative programs that had failed. None of the educational change efforts achieved its intended objectives, and most of them were largely ineffective.

To set the stage for the issues to be examined, I now consider briefly three preliminary matters: (1) federal legislation that launched the panoply of educational reform attempts of local school districts in

1. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed. (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957), p. 108.

recent years; (2) the kinds of changes that were introduced into schools; and (3) their educational effects.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATIONAL INNOVATIONS SINCE THE 1960s

The opening paragraphs of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Educational Message to the first session of the 89th Congress presented a crisp description of his assessment of the major educational ills of the nation. It unequivocally stated the priority he assigned education in his agenda to achieve the Great Society. In his words, "I urge that we now push ahead with the No. 1 business of the American people—the education of our youth in preschools, elementary and secondary schools, and in the colleges and the universities."[2] His Message concluded with a set of recommendations designed to cope with the educational shortcomings of the nation, including serious deficiencies in the education of disadvantaged children, the lack of innovative school programs and practices in American schools, shortcomings in the performance of state departments of education, and the glaring inadequacies of school libraries. His proposals to eliminate the deficiencies he had identified constituted the basic elements of the historic piece of legislation passed by Congress the following year, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). This Act was of historic significance because, as Timpane has noted, ESEA ". . . was the watershed in securing the permanent involvement of the federal government in the financial support of the schools."[3] Furthermore, in addition to making federal monies available to most school districts in the nation, it served as the stimulus for the subsequent swift escalation in the level of federal support for local school districts.[4] Between fiscal 1965 and fiscal 1966 federal aid to education in the United States doubled: it increased from one billion to two billion dollars. By the close of the decade the total federal contribution to public education had climbed to nearly three billion dollars. It is also important to recognize that the proportion of the public education bill picked up by the federal government during the past quarter of a century has escalated dramatically. A nearly 300 percent increase in federal support for public education occurred during this 25-year period: in 1950, only 2.8 percent of the costs of the public schools were borne by the federal government; in 1975, it was footing over eight percent of the bill.[5]

Two points deserve emphasis about this sharp increase in federal aid to education. The first is that federal funds normally can be spent only for categorical aid programs that reflect national priorities as defined by Congress. The second is that in view of the fiscal constraints to which local school districts have been exposed in recent years, federal funds have constituted the primary source of revenues available

2. *Message From The President of The United States Transmitting Education Program* (The White House, 12 January 1965), p. 3.

3. P. Michael Timpane, "Reform Through Congress—Federal Aid to Schools: Its Limited Future," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol. 38 (Winter/Spring, 1974), pp. 494–95.

4. Ibid., p. 495.

5. Robert E. Herriott, "The Funding Context The Experimental Schools Program" in *The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change*, eds. Robert E. Herriott and Neal Gross (forthcoming), chap. 3.

to most school systems desirous of introducing changes into their schools.

The monies appropriated by Congress to promote equality of educational opportunity or to facilitate specific educational reforms specified in ESEA and related federal legislation stimulated thousands of public school systems throughout the nation to undertake deliberate and sustained efforts to institute major changes in their educational programs during the past decade and a half. They introduced hundreds of innovations designed to eliminate or ameliorate problems such as the low reading test scores of disadvantaged elementary school pupils; high school students who graduated as functional illiterates or were ill-equipped for entry into the job market; high student dropout rates, truancy and other forms of deviant behavior; outmoded curriculum; dysfunctional teaching methods; and the increasing proportion of secondary school students who had negative or hostile feelings about their school experiences because they perceived them as meaningless or irrelevant to their immediate needs and long-range interests.

In attempting to cope with these and other pressing difficulties, the administrators of city, suburban, and rural school districts instituted a great number of new programs and practices of varying scope and complexity. Hundreds of school districts experimented with new strategies and techniques to teach reading to disadvantaged children or to improve their performance in this and the other basic skill subjects. Large city school systems instituted compensatory education programs to upgrade the academic performance of students with long-standing deficiencies. In the social studies and other fields courses based on the inductive method of teaching that focused on issues of concern to students were widely adopted. Large numbers of schools established individualized learning programs to foster the cognitive, social, and emotional development of their students, and primary schools in all parts of the nation adopted the British import, the open classroom. School districts established new types of schools, for example, alternative or magnet schools, on the assumption that they would provide disenchanted or dissatisfied students with socialization experiences that were more meaningful and functional than those they encountered in traditional schools. Numerous school districts instituted innovations such as programmed instruction, learning centers and modern vocational schools so that their students would be able to learn at their own pace. Long-standing procedures of class scheduling and teacher assignment were abandoned in many school districts in favor of innovations such as team teaching and the nongraded school that were designed to permit more flexibility in class scheduling and greater individualization of instruction.

To what extent did these change efforts achieve their intended outcomes? When systematic evaluations of them have been made, the findings reveal that their objectives were generally not achieved. Assessment studies conducted by a number of investigators, for example, J. I. Goodlad and M. F. Klein,[6] B. R.

6. John I. Goodlad and M. Frances Klein and Associates, *Behind the Classroom Door* (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co , 1970).

Heller and R. S. Barrett,[7] Neal Gross et al.,[8] and M. J. Wargo et al.[9] revealed that educational innovations introduced into many schools were, in fact, never implemented. An evaluation of over 300 compensatory education programs introduced into urban school systems showed that their influence on raising the academic achievement of students was minimal.[10] The evidence from large-scale evaluations of federal educational programs such as ESEA Title I and project Head Start has generally been discouraging.[11] Neither of these heavily financed programs could point to ". . . a consistent or significant effect on student outcomes that could be attributed to participation in special programs funded by federal dollars."[12] Furthermore, for those projects in which success was claimed, a careful examination of their outcomes revealed that their results were generally not statistically significant.[13] Hundreds of programs designed to upgrade reading performance in urban, suburban, and rural schools have been discarded. A large number of alternative and magnet schools, once described by their proponents as the answer to many of the ills of urban education, have been abandoned. Many school systems that introduced innovative courses in various fields in the 1960s dropped them in the 1970s. Furthermore, nearly every case study of the fate of a specific educational innovation in public schools has concluded that its anticipated outcomes were not achieved, that its educational benefits were minimal or that it was not fully implemented.[14]

The limited benefits derived from these federally funded programs have resulted in considerable soul searching on the part of educational officials and policymakers at all levels of government—local, state, and federal. They have been perplexed and vexed by the serious obstacles encountered by change efforts they have initiated or supported and have speculated at great length about the circumstances that con-

7. Barbara R. Heller and Richard S Barrett, *Expand and Improve . . . A Critical Review of the First Three Years of ESEA Title I in New York City* (New York: Center for Urban Education, July 1970).

8. Neal Gross, Joseph Giacquinta, and Marilyn Bernstein, *Implementing Organizational Innovations A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

9. Michael J. Wargo et al., *ESEA Title I: A Reanalysis and Synthesis of Evaluation Data from Fiscal Year 1965 through 1970, Final Report* (Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, March 1972).

10. Edmund W. Gordon and Doxey A Wilkerson, *Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1966).

11 E J Mosbaek et al., *Analysis of Compensatory Education in Five School Districts: Summary* (Washington, D.C. The General Electric Company, TEMPO, n.d.); Gene V Glass, *Data Analysis of the 1968–9 Survey of Compensatory Education (Title I), Final Report* (Boulder, Colo.: Laboratory of Educational Research, University of Colorado, August, 1970), Michael J. Wargo et al., *ESEA Title I: A Reanalysis and Synthesis of Evaluation Data from Fiscal Year 1965 though 1970, Final Report* (Palo Alto, Calif.: American Institutes for Research, March 1972).

12 Paul Berman et al, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change*, Vol. 1: *A Model of Educational Change* (Prepared for the U.S. Office of Education, Department of HEW, R-1589/1-HEW, by the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Sept. 1974), p. 4.

13 Ibid., p. 4.

14. See Gross et al., *Implementing Organizational Innovations*, chap. 2 and Berman, et al, *A Model of Educational Change*, pp. 3 and 4.

tributed to the inability of innovative attempts to achieve their objectives. The systematic examination of this problem requires longitudinal analyses of change efforts that examine in depth the events and developments that occur in innovative efforts of schools and that focus on the identification of the circumstances, in and outside of these organizations, that have a major impact on their dynamics and outcomes.

As a consequence of my interest in the process of planned organizational change in educational and other settings, I have participated in the analysis of six longitudinal case studies during the past decade that closely monitored and described the dynamics of deliberate efforts to institute major innovations into school systems.[15] I now turn to a set of circumstances that my colleagues and I identified as serious impediments to these major change efforts that have generally been overlooked in theoretical formulations designed to account for the fate of organizational innovations. In the following section, I shall consider the theoretical implications of these "ignored facts" for the development of more heuristic conceptual schemes to account for the fate of organizational change efforts.

IMPEDIMENTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE EFFORTS IN NEED OF THEORETICAL RECOGNITION

Failure to diagnose the problem properly

One important condition that constituted a major impediment to the change efforts of the school districts was their failure to engage in a careful diagnosis of the organizational problems that the innovations they introduced were designed to solve. This deficiency is exemplified by the generally unsuccessful new reading programs that were introduced into the school districts.[16] They were based on the assumption that the cause of reading problems of disadvantaged children was the inadequacies of the educational technology available to the teacher and that the solution was to be found in new and more effective techniques for teaching them how to read.

The school districts' diagnosis, of this problem, however, was simplistic and superficial. It completely brushed aside social influences which can have a significant bearing on whether a child wants to learn to read or to improve his academic skills. More specifically, it ignored the influence that a child's parents and his peer group can have

15 One of the case studies examined a major change effort designed to introduce a new definition of the teacher's role into a large city public school. The analysis and findings of this study are presented in *Implementing Organizational Innovations*, eds. Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein. Each of the other case studies focused on comprehensive change efforts in five small school districts located in different regions of the nation that participated in a federal project, the Experimental Schools Program, that was funded initially by the U.S Office of Education, and later by the National Institute of Education These case studies and their analyses will be reported in a forthcoming monograph. Robert E. Herriott and Neal Gross, (eds.,), *The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change*. The volume includes chapters written by Charles A. Clinton, William L Donnelly, William A. Firestone, Hendrik D. Gideonse, Neal Gross, Robert E. Herriott, James Kent, Michael W. Kirst, Ronald Lippitt, Donald A. Messerschmidt, Terry N. Saario, and C. Thomas Wacaster.

16. See Helen M Popp, "Current Practices in The Teaching of Beginning Reading," in *Towards a Literate Society*, eds. John B. Carroll and Jeanne S. Chall (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975).

on his attitudes toward learning in general, reading in particular, and his conception of his own capabilities. It overlooked the impact that teacher attitudes and expectations can have on the performance of pupils. In short, the poor record of these innovative efforts to upgrade the low reading scores of children from disadvantaged backgrounds can be attributed in part to the delimited manner in which the reading problem was defined and to the narrow view of its determinants. These innovations were introduced without a prior hard-headed diagnosis of the problems they were designed to resolve. Their ineffectiveness was due in part to the circumstance that the innovations were inadequate to deal with the complex nature of the problems they were expected to solve.

Failure to anticipate or resolve implementation problems

A second impediment to change efforts was the failure of educational officials who managed them to identify and deal effectively with serious obstacles to which their staff members were exposed when they attempted to implement them. A number of obstacles of this kind were identified that constituted serious blocks to the change efforts. One was the development of staff opposition to an innovation *after* it had been introduced into an organization. The case studies revealed that teachers who had an initially positive or neutral reaction to it frequently later offered resistance to the change when they encountered serious difficulties in carrying it out or became aware of the additional burdens it placed on them. A second was that inadequate or no consideration was given to the new skills or attitudes that teachers would need to acquire in order to implement an innovation. Major change efforts such as individualized instruction and career education can usually be effectively instituted only if teachers who participate in them undergo intensive retraining. The resocialization of teachers who participated in the several change efforts, however, was generally inadequate; in some cases it was nonexistent. A third implementation barrier was the lack of attention given to ways in which an innovation can conflict with other aspects of the school program or its routine processes. Collisions of this kind seriously impeded the implementation of several of the change efforts.

A fourth obstacle was the failure of those responsible for their management to provide the support and instructional materials needed by the staff. The case studies also showed that when professional support services were made available, the teachers typically found them to be of little value. The fact that the instructional materials they required usually arrived late, did not help matters The findings of the case studies strongly indicated that difficulties of this kind can usually be traced to the ineptitude of administrators responsible for the management of a change effort. A fifth obstacle was the lack of support the change efforts received from the central, administration and the school board after they were introduced into the school system. A sixth impediment was the exposure of consultants[17] and the principals of

17. The literature on educational change is largely silent on the selection and effective use of consultants. See Ronald Lippitt, "Traps and Potentialities" in *The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change*, eds. Herriott

schools in which change efforts were introduced to constraints from top-level officials that made it difficult or impossible for them to perform their tasks in a responsible and creative manner. A seventh barrier was the misunderstanding and serious conflicts that occurred between local educational officials and representatives of the governmental agencies that funded their change efforts. Problems of this kind consumed enormous amounts of time and energy at both the local and federal levels and the uncertainties and frustrations they engendered had significant negative effects on the implementation of change efforts. In addition to misfit innovations and failure to anticipate or overcome barriers to implementation, the case studies revealed a number of other circumstances that contributed to the ineffective outcomes of change efforts.

Ad hoc approach to educational innovations

A third circumstance was the disjointed manner in which the school systems introduced innovations. They generally displayed little concern for whether proposed changes would be educationally compatible with or could be linked to other aspects of the educational program so that they would have cumulative effects. Some of the change attempts were isolated from other parts of the school curriculum and hence quickly achieved a marginal status. When funding for these innovative efforts was curtailed or their initial sponsors lost interest in them or took other jobs, support for them rapidly waned.

and Gross, for an extensive discussion of this extremely important and largely neglected problem.

Uncritical acceptance of existing innovations

A fourth circumstance was the uncritical acceptance of questionable innovations that had been widely publicized. Some of the school systems threw caution to the winds and allocated resources to an assortment of untested, fuzzy or ill-designed innovations that lacked clear operational procedures or guidelines. The educational benefits claimed for these new programs or practices and the wide publicity they received led many school officials to view them as basic solutions for solving long-standing problems of their schools. They were often initiated on a crash basis, without any examination of their operational problems or their performance capabilities. Furthermore, many school administrators uncritically introduced innovations they had good reason to believe were functioning successfully in other school systems. They assumed that because an educational change had achieved its objectives in another school system, it would also be successful in theirs. They apparently were unaware that an innovation that "works" in one kind of educational context may be ineffective in another with dissimilar characteristics. They failed to inquire about the prerequisites that are essential if a particular innovation is to achieve its objectives. For example, innovations like individualized instruction require teachers who have excellent diagnostic and interpersonal skills and who are willing to devote a great deal of time to working with individual students. They also require parents who will support this kind of educational program. These conditions were generally not present in the schools that embarked upon this type of complex innovation, and their ab-

sence accounts in part for the failure of their change efforts.

Absence of monitoring and feedback mechanisms

A fifth circumstance was the lack of monitoring and feedback procedures. Their absence precluded early identification of barriers that blocked the implementation of the innovations by the individuals responsible for their management; hence, they were unable to deal with them promptly or effectively. The establishment of these mechanisms of "formative evaluation" are essential if an educational change process is to proceed in an orderly manner and with a proper sense of direction. They also serve the important functions of locating the stresses, strains, and frustrations that accompany change efforts and of providing feedback sessions to explore ways to overcome them. Mechanisms to identify and cope with major impediments to the change efforts were generally not available in the school districts. Their absence accounts in part for the poor outcomes of their innovative efforts.

Lack of teacher and community involvement

A sixth circumstance that served as an impediment to the change efforts was the reluctance or failure of school officials to involve faculty, parents, and concerned members of the community in deliberations about the proposed innovations. Many of the innovations were introduced into schools largely because authorities advocated them or because monies from external sources became available to finance them. Educational officials in several of the school districts made little effort to involve teachers and parents, and the community generally, in deliberations about the advisability of introducing major changes into their schools. In view of their limited information about the innovations, much of which was based on misinformation and rumor, and since they had not been invited to express their views about whether they should be introduced into the schools, many teachers and parents, resisted or turned against them.

Inadequate planning

A seventh impediment to the change efforts is implicit in most of the obstacles considered earlier: inadequate planning for implementation. Their administrators seldom developed short-run, intermediate, or long-run targets and when they did, they generally did not design plans to achieve them. They did not recognize that the way an innovation is introduced to a faculty can have a critical bearing on their initial and later reactions to it and their motivation to implement it. They developed no feedback loops or monitoring procedures to identify or cope with obstacles that could readily arise during different phases of a change effort. They usually did not consider role definition and role overload problems or ways to provide teachers with professional and social support when they attempted to implement an innovation.

Absence of leadership

The eighth barrier was the paucity of leadership exhibited by the officials who managed the educational change efforts. The case studies revealed that few of them displayed any understanding of the potentialities for leadership provided by their roles or of the role

performance required of them if they were to offer leadership to their associates in their difficult and challenging assignments. They also showed that the school districts frequently selected personnel to manage their change programs in a cavalier manner.

Theoretical Implications of the Case Study Findings

The impediments to planned organizational change that have been identified press for a major reformulation of the theoretical scheme most frequently invoked to account for the fate of organizational innovations, the theory of overcoming resistance to change (ORC), because it does not take these obstacles into account. Before considering needed revisions in the ORC theory, we need to examine briefly its assumptions and the reasoning on which it is based.

The ORC theory

The ORC theory has dominated the organizational change literature for over a quarter of a century. It asserts that the success or failure of an organizational innovation will essentially be a function of the ability of management to overcome staff resistance to a proposed change at the outset of, or prior to, its introduction into the organization. Michael Argyle has succintly stated the basic assumption of the theory. In his words:

> In the first place, there is usually resistance to change of any sort . . . In social organizations patterns of behavior become established and are of great stability because individuals work out drive-reducing ways of adapting and fear that any change will be to their disadvantage in some way. Changes in industry are resisted by workers because they are afraid that they will be paid less or will have to work harder to earn the same amount. Wage-incentive schemes are often foundered for this reason. Changes are resisted by managers because they are afraid that their position will be weakened somehow or that they will be further from the centers of power. There is anxiety either about possible material loss or about the disruption of a well-established and satisfying social system.[18]

The ORC theory, in short, assumes that the single barrier that needs to be overcome if an innovation is to become incorporated into an organization is staff resistance to change. It also assumes that staff resistance occurs only at the time when an innovation is introduced into the organization.[19]

The ORC theory constitutes the basic rationale for the advocacy by its proponents of power equalization between management and organizational members as the most efficacious strategy for overcoming staff resistance to change.[20] Another and related change strategy based on the theory, and one that has been used by numerous business firms and educational systems, has been group dynamics. These organizations have used techniques such as social sensitivity and T-group training in efforts to unfreeze the resistance of staff members to proposed changes or to predispose them to react positively toward a proposed innovation.

18. Michael Argyle, "The Social Psychology of Social Change," *Social Theory and Economic Change*, ed. T. Burns and S. B. Saul (London, Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 95

19. Ibid., p. 94.

20. Harold J. Leavitt, "Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural Technology and Humanistic Approaches" *Handbook of Organizations*, ed. J. G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 1159.

Needed revisions in the ORC theory

Six specific ways in which the findings of the case studies invite revisions in the ORC formulation of the organizational change process will now be specified.

1. The ORC theory is based on the assumption that the only barrier to the incorporation of an innovation into an organization is staff resistance to change. The case studies, however, identified a number of additional organizational conditions that can serve as important impediments to change efforts, for example, the inability or failure of management to identify and deal with serious implementation problems encountered by staff members, the introduction of change efforts that are off-target or deficient in important respects, lack of feedback mechanisms and serious shortcomings of planning efforts. Since these and other obstacles identified in the case studies markedly influenced the fate of organizational innovations, they press for conceptual recognition in theoretical formulations designed to account for the outcomes of change efforts.

2. A second limitation of the ORC model is that it fails to take into account that obstacles to change efforts may arise *after* an innovation has been introduced into an organization. It assumes that if initial staff resistance can be overcome, an innovation will shortly become incorporated into the organization. As noted, however, the findings of the case studies do not support this assumption. In one of the school districts the failure of the innovation could not be attributed to initial staff resistance, since none existed. The evidence revealed that the change effort was unsuccessful because of deficiencies in the innovation and unrecognized implementation obstacles. In systems in which staff resistance constituted a barrier at the time the innovations were introduced into schools, numerous obstacles to the change effort arose after their introduction. These case study findings thus press for conceptual recognition of the fact that serious obstacles to organizational innovations can arise *after* a change effort is introduced into an organization.

3. A third shortcoming of the ORC model is that it assumes that organizational members who are initially favorably predisposed toward an innovation will maintain that posture throughout the course of the change effort. However, the findings of the case studies show that this assumption is also tenuous. All staff members in one school held a positive or neutral orientation toward an educational innovation when it was initially presented to them. Six months later, however, most of them refused to attempt to implement it because of the frustrations and obstacles that they had encountered during the change effort. The findings of this and the other case studies indicate the need to give conceptual recognition to the possibility that staff orientations toward an innovation may change over time. They also imply that theoretical schemes need to specify organizational and other types of variables that may serve to influence staff reactions to an innovation during different phases of an organizational change process.

4. A fourth limitation of the ORC theory is that it posits that the task of management in organizational change efforts is restricted primarily to the single function of overcoming staff resistance to change. The case studies show, however, that unless management ex-

hibits leadership in identifying and removing implementation barriers, *the probability is slight that change efforts will result in intended outcomes. The findings also revealed that many of the implementation obstacles the teachers encountered were due to conditions that could only be removed by their administrative superiors. In some school districts the individuals who managed change efforts were unaware* of the obstacles to which teachers were exposed. In others, the school administrators did recognize teachers' problems; however, these officials generally were ineffective in coping with them. Furthermore, the case study findings revealed that the inept performance of the administrators in planning and monitoring the change efforts was an important determinant of their dismal outcomes. The findings strongly imply that the variable, quality of leadership, exhibited by management, needs to be placed on center stage in theoretical formulations of the organizational change process.

5. A fifth shortcoming of the ORC theory is its truncated conceptualization of the time line of the organizational change process. Implicit in its formulation is the notion that the process consists of two stages: the initiation (or introduction of an innovation) stage and the incorporation or rejection stage. The case studies indicate that this conceptualization ignores a time period of critical importance to any change effort: the stage of attempted implementation. This stage embraces the time period of the change process that starts as soon as the initiation phase is completed and that ends when either the innovation is discarded or is incorporated into the organization. As noted, the case studies revealed that innumerable impediments to innovative efforts arose during this period. They also showed that management's awareness of these implementation obstacles and its ability to deal with them effectively, constitute important determinants to change effort outcomes.

The ORC model has another serious deficiency with respect to its time line. It ignores the fact, documented by the case studies, that circumstances and developments that occur before a proposed change is introduced into an organization can have a significant impact on its dynamics and outcomes. The case studies identified a number of events that occurred or did not take place prior to the initiation stage that influenced later stages of the change process, for example, management's willingness or unwillingness to devote the time and effort required to design change programs that were tailormade to fit the special needs of their school district, the care with which it selected formal leaders of its change efforts, and the efforts it made to identify potential impediments to implementation. The case studies showed that circumstances of this kind that occurred *before* the innovations were introduced into the school districts had an important bearing on achieving objectives of the change efforts. The case study findings not only imply that a third stage, the "attempted implementation phase," needs to be incorporated in the time line of the ORC model. In addition, they also press for the inclusion of two additional stages in the organizational change process that occur *prior* to the initiation phase: *the exploratory stage and the strategic planning stage.*

The exploratory phase includes the time period when the problem(s)

that provoke the search for an innovation are being diagnosed and the innovation is chosen. The strategic planning phase embraces the period when the focus of a change effort is on designing strategies and procedures to facilitate its acceptance and implementation. The case study findings make us aware that organizational events may occur during these two stages, that can exert a major impact on the developments that take place in later stages of change efforts, and hence, that they require conceptual recognition. The findings of the case studies, in short, strongly imply that instead of conceptualizing the time line of an organizational change effort as consisting of only two stages, initiation and incorporation or rejection, a more heuristic formulation would view it as composed of five stages: exploration, strategic planning, initiation, attempted implementation, and incorporation or rejection.

6. A sixth shortcoming of the ORC formulation is that in addition to ignoring many internal organizational conditions which can serve as major impediments to change efforts, it also overlooks those that are created by individuals and groups in its external environment. Each of the case studies provided evidence of external constraints and pressures to which the change efforts were exposed that influenced their outcomes in significant respects, for example, the constraints placed on school districts by their external funding agencies with respect to personnel decisions and allocation of project funds. The school systems were also exposed to serious difficulties because of the high incidence of staff turnover in the federal agencies. The studies also revealed how educational change efforts can be markedly influenced by community conflicts and the disenchantment that can develop among school board members about them when they become aware of their unanticipated costs and the difficulties of implementing them. These and similar findings alert us to the need to give conceptual recognition in organizational change models to the potential impact that external agencies can have on the fate of change efforts.

To sum up: the findings of the case studies imply that the ORC model is truncated and simplistic. It is truncated because its time line does not take into account important stages of the process of organizational change. It is simplistic because it overlooks internal organizational circumstances and external conditions that can influence the dynamics and outcomes of change efforts. The neglected facts identified in the case studies press for the development of theoretical formulations designed to overcome basic limitations of the ORC model.[21]

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY FINDINGS FOR FEDERAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS

What implications can be drawn from the case study findings about courses of action the federal government might pursue to enhance the likelihood that the local educational change efforts it funds in the future will achieve their objectives? In examining this question I shall draw both on the case study findings presented earlier and on additional findings of the studies to be reported in a forthcoming volume. I now turn to seven implications of the case studies findings for Congress and

21. A model of this kind is presented by Herriot and Gross in *The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change*. See footnote 15.

federal agencies that fund major change efforts of school districts.

The findings of the empirical inquiries revealed that serious misunderstandings and conflicts arose between the local educational officials and the "feds" and that the attitudes or performance of school district officials were in many cases important contributing factors to the hassles. They also showed that a great deal of the blame in many of the disputes could be attributed to the performance of federal agencies and their representatives. At times they were abrasive and rude in their relationships with local school officials. At other times their performance indicated no awareness of earlier understandings reached by their predecessors with the local school districts. Some of the federal officials interfered in local educational affairs that were clearly none of their business. In consequence, trust and confidence were generally lacking in the relations between the "feds" and the "locals" and the case studies provide numerous examples of the negative impact this condition had for the educational change efforts. These findings indicate that the roots of many major obstacles encountered at the local level in these federally funded programs were attributable to serious deficiencies in the performance of federal officials who administered or monitored them. They clearly imply that Congress and top level governmental officials need to pursue courses of action that will assure that the individuals who administer federal educational programs will perform in a manner that will facilitate, not block, the accomplishment of their objectives.

The findings also imply that mechanisms may need to be established that will facilitate open and frank communication between Washington and local officials. For example, federal agencies could require quarterly feedback sessions between Washington and local officials that would focus on problems being encountered on both sides of the fence and on steps that could be taken to resolve them. A neutral third party might be asked to chair these meetings. The tensions and anxieties that arose in the relationships between federal and local officials were highly dysfunctional for the change efforts. They precluded the development of candor and trust in their relationships, conditions essential to the success of the change efforts.

A second important implication of the case study findings for the federal government emerges when attention is focused on the cavalier or inept manner in which local administrators dealt with the numerous difficulties that teachers encountered when they attempted to carry out the innovations. As noted, most of the innovations were never effectively implemented; hence, their utility remains problematic since they were never given a fair trial. The studies clearly show that when innovations are introduced into school systems, they will only be implemented and achieve their intended outcomes if those who manage them are aware of the obstacles they will probably encounter and of strategies to overcome them. Yet, the critical importance of overcoming implementation barriers for the success of local educational change efforts is seldom recognized in federal policies for education or by federal agencies. A great deal of time and effort is devoted to developing policies and programs designed to improve local public education. Little or no consideration,

however, is given to shaping policies that will increase the likelihood that educational change programs will be carried out in an efficient and effective manner. The findings of the studies strongly imply, therefore, that grants or contracts in support of major educational change efforts at the school system level should only be made if proposals include carefully designed strategies for implementing them and provisions for establishing monitoring and feedback mechanisms. They also suggest the need for provisions of this kind to be incorporated in federal legislation and programs designed to induce change in local school districts.

A third policy implication of the case studies derives from their findings about the needless constraints, communication difficulties, and other impediments which local officials were exposed to that could be primarily attributed to the "feds." The findings showed that throughout the change efforts local school district officials were frequently at a loss to account for the pronouncements or decisions of Washington officials or the actions of its local representatives. Furthermore, they revealed that local educators were at times greatly concerned and perplexed by what they perceived as the efforts of Washington bureaucrats to take over their school systems. The findings also showed that the local school administrators believed that many of their most serious problems were a direct consequence of the needless constraints the "feds" imposed on them, difficulties in working with Washington officials, or their unpredictable or inept performance. One problem that especially vexed a number of the school administrators was that Washington officials seldom offered clear responses to their requests for clarification of documents prepared by federal agencies. *Ambiguities about* this matter, and the uncertainties it engendered, constituted serious impediments to several of the change efforts throughout their histories.

The case studies also revealed that the "locals' were frequently unable to make decisions or carry out plans because of the inordinate delays they encountered in obtaining responses from Washington to their letters and phone calls. Local administrators reported great difficulty in obtaining replies to their requests for approval of project plans, personnel recommendations and the expenditure of funds. These and related conditions not only frustrated and upset local educational officials, they also were extremely dysfunctional for the management and operation of their projects. Two important implications can be drawn from these findings. The first is that before a federal agency launches a new educational program that involves local school districts it needs to make certain that its own house is in order. The second is that it needs to monitor its own operations once the program is underway. Thus, in addition to requiring that school districts that participate in federal programs fulfill their obligation to Washington, a federal agency needs to be clear about and carry out its responsibilities to participating school systems. The findings of the case studies strongly imply, in sort, that the "governmental store" should not be opened until it is equipped to meet the needs of its clients and to offer them services of high quality. They also imply that the "feds" need to monitor and appraise their own performance as well as that of school districts in federally funded local change efforts.

A fourth implication of the case study findings for federal agencies comes to the surface when we focus on the serious inadequacies they revealed in the performance of local school officials, for example, their lack of planning skills, their uncritical acceptance of imported innovations, and their lack of awareness of, or inattentiveness to, implementation obstacles. The frequency with which local inept administrative performance occurred and its deleterious effects on the change efforts strongly imply that governmental agencies need to recognize that unless impediments of this kind can be overcome or minimized, local change efforts funded by the federal government have little chance of succeeding. This, in turn, suggests that federal agencies that facilitate and fund local change efforts may in many instances need to take the initiative in establishing, directly or indirectly, training programs for local officials in participating school districts to provide them with the skills and understandings required to manage change efforts in a competent and responsible manner. These training programs will need to stress topics such as the need for systematic planning, planning models and techniques, criteria for assessing innovations, implementation problems and mechanisms to cope with them, leadership strategies, and the bearing of contextual factors on the management of educational innovations. A fifth implication of the findings is linked to the difficulties school district officials experienced in selecting consultants and using them efficiently. They imply that federal agencies might find it advisable to sponsor the preparation of booklets prepared by experts listing competent consultants by their area of specialization who are available to advise on problems that arise in educational change efforts. These publications also could offer guidelines and suggestions about ways to maximize the services of consultants.

A sixth implication of the findings is that they reveal a need for federal agencies to examine ways in which they can maximize their contributions to local change efforts and minimize needless friction in federal-local relationships. Many Washington officials had little comprehension of how their indecisiveness or belatedness influenced the change efforts and exacerbated the difficulties of those who managed them. They also displayed little understanding of courses of action that they could pursue that would facilitate the implementation of the local change efforts. The frequently inept or dysfunctional performance of federal officials implies, in short, that inservice training and organizational development are needed at the Washington level.

The seventh implication of the studies is suggested by the frequency with which school districts indiscriminately borrowed innovations from other school systems or introduced those disseminated by federal education agencies such as ERIC without concern for their limitations or relevance for their systems. The fiscal and human resources allocated to these change efforts were largely dissipated. These and related findings strongly implied that local school officials believe that someone else has ready-made answers to the basic problems of their schools. The fact that Congress has essentially followed a "categorical aid" strategy in voting monies for the nation's schools implies that it knows what the fundamental problems of school districts

are and the general strategies that should be pursued to eradicate them. The case studies imply that these orientations at the local and federal level to solving the educational ills of the nation need to be sharply challenged. The studies imply that instead of importing "canned" solutions, school districts need to design and implement tailor-made strategies that fit the special needs of their students and that take into account contextual factors. They also imply that instead of policies that stress categorical aid programs, Congress needs to fashion policies that will permit school systems to work out programs of school reform that are based on a hard-headed analysis of the basic educational problems of their school districts and the circumstances that account for them. In addition, the findings imply that Congress needs to establish policies that will permit school districts to use their internal resources and funds available from external agencies in multi-faceted efforts to resolve them. The findings of the studies strongly imply, in short, that congressional policy needs to be based on the notions that there are no educational panaceas and that what is required is a tailormade approach to educational reform.

The policy ideas presented here are examined in greater detail in a forthcoming volume.[22] It also considers other implications of the findings for federal agencies, what they imply for local school officials, and new mechanisms and roles that could facilitate educational change efforts.

22 Herriott and Gross, *The Dynamics of Planned Educational Change*.

Conceptions of Research and Development for Education in the United States

By BURKART HOLZNER AND LESLIE SALMON-COX

ABSTRACT: In the early 1960s, spurred by federal initiatives and funding, a movement got underway to place educational practice on a foundation of scientifically based knowledge. The Research and Development Centers program was the first of several institutional approaches to what came later to be known as the knowledge production and use (KPU) system in education. Based on their thirteen years of case study experience of one such center, and their application of a sociology of knowledge framework to some of the larger policy issues, the authors trace some of the positive and negative effects of this attempt to place education in the domain of "big science." They discuss the evolution of models for educational R&D, which are prescriptive, rather than descriptive, of intellectual activity. The development of epistemic communities and ensuing standards of judgment in the one institution are also seen to have been crucial to its development. While a final judgment of the efficacy of the Research and Development Centers program and other related efforts is not possible, some of the products and outcomes of these programs are now visibly available.

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IN THIS paper we report and comment upon a very recent aspect of the history of applied social science; namely, the attempt to provide a research and development base for education in the United States. Deliberate efforts have been made, and are continuing, to force the entry of educational research into the domain of "big science," and to create an explicitly knowledge-based educational profession.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The vantage point from which we have observed these developments is a special one, both privileged in one respect and limiting in others. For some years we have conducted a detailed study of organizational development in the University of Pittsburgh's Learning Research and Development Center (LRDC)—one of the first two federally funded centers for research and development (R&D) in education. Our role as sociologist-observers is to report to the Center's external board of visitors on the basis of continuous, sociological monitoring of the Center.[1] This work has allowed us to know one of the educational research and development organizations very intimately indeed; more sporadic contacts and general interest have enabled us to follow developments on the national scene as well.

The educational research and development movement, and the strategies of organizing for knowledge production and use that unfolded within it, has certain distinct features of historical interest. In the first place is the idea that education should and might become an explicitly knowledge-based profession. Of course, as all other professions, education has its claim to specific expertise and a body of relevant knowledge. Psychology and related sciences of human behavior have strongly shaped educational thought and provided certain tools for educational practice. However, education as a practicing profession, continues to rely less on organized, scientifically validated knowledge and technology than on experience and art. There are, indeed, very few professions genuinely based on the foundation of scientific knowledge and rigorous research. David S. Rubsamen argues that even medicine, whose reliance on explicit, scientific research certainly long predates that of education, entered the era of scientifically grounded professional practice only about 30 years ago.[2] However one evaluates that claim, the attempt to base instructional practice on rigorous scientific research and evaluation would, if successful, produce large-scale and significant changes in the structure of the educational professions. These changes would point in directions different from those characteristic of the education profession in the past, which tended to emphasize value transmission, stability of practice, and, on the whole, a certain conservatism.

During the same years in which the federal involvement in educational R&D became significant in terms of financing and program direction, the national professional association, the American Educational Research Association, also

1. This work was begun by Burkart Holzner in 1964, other colleagues have served in this role, including William Pearman, Geoffrey Guest, Bernhardt Lieberman, and Evelyn Fisher.

2. David S. Rubsamen, "Medicine Malpractice," *Scientific American*, vol 235, no. 2 (August 1976), pp. 18–23

underwent change. As reported in a case study of that organization,[3] its executive officer initiated a series of self-investigatory, and self-renewing, processes in an attempt to upgrade the membership, quality and influence of the Association. He was joined in his concern first by the Association's president, and later by its council, as well as a specially selected planning committee. The impetus for this explicit attempt at improvement shares common sources with other initiatives—federal, local, within and outside universities—in the domain of educational R&D.

The commitment of recent American educational reform movements to improving the scientific base for educational practice is linked to the centrality of education to the values of liberal democracy. It provides another instance of the interpenetration between social movements and professions. Some observers have commented upon the professionalization of social movements; we must also note that professional reform efforts often are aspects of broader social movements.[4]

Our interest is that of sociologists of knowledge. We are here concerned with the emergence of conceptions of how to organize an intellectual activity, their institutionalization, and their changes.

We recognize that actual change can eventuate from changes in planning models and, in fact, did in the domain under scrutiny. However, our focus in this paper is on abstracta rather than concreta, and on the emergence of a complex notion from a fairly simple one in the short space of 13 years. Though research and development institutes in any field are relatively new entities, dating back only to the nineteenth century, those concerned with educational practices were created only "yesterday." It is notable that there has been an evolution in the thinking about these organizations, one in which stage-like progressions can be discerned. The planned effort to create an explicit knowledge base for education, to establish an institutional base for knowledge production, with its manifold reliance on behavioral and social sciences and its peculiar reflectiveness, makes the phenomenon a particularly interesting one in the recent history of applied social science.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

Deliberate attention to organizational forms for producing scientific and professional knowledge is certainly not new. One can think of the extensive debates about institutional design which preceded and accompanied the foundation of the University of Berlin in the beginning of the nineteenth century as one prototype of the research university. However, such attention has recently expanded in scope and depth, a development in social science that has accompanied, resulting from and in, the actual increase of organizational forms in the field.

Fritz Machlup's book on the production and distribution of know-

3. Caroline Hodges Persell, "The Utilization of Sociological Ideas in Organizational Planning" in *Final Report to the National Institute of Education of the Multi-disciplinary Graduate Program in Education Research*, 1974.

4. See, for example, John D. McCarthy and Mayer M. Zald, *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, Modular Publications, 1973).

ledge in the United States describes especially the economic aspect of organizational innovation and the development of knowledge industries. Moreover, a selected bibliography annotating only very recent social scientific publications on research organizations in the United States summarizes no less than 300 studies.[5] Such attention has increased the ability to reflect instrumentally on organizational forms for knowledge production. We believe this intellectual development, this attention to and analysis of forms, is connected to the style and manner in which deliberate organizational innovation and policy intervention have been used to propel educational research into the R&D age.

Conceptions for research and development policies and organizations are, of course, models for organizing intellectual work. We are using the idea of "models" here in the sense of Clifford Geertz.[6] A model is more a prescription for, than a description of, an actual organizational design. As such, these conceptions contain at least implicit social theories about how intellectual activity occurs. They also imply certain epistemic standards and make provision for the application of truth tests to validate whatever knowledge is produced. As this is true of ideas in general, such conceptions for broad knowledge policies and specific organizational designs are hard to come by. Certainly, one would expect to find that they diffuse from domains in wh certain models have been succ fully validated to those wh models are lacking. Innovation, fusion, and adaptation do pla role. And such "borrowed" mo for knowledge production and may transform or conflict with e: ing social contexts of knowle especially the established patt in the professions and acade disciplines. To observe the eff toward development of knowle production policy in Ameri education may be relevant to un standing our increasingly kn edge oriented society. Such an stance serves as an illustratio a distinctly modern sociocult process.

One might argue generally social settings and substantive p digms of knowledge are interde dent. Such a point, for exam had been made by Foucaul his *Archaeology of Knowle* One prominent example given Foucault is the emerging stud "madness" in France. Surely, "n ness" is not simply a phenome given in itself. Its understan is determined by a large variet institutional arrangements, s forces, and cultural patterns. very topic is not only embed in social structure but is an as of it. A similar point can be m about educational research and velopment. Interestingly, it is quently argued that the para matic organization of knowledg the most significant preconditio the unfolding of a field of inq For example, Terry Clark sees institutionalization of science as folding from a paradigmatic se

5 Tom Landry in collaboration with D Grandstrom, C Kaufmann, and D. Musa, "Social Research Organizations and Related Topics, A Bibliography with Selected Annotations" (Produced for the Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, 1976)

6. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

7 See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeolo Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith York: Random House, 1972).

coherent ideas.[8] In the case of the R&D movement in education, this can hardly be argued. Certain goals for social policies and knowledge outcomes, broad scientific strategies and conceptions of organized endeavors, exist but can hardly be called paradigm-like. The very significance of the organizing activities, in addition to the substantively intellectual ones, in this domain gives it its special interest for us.

CONCEPTIONS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR EDUCATION IN FEDERAL POLICY

At this point in this paper, we can offer only a very brief summary of major approaches and their characteristics, not a full history of the educational R&D movement. Materials for such a full history do, indeed, exist but it still remains to be written. An important early work is the overview by Hendrik Gideonse. Statements of those concerned with planning innovation in the Office of Education and the National Institute of Education, as well as by others, also exist.[9]

Federal science policy in the area is only about 20 years old. It began with the Cooperative Research Act (1954) which provided support for educational research, but did not formulate an explicit organizational strategy. Following the then reigning conception of the manner in which basic science preceded, appropriations made emphasized the support of individual research, and the unit of work was the research project. The immediate social settings were universities, schools of education, and academic departments. This beginning of deliberate federal stimulation and support for research in education was not intended to produce significant alterations in organizational structure. Yet, an increase in the number of diverse local research and service organizations in the field was one consequence.

The state of affairs was unsatisfactory and several assessments of the shortcomings of educational research argued for policy change. For example, a survey by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Sam Sieber on the organization of educational research painted a discouraging picture. The work became influential even before its publication. It appears that the

8. Terry N. Clark, "The Stages of Scientific Institutionalization," *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 24, no. 4 (1972), pp. 658–71.

9. Hendrick Gideonse, *Educational Research and Development in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Research, Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969). *See also*, William Paisley et al., *The Status of Educational Research and Development in the United States, 1975 Databook* (Washington, D.C.. National Institute of Education, U.S Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1975); CEDaR Evaluation Committee, *A Review of the NIE Evaluation of Research and Development Centers and Educational Laboratories* (Denver, Colorado: Council for Educational Development and Research, Inc., 1973); Francis S. Chase, "Educational Research and Development in the Sixties. The Mixed Report Card" (Background Paper for the Select Subcommittee on Education, U.S. House of Representatives, 1971); Burkart Holzner, "The Research and Development Center Program in the United States," in *Emerging Strategies and Structure for Educational Change* (Ontario, Canada: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1966); Institute for Educational Leadership, *Facing the Figures, Analysis of Products and Users* (Washington, D.C. George Washington University, 1975); Ward Mason, "Issues Related to the Transfer of the R&D Center and Educational Laboratories Programs to the National Institute of Education" (Unpublished staff paper, National Center for Educational Research and Development, Washington, D.C., 1972), "USOE-Funded Research and Development Centers. An Assessment" *Journal of Research and Development in Education*, vol. 1, (1968) pp. 1–202

organizational structure of schools of education and of educational research institutes actually impeded the development of cumulative knowledge and a base for rigorous professional expertise.[10] The isolation of schools of education from the rest of the university and the impediment to long-range research stemming from short-term service studies were highlighted.

The research and development system of the middle 1960s was both a federal policy initiative and a value oriented movement. It appeared that social scientific knowledge of the structural conditions for the production of knowledge, and of the successful experience in other domains of effort, especially in defense related areas, demonstrated certain policy relevant points. In education, there existed a long lag between the creation of knowledge and its use in the field. Sustained knowledge accumulation needed significant concentrations of resources, manpower, leadership, and effort. The disciplinary organization, especially the split between the arts and sciences and the schools of education, appeared more an impediment than an asset.

The examples of research and development in defense and in agriculture seemed to offer the lesson that successful development research is product oriented and proceeds in a more or less linear fashion from science through engineering to use. The assembly of teams committed to a shared mission seemed to be necessary. In response to these kinds of considerations the notion of the educational research and development center emerged. It was not to be service oriented as such, but it was expected to fulfill certain functions of intellectual leadership, in addition to producing specified technical outcomes. The R&D centers were to be university based and national in their orientation. One can say, in brief, that the cultural model of "big science" was to be transferred to education and adapted to its needs.

The recognition of the problem—the need to improve knowledge production capabilities for education—and the definition of the solution—R&D centers whose staffs would transform behavioral science, making it educationally relevant—represented only one conception, with possible alternatives thereby deemphasized. In addition, as with any such organizing decision, the adoption of this strategy resulted in some negative decisions; that is, things that would or could not be attempted or accomplished.

From our specific experience with the one center, we have observed the results of both of these phenomena. Regarding alternative solutions—or strategies to solutions—the question of the means for coping with the problems of poverty is an example. Recognizing that children from poor families had a disproportionate number of educational problems, the R&D center strategy proposed to deal with these by means of improved instructional materials. Clearly, provision of an educational environment in which instruction was tailored to individual students was one way of accommodating sociocultural and economic differences in student backgrounds.[11]

10. See Sam Sieber and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *The Organization of Educational Research in the United States* (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1966).

11. Robert Glaser and Steele Gow, "A Proposal for a Learning Research and Development Center" (Produced for the University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 27–29.

Yet, logical alternatives did exist: mobilization of the adult community for educational improvement, provision of career training and/or job opportunities for adolescents and adults, provision of parent training programs for use with preschoolers, etc. Defining the poverty problem in terms of an instructional solution was certainly only one possibility among many.

As for negative decisions, again an example: the relationship of classroom teachers to the R&D process. Briefly, at the LRDC there was little such involvement for a number of years. Given the notion that the key to an improved classroom environment was individualized instruction, energy was consumed in the production of curricula. While necessary change in the teacher's role was recognized, teachers were thought of in a passive stance, and were exhorted to become receptive to behavioral science, to accept and employ the results of R&D activity.[12]

In a 1972 overview of educational R&D, Sam Sieber noted:

> The supply side of the equation (i.e. emphasis on R&D "output") has been tremendously inflated, while the discrimination and appreciation of the average practitioner have been left untouched. This state of affairs . . smacks of technocratic elitism . . .[13]

The elitism which Sieber observed was, and in many ways continues to be, widespread. It appears to be an epiphenomenon, if not an inevitable one, of the attempt, through the R&D center strategy, to upgrade the quality and the standards of educational research and development.

The network of institutions begun in 1964 rapidly became quite differentiated. Of course, policy decisions were not of one piece, but rather made at different times with different considerations in mind. The establishment of regional educational laboratories as multipurpose institutes, partly dedicated to research and partly to the further development and dissemination of products coming from the R&D centers, was an example of such differentiation.

The creation of the laboratories is generally credited to the recommendations of an advisory group, the Gardner Task Force, which reported to President Johnson on the nascent educational R&D program. That the centers would be unable to fulfill all the initial obligations foisted upon them was obvious by 1966. Hence, the distinction emerged between national centers and regional laboratories, differing in geographic focus as well as in practice.

Joining the laboratories and the R&D centers were several other organizations; e.g., centers for the study of child development, centers for vocational education, and ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center, an information dissemination system). Most of these were interwoven organizationally with universities, but the placement of each in the university structure, as well as the purposes each organization pursued over time, varied tremendously.

The end of the decade saw other educational programs become institutionalized as well. Prominent examples of programs designed to alleviate identified pressing strains in the system include Project Headstart and its sibling, Project Follow Through. These were yet another form, a network whose sites were primarily the public schools, but

12. Ibid., p 8.

13 Sam Sieber, "Federal Support for Research and Development in Education and Its Effects," in *Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (1974)*, p 24

whose personnel formed a human chain, linking public schools to dissemination networks to state agencies to university centers.

In these years there emerged the idea that both the government and the professional communities concerned with education needed a global view of the manifold arrangements for educational reform through new knowledge. In this context the idea of a knowledge production and use system was formed.[14] The complex of professions, disciplines, departments, and research institutes specifically devoted to educational research and development can, of course, be considered a natural system of some kind. However, this conception of a knowledge and production use system goes further than that. It includes the idea that it is a governmental responsibility to describe and monitor the changing nature of this sociocultural system and to intervene in a strategic manner to increase its effectiveness. The work of the R&D system support group at the National Institute of Education, and especially of Ward Mason, the sociologist directing it, is noteworthy in this regard. This broad conception of a knowledge production and use system (KPU) introduced a great expansion in the scope of considerations. It is certainly a comprehensive idea. Further, the system is to be thought of as having a capacity to correct itself on the basis of systematic monitoring; that is, it has reflective abilities. It is not thought, of course, that systematic planning on anyone's part could truly determine the specific nature of scientific progress. But the idea has come into being that the intellectual work of science and development is so systematically embedded in social contexts that strategically focused intervention is possible. Even more salient, this intervention might not merely be the allocation of funds but it could be of a manifold, if indirect, kind.

14. For a view from within a government agency, see *Building Capacity for Renewal and Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Research and Development Resources, National Institute of Education, 1973).

The context for this effort, American education and society, includes major social and political forces, the effects of which may dwarf the effectiveness of the R&D system.

This has been the case in each era. In 1964, court rulings concerning desegregation were a major fact of the environment within which the R&D center strategy evolved. So, too, was the beginning of a sociopolitical climate which would urgently cry out for reform and innovation, especially in the schools. The federal policy, the adoption of the "big science model" was a statesman-like approach to these concerns, in effect neglecting them, apparently on the premise that scientific problem solutions would be pure, value-free, and above the fray.

Today, prominent political issues include teacher militancy, unionism on college campuses, a back-to-basics movement in elementary education, and, perhaps, most clearly, a decline in the money available for schools and for educational R&D. These issues are not prominent on the research agendas of the R&D centers in 1976.

The so-called KPU system represents only a tiny fraction of those social and cultural forces impinging on education. After all, there are strong political bases for educational beliefs and practices. The effectiveness of what is being tried, therefore, may be severely limited. In a recent attempt at a systematic description of the educational knowledge system, Michael Radnor still

concludes that in spite of all efforts, it remains institutionally and intellectually immature.[15] Yet the fact is important that a highly reflective effort at using sociology of science insights for policy formation and organizational design is underway.

Finally, if the system is immature, it is at least in its adolescence and it represents an approach to educational R&D markedly different from the work which preceded it. Though professional R&D in education predates the centers program, and all the other initiatives which followed, this earlier work could be characterized, as Boyan and Mason did in 1968 by: a) its inability to directly or quickly enough lead to observable change in schools, and b) its fragmented, noncumulative and inconclusive nature.[16]

We hasten to add that neither the centers, nor the ensuing laboratories and other programs, have overcome all of these problems. But, the assemblage of a critical mass of multidisciplinary professionals in centers has made large-scale development possible[17] and the amount of time elapsed between R&D center activity and school utilization has been decreased.[18] Across the system, there is increased communication making more cumulative R&D possible.[19] These kinds of developments did not, could not, take place when research was an individual or small group, unidisciplinary activity.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN ONE INSTITUTE

We turn now from a certain degree of abstraction and from a view of the national scene over time to some more focused concerns. Our interest in this area was engaged through our involvement with a specific organization, and in our brief presentation of models for this organization and the experience with it, we rely heavily on the study by Evelyn Fisher who investigated the evolution of the LRDC.[20] The institute began with a linear continuum model for the

15. Michael Radnor, Earl C. Young and Harriet Spivak, "Analysis of Comparative Research—Development and Innovation Systems and Management. With Implications for Education" (Research Report for the National Institute of Education, April, 1975)

16. "Perspectives on Educational R&D Centers," *Journal of Research and Development in Education*, vol. 1, no. 4, (Summer, 1968)

17. During the sixties and early seventies, the LRDC staff designed curricula in several content areas. In some cases, e.g., mathematics and reading, several generations of curricula were developed. Each of these curricula is individualized, adaptive to individual students' rate and style of learning. LRDC curricula include the following programs: "Perceptual Skills," "Individualized Science," "Individualized Mathematics," "Individually Prescribed Instruction in Mathematics," "Individually Prescribed Instruction in Reading," and "The New Reading System."

18. Over 300,000 students are using LRDC developed instructional programs. Center curricula are being used in all 50 states and in six foreign countries. Several Center curricula are only now undergoing field testing, and will be more widely disseminated in the next year or two.

19. An example of this is the series of substantive conferences held at LRDC, and elsewhere, over the past 12 years. A most recent one of these was the Conferences on Reading, held at LRDC in spring and summer, 1976. The cumulative research on reading in the past decade led to the creation, this summer, of a new Center for the Study of Reading at Illinois, under the auspices of the National Institute of Education.

20. Evelyn M. Fisher, "The Influence of Leaders' Models for an Organization on Organizational Development" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1974).

organization in 1964. While the Learning Research and Development Center at Pittsburgh predates the federal research and development policy, it was designed in terms of very similar assumptions. The founders of the Center envisioned a "mile-long building," in which the results of basic research would inform instructional designers who, in turn, would pass the matter on to practicing professionals. This linear conception emphasized a gradient from scientific laboratory to school application and thus implied an emphasis on a certain direction of knowledge flow. From the very beginning of actual operations, it was clear that this conception did not fit the compelling realities of organizational life. The staff's orientation to the Center's practical objectives and the exigencies of work forced a project organization. Soon there emerged a communications gap between basic researchers and professionals involved in instructional development. The practical communication needs of daily work reinforced the gap as well as the internal solidarity between those involved in one major project. Curriculum construction and validation and school setting became a very large effort. In its context there emerged new roles and working teams. The role of educational developer—the designer of curricula and of learning environments—appeared between the researcher and the practitioner.

The gap between knowledge production and use apparently was bridged most readily when a single individual was engaged in both activities. On the basis of this observation a new model for the organization emerged which may be called the interaction model. The interaction model gave great prominence to professionals involved in both worlds, the domain of research and that of practical educational development. With the physical growth of the Center, a new conception gained ground which was formulated as the programmatic model. The structuring of the organization in terms of programmatic clusters, however, seemed to be unsatisfactory as well. The interactive aspect needed to be stressed and therefore a highly complex matrix evolved, an organizational conception that emphasized interdependencies and interconnections rather than hierarchies.

It is interesting that experimentation with organizational models continues in the LRDC. While the matrix conception has not been discarded, the need for some hierarchical coordination was expressed in the creation of clusters and cluster leaders; that is, groups of projects that shared similar objectives and characteristics. With this conception both the communication interdependencies of the matrix and the hierarchical aspects seemingly required for coordinating a very large enterprise were expressed.

It is significant that as experience with educational research and development was gained in Pittsburgh, the linear conception of the enterprise was rapidly discarded. The much more complex interactive design of the recent past and present encompassed several new professional roles and placed researchers, developers, and practitioners into a distinctly new context.

One important characteristic of this context is that it is designed in terms of shared intellectual objectives and criteria, the goal being to create theories and rules for adaptive education. This means the creation of a knowledge and

technical base for adapting instruction to the varying requirements of individuality. This mission orientation of the LRDC—and apparently of some of the other R&D centers as well—is a hallmark of the kind of organization it was initially and has remained. Program details have evolved in response to events both internal and external to the Center both scientific and political in nature. Yet the continuity of orientation—of overall objectives and of careful, technical rigor in execution—is marked.

As members of LRDC gained experience, the nature of the tasks confronting them became more clear. This was not difficult to mistake initially, clouded in part by the very adoption of inappropriate models we referred to above. Research and development in agricultural or defense-related fields has as its objective the development of technological artifacts. A linear, unidirectional flow of knowledge from research to use is, in fact, well suited to such an objective. At another extreme, there is research and development resembling a form of social experimentation, normally found conducted within the user sites. Examples might be voucher system experiments in education or experiments in delivery system formats in health care.

Educational research and development as conducted at LRDC is not exactly either of these. Its focus is modification of professional practice. This necessitates some technological innovations, it involves some on-site development and design. But it is a mixed case, requiring a constant shifting back and forth from laboratory to classroom, from research to design, from problems defined in the Center to problems defined in the field. It was this interactive objective and strategy which was not clear in 1964 and is more fully appreciated at the present time.

How, one might ask, does the organization of LRDC have any significant bearing on what it produces? Why the continuing concern with organization, the many reconceptions of organizational design, when what is being talked about is nothing much more than a collection of university scholars conducting research? The answer lies in the fact that LRDC is something much more than a collection. The creation of its products—instructionally relevant research and discipline-based instructional materials—requires an organizational environment significantly different from the traditional research bureau, one in which a variety of people, their cognitive styles and their intellectual criteria, were encouraged to interact and influence one another. The leadership has grasped the need for this environment for many years now. Its implementation has been attempted through organizational design, as well as by other mechanisms (e.g., the existence of Center committees and the adoption of particular leadership styles). Finally, the local development of LRDC, like the development on the national scene, emphasized organizational reflectivity. Not only did it provide for a board of visitors, which periodically discussed matters of intellectual and scientific work as well as concerns with organizational design, but we were asked to conduct a systematic continuing observation of the process. It is these observations which have led us to the points we have just enunciated, as well as to an insight

into a signal requisite for an organization like the LRDC. It is to this that we now turn.

ON EPISTEMIC ASPECTS OF ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES

The emphasis on a shared substantive objective had the effect of introducing, quite pragmatically, certain shared epistemic criteria as to what is relevant to the LRDC's work and as to standards of judgment. In that sense we can describe the LRDC as an epistemic community.[21] The emergence of an epistemic community seems to us to require the presence of certain supportive mechanisms defining the boundaries of the community and channels and criteria for communication within it.

Such emergence also implies new boundaries, we/they distinctions. A clear example of this is the difficulty LRDC has encountered in conceptualizing definitions of roles and activities in the interface between itself and schools.[22] In solidifying its self-concept as a research-based, discipline-based center, removed from direct service requests of schools, LRDC has rigidified the boundary between itself and schools, other than those under its direct control. This problem is now beginning to be recognized. One result is the new research underway on implementation processes conducted by a sociological team at LRDC which is necessarily directed toward careful analysis of organizational structures, linkages, and change processes. Significant new sociological conceptions appear to be emerging here, going well beyond the older diffusion or resistance to change models. Within the Center one can observe the emergence of several subsidiary epistemic communities, each engaged in some aspect of the multidisciplinary work on educational problems. Three major mechanisms support this development: the rise and professionalization of new knowledge based work roles, including that of curriculum designers; the creation of an ideal typical role model—the professional combining research and development abilities; and specific arrangements for opening up and modifying traditional frames of reference to accommodate new criteria of relevance. The emergence of a multidisciplinary community and the construction of newly shared frames of reference is not a process that can be forced. However, the very organizational location of the Center both in its university and in the national context facilitated the development.[23]

We believe that we can show that the professional working group did modify its frames of reference and, partly through national validation, achieved a new problem-oriented outlook. As a consequence, the criteria for validating knowledge as significant do not only include theoretical and empirical assessment, but also the question of practical significance and workability in an instructional context. This is a major reori-

21. On this concept, see Burkart Holzner, *Reality Construction in Society*, 2nd ed (Cambridge, Mass.. Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972). Also pertinent is Eliot Friedson, *Profession of Medicine* (New York. Dodd, Mead and Co., 1972), Chaps. 4 and 8.

22. An analysis which holds the mirror up to these problems, viewing them from the school perspective, is the article by Neal Gross in this issue of *The Annals*.

23. For a related analysis see H. Petrie, "Do You See What I See? Epistemology of Interdisciplinary Inquiry" (Unpublished manuscript, University of Illinois, 1975).

entation for university scholars. That is, LRDC as an entity, as a multidisciplinary organizational context which subsumed a variety of research and development, provided a ground on which various perspectives could meet. Sharing this common ground served to reorient these perspectives to one another in such a way that a new, shared orientation to instruction emerged. The acceptance of instructional practice as the area in which one's work needs to prove itself has added a significantly new discipline to the professional worker's outlook.

CONCLUSIONS

In both the national and local efforts, organizational designs predominate early which are borrowed from other domains in which research and development had proven itself. This was predominantly technical R&D, oriented towards the creation of products. The national shift towards the conception of the knowledge production and use system goes hand in hand with the actual increase in the diversity and differentiation of the network of centers and institutes. Like the experience of the local institute, it can be interpreted as groping toward the construction of patterns and organizational forms uniquely adequate to the educational area. In fact, most research and development for education aims to modify instructional practice, rather than to create technical objects. The maturation of the movement will, no doubt, lead to the recognition of major differences among technical R&D, social experimentation, and research and development for the improvement of professional practice.

Whether the forced draft moving of educational research into the era of "big science" is successful or not is really impossible to say at this time. The impact of such an effort on education in the nation's schools is only in very small part a direct one. In fact, the conception borrowed from the cost-effectiveness measures of technical R&D that one must be able to trace the effect of specific R&D products in use seems to be a mistaken one for this domain of social life. The indirect impacts—of new standards of judgment, of criteria of relevance, of epistemic communities—on the various educational professions, their self-conceptions and practices may well be a very large one. Even then it will be difficult to tell. The country's schools are being buffeted by massive political and social forces whose effects might powerfully overshadow the attempts we have described. All the same, we do believe that the value-oriented movement of educational reform that presses for such systematic use of science represents a noble effort.

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Normative Assumptions in Educational Policy Research: The Case of Jencks's *Inequality*

By LAWRENCE B. JOSEPH

ABSTRACT: Christopher Jencks's *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* is an example of social policy research which is also policy advocacy or normative political argument. His empirical analysis of the short-term and long-term effects of education is aimed at discrediting the "equality of opportunity" model for reducing social and economic inequality. He argues that we must move from concern with "equality of opportunity" to direct emphasis on "equality of results." Jencks cannot make a convincing case, however, because of a failure to pay sufficient attention to underlying normative assumptions concerning both the meaning of the concepts of equality and equality of opportunity and the nature and purpose of education. His argument is fundamentally misdirected because of a lack of awareness of the normative implications of both the position he is attacking and position he is advocating. Because of the role of social science as a legitimating symbol in debates over educational policy, it is particularly incumbent upon policy analysts both to clarify their own normative assumptions and to justify them in terms of a larger theoretical framework. Policy research as policy advocacy is likely to fail as long as it neglects fundamental issues in normative political theory.

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THE ideology of equality of educational opportunity permeates the history of public schooling in the United States. Education has been offered as a panacea for great variety of social problems, particularly with respect to its presumed relationship with "equalizing social opportunities."[1] The idea of equal educational opportunity has, of course, meant different things at different times in American history.[2] In this century, growing emphasis has been put on the notion that the prime function of education is to promote social mobility and that equality of educational opportunity will lead to broader social equality. In other words, education has been increasingly viewed in terms of meritocratic principles, that is, as a means to social reform through providing everyone with an equal opportunity for individual success (on the basis of merit), both in school and in later life.

In recent years, equal educational opportunity has been the focus of a considerable body of social science research, much of which has generated intense debates, in both the political and academic realms, over whether schools do, or even can, provide equality of opportunity and whether education is, indeed, the means to equal social opportunity and broader social reform. The best known of these studies is, of course, the massive U.S. Office of Education survey known as the "Coleman Report."[3] More recently, debate has been focused on Christopher Jencks's *Inequality*, which has generated a good deal of controversy by its provocative thesis about the short-term and long-term effects of schooling.[4] For the purposes of this paper, the significance of Jencks's work lies in the fact that it is an example of what Alice Rivlin has called "forensic social science;" that is, policy-related research which is also policy advocacy or political argument.[5] At the same time, Jencks's book is an attempt at radical policy analysis. His work is explicitly normative, in that he tries to muster his empirical evidence in an attack on the notion of equality of opportunity. Jencks contends that our conventional strategy for reducing social and economic inequalities has been to reduce people's unfair competitive advantages by equalizing opportunity, particularly educational opportunity. His book is devoted to trying to discredit this equal opportunity model. Inequalities in adult life, Jencks maintains, are not the result of unequal social opportunities, as measured by education or family background. In order to have a more egalitarian society, we ought to be concerned with equalizing adult status (e.g., by redistributing income directly through progressive taxation and income supplements), not simply with equalizing educational opportunities for children. Instead of trying to reduce people's unfair competitive advantages, we

1. See, for example, Rush Welter, *Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America* (New York Columbia University Press, 1962), Henry J. Perkinson, *The Imperfect Panacea. American Faith in Education, 1865–1965* (New York. Random House, 1968)

2. See James S. Coleman, "The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol 38, no. 1 (Winter 1968), pp 7–22

3. James S Coleman et al, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington D.C.: U S Government Printing Office, 1966).

4. Christopher Jencks et al., *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

5. Alice M. Rivlin, "Forensic Social Science," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 43, no 1 (February 1973), 61–75

ought to change the rules of the game so as to reduce the rewards of competitive success and the costs of competitive failure. In short, he wants to argue that we must move from concern with "equality of opportunity" to direct emphasis on "equality of results."[6]

I shall argue here that Jencks's attempt at radical policy analysis or forensic social science is both misleading and fundamentally unsuccessful. His failure is rooted in a problem common in debates over equal educational opportunity, namely, a lack of self-conscious awareness of underlying normative assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of education and the meaning of equality and equality of opportunity. Jencks cannot make the case he wants to make because he has an insufficiently clear understanding of the normative concepts which he uses and because he provides an inadequate normative justification for the policy position which he advocates. This problem is manifested in two specific ways: First, in his treatment of the concepts of equality and equality of opportunity, Jencks demonstrates a confused understanding of the position he is attacking. Second, in arguing for greater equality, he does not have a clear understanding of the normative assumptions underlying his own position. In both instances, therefore, Jencks's argument fails because he cannot deal adequately with questions of normative political theory.

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND EQUALITY OF RESULTS

Jencks's normative argument or policy conclusion is based upon a two-step empirical argument. First, Jencks restates the thesis inferred from many previous studies, particularly the Coleman Report, that inequalities in school resources and facilities have little effect on the cognitive outcomes of education. The single most important determinant of academic achievement seems to be the student's family background. Second, Jencks goes on to analyze the long-term effects of schooling. He argues that social and economic inequalities in adult life (e.g., occupational status and income) are not strongly related to inequalities in schooling (or to family background or to standardized test scores). Jencks's basic policy conclusion, then, is that equal educational opportunity does not, and will not, lead to equality in adult life. If we want to equalize outcomes in adulthood, we must do so directly by redistributing income.

The key problem here is that Jencks's strategy for discrediting the equal opportunity model is fundamentally misconceived and misdirected. He tries to show that equality of opportunity does not lead to equality of results (in terms of either education or adult status) by showing a relatively weak empirical relationship (or at least a weak statistical correlation) between the two. In other words, Jencks is implying that since inequalities in adult life (i.e., adult income) are not strongly related to unequal social opportunities as measured by education or family background, then equal opportunity cannot provide equality of results. This approach is, however, both unnecessary and misleading. Even if we were to accept the validity of Jencks's empirical analysis, it would tell us nothing new about the normative implications of the maxim of equality of opportunity. While Jencks may be right in

6. Jencks, *Inequality*, pp. 3–8.

objecting to a system of distribution based upon an equal opportunity to compete (i.e., meritocracy), such a model can be questioned on normative grounds, quite apart from any empirical analysis. In fact, Jencks's lengthy empirical analysis about the determinants of school outcomes and the determinants of adult status is essentially irrelevant to his normative argument for greater equality.

Jencks's argument is misleading because it is based upon a confused philosophical understanding of the normative concepts of equality of opportunity and equality of results (or equality of circumstances). In other words, Jencks has caught himself in a serious conceptual muddle. The concepts of "equality" and "equality of opportunity" are what might be called context-dependent principles. They have no single, definitive meaning. The substantive meaning of the concepts depends upon the context in which they are used.[7] Thus, we may speak of one formal principle of equality: "Equals are to be treated equally and unequals, unequally." This maxim tells us nothing, however, about how to treat individuals or groups in substantive terms. By themselves, the concepts of "equality" and "equality of opportunity" provide no definitive criteria for the distribution of social goods; they do not specify the respects in which people are to be treated equally or unequally. The substantive meaning of "equality" and "equality of opportunity," as well as their relation to each other, depend upon their context in a theory of distributive justice, which would define the distribution of benefits and burdens in society and specify the respects in which individuals are to be considered as equals and treated equally.

The meaning of the concept of "equality of opportunity" varies, then, according to its context in a theory of distributive justice. What Jencks should be attacking is not "equality of opportunity" per se, but rather one particular conception of it. He is actually arguing against the meritocratic conception of equality of opportunity and the meritocratic theory of distributive justice, both of which he seems to misunderstand. The meritocratic theory of distribution involves the notion that a just society is one which distributes social rewards in accordance with merit, that is, ability, effort, achievement. This theory suggests a certain conception of equality of opportunity—competitive equality—an equal chance to compete for desirable social positions and social rewards on the basis of merit. Thus, the meritocratic conception of equality of opportunity means an equal opportunity in the pursuit of success, an equal chance of becoming unequal.

Within the context of the meritocratic model, equality of opportunity is not meant to be construed as a

7 The philosophical literature on the concept of equality is rather extensive. See especially Isaiah Berlin, "Equality as an Ideal," in *Justice and Social Policy*, ed. Frederick A. Olafson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. 128–50, Richard Wollheim, "Equality and Equal Rights," in *Justice and Social Policy*, pp. 111–27, Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, 2d ser., eds. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 110–31; R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1967), chap. 3; B. Paul Komisar and Jerrold P. Coombs, "The Concept of Equality in Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 1974), pp. 223–44, J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Equality. Nomos IX* (New York: Atherton, 1967). A very useful collection is William T. Blackstone, ed., *The Concept of Equality* (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Co., 1969).

means to equality of results. In fact, equality of opportunity and equality of results are logically incompatible. The two terms refer to quite different phenomena. "Equality of opportunity" refers to the assignment of individuals to social roles or social positions and to the criteria according to which individuals are selected to fill those positions. "Equality of results" or "equality of circumstances" refers to the stratification of roles to which individuals are assigned and to the attachment of societal rewards to those roles. The meritocratic model presupposes an existing pattern of social stratification and a system of unequal social rewards in accordance with achievement or merit of some sort. Thus, as equality of opportunity increases, social mobility will increase, but not necessarily social equality (i.e., "equality of results"). In the meritocratic model, "equality of opportunity" and "equality of results" are logically heterogeneous.

What Jencks fails to understand, then, is that the lack of relationship between equality of opportunity and equality of results is a logical, not an empirical one. The normative implications of the meritocratic model are such that we should not expect equality of opportunity to lead to equality of results. To repeat, the lack of relationship between the two is not an empirical one, as Jencks claims. Rather, it is one rooted in the different normative implications of the two concepts. Thus, regardless of the validity of Jencks's empirical analysis, his argument about the determinants of school outcomes and the determinants of inequality in adulthood is essentially irrelevant to his policy conclusion regarding income redistribution. That is, his normative argument for equality of circumstances in no way depends upon whether equality of opportunity leads, empirically, to equality of results.

The conceptual distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of results suggests that if there is any causal relationship to be sought between the two, it is one which moves in the opposite direction from that analyzed by Jencks. If anything, equality of circumstances is a prerequisite for equality of opportunity, not the other way around.[8] In this regard, equality of opportunity can have quite radical implications. Insofar as equality of opportunity involves compensating for individuals' initial social disadvantages associated with family background, for example, then it may suggest measures such as collectivized childrearing in order to compensate for class-related socialization patterns. Jencks, himself, observes that equalizing opportunity necessitates greatly reducing the absolute level of inequality: "Unless a society completely eliminates ties between parents and children, inequality among parents guarantees some degree of inequality in the opportunities available to children."[9] The key point which Jencks fails to understand, of course, is that equality of opportunity, in its meritocratic form, is not meant to lead to equality of results. Equality of opportunity will be compatible with equality of results only in a society which is already radically egalitarian.

There are a number of strategies which Jencks might have adopted in defending his normative position but did not: 1) He could have advocated equality of circumstances as a pre-

8. This point has, of course, been argued forcefully by socialists such as R. H. Tawney. See R. H Tawney, *Equality* (New York: Barnes and Noble/Unwin Books, 1964).

9. Jencks, *Inequality*, p. 4

requisite for genuine equality of opportunity; 2) he could have advocated equality of circumstances per se, i.e., as an alternative to the meritocratic distribution of social rewards; 3) he could have argued for a different conception of equality of opportunity. He was, however, mistaken in trying to discredit equality of opportunity by trying to show that it does not lead empirically to equality of results. What Jencks wants to discredit is not necessarily equality of opportunity, but rather meritocracy. In order for him to make his case for income redistribution, he would have to attack the meritocratic theory of distributive justice directly, on normative grounds. As it stands, his argument misconstrues the position it is meant to oppose.

UTILITARIANISM AND THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION

Let us now turn to Jencks's handling of his own normative assumptions. Many social scientists try to indicate their awareness of the possible bias of values in their research by simply announcing their normative position without any real defense of it. This implicitly reflects a logical positivist view of meta-ethical questions, that is, the assumption that value judgments are matters of individual subjective preference rather than matters of reasoned argument. This is essentially what Jencks does. Nowhere does he provide a comprehensive normative justification for his position on equality. Instead, at the beginning of his book, he simply announces that his commitment to egalitarianism (i.e., his call for income redistribution and equalization of school facilities) is based upon the assumptions of Benthamite utilitarianism.

> We begin with the premise that every individual's happiness is of equal value. From this it is a short step to Bentham's dictum that society should be organized so as to provide the greatest good for the greatest number.[10]

In addition, Jencks applies to social goods the law of diminishing returns (although he means to say the law of diminishing marginal utility). Thus, he asserts that people with low incomes value extra dollars more than do those with high incomes:

> It follows that if we want to maximize the satisfaction of the population, the best way to divide any given amount of money is to make everyone's income the same. Income disparities (except those based on variations in "need") will always reduce overall satisfaction, because individuals with low incomes will lose more than individuals with high incomes will gain.[11]

Thus, Jencks's alternative to the meritocratic theory of distributive justice is a theory based upon Benthamite utilitarianism. It is not, of course, unusual for discussions of public policy problems to appeal to utilitarian criteria. The development of modern welfare economics, for example, has been based upon the assumptions of utility theory.[12] More generally, both academic and non-academic discussions of social policy often reflect an implicit utilitarianism, appealing to notions such as the public good, the public interest, or the general welfare. There is, then, wide currency for the notion that public policy should be evalu-

10. Ibid., p. 9
11. Ibid., pp. 9–10
12. See I. M. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), chap. 1.

ated in terms of the greatest net balance of satisfaction.

Jencks, however, does not fully realize the implications of basing his argument on utilitarian assumptions. There are, to begin with, serious theoretical limitations in trying to use utilitarianism to justify an egalitarian distribution of income, as well as more general problems with utilitarianism as a theory of distributive justice.[13] The focus of concern in this paper, however, will be on the implications of utilitarianism with respect to the distribution of educational goods or educational opportunities. I shall argue that since Benthamite principles can place no special value on a social good such as education, the theory may undermine any argument for improving educational opportunities.

Utilitarianism, at least in its Benthamite formulation, cannot distinguish between the inherent value of different sorts of social goods—between, for example, the value of food and the value of swimming pools, or between the value of education and the value of academic credentials which may increase one's earning power. John Stuart Mill, of course, gave up the Benthamite notion that "pushpin is as good as poetry" well over a century ago. He rejected the idea that comparisons between pleasures must be purely quantitative and tried to distinguish between "higher" and "lower" pleasures.[14] Within a strictly utilitarian framework, however, "higher" and "lower" pleasures cannot be distinguished. External, nonutilitarian criteria must be introduced in order to make such a distinction. Henry Sidgwick, an important synthesizer of utilitarianism, clearly recognized this problem in his rejection of Mill's attempt to distinguish between qualities of pleasure. In order for utilitarian theory to be consistent (i.e., to retain pleasure as the sole ultimate end of rational conduct), Bentham's formulation must be accepted and all qualitative comparisons must be resolvable into quantitative ones. By saying that certain pleasures are "nobler," although less pleasant, we are introducing nonutilitarian (in Sidgwick's terms, nonhedonistic) criteria.[15]

In the framework of utilitarianism, then, the satisfaction of any desire has inherent value which must be taken into account when deciding what is right or just. As John Rawls has noted, in calculating a net balance of satisfaction, it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for.[16] In a sense, the utilitarian position presupposes the legitimacy of a free market economy model for the distribution of social goods. Utilitarian theory can make no normative distinctions between different types of social goods. Consumers decide themselves which goods will give them satisfaction. All utilitarianism can do is count heads and try to discover who wants what. Not surprisingly, these sorts of

13 See especially Hugo A. Bedau, "Justice and Classical Utilitarianism," in *Justice: Nomos VI*, eds. Carl Friedrich and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton, 1963); Nicholas Rescher, *Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

14. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, chap. 2.

15 Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, 5th ed (London. Macmillan, 1893), pp. 94–95

16. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 30.

assumptions are strongly implicit in the Jencks argument.

With respect to education, Jencks jettisons his diminishing marginal utility argument for equalization:

> If schooling and knowledge are thought of strictly as ends in themselves, it is impossible to make a case for distributing them equally. We can see no reason to suppose, for example, that people with relatively little schooling value additional schooling more than people who have already had a lot of schooling. Experience suggests that the reverse is the case. Insofar as schooling is an end in itself, then, Benthamite principles imply that those who want a lot should get a lot, and those who want very little should get very little . . . insofar as knowledge or skill is valued for its own sake, an unequal distribution is likely to give more satisfaction to more people than an equal distribution.[17]

Since the demand for both schooling and cognitive skills is very unequal, and since the marginal utility principle does not seem to apply to education, Jencks concludes that the case for equalizing the distribution of schooling and cognitive skills cannot derive from the idea of maximizing consumer satisfaction. Any argument for equality in education must be based on the assumption that education is a means to equalizing status and income in adult life.[18]

Since Jencks's entire book is designed to show that schooling has a relatively minimal effect on inequality in adult life, he would seem to be left with a rather weak case for equalizing schools. Within the context of a strictly utilitarian framework, schooling is important only insofar as it maximizes satisfaction and cannot, by itself, be deemed of greater value than any other social good. Not coincidentally, then, Jencks asserts that the case for distributing school resources and educational opportunities equally is the same as the case for making the distribution of public parks, trash collection, and other public services equal: Everyone should get more or less comparable benefits over a lifetime.[19] For those who do not want to take their benefits from schooling, there should be other options. Jencks thus advocates a system of financing which provides alternative services to those who get relatively few benefits from the educational system. If people do not wish to attend school or college, an egalitarian society should accept this as a legitimate decision and, instead, provide them with benefits such as subsidized job training, subsidized housing, or perhaps simply a lower tax rate.[20]

Jencks's position does not, however, necessarily make sense from an egalitarian perspective. It does not even make sense from a utilitarian perspective, given his conclusions about the effects of schooling. If he is correct in maintaining that schools have little effect on differences in cognitive skills or adult earnings, it becomes uncertain what benefits are being accrued by individuals from public education. Jencks's position is justifiable only in a society which is indifferent to the amount or quality of education which its citizens receive. Consider Jencks's view of higher education. Most egalitarians, he notes, advocate giving all people as much education as they want and financing it through a progressive income tax. No injustice is seen in taxing high school dropouts in order to finance higher

17. Jencks, *Inequality*, p. 11.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 17
20. Ibid., p. 23.

education as long as everyone has an opportunity to attend college. This position, Jencks contends, is rooted in a mistaken analogy between education and other public services. Certain public services are free either because it is difficult to determine who benefits from them (e.g., public parks) or because the beneficiaries are needier than the average taxpayer (e.g., public hospitals). Higher education falls into neither category. The beneficiaries of higher education are readily identified. Thus, Jencks concludes, we ought to consider a system of education where access depends upon the student's willingness to pay in the future, as in a system of deferred tuition.[21]

Jencks's characterization of education here ought to be examined with a bit of care. First, it is not self-evident as to who benefits from schooling. Jencks views benefits entirely in individual and economic terms. If, however, he is correct in suggesting that schooling has relatively little economic payoff, then we can hardly say that students ought to finance their own schooling from the economic benefits which they will accrue in later life. Furthermore, one could argue, on utilitarian grounds, that society as a whole benefits from having an educated population, in social, political, and cultural, as well as economic, terms. That is, the general welfare might be enhanced by a more equal distribution of educational benefits. In this regard, the analogy between schools and a public service such as hospitals is not quite so far fetched. Both education and medical care might be viewed as vital public services insofar as both the intellectual and physical health of the community are deemed important. In Jencks's framework, however, education is not a vital public service at all. It is viewed rather as a good to be valued in terms of individual consumption.

Be that as it may, Jencks insists that he does not want to forget about schools, although his reasons are unclear. He spends an entire book assessing the effects of schooling on adult life and concluding that the effects are minimal. At the same time, he asserts that he wants to get away from the view that schools should be evaluated in terms of what they produce:

> We have been preoccupied with the *effects* of schooling, especially those effects that might be expected to persist into adulthood. This has led us to adopt a "factory" metaphor, in which schools are seen primarily as places that alter the characteristics of their alumni. Our research has convinced us that this is the wrong way to think about schools.[22]

Jencks tries to make a case for equalizing school expenditures which rests on the assumption that public money ought to be equitably distributed even if it has no long-term effect. Thus, he wants to justify adequate school financing on the ground of making life better (i.e., as pleasant as possible) for children now, rather than because of any effects of education on adult life:

> Instead of evaluating schools in terms of long-term effects on their alumni, which appear to be relatively uniform, we think it wiser to evaluate schools in terms of their immediate effects on teachers and students, which appear much more variable. Some schools are dull, depressing, even terrifying places, while others are lively, comfortable, and reassuring. If we think of school life as an

21. Ibid., pp. 38–39.

22. Ibid., p. 13.

end in itself rather than a means to some other end, such differences are enormously important. Eliminating these differences would not do much to make adults more equal, but it would do a great deal to make the quality of children's (and teachers') lives more equal.[23]

Despite Jencks's intentions here, this is virtually an impossible case for him to make. Jencks is trapped by his own analytical framework in a number of ways. To begin with, he is constrained by the factory metaphor, which he claims to have rejected. While he maintains that it is the internal life of the school that is important, his entire empirical analysis is based on the input-output model.[24] His empirical analysis shows, however, that schooling gives the individual relatively little economic payoff. Where, then, does that leave Jencks? He wants to view school life as an end in itself, but he cannot place any intrinsic value on education (defined by, say, cognitive development). His Benthamite assumptions lead him to view social goods entirely in terms of maximizing pleasure or satisfaction. Schools are either factories or playgrounds. (Note that Jencks's objection to the factory metaphor is empirical, not normative.) Whether any learning (i.e., education) goes on inside them is irrelevant within Jencks's framework. Philip Jackson has raised this same criticism rather nicely: ". . . if the justification for *all* the activities that go on [in school] is based on enjoyment alone, we would have difficulty distinguishing between a school and an amusement park. If school is only fun, why have school? Why *not just* have fun?"[25]

For Jencks, schools are either factories or amusement parks. Within his utilitarian framework, there are only two possibilities: schools as a vehicle to economic success or schools as a place to have fun. In either case, of course, the criterion is maximizing satisfaction. From such a point of view, the case for equalizing, or even improving, educational opportunities rests on rather weak ground. After all, if schools do not or cannot do anything of lasting importance, but simply serve to make life pleasant for those who go to school, then why have public funding of education in the first place? Perhaps there are more efficient ways to produce happiness or to maximize satisfaction. Jencks is unable to justify the value of schooling except in utilitarian terms and thus cannot, in fact, place any intrinsic value on education. He gives himself away when he says:

> . . . students' and teachers' claims on the public purse are no more legitimate than the claims of highway users who want to get home a few minutes faster, manufacturers of supersonic aircraft who want to help their stockholders pay for Caribbean vacations, or medical researchers who hope to extend a man's life expectancy by another year or two.[26]

Such a contention may offend one's sense of justice, but it is inherent in the logic of the position which Jencks is advocating. For Jencks, as for Bentham, pushpin is, indeed, as good as poetry, and supersonic transports are as good as schools. In Jencks's empirical analysis, schooling is shown to have little instrumental value; in his normative framework, education has no intrin-

23. Ibid., p. 256.

24. See Philip W. Jackson, "After Apple-Picking," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 43, no. 1 (February 1973), pp. 53–55.

25. Ibid., p. 56.

26. Jencks, *Inequality*, p. 29.

sic value. Jencks, perhaps, has some minimal justification for equalizing school expenditures, but he cannot make a convincing case for spending the money in the first place. He is bound to such a weak position so long as he views the distribution of educational opportunities in terms of a utilitarian framework.

CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF POLICY RESEARCH

This paper has tried to show that Jencks's "forensic social science" fails because of a neglect of certain fundamental issues in normative political theory. I first argued that Jencks's mode of attacking the idea of equality of opportunity is misdirected. He tries to show empirically that equality of opportunity does not lead to equality of results. This approach is both unnecessary and misleading. The key reason for this error is that Jencks misunderstands the normative theory he wants to attack and misconstrues the conceptual relationship between equality of opportunity and equality of results. I then argued that Jencks's own normative position is delimited by his Benthamite assumptions. Most particularly, Benthamite utilitarianism suggests a rather narrow view of education. Jencks can view the function of schools only in terms of maximizing satisfaction and thus cannot make a convincing case for equalizing educational opportunities.

Most of Jencks's critics have attacked his methodology. I am suggesting that the most basic problem with Jencks's work may be his failure to be critically aware of the underlying normative assumptions of both his own theory and the theory he is attacking. At least in part, the debate over whether schools can provide equality of educational opportunity is a normative debate. This point is obscured by the inability of most social policy research to deal adequately with normative concepts and normative arguments. There is often not sufficient sensitivity, on the part of either social scientists or policymakers, to the conceptual and normative problems involved in trying to move from specific research to policy recommendations.

The question of what it is that we "know," in the empirical sense, or can "conclude," in the sense of reaching policy decisions, when drawing inferences from the findings of social research, cannot be answered scientifically. It is very much a philosophical question. Social and political analysis (and policy analysis in particular) is necessarily conceptual and normative, as well as empirical. What may appear to be empirical or even methodological disagreements (in this case, in the analysis of educational policy) are often actually normative disagreements. Links between empirical findings and policy conclusions (i.e., what ought to be done) cannot be made intelligibly in the absence of a clearly defined normative framework. Without a clear philosophical justification, the same scientific evidence can be used to support a variety of different, and often contradictory, policy positions, especially when the empirical findings are themselves ambiguous and tentative and are the subject of methodological dispute among social researchers, as is the case with the educational policy research discussed here. The policy implications of empirical research depend, in a very fundamental sense, upon the underlying normative assumptions of the research, upon the use of normative concepts, and upon

the normative model which informs the analysis.

That social scientists such as Jencks do not adequately clarify or justify their normative assumptions is a problem of more than just academic interest. Research findings do sometimes influence public policy, although usually not in the direct fashion that may seem rational or desirable to many social scientists. It is probably a mistake to believe that policy research in general or specific policy studies affect individual policy decisions in any clear-cut manner. Policy research may, however, affect public policy in a rather different way. Public policy does not simply consist of particular policy decisions. As David Cohen and Michael Garet observe, social policy also involves a system of knowledge and beliefs, i.e., ideas about the causes of social problems, assumptions about how society works, and notions about appropriate solutions to social problems. In this regard, educational policy research probably has affected the system of ideas underlying educational policy in this country. While individual studies may not affect individual policy decisions, cumulative research traditions do sometimes shape public policy. Fluctuations in support for compensatory education, for example, may be related to beliefs about the implications of social scientific studies such as the Coleman Report and Jencks's work. Thus, policy research conceived in terms of *traditions* of inquiry and *systems* of knowledge and belief does probably help shape policy *climates*.[27] Put differently, educational policy research may have profound effects upon conventional wisdom about education, which in turn helps direct the broad course of public policy.

The avowed purpose of Jencks's radical policy analysis is to discredit, or at least refine, conventional wisdom about education and social inequality. His success in this regard, however, is severely diminished by the fact that he accepts as given an analytical and methodological framework which asks certain questions, rather than others, about schools. Despite his concern with redistributing income and his insistence that schooling ought not to be viewed in instrumental, economic terms, his entire analysis is based upon the equal opportunity/social mobility/status attainment model which he claims to have rejected. This framework has, of course, certain normative implications as well. Moreover, Jencks's own normative assumptions, in regard to both the basis of equality and the purpose of education, are vaguely defined and inadequately justified. One consequence of this is that his lengthy and elaborate empirical analysis is largely irrelevant to the normative position which he wants to take. Perhaps more importantly, however, one unanticipated effect of his work may be to reinforce, rather than belie, existing preconceptions about education in American society.

The ramifications of policy research for public policy are complicated by the fact that the findings of social science which relate to policy issues, such as education, do not easily escape politicization (even if they were not inherently political to begin with). On the contrary, research findings are filtered through the academic establishment, the mass media, government bureau-

27. David K. Cohen and Michael S. Garet, "Reforming Educational Policy With Applied Social Research," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 45, no. 1 (February 1975), especially pp. 20–21 and 23–25.

cracies, and other institutions holding various ideological predispositions which strongly affect the way research is interpreted and utilized. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the findings of the Coleman Report have been used to justify a wide range of differing and often contradictory strategies (e.g., integration, compensatory education, community control, education vouchers) for attaining equal educational opportunity. Social scientific research on social policy issues does not take place in a political vacuum, and the ultimate inferences drawn from social science by policymakers may depend, more than anything else, upon the dominant ideology or conventional wisdom of a particular time period. The very terms in which Jencks and other social scientists frame their debates over educational policy often reflect (both implicitly and explicitly) the ideological assumptions which inform the status quo.[28]

More than academic scholars care to admit, then, one unanticipated function of social scientific findings regarding social policy in general and educational policy in particular may be a symbolic one of buttressing certain kinds of ideologies.[29] Social scientific research both generates symbols about the meaning of the social world and is itself a symbol of legitimacy. Faith in the ability of empirical science to solve educational problems in particular has been widespread among educators and policymakers, if not the general public. Scientific theories, running from Darwinism in the nineteenth century to cultural deprivation theories of the past 20 years, have been used to justify many different sorts of educational policies and ideologies. Because of the role of social science as a legitimating symbol in debates over educational policy, it is especially incumbent upon policy analysts both to clarify their normative assumptions and to justify them in terms of a larger theoretical framework. Particularly when the available evidence is compatible with more than one explanatory theory, the responsibilities of social scientists must go beyond merely presenting empirical data. They are obligated also to understand the subtleties of the relationship between empirical explanation and normative judgment, as well as to examine critically the normative assumptions and normative implications of social scientific research.[30]

28. See Stephan Michelson, "The Further Responsibility of Intellectuals," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol 43, no. 1 (February 1973), pp 92–105

29. On the role of symbolism in politics, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), and idem, *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham, 1971).

30 See the illuminating discussion by William E. Connelly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," *Polity*, vol. 6 no. 1 (Fall 1973), 5–35.

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Contemporary Crime in Historical Perspective: A Comparative Study of London, Stockholm, and Sydney

By TED ROBERT GURR

ABSTRACT: The question is whether historical evidence from other Western societies helps us understand the apparent increase in contemporary crime. Official records of offenses against persons and property in London, Stockholm, and Sydney show remarkably similar trends during the past 150 years. From around 1840 to 1930, indicators of common crime fell by an average ratio of 8:1. Since then, especially since 1950, they have increased by similar ratios. Changes in criminal law, police systems, and judicial policies in these societies are examined to see whether they explain the trends. One conclusion is that the trends are a roughly accurate tracing of real changes in the magnitude of socially-threatening behavior. Another is that the policies and institutions, credited for a century of improving public order, have little impact on the contemporary increase. It is suggested that those who blame increasing crime on "repressive" or "inefficient" officials are missing the real social and intellectual issues.

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ALMOST all authorities concerned with criminal justice and ordinary citizens in Western societies believe that common crimes against persons and property are, and have been, increasing for some years. Crime statistics by and large support this perception of rising disorder. In most countries of Western Europe, in North America, and in Australia and New Zealand, the official data document a decade or more of accelerating increase in rates of most kinds of offenses known to police, arrests for them, and criminal proceedings taken.

A common view among sociologists concerned with crime is that the data on which such judgments are based are grossly unreliable. They are a function, it is argued, of the way in which crime is defined, policed, and recorded. On this view, the perception and fear of rising crime can be dismissed as a social myth. Scholarly attention is directed away from the study of threatening behavior per se to the analysis of the interests and activities of officials who "create" crime by selective labelling and policing, and to the study of the circumstances which induce in people an exaggerated fear of crime. A corollary of this approach is that it enables the analyst to invert the structure of social responsibility. Whereas officials and private citizens blame criminals, who are mainly young and poor, for deviant acts, the critical sociologist places the onus on the authorities and citizens whose interests motivate them to "cry thief" when threatened from below.[1]

The purpose of this essay is to bring some historical perspectives to bear on the issue of public order as it is reflected, or distorted, in official data. The empirical grist for this analysis is provided by data on crime for three Western cities from the 1820s to the 1970s.

CONCEPTS AND MEASURES OF DISORDER

In the larger study from which this paper is derived, "disorder" means the socially-threatening acts commonly called crime and civil strife. This paper deals only with crime, defined in its formal-legal sense, as those individual acts which are legally proscribed and sanctioned by public authority.[2]

The beginning point for this analysis is to identify the trends and patterns in official data on crime in London, Stockholm, and Sydney, weighted for population.[3] One funda-

1. A detailed North American statement of this point of view is Clayton A. Hartjen, *Crime and Criminalization* (New York Praeger, 1974). Others are Austin Turk, *Criminality and Legal Order* (Skokie, Ill.: Rand-McNally, 1969), Richard Quinney, *The Social Reality of Crime* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), idem, *Critique of Legal Order* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). Critical European analyses are provided by Herman Bianchi, Mario Simondi, and Ian Taylor, eds., *Deviance in Europe: Papers from the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control* (London: Wiley, 1975); Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, *The New Criminology. For a Social Theory of Deviance* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

2. For a more extensive discussion of definitions, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers. A Political History of Urban Crime and Conflict* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976), chaps 1 and 2.

3. There has been little comparative historical research on crime. We know of some 20 quantitative studies of the changing incidence of crime in English-speaking societies, only four of which span as much as a century, and none of which examine more than one society. The principal American contributions, all dealing with Boston, are Theodore N. Ferdinand, "The Criminal Patterns of Boston Since 1849," *American*

mental difficulty with such indicators is the inherent inaccuracy of official data on offenses and offenders. Crime, as legally defined, usually is covert behavior, which means that ordinary crimes against persons and property come to official attention by the reports of those victims who choose to report them, while so-called victimless crimes ordinarily are detected only through active police work, which is notoriously variable in scope and quality. Add to this the inconsistent recording practices of the police and statistical bureaus, and one has ample grounds for the kind of judgment passed by Daniel Bell, that criminal statistics in the United States are about as reliable "as a woman giving her 'correct' age." There is comparable skepticism about official crime data in other Western societies.[4]

Much of the debate over the accuracy of crime statistics results from attempts to assess the true extent of criminal behavior. Perhaps that is the wrong question to ask. In this study we are concerned with two other problems, which are equally important, and more readily answered with such data as are available. The first is how much popular and official concern there is about crime, and how much public effort is directed at it. These are precisely the kinds of conditions that are most directly reflected in official crime data. Readily available indicators and their *prima facie* significance include:

Indicator	*Prima facie significance*	*Validity of information*
Crimes known to police per 1000 population	Extent of citizen and police concern with crime	For crimes with victims, markedly influenced by citizen trust in police. For crimes without victims, a function of police surveillance. For both, a function of recording systems
Arrests per 1000	Extent of police action against suspected offenders	Generally good, but affected by recording and reporting practices
Committals to trial per 1000	Extent of official concern with crime	Good, except where cases are shifted among jurisdictions or between higher and lower courts
Convictions per 1000	Extent of official sanctions against offenders	Good

Journal of Sociology, vol. 73 (July 1967), pp. 688–98; Roger Lane, *Policing the City Boston, 1822–1885* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), and Sam Bass Warner, *Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston* (Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1934). An exception to the singular fascination with Boston is Elwin H. Powell, *The Design of Discord: Studies of Anomie* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), part 2, which focuses on the history of crime in Buffalo, New York Two major studies of England are V. A. C. Gatrell and T. B. Hadden, "Criminal Statistics and Their Interpretation," in *Nineteenth Century Society*, ed E. A. Wrigley (Cambridge, Eng.. The University Press, 1972), pp. 336–96, and J. M. Beattie, "The Pattern of Crime in England 1660–1800," *Past and Present*, vol. 62 (February 1974), pp. 47–92.

4 Daniel Bell, "The Myth of Crime Waves," in his *The End of Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 157. A more recent North American critique is Donald Mulvihill and Melvin Tumin, "American Criminal Statistics: An Explanation and

The second problem deals with how public order changes over time. On the above argument, statistics on crime and arrests in most contemporary societies are, in effect, the reports of the social and political system to itself about the seriousness of its self-defined problems of public order. As public concern mounts, more crimes are likely to be reported; as police concern rises, so will patrolling and arrests. Similarly, changes in the extent of official insecurity will likely show up in changing rates of commitals for trial, convictions, and—depending on the time and place—the severity of sentences. Evidently there is a circular process in which increasing public concern is likely to generate higher rates of reported crime.

It is reasonable to assume that there is an approximate relation between changes in objective criminal behavior and changing public concern. If illegal behavior of particularly threatening kinds increases in frequency and visibility, concern and official reaction are likely to increase too, perhaps more rapidly than the behavior itself. Therefore the trends in crime indicators are revealing about the changing volume of disorderly behavior in ways that statistics, for one point in time, cannot be. The one major qualification is that changes in the law, police procedures, and court disposition of cases sometimes occur independently of the degree of concern about crime, and alter indicators as a consequence. So the practical task, when interpreting data on crime trends, is to disentangle the social reality of behavioral change from the political and administrative reality of change in the institutions which respond to and record behavioral change.

In brief, official data on crime, weighted by population, are prima facie indicators of levels of public disorder, defined as the extent of public concern about crime (indexed by indicators of crimes known to police) and the extent of official efforts at crime control (indexed by data on arrests and convictions). Given enough contextual information, one may also be able to infer the relative importance of behavioral and institutional factors in causing changes in indicators of public disorder. In the aggregate, we can think of crime data as the product of two different conditions. One is behavioral: the volume of criminal acts. The other is institutional: the activities of the agencies which define and maintain public order. Both change over time, but changes in official activities are more readily observable than changes in social behavior. Given an observed set of short- and long-term trends in indicators of disorder, institutional factors are examined first to see to what extent they can account for the trends. By a process of elimination, the residual changes, if any, can with some confidence be attributed to changes in social behavior.

Appraisal," in *Crimes of Violence* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 11, 1969) For general commentary on the sources, uses, and limitations of criminal statistics, with special reference to Britain, see Hermann Mannheim, *Comparative Criminology* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), chap. 5, and, especially Nigel Walker, *Crimes, Courts, and Figures: An Introduction to Criminal Statistics* (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1971). The adequacy of contemporary Australian data on crime is discussed in Paul Wilson and J. Brown *Crime and the Community* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1973).

THE REVERSING TREND IN PUBLIC ORDER IN THREE CITIES, 1820S TO THE 1970S

Optimistic celebration of the improvements in urban life was a common theme of observers of most Western cities during the second half of the nineteenth century. Improved public order was one of the celebrated accomplishments. Not only were streets increasingly likely to be paved and lighted, they were safer to travel by day and night. Not only were productivity and personal wealth increasing, property was more secure from the depredations of thieves than ever before. One can be skeptical about whether the voiceless underclasses had such a rosy perception of city life. The fact remains that the official records of crime and punishment for three cities that we have studied in depth document a sustained improvement in public order that began in the second quarter of the century and continued to 1900. In proportion to the rapidly growing populations of London, Stockholm, and Sydney, the numbers of murders, assaults, and thefts of almost all kinds which came to police attention declined irregularly, but consistently, for half a century or more. So did the numbers of persons arrested and convicted for such offenses. As public order improved, so did the quality of justice. The courts, though harsh and biased against defendants by contemporary standards, were distinctly more lenient and solicitous of defendants' rights than they had been before 1850.[5]

Public order, as reflected in the official data, continued to improve in London until the 1920s, and in Stockholm and Sydney, through the 1930s. No clear trends were evident during the 1940s, but in the 1950s a pronounced increase began in almost all indicators of crimes against persons and property, one that has continued upward to the present at an accelerating rate in all three cities. We have noted the skepticism of many sociologists about the significance of the reported recent increases in disorder; they have voiced no such doubts about the declines of the nineteenth century, indeed seem unaware of them. The historians, for their part, generally accept the social reality of improving public order in the nineteenth century, but have not been disposed to evaluate recent developments. Our analysis summarily examines selected indicators of crime across a century and a half, with special attention to the changing institutions which generated them, as a means of assessing the validity of the historical versus sociological interpretations.

Indicators of common crime

The first consistent data on criminal offenses in the three cities appeared early in the nineteenth century. By 1880 they reached, and in some cases surpassed, in detail and precision the data currently available. A deceptively difficult problem in this kind of study is matching crime to population data for the purpose of constructing indicators. Our data for London before 1869 refer to the County of Middlesex alone and to the Metropolitan Police District (MPD) thereafter. The data on Stockholm refer to the administrative city, whose boundaries have ever lagged behind

5. See the case studies in Ted Robert Gurr, Peter N. Grabosky, and Richard C. Hula, *The Politics of Crime and Conflict: A Comparative History of Four Cities* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977)

suburban sprawl; in 1968, for example, administrative Stockholm included only 59 percent of the population of Greater Stockholm. Data on crime in the City of Sydney proved so scanty that we employ data on crime and population for New South Wales in its entirety; Sydney, itself, has comprised as little as 25 percent of its population (in the 1850s) and as much as 60 percent (in 1970).

This analysis is limited to "common crimes" against persons and property, because these are the offenses that typically arouse the most widespread and vocal public concern. Since people of all classes fear and excoriate offenses like murder, assault, robbery, and burglary, they can be expected to be more often reported to the authorities and more consistently policed than moral offenses or political crimes.

To simplify comparison, we use summary indicators of crimes of agression and crimes of acquisition. These are constructed by aggregating more detailed categories of offense. For London, for example, the summary indicator for crimes of aggression includes murder, manslaughter, attempted murder, wounding, and assault (but not rape or armed robbery). The summary indicator of crimes of acquisition includes burglary, robbery, larceny, receiving stolen goods, fraud, embezzlement, forgery, and similar offenses.[6] For London and Sydney (New South Wales) the analysis is restricted to the more serious (indictable) offenses of these two kinds, because data for lesser offenses are not available for the entire period of interest. Only for Stockholm are data on petty as well as serious offenses available for the entire period—more precisely, from 1830 onwards.

The criminal justice system has been likened to a funnel in which the police record many more offenses than they clear by arrest, and many more people are arrested than are charged, tried, and convicted. For each city and general category of offense, we sought indicators representing what was happening at two distant points in the funnel: crimes known to police and convictions. For New South Wales, statistics on crimes known are too sparse, so arrest data are used instead. The two kinds of indicators are not uniformly available for the full century and a half. With some exceptions, only convictions data were reported during much of the nineteenth century and only offenses known for the most recent period. Moreover, the two indicators usually differ markedly in magnitude, crimes known being invariably more numerous than convictions. Nonetheless, for periods when both were reported, they prove to be closely correlated; that is, they have similar peaks, valleys, and trends.[7] This simplifies the task of studying long-term trends because it shows that known of-

6. Many of the components of these composite crime indicators are separately analyzed in Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula, *The Politics of Crime and Conflict*, pts. 2 through 4, and almost all of them prove to have similar trends. The most significant exception is burglary in London, which increased throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

7. These are representative correlations (Pearson r's) between alternative indicators of disorder: Stockholm, 1865–1963, thefts known versus convictions, r = .89, London, 1893–1931, arrests for all indictable offenses versus convictions on trial, r = .84; New South Wales, 1914–70, arrests for crimes of aggression versus convictions, r = .75, arrests for acquisitive crimes versus convictions, r = .89.

fenses and convictions can be used, cautiously, as interchangeable indicators of trends in disorder.

London. Historians of crime and public order in England have pointed to the Victorian era as one in which civil order greatly improved. Trends in indicators of court convictions for serious crimes of acquisition and aggression, in figures 1–4, are entirely in accord with the historical judgment and, we might add, with the opinions of contemporary Londoners who committed their views to paper. The 1830s and 1840s were disorderly times, matched by strenuous efforts at official control, including the founding of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and the high conviction rates reflected in our data. By the 1850s, however, conviction rates declined markedly and continued to do so, though more gradually, throughout the Victorian and Edwardian eras. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the conviction rates for both categories of serious crime were approximately one-quarter of what they had been in the 1830s and 1840s.

Most data series for the MPD were interrupted by the Great Depression, but there is evidence of a substantial increase in known crimes of both types beginning in the late 1920s. Data after the Second World War are for known offenses only, not convictions; nonetheless, indicators of all categories of known crimes show marked increases. (So do measures of total convictions, not shown here.) As of 1930 known crimes of aggression were about 7 per 100,000 population, compared to about 12 per 100,000 in the early 1950s. The most dramatic changes in all the London data are the increases in offenses known after 1955. Between that year and the early 1970s the indicator of crimes of acquisition increases by a factor

FIGURE 1

London: Indictable crimes of aggression, 1834–1931, per 1000 population.

FIGURE 2

London: Indictable crimes of acquisition, 1820–1931, per 1000 population.

FIGURE 3

London. Indictable crimes of acquisition, 1933–1972, per 1000 population.

Change in reporting procedures

30

20

10

1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

FIGURE 4

London: Indictable crimes of aggression known to police, 1945–1972.

of four; assaults and similar crimes by a factor of seven; and the murder rate more than doubles. Official data through 1975, not graphed here, show no levelling off of the upward trend.[8]

Stockholm. The crime data for Stockholm, summarized in figures 5–7, are aggregated somewhat differently from those of London, but trace a similar pattern. Convictions for assault and breach of the peace, though quite variable in the nineteenth century, were higher than in the first half of the twentieth century by a ratio of about 4 to 1. Statistics on convictions were not reported after 1947, but the overlapping indicator of assaults known to the police shows a four-fold upturn after 1950. Murder and manslaughter are, and have been, relatively rare crimes in Stockholm, but convictions and reports for them (not shown here) showed a similar decline from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century, and a marked increase from 1950 to 1965.

Indicators for theft in Stockholm include both serious and petty offenses, but not the white-collar crimes, like fraud, that are included in the indicators of crimes of ac-

8. For a more detailed analysis of crime in London, see Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula, *The Politics of Crime and Conflict*, pt. 2.

FIGURE 5

Stockholm: Convictions for assault and breach of the peace, 1842–1947, and reported cases of assault, 1943–1971, per 1000 population.

quisition for the other cities. The convictions data show that, as in London, the 1830s and 1840s were times of unprecedented civil action against offenders. The long-term trend thereafter was one of decline, interrupted by marked, but short-term, increases about 1870 and 1918. In the 1920s and 1930s the conviction rates were half what they had been between 1890 and 1915, and one-fifth their levels a century

FIGURE 6

Stockholm. Convictions for theft, 1830–1964, per 1000 population.

FIGURE 7

Stockholm: Thefts known to police, 1866–1970, per 1000 population.

before. Statistics on known offenses were reported only after 1865, but generally show the same gradual decline—and sharp, short-term increases—as the data on convictions. Beginning in the 1940s, concern about property crimes seems to have increased as drastically as it did in London, judging by the indicator of offenses known. They more than double during the 1940s, decline briefly, and then double and redouble in the next 20 years. The convictions data are available only through 1964, but trace the same variations: by 1964 the conviction rate was four times what it was in the late 1930s. The sheer scale of the contemporary problem is suggested by the fact that one serious (indictable) theft was reported for every 20 Londoners in 1974, and one theft for every 11 inhabitants of Stockholm in 1971.[9]

Sydney. Sydney was founded as a penal colony in 1788. Until the end of transportation of convicts from England in 1840, a sizeable proportion of its inhabitants were convicts or ex-convicts, who were

9. For a more detailed analysis of crime in Stockholm, see ibid., pt 3

unquestioningly assumed to have criminal proclivities by the nonconvict population and whose behavior was subject to careful policing and harsh sanctions. One consequence was the very high—absolute and relative—level of convictions for serious crimes in early nineteenth century New South Wales, shown in figures 8 and 9. Despite the distinctive composition of the population and its antipodean location, the nineteenth century trends in New South Wales are remarkably similar to those in London and Stockholm. Conviction rates began to decline in the 1840s rather than later, but from then to the end of the century, their steady decline was marked only by slight perturbations. If 1840–41 is used as a base period and conviction rates then are compared with those 20 and 40 years later, these approximate ratios are obtained:

	1840–41	early 1860s	1880s
Serious crimes of acquisition	6	2	1
Serious crimes of aggression	10	2	1

The twentieth century data in figures 10 and 11 show that the trend continued through the 1930s. Underneath the marked year-to-year fluctuations, it is apparent that by the early 1930s the conviction rates for these two categories of offenses had declined by nearly half from their levels in the 1880s.

FIGURE 8

New South Wales: Serious acquisitive crimes, 1811–1892, convictions per 1000 population.

FIGURE 9

New South Wales: Serious aggressive crimes, 1811–1892, convictions per 1000 population.

In the 1940s, in what is by now familiar pattern, the conviction ates for serious acquisitive crimes egan to increase substantially; they ripled by 1970 and showed no igns of levelling off. Convictions or serious aggressive crimes also ncreased but not so sharply: their werage in the 1950s and 1960s vas about double the rates of 1935–10, and they do not increase signif-cantly after the early 1950s. The arrest rate for such crimes (not shown), however, increased much more sharply and continuously throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and in the latter decade was 600 percent of the arrest rates in the 1930s. The apparent discrepancy is readily explained: one of the institutional responses to rising arrest rates in New South Wales, as in England, has been to shift less-serious cases from the higher courts to magistrates' courts, which can dispose of them in less costly and more efficient fashion.[10]

Interpreting Trends in Crime

All three of the cities share the Western cultural tradition, and two of them—London and Sydney—have institutions of public order rooted in the English common law tradition. In other respects, though, the cities are dissimilar: they vary in ecological setting, size, political history, economic activities, class composition and stratification, social policy and services. It is all the more singular, therefore, that the trends in their indicators of crime

10 For a more detailed analysis of crime in Sydney and New South Wales, see ibid., pt. 4.

FIGURE 10

New South Wales: Aggressive crimes, 1893–1970, arrests per 10,000 and higher court convictions per 1000.

over a century and a half can be summarized, without serious distortion, in figures 12 and 13. The first figure represents the changing incidence of convictions for crimes of acquisition and violence against the person from the 1830s through the mid-1960s. Figure 13 shows the trends in crimes known during the 60 years for which such data are regularly available.[11]

11 The following procedure was used to determine the common trends. For each city, the moving ten-year average for convictions was recorded for every fifth year for which data were available (as shown in figures 1–11), for 1830, 1835, 1840, and so forth. The lowest rate in each series was set equal to 1.0 and the other rates expressed as a ratio of that. In London, for example, the lowest average conviction rate recorded for indictable murders and assaults between 1820 and 1930 was 1.36 per 100,000 in 1930, while the highest was 12.5 in 1845. The 1930 ratio was set at 1.0, the 1845 ratio, therefore, was 12.5/1.36 = 9.2. The procedure was repeated for the trend in indictable thefts, and for both kinds of convictions in New South Wales (higher court convictions) and Stockholm (all convictions). Since all the series have a common minimum of 1.0, they can be plotted on the same graph. The graph covers only the period for which at least four ratios were available. New South Wales is excluded before 1850 because of its exceptionally high rates during the convict era, if they were included the 1830s average would exceed ten.

FIGURE 11

New South Wales: Serious acquisitive crimes, 1893–1970, higher court convictions per 1000 population.

The fateful question is: What do these trends in public disorder signify? Since official data on public disorder present at best a diffracted image of criminal behavior, one must ask whether the trends can be attributed to changes in the institutions of public order. Such institutional effects must be discounted before one can attribute the trends—if any remain—to a changing social reality.

The vertical bars represent the range of variation around the mean. In 1880, for example, the highest ratio score was 4.8 (aggressive crimes in Stockholm), the lowest was 2.0 (theft in New South Wales), the average of six ratios was 3.2. Neither kind of offense and no one city has a consistently higher or lower rate of decline

Criminalization and decriminalization

The first question is whether there have been substantial redefinitions of criminal behavior in any of the Western societies during the past 150 years that might account for declining crime indicators in the nineteenth century or their increase in the last several decades. Much nineteenth century legislation aimed at controlling economic and political dissent by the working class, but most of it has long since been repealed. There also has been great variation in social and legal definitions of deviant and immoral conduct. The list of social behaviors that have been the subject of recurrent attempts at regulation is

FIGURE 12

The common trend in convictions for crimes of theft and violence in Western societies, 1835–1965.

similar in all three societies and includes—among others—vagrancy, lack of regular employment, infidelity, homosexuality, abortion, prostitution, public urination and profanity, insulting behavior, gambling, alcohol consumption, and the use of drugs other than alcohol. Vagrancy and similar conditions are now rarely a criminal offense and most sexual acts between consenting adults have been decriminalized—formally in England and Sweden, by de facto nonenforcement in New South Wales. Most of the other offenses listed remain on the books.[12]

The changing scope of criminal laws governing collective behavior and social conduct is evident in the spasmodic rise and decline of conviction rates for those offenses. When we turn to crimes of violence and theft, the picture is different. Many revisions have been made in the laws relating to these offenses in all three societies. In

12. Trends in "victimless" crimes and political offenses in the three cities are analyzed in *The Politics of Crime and Conflict*. In some instances they parallel the trends in common crime, in others, not. It should be noted that the most frequent occasion for arrests in all the cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not "common crime" but drunkenness, while in the mid-twentieth century, traffic violations have pride of place

FIGURE 13

The common trend in known crimes of theft and violence in Western societies, 1910–1970.

England the principal changes occurred in the 1820s and 1830s. In Sweden there were wholesale recodifications in 1865 and 1965. In New South Wales the criminal law has grown by accretion, with fairly substantial revisions in 1883 and 1900. But none of these legal changes, nor any others, have in any substantial way broadened or narrowed the prevailing definitions of what constitutes murder, assault, theft, or fraud. Most people in these three societies, dominant groups and ordinary citizens alike, enter the last quarter of the twentieth century with much the same distaste for these kinds of behavior as was found in the nineteenth century.[13]

Police systems

Measures of crimes known to the police depend on public trust in the police and police efficiency. By the same token, arrests, and hence conviction rates, tend to vary with police manpower and efficiency. Therefore we must ask whether changes in the scope, efficiency, or activities of police systems might account for crime trends.

13. For a comparative analysis of changing legal boundaries of crime see Gurr, *Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers*, pt. 2, chap. 3.

The long-term decline in the crime indicators in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries cannot by any stretch of the imagination be attributed to declining police efficiency. The greatest declines in the crime indicators, in fact, followed or coincided with the establishment of modern, centralized police forces in all three cities. In London the Metropolitan Police was established in 1829, replacing a patchwork of uncoordinated and mostly unprofessional police and watch services. From then onward they employed increasingly well-trained officers and new methods of detection, winning the grudging respect and, ultimately, the admiration of London's citizens. Increased efficiency and growing public support coincided with declining rates of commitals and convictions, not increasing ones. In New South Wales there was a marked increase in the efficiency of police following the establishment of a colony-wide force in 1862, and careful inspection of the conviction rates in figures 8 and 9 shows that they increased distinctly and sharply in the next few years. But this is a relatively small fluctuation around the long-term declining trend. In Stockholm the police establishment was centrally organized and given expanded duties and resources in 1850; figure 7 shows that the following decade was characterized by sharply declining rates of conviction for theft. Subsequent reorganizations mainly took the form of the addition of specialized departments, until 1965, when all local police forces in Sweden were placed under national control.

Since increased police efficiency contributed to, or at least coincided with, the improvement of public order in these three cities, it challenges the plausibility of the argument that police efficiency accounts for the contemporary increase in record crime. But the argument needs to be tested more directly. One way in which reformed police procedures might cause increases in crime indicators is by way of change in recording systems. Such a change occurred in London in 1931–32, when police were required to enter into the official records a host of offenses about which they earlier had taken only informal notes. This change caused a doubling in the total number of indictable crimes recorded by police. But we can identify no comparable changes between 1955 and 1972 that might account for the 400 percent increase in known thefts in London. In fact there is a countervailing tendency: there have been recurring increases in the threshold value of goods stolen, distinguishing indictable from nonindictable offenses.

Another example comes from New South Wales, where officials put an end in 1970 to keeping the "Paddy's Book," in which petty offenses were informally recorded. Thereafter, such offences were to be included in the official totals, which means that increases in reported theft after 1970 will be inflated by comparison with pre-1970 data. But there were no recording changes which conceivably could have accounted for reported increases between 1960 and 1970: 200 percent in larceny, 300 percent in breaking and entering, 600 percent in armed robbery. One last example comes from Stockholm, where the rate of reported murders, attempts, and manslaughter (not shown here) increased by a ratio of about 1:5 between the early 1950s and 1967, and then, in the next four

years, fell by 3:1. This improvement in public security reportedly was due to a change away from the practice of using the label "attempted murder" for the more serious cases of assault.

Increased police efficiency historically coincided with declining indicators of common crime in these three cities. Nonetheless, critics of modern police forces often suggest that the recent increases in known offenses, arrests, and convictions are the result of increasingly diligent police dipping into the dark figure of previously unrecorded crime. We have three kinds of evidence to bring to bear on this hypothesis. One is the evidence of police force size: if rising crime indicators follow the expansion in police manpower, then the argument gains plausibility. Elsewhere we have reported on statistical tests of this relationship. Between 1870 and 1940 there were nine instances of particularly rapid short-term expansion in the absolute and proportional size of the police forces in the three cities. During this era, periods of police expansion were followed by short-run declines averaging 3.9 percent per year in indicators of aggressive and acquisitive crime. Between 1941 and 1970, we identified five further instances of rapid police expansion. In this recent period, police expansion was followed by increases averaging 3.8 percent per year in the summary crime indicators. Analysis of the specific circumstances, however, shows that in each case, as in many earlier ones, a sustained increase in reported crime provided the incentive for police expansion. In Stockholm, for example, the ratio of police to population remained roughly constant until 1962; in the next eight years it was expanded by a third. *Crime rates had been rising for a decade or more prior to police expansion. In New South Wales the police force declined in size in the 1950s and early 1960s, then underwent a modest expansion beginning* about 1965, Here, as in Stockholm and London, police expansion reflected public and official concern about previous increases in recorded crime. The police and politicians in these three cities used crime data to justify increases in police resources, but it strains belief to argue that they created crime waves for that purpose. What distinguishes the contemporary experience is that increases in police manpower have not had any impact on the steadily rising rates of crime which prompted police expansion.

Two other tests of the "more thorough policing" explanation are provided by the crime data themselves. The great majority of crimes known to police are not detected through active police patrolling, but come to their attention through citizen complaints. The size and efficiency of the police play little part in this process. Where police efficiency does play a role is in apprehensions. If increased efficiency is a principal cause of rising crime rates, then arrests, and perhaps convictions, should rise as fast or faster than known crimes. The opposite proves to be the case. Postwar data from all three cities show that the known crimes have increased much more rapidly than arrests or convictions.

The third test is provided by comparing the rates of growth in more serious versus less serious offenses. In general, serious offenses are more likely to come to police attention than petty ones. If rising crime rates are the result of more thorough reporting, then the increase in offenses known should consist dispropor-

tionately of minor offenses. It is consistently the case in all three cities that reported assaults—a lesser offense—have increased somewhat more rapidly than murder and attempts. Where theft is concerned, however, the opposite is true: the serious offenses of robbery and burglary have increased far more rapidly than those for petty theft. (See the above figures of New South Wales.) So this evidence is ambiguous. Part of the rise in reported assaults (but not murder) may be a function of increased citizen reporting; the rise in various forms of theft cannot be so explained.[14]

We have identified several instances in which changing police operations caused distinct, abrupt changes in crime indicators. A part of the postwar increase in rates for assault could be due to better policing or better reporting. But the weight of the evidence is substantially against the "more efficient policing" explanation of rising crime rates in these three cities.

Judicial disposition of cases

There are two ways in which changes in court procedures over time might significantly affect indicators of convictions for crime. We need to be especially concerned about these issues when assessing trends in nineteenth century London and New South Wales, where we rely on conviction data alone. Expansion of defendants' rights before the courts may result in proportionally fewer convictions, but this probably can be dismissed as a significant factor in the nineteenth century because the most substantial expansion of rights in all three societies occurred late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth, after many decades of declining conviction rates. In New South Wales, for example, accused persons were not given the right to examine witnesses or testify in their own defense until 1891, nor was an appeals court established until 1912. English reforms of this sort were introduced in the same era. Free legal services were widely provided in Stockholm beginning in 1919, but not in London or New South Wales until much later. The expansion of defendants' rights may help explain why conviction rates have increased much more slowly than known offenses or arrests in the last 20 years, but it does not account for the nineteenth century decline in conviction rates. Moreover, indicators of commitals to trial, show the same declining nineteenth century trends as convictions, which provides one additional kind of verification.

If defendants for a given kind of offense are brought before higher courts in one period, and given summary justice by magistrates' or police courts in another, the conviction rates for serious offenses obviously will be affected. Similarly, courts may be more lenient in one period than another. A variety of evidence shows that the severity of sentences declined substantially during the nineteenth century in all three societies. At the beginning of the 1880s the emphasis was on capital punishment for all major offenses—sentences which in England usually were commuted to transportation to Australia. By mid-century the emphasis had shifted to imprisonment. Later in the nineteenth century and especially in the twentieth century, a decided trend toward shorter sen-

14. For a comparative discussion of the evolution of modern policing systems in the three cities, and more detailed evidence on the impact of changes in policing on crime rates, see ibid., pt. 2, chap. 4.

tences and greater reliance on fines set in. Probation and parole systems were introduced beginning around the turn of the century, as part of a growing interest in rehabilitation. More important for the purpose of interpreting nineteenth century conviction statistics, the same liberalization of punishment was accompanied by increasing reliance on summary justice and probation. In other words, a given criminal offense in the first half of the nineteenth century was more likely to lead to a higher court conviction in both London and New South Wales than it was thereafter. In Stockholm, where we have the parallel evidence on reported offenses and the total volume of convictions, there are no grounds for doubting the magnitude of decline. But in London and, especially, New South Wales, part of the decline in conviction rates is a consequence of changing judicial practice.[15]

CONCLUSION

There are similar 150-year trends in the official data on common crimes in London, Stockholm, and New South Wales. We have examined the historical evidence on the operations of the institutions of public order, to test the possibility that the reversing trend was due largely, or in some substantial part, to changes in the criminal law, urban policing, or court disposition of cases. Some short-term fluctuations in crime rates can be accounted for in these terms. A part of the nineteenth century decline in convictions for serious offenses in London and New South Wales probably was due to shifts in the disposition of cases from higher to lower courts. The recent increases in conviction rates probably are muted by the same factor. There is little evidence, though, that either nineteenth century declines in crimes reported to police, or the dramatic increases since 1950, can be attributed to institutional factors. The major alternative explanation of the reversing trend is also the simplest one: that the volume of threatening social behavior did decrease consistently and dramatically in the nineteenth and early twentieth century experience of these three cities and then, in the aftermath of World War II, began an increase far more rapid than the earlier decline. This interpretation cannot be accepted beyond a shadow of a doubt, because so many distorting cultural and institutional factors intervene between illegal behavior and its official records. But it is improbable, to say the least, that these factors could simultaneously cause declines of four to eight magnitudes in different kinds of crime in three distant and disparate cities in the second half of the nineteenth century and equally great increases in the third quarter of this century. It is far more likely that the trends reflect, in a somewhat distorted way, real and profound changes in aggregate social behavior.

Two fundamental questions are raised by the findings of this study. One is whether they are generalizable to other Western societies. Few published studies have dealt systematically with the nineteenth century records, but those which have come to conclusions similar to ours. The trends we observe in nineteenth century London closely resemble those of all England and Wales.[16]

15 For a comparative discussion of judicial and penal policies in the three cities see ibid., pt. 2, chap 5

16. See Gatrell and Hadden, "Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation."

In France, the rate of persons accused of property crimes declined by a ratio of 10:1 between 1826 and the 1930s.[17] Studies of Boston and Chicago show declines in diverse official indicators of crime during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century.[18] Turning to the contemporary period, the rise in official indicators of crime since around 1950 in London, Stockholm, and New South Wales parallels the widely-documented experience of most other Western societies. In a forthcoming study of trends in public order since 1945, for example, we survey official data on known offenses and convictions in 16 Western democracies. All of them have experienced accelerating rates of property crime in recent years, and most have had parallel increases in offenses against persons. Interestingly enough, the English-speaking and Scandinavian countries have experienced the sharpest and most consistent increases.[19]

The second question is one of causality. What mix of social, economic, demographic, political, and cultural changes are responsible for the common trends in socially-threatening behavior in Western societies? Subsequent studies will deal with aspects of that question. The evidence of this essay, though, does challenge one approach to explanation: it provides little support for the contention that the recorded increase in crimes of theft and violence in Western societies during the recent past can be explained away by changes in the operations of the police and criminal justice systems. On the contrary, the internal consistency of the data and the cross-cultural parallels in trends in public order strongly imply an underlying behavioral reality: an upward surge in socially-threatening behaviors that was first detectable in some societies in the 1930s, subsided briefly after World War II, and then accelerated with gathering momentum to the present.

This conclusion challenges at least one of the conventional views about how to control crime. Although the evidence supports the common belief that crime has greatly increased in most Western societies, it does not sustain the companion belief that the workings of the police, courts, or penal institutions have consistent effects on the magnitude of crime. The century-long decline in common crime that began in the 1840s in London, Stockholm, and New South Wales was accompanied by increased policing and less punitive, more rehabilitative penal treatment. Since the 1960s the same conditions are associated with sharply increasing crime. Leon Radzinowicz made the point well when he said, nearly two decades ago, "The potentiality of criminal legislation and penal system combined, for influencing the phenomenon of crime, has been greatly exaggerated

17. See Abdul Q Lodhi and Charles Tilly, "Urbanization, Crime, and Collective Violence in Nineteenth Century France," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 79 (September 1973), pp. 296–318

18. On Boston, see the references in note 5, above Data on Chicago are reported in Wesley G Skogan, *Chicago Since 1840. A Time-Series Data Handbook* (Urbana: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1975)

19. Ted Robert Gurr, "Crime Trends in Modern Democracies since 1945," *International Annals of Criminology*, forthcoming. The rates of increase have been lowest in the German-speaking countries. Japan offers a marked contrast to the Western experience. its rates of common crime have declined steadily and substantially since the early 1950s.

in all countries."[20] In present perspective, it is evident that the policies of public order which seemed to work for nearly a century no longer have the salutary effects once attributed to them. If the reversing trend is to be explained, it must be by reference to the workings of more fundamental social forces.

One other homily on the state of social knowledge and research about common crime also follows. It is that those who dismiss rising rates of theft, assault, and murder as a social fiction which needs no remedy may be correct in some instances, but in general are just plain wrong. The problem is a very real one in most Western societies, and it weighs most heavily on less advantaged social groups. It is the poor and the near-poor who are most victimized by assault and theft in Western societies, and they are the ones who pay a disproportionate share of the costs of commercial theft, which are passed on as a kind of regressive tax to consumers. They are also the people most likely to be caught up in deviant behavior that becomes, at the hands of the authorities, first a stigma, then a bitter, antisocial life from which there is no exit. From the point of view of all these victims, the academics who dismiss or minimize the social reality of crime from their point of security and social advantage are accessories after the fact, and so are officials who deal symbolically rather than substantively with the issue.

20. Leon Radzinowicz, "Changing Attitudes towards Crime and the Devises Used to Combat it," *Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain*, 37 (1958–59), pp 29–53.

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Sociological Criminology and Models of Juvenile Delinquency and Maladjustment

By DENIS SZABO

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to review and reinterpret the contemporary literature on juvenile delinquency by classifying it according to two explanatory models called the "consensual" and "conflictual" models.

The consensual model considers the social system as a general framework of interactions structured in a homeostatic system, while the conflictual model sees it as a system of unresolvable conflicts between its component elements. Methodological and theoretical correlates of the two models are outlined, based on the general sociological literature; the relevant research on juvenile delinquency is summarized and analyzed according to its ties or affinities to one or the other model. Studies on ecology, social organizations, subcultures, social regulation and control are included in the consensual model; research on hidden delinquency and dark numbers, on deviance as opposed to delinquence, on existential contexts and meaningful acts as opposed to legally defined conduct are included in the conflictual model.

For both models, the impact on social policy and practice is discussed.

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THE identity crisis in sociology during the 1960s fragmented the relative coherence which this discipline had achieved since the 1930s under the influence of a positivist philosophy of science. As in the formative years of the discipline in the latter part of the nineteenth century, we are facing many sociologies, sometimes in fundamental epistemological and methodological conflict with each other. In view of this, it is only natural that sociologists' contributions towards explaining juvenile delinquency must reflect this confusion.

The aim of this paper is to review and to reinterpret the contemporary literature on juvenile delinquency by classifying it according to two explanatory models. These I call the "consensual" and "conflictual" models. I well realize the danger of such a simplification, whatever the heuristic justification. The thinking of most authors reveals many more nuances than are brought to light by the observations in the essay that follows. However, to encourage discussion and to provide an overview of the subject, I decided to risk these perfectly justifiable criticisms.

PARADIGMS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

How can we define these two models? One can get a clear picture of their distinguishing characteristics by looking at how each model views various concepts. Let us consider the concept of social organization first. The consensual model sees social organization as a homeostatic system in which all the elements are related by subtle interactions causing equal retroactions, stabilizing the whole and contributing to its internal cohesion. Conflicts are resolved by the establishment of a new equilibrium. On the other hand, the conflictual model views social organization as a system in which opposing interests create unresolvable conflicts between elements. These conflicts emanate from the very nature of the social organization which it is their mission to change radically. They are the natural instrument to bring about a more just, less alienating society, reconciling man to himself.

The consensual model interprets social reality via an intellectual paradigm which considers reality as a fact which must be discovered, while the conflictual model uses an intellectual paradigm in which reality must be constructed. For the consensual model, all social phenomena are explained in terms of interaction—of domination—between numerous organizations, be they national, religious, ethnic, professional or whatever. The explanatory key and the primary object of analysis is the exercise of power among all the elements of a social organization. For the conflictual model, all social phenomena are explained in terms of class conflict, where social class is defined by the relation of individuals to the ownership of the means of production.

The consensual model assumes that man faces life endowed with a highly complex biogenetic and sociocultural legacy. Placed in certain historical conditions, in a given socioeconomic structure, man develops in different ways according to his learning processes. This differentiation, based on his specific sociological and genetic heritage, gives him a status in society that will be higher or lower than that of others who have a different heritage. This inequality is a fundamental

fact of the human condition; it should be corrected to some extent by the sense of justice existing in each era, but cannot and should not be entirely eliminated. Consensus, the ability and the need to adhere to a common good is at once a principle of explanation and a principle of justification.

The conflictual model assumes the ontological equality of man. Everything that leads to inequality in a given society must therefore be corrected. Correction is not achieved through natural adjustment, but through conflicts, confrontations, and revolutions. Thus, for the conflictual model, conflict is at once a principle of explanation and a principle of justification.

Having outlined some epistemological differences, we can now look at the essential methodological differences between our two models. The consensual model is well suited to the positivist methodology, having a preference for quantitative methods. An analysis of interdependence of factors as, for instance, the effects of social mobility on the integration of the family or of the view of the mother's role in the adoption of specific behavior in the relationships between adolescents and adults, could alone contribute sufficient knowledge of an acceptable scientific exactness. This is the only acceptable way of contributing to a "theory" of society. The social facts are taken as they are, assuming the objectivity and neutrality of the researcher in the gathering of the facts and the interpretation of the results. The relative detachment of the researcher from the conflicting interests being debated is an article of faith that is traditionally proclaimed in the very first chapter of methodological treatises. "To know more and more about increasingly restricted subjects," the adage of the exact sciences, which largely characterizes the positivist methodology, applies as well to the social sciences. The rest is qualified as "literature"—somewhat pejoratively.[1]

The conflictual mod l, on the other hand, gives preference to qualitative methodology. The translation of social reality into simplified indicators does not conform to the objective of this kind of sociological theory, which assigns itself the task of redefining the basic facts of the social reality. Is the rate of divorce an indication of family disintegration or does it reflect a new form of relationships between the sexes? Does the increase in suburban population mean the failure of urbanization or is it a new type of rural life? There are many such examples. What must be remembered above all is the questioning of the positivist functions of the interdependence of the variables that constitute the social structure. The significance of the data takes precedence over precision (in the quantitative sense). The first question in methodology will not be assurance to the world of the objectivity and neutrality of the researcher's approach. On the contrary, he will be asked to show his colors. On which side is he? For whom is he working?

The redefinition or reconstruction of the sociocultural reality is the message, particularly of the trend in phenomenology inspired by Schutz. A whole new sociology will be created around the hopes and aspirations of certain social groups—the "masses" as they are called by

1. L. A. Coser, "Presidential Address. Two Methods in Search of a Substance," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 40, no. 6 (1975), pp. 691–700.

some—based on values that are flourishing in opposition to those which are held by mainstream social groups. The methodology of the social sciences must channel this potential for change, these aspirations for authenticity of men, whose true nature has been alienated, caught in a stranglehold by the existing social institutions.

A methodology very close to theory, extensively using participant observation, producing works of a literary nature—this is the image presented by most of the works closely or remotely connected with the conflictual model. With the resources of this methodology, sociology poses rather than solves problems. If social engineering, close to economics, is the model for many of the positivist sociologists, it is social criticism which attracts the adherents of most qualitative methodologies. Incidentally, Marxism comes closer to one or the other model depending on whether or not power is in the hands of Marxist-Leninist parties. A Marxist in power adopts the consensual model; the same, in opposition, obviously sees things in terms of conflict. As Raymond Aron rightly said, the social scientist of the first school sees himself as the counsellor of the Prince; the other, as the confidante of Providence.[2]

Turning now to the political context of research, we see that significant differences between our two models are again to be found. In the consensual model, concern about the political implications of research is mediated by the methodological principle of relative neutrality on the part of the researcher. It follows that research itself and the application of the results of research for political purposes will, in this perspective, constitute two entirely different things. This is not to say that many researchers working in the positivist tradition do not consider themselves engaged politically. But the majority will deny any direct connection between research, its conception, development and realization, and definite political intervention.

This would not be the opinion of most supporters of the conflictual model. In their view, to define a subject is already to take sides in a conflict in which those who are on the "good" or "bad" side of those in power are opposed. Finally, when we consider sociological theory itself, we identify with the consensual model's ecological theories, as well as those relating to structure, organization and social control. Among the contributions of the conflictual model, we count the Marxist contributions in the Western European countries, interactionist theories, and ethnomethodological theories.

To sum up, the crisis in sociology is closely linked with the social, political and moral crises of the second half of the twentieth century. Liberal and pluralistic democracies can only partially exorcise their demons and, even then, only during major crises or when collective danger confronts them. The industrial and scientific revolution of the nineteenth century, the tragedies of the two world wars, are examples of such "uniting factors." But the birth and rebirth of doctrines which seek the destruction of the social and political fabric of a pluralist, liberal democracy are cyclical phenomena, recurring in different guises at approximately regular intervals. The arguments are similar; only the vocabulary changes. As Aragon said, "experience is never trans-

2. R. Aron, "Macchiavel et Marx," *Contrepoint* 4 (1971), pp 9–23.

mitted; only dogmatism is." So the discussion goes on and on, and texts of a hundred years ago take on a contemporary flavor, and vice versa.

It is equally obvious that these models are exercising a noticeable influence on public policy. Practitioners in the field of juvenile delinquency will interpret the facts and act upon them according to their views on issues vis à vis the relevant models. The contradictions in criminal policy, as well as in correctional practices, the well-known phenomenon in policy sciences of self-fulfilling prophecies are reflections of or account for these contradictions. The theoretical insights in this article, by the same token, highlight their own policy implications.

MODELS OF SOCIOLOGICAL CRIMINOLOGY AND JUVENILE MALADJUSTMENT

In the light of the reservations already mentioned, we have gathered here works which, in the final analysis, accept the premise of the adaptation of the social organism to the exigencies of change inherent in the functioning of the social system. The idea of adaptation is opposed here to that of the fragmentation that occurs when adaptation has not run its normal course. It is presumed that adaptation—the adjustment to changing conditions—is the rule in the functioning of society. Should fragmentation occur, it is the result of a failure of the process of adaptation.

The consensual model's explanation of juvenile delinquency

Let us remember that it was the ecological study of society that dominated the theoretical background of the first important American school of sociology, borrowing from biology the concept of the "community," where a society is organized in complex interaction with the physical resources of the environment and later on with the sociocultural milieu. The influence of the environment and the interaction between the environment and social groups constitute the first formulation of the consensual model. Inasmuch as the transmission of community values was taking place, thanks to the constraint exerted by the imposition of norms of conduct, it was enough for the sociologist to identify, describe, and analyze the factors which prevented, distorted or changed the natural tendency of young people to conform to the expectations and restraints of their milieu: family, neighborhood, school, peers, work.

Very soon, and always in this same perspective, certain authors concentrated on some explanatory factors which they believed were strategically more decisive than others. Thus Cloward and Ohlin,[3] after Durkheim and Merton, showed the effects of the socioeconomic organization on the chances of young people to adjust, particularly those who came from underpriviledged social milieus. Their conclusion was that, for those who started life with handicaps accumulated for generations, equal opportunity was mere fiction, a meaningless article of faith in a liberal democracy.

The conclusions drawn from these studies tended, for the most part, to follow the direction of the consensual model. Appropriate social

3 R. A Cloward and L. E. Ohlin, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

policies were essential to assure the handicapped a truly equal chance in the competition that is the law of urban living. The Great Society of the sixties largely conforms to this ideal. The consensual model was the great driving force, the helping hand in a reformist social policy. Social democracy, the complement of political democracy, characterized Great Society programs.

Those who set out to study the idea of the subculture more thoroughly, such as Wolfgang and Ferracuti,[4] Downes[5] and Morris,[6] for example, were intrigued by a sort of inverse integration of young people in mini societies which were established marginal to, or at odds with, the community. For these authors, the very term "subculture" indicates a kind of writing-off of a part of the society from the great whole, whose mission it is to integrate in active harmony all parties, categories, classes, and groups. Within this same broad perspective, but drawing upon different sources, are those who subscribe to social regulation. The difference between this and the ecological tradition lies mainly in the fact that the mobility of the population within the urban area has increased. This fact assured greater prominence to theories which stressed the psycho-sociological elements of integration rather than the physical milieu. The black ghetto in large American cities is still an appalling reality; it is unlikely to change significantly however.

Starting with Durkheim and his concept of mechanical solidarity, researchers, including Empey,[7] Hirschi,[8] and Jessor,[9] make room in their perspectives for the contributions of Tarde,[10] Mead,[11] Dollard,[12] and Skinner.[13] This tradition of social psychology stresses the importance of socialization, of acquiring norms of motivation and behavior through experience or imitation.

According to M. Cusson,[14] who maintains that processes of exchange are the basis of social interaction, the "exchanger" is always concerned about the consequences of his behavior. His actions are based on the principle of reciprocity and mutual and complementary interests. Man is considered a rational being who calculates the advantages or disadvantages his actions can elicit. Neither subconscious impulses nor environmental forces alone can explain the motivation behind human behavior.

4. M. Wolfgang and F. Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence. Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology* (London: Tavistock, 1967).

5. D. M. Downes, *The Delinquent Solution. A Study in Subcultural Theory* (London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966).

6. T Morris, *The Criminal Area. A Study in Social Ecology* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

7. T. Empey, S G. Lubeck and R L. LaPorte, *Explaining Delinquency. Construction, Test and Reformulation of a Sociological Theory* (Lexington, Mass · D C. Heath, 1971).

8. T. Hirschi, *Causes of Delinquency* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1969).

9 R. Jessor et al., *Society, Personality and Deviant Behavior* (New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968)

10. G. Tarde, *La Criminalité Comparée* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1924).

11. G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

12. J Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1950)

13 B F Skinner, *Par delà la Liberté et la Dignité* (Paris: HMH–Laffont, 1972).

14. M. Cusson, "Les Théories de l'Échange et al Délinquance," (Manuscript, Research Group on Juvenile Maladjustment, Université de Montréal, 1976).

In a community or a group, the norms will be respected to the extent that those who are in agreement with them resort to rewards and penalties to impose them. In a group where non-conformists are too numerous and the conformists too "spineless," there cannot be respect for the established norms. A youth will be deviant, then, to the degree that he finds little gratifying exchange with the members of the conformist group and that he spends his time with other deviants who at once protect him against the possible pressure of conformists and approve of his behavior. The result is the contravention of norms, respect for which is no longer enforced.

When an individual is strongly integrated in a conformist society, he has little motivation and few sociocultural grounds to create a milieu where antisocial conduct can crystallize. Certain individuals, certain milieus are thus deeply set in their conformist pattern of behavior. When this integration is weakened, when social regulation is exercised only partially, and by fits and starts, defiance, deviance, and confirmed delinquency occur.

Adherence to a deviant norm at a given moment provides a profile of the make-up of the delinquent personality as it was analyzed, by analogy with the phenomenon of conversion, by De Greeff[15] and developed and standardized by Pinatel.[16] If integration in delinquent subcultures reinforces the making of a delinquent personality, the accompanying exclusion from the conformist society does likewise; as Cusson observes, theft is the antithesis of exchange. In the ideal model of exchange, each partner gains from the transaction. In theft, one partner profits at the expense of the other. The basis of exchange is agreement; that of theft is force or trickery, a negation of agreement. Exchange prospers where there is understanding or mutual trust. Theft and aggression break the relationship, setting individuals one against the other.

Thus delinquency can be analyzed from two points of view, stemming from the principle of reciprocity which this approach proposes. It concerns a) delinquency as a negation of reciprocity in social relations based on the exchange of services and manufactured goods and b) the violation of a norm which is considered a rule of the game, accepted by common accord, and which assures justice and fairness to all parties concerned in the exchange.

The model is constructed by combining the variables, including and standardizing the transactions of the young person with his milieu. Reciprocity of expectations should correspond with a reciprocity of services furnished. The explanation of delinquency will therefore be based on the following:

1) Insufficient gratification of the subject by his milieu.
2) A lack of reciprocity between the contribution of society and that of the subject
3) Too many demands which cannot be met by the subject.
4) Little gratification of the young person, creating a feeling of injustice.
5) A general decrease in the exchanges between the young person and his milieu (alienation).
6) A general decline in the quality of the exchanges with the milieu, culminating in near rupture.
7) A greater number of gratifying rela-

15. E. De Greeff, *Introduction à la Criminologie* (Bruxelles: Van der Plas, 1946).
16. J. Pinatel, *Criminologie*, 3rd ed (Paris Dalloz, 1975.)

tions with non-conforming subjects or groups or those which are marginal to the community.

If all these variables follow the same direction, the result is the exclusion of the subject and his chosen milieu from the community. This exclusion is based on the lack of established authority in the pursuit of exchange relations based on confidence and reciprocity. At the same time, the individual is freed from all the controls inherent in exchange relationships. He therefore is labelled, based upon the bad reputation that is the result of the seven variables just enumerated. Once labelled, the subject's ability to engage in gratifying exchange relationships is practically nil. Maurice Cusson concludes that the model of social regulation, based on the concept of exchange, easily fits in with the other sociological models explaining juvenile maladjustment.

Impact on social policy and practice

This then, very briefly, is the consensual model's explanation of juvenile maladjustment. It is now important to consider the impact and significance of the model on social policy:

a) Man is evil but, under certain conditions, capable of giving of his best; left to his own devices, however, the indomitable forces of evil will prevail. Evil must be seen as a fact of the human condition, embodied in the hostility of nature (suffering, sickness, death), in the hostility of the interior world of man, his own wickedness, his inability to live up to his own aspirations.[17] All great civilizations have tried to interpret the evil, the existence of which is a universal fact. The source of the evil is in man himself and not in sources outside him. From Pascal to Jung, we find this notion, which is still voiced among contemporary thinkers with approaches as different as Baechler's[18] and Kolakowski's.[19]

b) Since good and evil are inextricably mixed in man, there is no hope for the advent of an ideal society. By persistently hunting down what is considered evil, we risk setting up regimes or tyrannical practices which, in order to suppress the sources of evil, must also suppress freedom. This dualism makes it necessary at all times to consider the consequences of remedial action. History has proved that the remedy often is worse than the disease. There has been a price for the slightest element of what we call progress, and we cannot compare the loss and the gain, observes Kolakowski. "It is our duty to fight all the sources of affliction, but we do so without the hope of ever being sure that the tree of progress will bear fruit."[20] This skepticism about means, which does not exclude the passion for justice, is a very special characteristic, and illustrates our point nicely.

c) If we cannot increase the good without increasing the evil, we can only hope for modest and partial results from any social policy. Baechler says that the massive increase in resources has created a great deal more envy.[21] The waning of religious fanaticism has been com-

17. J. Baechler, "De Quelques Principes Généraux du Libéralisme," *Contrepoint* 17 (1975), pp. 125–47

18. J. Baechler, *Qu'est-ce que l'Idéologie?* (Paris, Gallimard, 1976)

19 L. Kolakowski, *Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought* (New York: Doubleday, 1969).

20. Ibid., p 134.

21. J. Baechler, "De Quelques Principes Généraux du Libéralisme "

pensated for by a greater secular fanaticism. Free education has resulted in the State—and thus everyone—paying some of the cost for educating the children of the leisure classes. The only way social conditions can be equalized is by increasing the role of the State, which means increasing inequalities in terms of power. Generalized participation in decisions would only mean a tremendous loss of time in idle talk, resulting in boredom, and would inevitably pull the autonomous individual into a socially stratified system. The rational conclusion, therefore, is a reformism accompanied by great prudence, and a refusal to replace the present solutions by others which have not proved themselves. One might say that the latest works of Daniel Bell,[22] Irving Kristol, and Daniel Moynihan in sociology, and J. Q. Wilson[23] in criminology, subscribe to this point of view, and their influence today is far from negligible.

The conflictual model's explanation of juvenile maladjustment

The consensual model dominated criminological theory and research almost exclusively until the mid 1960s. Rehabilitation and resocialization: these were the key words of the criminal justice policy of the era. During the crisis in sociology mentioned earlier, another theory appeared and another interpretation model developed, which for lack of a better title, we called the "conflictual model." As in the case of the preceding model, it is an archetype, combining a whole series of approaches, traditions, explanations, and methodologies, which, incidentally, may seem in certain respects to be in opposition to one another. We are presenting them here descriptively, without integrating them in a coherent whole. Nonetheless, as in the previous model, we shall show that in a way they belong less to a school than to a community of thought. The conflictual model rejects the idea of adaptation. The pejorative meaning given the concept of "recovery" is an example of this rejection.

The concept of power and its exercise seems to be central to this model. It is presumed, straight off, that those who exercise power make it an instrument of oppression, reserved for their exclusive profit. The very nature of power is oppressive, its exercise arbitrary. The unequal treatment of the citizens that results always benefits those in authority, to the detriment of the poor. This discrimination which stems from the very nature of the existing social organization and which establishes inequality as a principle of organization in this society, is a scandal in the eyes of criminologists of the conflictual model.

The research which gave birth to this interpretive model increased towards the end of the fifties. Finding that the majority of delinquents, both adult and juvenile, came from the poor and underprivileged classes, the sociologists' first step was to question the validity of the measuring instrument that established this image. This was the reason for the studies on hidden delinquency, started by Nye and Short.[24] Although it was not clear

22. D. Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

23. J. Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

24. J. E. Nye and J. F. Short, "Scaling Delinquent Behavior," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22 (1957) pp. 326–31.

at the beginning, the desire to redefine the data concerning the problem of delinquency in new terms emerged. The result of these works was the perception of a delinquency distributed much more generally throughout society. It was found that breaking the law was not only limited to members of the poorer classes that filled the institutions, but that many norms, protected by the law and its agencies, were violated by the middle classes. The latter furnished not only the lawmakers, but also the administration charged with enforcing the law (policemen, magistrates, social workers, educators). Very quickly the question was asked: Could delinquency not be the expression of an attitude, a defiance, of one social class towards the other?[25] Since the majority of these studies were made in the United States, the fact that the "dangerous classes" were black and belonged to the urban subproletariat, played a considerable role in the sensitivity which oriented these studies and their interpretations.

The substitution of the term "deviant" for delinquent marks the schism between the consensual model and the conflictual model. Albert Cohen was the first to make the change in his essay which appeared in 1960. According to him, deviance was a concept that encompassed delinquency which was, itself, a result of a purely juridic and sociologically accidental technicality. Deviance he defined as the opposite of conformism.

For those who upheld the conflictual model, this society was not characterized by a spirit of solidarity, as Durkheim believed, nor by an interdependence based on the play of complex interests, in instant balance, as Pareto saw it. No, this society was based on social classes in conflict with one another, having opposing interests, some reconcilable, some not. Some researchers focussed on the legislation responsible for juvenile justice. The works of Platt,[26] Chambliss,[27] and Quinney[28] pointed out the extent to which these laws had no purpose other than to dispose of a class enemy. The critical function of science must prevail. One cannot look for solutions to problems posed in terms of postulates and premises that are declared unacceptable, that are challenged on philosophical and moral grounds. It is in this perspective that the question of Howard Becker becomes meaningful: on what side is the sociologist?[29] He must take the side of the victim of a rule instituted by those in power to maintain that power intact and intended to exploit the people of our postindustrial society.

The sociologist as critic reminded us that to define the problem is to become involved. We will therefore pose the problem by asking the delinquent the significance of his act, the aspirations that led him beyond the pale of this society that does not accept him, but which he too rejects. In the interpretation of all the criminogenic factors previously enumerated, we see the introduction of a radical criticism of

25. W. C. Miller and J. J. Conger, *Personality, Social Class and Delinquency* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

26. A. M. Platt, *The Child Savers. The Invention of Delinquency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

27. W. J. Chambliss and R. B. Seidman, *Law, Order and Power* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1971).

28. R. Quinney, *Criminal Justice in America: A Critical Understanding* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974).

29. H. S. Becker, ed., *The Other Side: Perspectives on Deviance* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

contemporary postindustrial society. Among the latter's victims are the delinquents.

The concept of man and society put forward by this model is very different from the preceding model. Here man is as conceived by Rousseau; all evil is external. As Sartre said, hell is other people. Other men, groups, societies, all the sociocultural and economic environment must be changed in order to save man. The Dionysian concept of man postulates the expansion of the ego to the limit. It promises to break the narrow corporal prison in which we are all captive by affording a glimpse of the exaltation of communion with the infinite. The end of alienation, of fragmentation, due to the contradictions of our involvement in the complex and sometimes contradictory networks of our interpersonal relationships, will be proclaimed once these contradictions are removed. The elimination of these contradictions leads us to a new human society, where, at last, the tug of war between the forces of good and evil no longer exists, since their main function will have been eliminated during the destruction of the socioeconomic base of capitalist exploitation.

The hope of a community without conflict, above good and evil, is an integral part of the philosophy underlying the new criminology, as certain of its adherents call it. "It is forbidden to forbid," was the anonymous graffiti appearing on the walls of the Sorbonne in May 1968. "We want a society where the power to 'criminalize' will no longer exist because it will have no object," proclaim the authors of *The New Criminology*.[30]

Let us enumerate the characteristics of this model as defined by one of its most gifted representatives, Michael Philipson.[31]

1) Instead of looking for the causes of delinquency, we seek the significance. We try to understand, in the Weberian sense of the term, the process by which the actors arrive at their specific conduct.

2) Based on the perception of the actor, we shall try to describe the emergence, transmission, perpetuation and modification of the sociocultural significance of the delinquent act. From this point of view, the social structure could be considered a vast network of symbolic clues diversely shared among various individuals and groups in the society. The role of the sociologist is to take the part of the subject he is analyzing, in this case the delinquent, and to understand from his perception of these clues the scope and meaning of the deviant act.

3) The persons thus analyzed belong to groups, to social classes, however, whose existence and conscience are determined by a common dependency on those who exercise power through the control of the economic system.

4) The subject's decision to act is not due to objective calculation, to a rational choice of available alternatives. For the sociologist working in this perspective, the alternatives seen by the actor cannot be reduced to objective and rational data

5) Delinquency belongs in the vast category of deviant behavior, some of which is innovative, while some reflects the refusal on moral grounds to accept odious values.

6) By detypifying the concept of delinquency, the sociologist points out the existence in society of forces of dynamic change, which constantly redefine the objectives, methods, and orientation of society, its groups and classes.

30 I. Taylor et al., *The New Criminology For a Social Theory of Deviance* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

31 M Phillipson, *Sociological Aspects of Crime and Delinquency* (London. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).

7) Statistics as indicators of delinquency are rejected. However, they can be accepted as indicators of the functioning of the judicial and social control systems.

8) We tend to consider delinquency an expression of social conflict.[32] The Marxist adherents of the conflictual model look upon the penal law as an instrument of oppression and manipulation in the hands of the bourgoisie. Power is the essence of the conflictual perspective: it is a confrontation of value systems, of world views, of hope for a new society and stubborn defense of the status quo.

9) In the light of these considerations, it seems clear that nothing in the deviant act itself qualifies it as deviant; it is in the eyes of others that it becomes so.

10) With regard to methodology, this model is characterized by a total distrust of the value of official statistics, of the gathering of opinions stereotyped and conditioned by the mass media, by the Gallup Poll survey method. It is by participant observation and empathy, that the researcher penetrates his subject's world.

Impact on social policy and practice

The impact of the conflictual model on social policy is not easy to assess. Its protagonists have more critiques of social action than concrete proposals. Apart from sporadic experiments in communes, the very special case of the kibbutzim in Israel, and the communist countries, there has been no integrated social model designed that would evolve from the breakdown of the present society.

It must be pointed out, however, that adherents of the conflictual model have made efforts to decriminalize acts which result from moral commitments of non-conformists, but are not prejudicial to the majority. Certain homo- or heterosexual practices and the use of certain drugs are being removed from the control of criminal law; other behavior, particularly white collar crimes, should be more severely criminalized in the conflictual view. Nevertheless, subscribers to this model certainly held no monopoly in fighting for these reforms. Nor were efforts to limit the role of criminal law in areas which seriously endanger the physical and spiritual integrity of individuals supported exclusively by research based on conflictual model predispositions. The study of more or less radical alternatives to the present system of criminal justice was encouraged as well.

CONCLUSIONS

What effects have these two models had on criminal justice policy and on the activities of those working in the field of juvenile delinquency? It is certain that the consensual model, an offshoot of the existing system, accepts the rules of the game. What it proposes is to rectify the rules where there is cheating and redefine those where a reasonable consensus can be obtained. Researchers should show the reality as it exists, as it is experienced by others, and as it is exemplified not only by the intersubjectivity of the actors but also by the institutions with their constraints, traditions, and influence. They believe in the possibility that contradictory interests can be resolved, but within the context of the natural and necessary hierarchy of the needs of the conformist majority and the deviant minority. Practitioners and clinicians should try to guide those in their charge in order to better prepare them to

32. J Lofland, *Deviance and Identity* (Englewood Cliffs, N J . Prentice-Hall, 1969).

make a place for themselves in the social system. Justice on the labor market, in the school, and in the family: these are the necessary conditions for producing the moral integrity basic to constructive social behavior.

Obviously then, social criticism is not lacking in the consensual model; it is even an integral part of it. Although it is partial, it can become a basic principle if conditions so require. Its adherents' conception of man and society makes them particularly heedful of the fact that to replace one tyranny by another means, as history has shown, a general loss of freedom and an inferior way of life. The most unjust "protectors" of the society know that it is they who would lose the most by the change. But the subscribers to the consensual model foresaw the correctness of the thinking of the philosopher Kolakowski. Our corruptibility is not contingent. We know, he writes, that the very process of living is a source of anxiety, conflict, aggression, uncertainty, and care. No coherent system of values is possible, and any attempt to apply one to individual cases is a failure. The moral victory of evil is always possible.

If the above model is well-suited to an Apollonian civilization, the conflictual model is directly in keeping with the principles of a Dionysian civilization. In this perspective, researchers try to find in the world of non-conformists, of deviancies, and delinquencies, premonitory signs of a liberation from the constraints arbitrarily imposed by an unjust society. The first task of the researcher is to compare non-conformist values with conformist values. As soon as it is felt that neutrality is impossible for the scientific investigator, it seems to be an inevitable deontological rule to use research as a weapon of accusation in the class struggle. It is the researcher's moral obligation to denounce the production of other researchers as so many means of defense in the service of the ruling classes and their regime of privilege.

With regard to practitioners in the juvenile justice system, their situation seems to be untenable in this perspective. Either they must admit their role as mercenaries in the service of the unjust and illegitimate authorities or continue to delude themselves. Inasmuch as they admit to neither of these conclusions, their duty, within the limits allowed them by the law and by society, is to denounce the iniquities of the present system. What side are we on? There is no doubt about the answer, and many magistrates and educators have joined with researchers to show, each with the means at their disposal, their refusal to shoulder automatically the responsibility for the injustices of the system. Truth takes precedence over efficiency. The promise of a total well-being, the hope of a benevolent apocalypse, which will give man back his innocence, is the supreme source of hope and the direct motivation for action.

In this paper, in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, we have grouped a whole series of ideas, often very different from one another, into two paradigmatic models. We call them paradigmatic because they are actually two fundamental approaches, unyielding one to the other, and each commanding an epistemology, a theory, a methodology, and a deontology which, without being exclusive, are specific. In fact, they constitute communities of thought.

We have tried to keep in mind the influence of epistemology on theory, of theory on methodology and on the strategy in social policy. We must also remember that the *cultural revolution which eroded sociology towards the end of the sixties, left its mark on sociological criminology, just as the wave of antipsychiatric feeling did on clinical criminology.*

Intellectuals, men of science, advisors of the Prince in matters of criminal justice, policy, lawyers assigned by law to the delinquent, and the criminologists of today must bear the weight of these contradictions imposed by the constant changes in scientific methods and approaches. Our moral and intellectual discomfort, however, must not be greater than that of preceding generations. Each time there is a breach in the spiritual and material structure of the world, the contradiction becomes more destructive.

The views of the world that we have described, and whose contemporary interpretations of juvenile maladjustment we have presented, are based on a tradition that has existed in the Western world for centuries. Upon their dialogue, the results of their confrontation, depends the quality of today's society and that of the future. I have tried to present objectively the two models of sociological explanation of juvenile delinquency and to outline their proposals for contemporary criminal justice policy. I have now only to say a word about my own thinking on these matters.

I have cited the philosopher Kolakowski[33] a number of times because, essentially, my personal position coincides with his. I believe, as he does, that the unity of man is not possible. If it were, we would do everything possible to bring it about. The greater our hopes for humanity, the more we are tempted to offer it all sorts of sacrifices. The words of Anatole France are frighteningly true today: never have so many been killed in the name of a doctrine which proclaims the innate goodness of man. And we could add that never have we been so hard on man as when we impose sacrifices in the name of humanity.

The evil in us can only be held in check, at least partially, by doubt which should be cultivated and firmly exercised in the judgments we make, not only in science but also in politics. The greatest ruse of the Devil is to have us believe he does not exist, said Baudelaire. It is by thinking of him and his power as the fallen angel that the intellectual, the man of science and the criminologist must confront and evaluate the adverse dangers implied in each act and each decision he makes when trying to deal with the difficult problem of delinquency.

33. L. Kolakowski, "Le Diable Peut-il Être Sauvé?" *Contrepoint* 20 (1976) pp. 151–64

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Monetary Policy Instrumentation and the Relationship of Central Banks and Governments

By John T. Woolley

ABSTRACT: Despite the importance of monetary policy in economic management and the substantial stakes involved in monetary policy decisions, political scientists have almost entirely ignored important political questions involving both monetary policy and central banks. This article organizes information about central banks, the institutional focus of much of monetary policy, and central bankers. Two dimensions of monetary policy instrumentation, complexity and concentration, are defined and related to differences in the relations of central banks to governments and interest groups.

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WHEN Phillip Cagan writes that, "Monetary policy has finally come center stage,"[1] he is scarcely alone in his evaluation of the position of monetary policy in economic management since the late sixties. Not surprisingly, monetary policy is a controversial subject, and the object of political conflict. Central banks, typically the institutional center for forming and executing monetary policy, provide a convenient reference point for an examination of the politics of monetary policy formation.

A great deal is at stake in monetary policy. The significance of monetary policy in determining levels of economic growth, employment, inflation, and international payments balances is recognized by economists of all persuasions. Although there are lags between policy actions and their effects on such conditions as employment and inflation[2] the consequences for overall economic performance are considerable. To the extent that there are difficulties in achieving some goals simultaneously—for example, lowering inflation and increasing employment—central banks will make choices. The consequences of these choices should be considered the consequences of a political process.

In addition to the problems associated with achieving these larger goals, specific policy maneuvers have accompanying distributional effects—effects which have often served to generate conflict. Restrictive monetary policy usually makes credit more expensive. This disadvantages potential borrowers who cannot afford higher interest rates or who are likely to be prevented from borrowing due to credit rationing by commercial banks.[3] The more modest the rate of monetary growth, the more likely that government borrowing for deficit finance will "crowd out" private borrowers from credit markets, which may discourage fixed capital formation. It is often the case that monetary policy actions change the relative prices of different kinds of credit instruments; that is, the return investors can expect from one kind of investment rather than another. Thus, recent United States "credit crunches" have resulted in a sharp depression for the housing industry since other kinds of investments were more profitable.[4] These same kinds of effects can sharply alter the cost of borrowing by local governments, requiring larger claims on tax revenues for interest payments, or forcing construction to be postponed or foregone. Thus, the effects of monetary policy are very broadly felt, and policy actions can have substantial distributive impacts.

It is remarkable, then, that central banks and the conduct of monetary policy, like few other public organizations or policy activities, are often located in positions independent of electoral political processes, which is not true of other aspects of macroeconomic management. In fact, as we shall see, the autonomy of central

1. Phillip Cagan, "Monetary Policy," in *Economic Policy and Inflation in the Sixties*, ed. Phillip Cagan et al. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), p. 149.

2. The exact length of lags has been a matter of considerable debate among economists. See Michael J. Hamburger, "The Lag in the Effect of Monetary Policy: A Survey of Recent Literature," in *Monetary Aggregates and Monetary Policy*, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1974).

3. Duane G. Harris, "Credit Rationing at Commercial Banks," *Journal of Money Credit and Banking*, vol 6 (1974), p. 227.

4. Cagan, "Monetary Policy," pp. 117–25; Arnold H. Diamond, "Credit Flows and Interest Costs" (Study for the Subcommittee on Economic Progress of the Joint Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975).

banks from governments does vary considerably across countries. Nonetheless, it remains true that these organizations are distinguished by the fact that arguments for their independence are common. The justifications presented for central bank independence directly confront democratic theory, and raise the major problem to which the current work is addressed: how do we account for differences between countries in the autonomy of central banks from governments?

That central bank independence is an interesting problem is further confirmed by an awareness of the distinctive outlook of central bankers with regard to economic policy choices. The profile sketched below suggests that central bankers are atypically concerned with the hazards of inflation, and tend to prefer the risk of too little stimulus to that of too much.

Of all the major areas of substantive policy with broadly felt impacts, monetary policy and central banking are notable for the lack of attention received from political scientists. Almost no systematic work of any sort has been done on central banks, central bankers, or monetary policy.[5] The opportunities for research in this area are extensive.

In this essay, some elements of a framework for analysis of central bank autonomy will be examined. Specifically, variation in the policy instrumentation of central banks will be related to variation in the politics of central banking. Since extensive information is readily available about the instruments used by central banks, these dimensions provide one fruitful way for political scientists to approach what clearly has been a somewhat forbidding terrain. In light of the hypotheses developed here, the problem of central bank autonomy will be addressed further in order to assess the hypotheses developed. While it is clear that the variables examined here do not constitute a complete explanation of variation in central bank autonomy, available data suggest that they do represent useful predictors of the general nature of central bank relations with governments and interest groups.

The central banks included here are the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the Bundesbank (Germany), and the Riksbank (Sweden). This sample not only represents some of the most important central banks in the world, but should provide a fairly wide range of experiences for examination.

Central banks in Western countries have emerged gradually over the past two centuries as major economic institutions. Typically, they were formerly private banks which gained sole rights of issuing currency for the country and established a special position as banker (including lender) to governments. These banks assumed a role of banker to the commercial banks, lender of last resort and, in turn, the central banks assumed responsibility for the stability of the value of the currency. In addition to serving as bank of issue and regulator of the banking system, central banks are typically responsible for regulating the volume of currency and credit in the economic system, for overseeing bank reserves, for regulating for-

5. A rare example is Michael D. Reagan, "The Political Structure of the Federal Reserve System," *American Political Science Review* (March 1961) Central banks are usually only mentioned in passing in textbooks on the politics of particular nations. This is a sharp contrast to the attention that has been given to budgetary politics.

eign exchange transactions, and, not least, for advising governments on economic policy.

Most of the information for this analysis is culled from previously published sources concerned with comparing the monetary policies of differing countries. In addition, information is drawn from interviews with close professional observers of the central banks in question. While promises of anonymity do not permit identification of the individuals or their organizational affiliation, all are professional economists, employed in nonacademic posts.

CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY

In conventional discussions, the question of central bank autonomy refers only to the extent of their independence from other public organizations, and, particularly, elected politicians ("government").[6] However, an interesting political question is the degree of autonomy of the central bank in a larger sense—particularly in relation to interest groups. For purposes of this discussion, however, the more restricted use is retained.

Virtually all arguments justifying the autonomy of central banks from governments refer to a fear that in the absence of independence, central banks would permit too much inflation. There are numerous rationales for why this might be the case, most of them focusing on the inability or unwillingness of elected officials to prevent inflationary printing of money and the instability of currency values. One kind of argument suggests that the public, whose opinions are believed to translate into policy quasi-automatically, is incapable of comprehending and/or accepting the need for restrictive policy. A more popular view holds that governments and parliamentarians are systematically biased toward inflation, incapable of collectively restraining their individual urges to spend the country into inflation and ruin. Thus, they are in need of the discipline imposed by the refusal of a central bank to "print money."

In an unusually clear statement, which would still be subscribed to by many today, David Grove wrote in 1952:

> A strong case can be made for an independent central bank on the ground that governments need such an institution to act as a brake to their inflationary propensities . . . The temptation to the government to pursue an inadequate tax or debt-management policy is especially great, however, if the central bank is subordinate to it and is unable to make known to the public the economic and financial consequences of deficit financing and easy money policies in periods of high levels of employment.[7]

A less restrained view has been attributed to former Bundesbank president Karl Blessing:

> . . . a [central] bank has to be independent because one cannot really trust the politicians—they are all a rotten lot and any of them might seek to get out of a hole by printing money.[8]

6. For example, E. Ray Canterbury, "The Awkward Independence of the Federal Reserve," *Challenge* (September/October 1975), A. Jerome Clifford, *The Independence of the Federal Reserve System* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), Edward J. Kane, "New Congressional Restraints and Federal Reserve Independence," *Challenge* (November/December 1975).

7. David L. Grove, "Central Bank Independence and the Government-Central Bank Relationship" (Memo for the International Monetary Fund in the Joint Bank-Fund Library, Washington, D.C., 2 April 1952), p. 21.

8. From the "First Report of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industry, 1969–

Another justification for central bank autonomy is the need to keep money creation removed from the fluctuating demands of partisan politics. A frequent argument is that a politically controlled central bank might adopt easy money policies just before an election, benefiting the incumbent party, predictable unfavorable consequences occurring after the election.[9] This is the monetary equivalent of the "political business cycle" that Nordhaus has examined.[10] It has been alleged that such partisan behavior occurred in the United States in association with the 1972 election.[11]

Given these concerns and the lack of trust for politicians that they reflect, the apparent differences in central bank autonomy demand explanation. A wide range of possible factors might be considered. Only three will be discussed here, and these are selected only partly for their explanatory strength. They are also useful in introducing a wide range of available literature on central banks in a politically relevant fashion. Differences between countries in central bank autonomy will be related to differences in the attitudes and outlooks of central bankers, to the formal-legal differences between central banks, and to differences in the degree of controversy and political salience of central banks traceable to differences in policy instrumentation. In the first case, the degree of variation appears to be fairly small; in the second case, variation does not appear to point decisively to particular conclusions; in the third case, variation does lead to fruitful insights.

CONCERNS OF CENTRAL BANKERS

Variations in the attitudes and policy preferences of central bankers might be a source of variation in central bank autonomy from government. For instance, some central bankers might be much more aggressive in opposition to inflation than others, and, following the logic of the justifications for autonomy presented above, this might result in the application of much greater pressure from elected politicians on central bankers, leading to lower autonomy. This would suggest that central bank autonomy would be expected to increase as the willingness of the central bank to tolerate inflation increases—a perverse hypothesis from the point of view of those arguing for autonomous central banks.

However, the modest evidence available does not reveal marked differences in the attitudes and preferences of central bankers between countries. On the other hand, the evidence does suggest that, in comparison to other macroeconomic policymakers, central bankers are more concerned with maintaining stable prices, no matter how autonomous the central bank is from government. This is, of course, a politically interesting difference. The dominant concerns of central bankers not only indicate their pref-

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70, Bank of England," quoted in Richard Spiegelberg, *The City, Power Without Accountability* (London, Blond Briggs, 1973), p. 154.

9. This argument, and several other arguments for and against central bank autonomy are summarized nicely by Thomas Mayer, "The Structure and Operation of the Federal Reserve System: Some Needed Reforms," in *Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy, Book II*, U S Cong House, Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong , 2d sess.

10. W D. Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Economic Studies*, vol 42 (April 1975) pp 169–90

11 A fairly extreme view of this is in Sanford Rose, "The Agony of the Federal Reserve," *Fortune* (January 1974).

erences about how economic policy should develop, but has frequently indicated the lines of cleavage between central bankers and other policymakers. While a full investigation of the theories used by each country's central bankers to guide their policies is far beyond the scope of this essay, some features of a common outlook among them are readily observed.

Inflation

The concern which unites virtually all central bankers is their opposition to inflation. As further discussion will make clear, this concern is not expressed in some absolute, singleminded way. Rather, a tendency to condition their willingness to respond to other problems by a desire to contain and reduce inflation is more typical. The public statements of central bankers are replete with warnings about the "evils" of the inflationary "disease."[12] Inflation is depicted as a seductive temptress luring politicians and the naive to excess and lack of discipline. Official bank publications often stress arguments featuring less vivid images focusing on the unjustified randomness of the distributive consequences of inflation, the detrimental consequences of inflation on investment and profits, and economic efficiency.

No close observer of these central banks has suggested that central bankers are exceeded by any other group of governmental officials in their distaste for unstable prices—although it has been suggested that some treasury officials provide a match for the bankers.[13] Rather than arguing that central bankers are consistently anti-inflationary, perhaps it is more accurate to state that they are preoccupied with the stability of the currency—sometimes by legal requirement. This is legally the case in Germany, and one might argue that this is the case in the United States under the terms of the 1946 Full Employment Act. Stability of the currency is usually taken to mean domestic price stability—a factor in which is external (exchange rate) stability.

It is over these issues that central banks most frequently clash with governments. Because of the fear that deficit spending fuels inflation, central bankers decry government deficits. It is difficult to discover an example during the past decade or so of conflict between government and central bank in which the bank was battling for more expansionary policies than the government. This does not mean, of course, that central banks have not actually engaged in policies which, mistakenly, were in fact inflationary. Monetarist economists have long been fond of explaining how central bankers' propensity to regard interest rates as the appropriate indicators of the direction of policy, and their efforts to stabilize those rates, were frequently pro-cyclical.[14] However,

12. These are often reproduced in official publications such as the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, the annual *Report* and *Quarterly Review* of the Bank of England, and the annual *Report* of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

13. It is the consensus of my informants, as well as published references to the question, that central bankers are more concerned with inflation than are other economic policy officials. For general confirmation of this phenomenon for the period 1949–61, see E. S. Kirschen, et al., *Economic Policy in our Time* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), chap. 9.

14. For instance, see the essays in Karl Brunner, ed., *Targets and Indicators of Monetary Policy* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1969). In this source and others, it is sometimes argued that the real objective of the Federal Reserve and other central banks has

their price stability concerns have meant that central bankers have been particularly responsive to arguments which seem to demonstrate that current policy targets and procedures probably are destabilizing.

This point is well illustrated by the quickness with which central bankers have adopted the idea of announcing, and trying to hit, targets for the rate of growth of the money supply. Interest rate targets were thought to be destabilizing precisely because they did not accurately reflect the trend in money supply—argued to be more clearly linked with changes in prices and economic growth. In December 1974, the Bundesbank was the first central bank to announce publicly monetary growth targets. It was followed by the Federal Reserve Board in May of 1975, and currently, both the Bank of England and the Bank of France have announced their own targets.[15]

There is somewhat more to the issue of monetary targets than a simple question of gaining a better control of the economy, however. The announcement of monetary growth targets and serious efforts to reach them are largely aimed at influencing wage settlements.[16] The central bank hopes to set a common framework for negotiation of wages so that both management and labor will realize when a pending settlement will be inflationary. Lower inflation is seen as essential for restoring profits and investments. The structure imposed on the wage bargain, once monetary targets are announced, is intended to force unions to choose between higher wages and lower output/employment, while simultaneously increasing management resistance to union wage demands by posing a choice between increased profits and increased wages.[17] If effective, this policy instrument should impede labor efforts to gain a larger share of national income.

It is not clear that central banks have either the capacity or the desire to insist on their targets if wage increases are too high. In particular, the less autonomous central banks may find it more difficult to achieve their monetary targets. In any case, central bankers have tended to adopt a strategy that takes as given just about everything in the economy except the wage determination process.

Tradeoffs

In keeping with their pro-stability concerns, central bankers have had a consistent tendency to deny the existence of a Phillips-curve tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Matters of considerable debate among economists have been the following: what is the shape of a particular country's Phillips curve, how has the curve shifted and twisted over time, what is the appropriate specification of variables for measuring the tradeoff, and does the tradeoff even exist? Still, a distin-

been financial market stability, which would conflict with price stability under certain conditions. Alexander James Meigs, *Money Matters Economics, Markets, Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)

15. The Federal Reserve Board made the shift to examining monetary targets around 1970, but did not begin public announcement of these targets until 1975. See Paul A. Volcker, "A Broader Role for Monetary Targets," Federal Reserve Bank of New York *Quarterly Review*, vol. 2 (Spring, 1977), pp. 23–28.

16. To some extent, this is also an effort to influence price-setting of firms, and to "impose a constraint on government policy." See the Bank for International Settlements, *Forty-Sixth Annual Report* (Basle, 1976), p. 133.

17. With regard to price-setting, the logic would be essentially the same.

guished American economist could write as recently as 1975 that economists were in general agreement that there is such a tradeoff.[18] Neither the general consensus nor the suggestions of uncertainty evidenced by the debate have deterred central bankers from rejecting the notion of a tradeoff.[19] By way of contrast, the concept of a tradeoff has frequently been important as a policy guide, particularly to left/liberal governments which have probably accepted the idea as quickly as central bankers have rejected it.

The central banker's opposition to inflation does not mean that evidence is never discovered that central banks respond to economic conditions other than the movement in prices, for example, unemployment. Probably the central bank closest to an exclusive concern for price stability, even at the cost of considerable unemployment, very low growth, or high interest rates is the Bundesbank. Least so is perhaps the Riksbank. Even the Bundesbank's concerns are not without limits. Arthur Burns probably expresses a fairly common sentiment among central bankers in arguing in congressional testimony that while greater growth and higher employment are needed, these cannot be achieved in a way consistent with a stable economy without first reducing inflation.[20]

With the data available, it is impossible to evaluate central bankers' views on any possible tradeoffs with any quantitative accuracy. We do know from Sherman Maisel's account that very real differences did exist for a time on the Federal Reserve Board over the extent to which inflation should be resisted.[21] However, the evidence suggests that, unmistakably, central bankers prefer that public policy follow a strategy of attempting to insure the minimum foreseeable occurrence of price instability.

Market ideology

Although it would be accurate to consider central bankers as highly influenced by the logic of free markets, it is inaccurate to view them as unswerving free market ideologues. As will be seen below, many central banks have not hesitated to use policy instrumentation that is very direct and selective—in short, not the market at all. Of course, these differences, to a large extent, reflect differences in inherited policy instrumentation, and cannot be taken as expressing the preferences of particular officials about optimal policy. For instance, one informant pointed out in an interview that Bank of France officials no longer claim to prefer direct credit controls as their primary monetary policy tool. Still, he reflected, "when it gets right

18. Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," p. 169.

19. Sherman, J Maisel, *Managing the Dollar* (New York, Norton, 1973), chaps 1 and 2, William Pollard Wadbrook, *West German Balance of Payments Policy* (San Francisco Chandler, 1969). These themes should strike a familiar note with students of decisionmaking who have an interest in cognitive processes: " cognitive inference mechanisms tend to eliminate tradeoffs from a belief system . Under the assumptions of cognitive theory, the information-processing mechanisms of the mind operate to deny the trade-off relationship unless compelled to recognize it by a highly structured external situation (the reality constraint)" John D. Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, (Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 1974), pp 104, 108

20 Testimony before the House Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee, 3 February 1977.

21 Maisel, *Managing the Dollar*, pp. 48–49.

down to it, I think they like the quality of *dirigisme* involved."

Even in countries where one might expect to find the highest degree of free market sentiment, Germany and the United States, there are significant disconfirming events. Wage and price controls in the United States were supported initially with some strength by Arthur Burns and in Germany by the Bundesbank. In fact, in 1970–71, central bankers generally were strongly favorable to institutionalizing income policies as major economic policy tools.[22] The Governor of the Bank of England has often reiterated his belief—which is not uncommon among central bankers—that monetary measures alone are insufficient to deal with inflation and that "pay restraint" is also required.[23] It is true, of course, that these examples of central banker flexibility involve intervening in wage-setting processes that often cannot be regarded as competitive markets. It is also clear that the recommended policy is not one the central banks would have to execute, and reflects a theory of inflation which tends to remove responsibility for inflation from central banks and the financial sector.

The fact remains that in defending against inflation, central bankers have demonstrated pragmatism in their adjustments to current circumstances. A further example involves the Bundesbank. In the early seventies, the Bundesbank is reported to have given very serious consideration to imposing direct controls on the quantity of bank credit expansion, a fairly interventionist policy, in an effort to gain a higher degree of control of the economy that it felt was needed. That the Bundesbank did not choose to use such tools should not obscure the fact that central bankers felt little or no ideological or intellectual compunction against serious consideration of using very interventionist, direct policy instruments.

As a group, central bankers have distinctive views. They are prone to reject theories which might identify beneficial consequences with inflation and prone to accept theories which identify labor's wage demands as the source of inflation which is most to be confronted. Although they do respond to other problems, evidence suggests that inflation is seen as the most important problem, and central bankers tend to be more inflation conscious than other government officials.

Moreover, the international differences between central bankers are not very marked in the views that they hold. This stems partly from the structural similarities of their tasks—all are responsible for maintaining financial stability. Additionally, there is a kind of international social system among central bankers which brings them into frequent contact. The uniform interest in incomes policies among central bankers in the early seventies was encouraged by and facilitated through their regular contacts at the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund.[24] It is now clear that adoption of money growth targets is strongly supported through the same institutions.[25] During the

22. Wadbrook, *West German Balance of Payments*, p. 64.

23. Bank of England, *Quarterly Review*, (December 1975), p. 365.

24. Wadbrook, *West German Balance of Payments*, p. 64.

25. *Business Week*, 27 June 1977, p. 86. Bank for International Settlements, *Forty-Sixth Annual Report* . . . , pp. 119–20, describes the various coordinating and communication roles of the BIS. There is a continuing concern for incomes policy, particularly as a means of shifting from consumption to capital formation (p. 135)

1960s, the exigencies of maintaining a fixed exchange rate system required almost constant high level interactions between central bankers in the West.[26] This facilitated an exchange of views and served to solidify the relationships between central bankers. Now that "managed floating" is typical, international contacts between central bankers have again assumed greater significance. Thus, the contacts needed to sustain consistent outlooks among central bankers across national boundaries are present, both at an individual and an organizational level.

Given these orientations—which might fairly be characterized as conservative—it is clear that the problem of autonomy of central banks is even more arresting. Why should some central banks be relatively autonomous from government, given that the banks are likely to be promoting more restrictive policies than the government, and given what many economists see as politicians' dangerously pro-inflationary tendencies?

FORMAL-LEGAL STATUS OF CENTRAL BANKS[27]

Although there is some variance among these five central banks, each has somewhat close formal ties to governments. There are several aspects of these relationships to be considered here: ownership of bank capital, appointment of top officials, legal/constitutional assignment of responsibility for monetary management, and budgetary control.

Only in the United States is the capital of the central bank privately owned, subscribed by the "member [commercial] banks." In all other cases, public ownership is the rule. Except for Sweden's, publicly owned since 1668, the banks were nationalized in the post-World War II period.[28] While the question of owner-

26 For instance, see the account by Charles Coombs, *The Arena of International Finance* (New York, Wiley, 1976).

27. The following account draws on many different sources including Grove, "Central Bank Independence," European Communities, Monetary Committee, *Monetary Policy in the Countries of the European Economic Community: Institutions and Instruments* (Luxembourg, 1972), Staff of the Committee on Banking Currency and Housing, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., *Activities by Various Central Banks to Promote Economic and Social Welfare Programs* (1971); Donald R Hodgman, *National Monetary Policies and International Monetary Cooperation* (Boston. Little Brown and Company, 1974), idem, "Credit Controls in Western Europe. An Evaluative Perspective" in *Credit Allocation Techniques and Monetary Policy*, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series, no. 11, selections from Karel Holbik, ed., *Monetary Policy in Twelve Industrial Countries* (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1973), including the introduction, and Charles A D. Goodhart, "Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom," and Inge Vikbladh, "Monetary Policy in Sweden", Assar Lindbeck, *Swedish Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), Martin Schnitzer, *The Economy of Sweden* (New York: Praeger, 1970), J G S. Wilson, *French Banking Structure and Credit Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), George Garvy, "The Discount Mechanism in Leading Industrial Countries since World War II," in *Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount Mechanism* (Washington, D.C.. Federal Reserve Board, 1971), G. L. Bach, *Making Monetary and Fiscal Policy* (Washington, D C: The Brookings Institution, 1971), OECD publications were indispensable, including, particularly for Sweden and the United Kingdom, the annual *Economic Survey*, and *Monetary Policy in France* (1974), *Monetary Policy in Germany* (1973), *Monetary Policy in the United States*, (1974).

28. In neither the case of France nor the United Kingdom did this change represent much more than a ratification of existing relationships. For instance, see the accounts in Michael J Artis, *Foundations of British Monetary Policy* (Oxford· Basil Blackwell, 1965), and Patrice Brunet, *L'Organisation de la Banque de France* (Paris. Presses Universitaires de France, 1973).

ship has had some importance as a political symbol, it is generally regarded as having been fairly unimportant in central bank behavior.

Each of these central banks is headed by a Governor or President, who presides over a governing council. These officers are appointed by governments. In Germany, where the Central Bank Council is composed jointly of the Bundesbank Directors and the Presidents of branch banks (Land Central Banks), appointment power is shared by the federal government and the Bundesrat. In France, the Governor and two Deputy Governors are appointed by the President. The members of the General Council are appointed by the Minister of Finance. The members of the National Credit Council, formally the overseeing body for the bank of France, are either specified by law or are appointed by the Minister of Finance. In Britain, the Governor and Directors of the Bank of England are all Crown appointments. In Sweden, six of seven Directors of the Riksbank are elected by the Parliament from among its own members. The seventh (the Chairman) is appointed by the government (King-in-Council). The Governor and Deputy Governors are selected by election from among the Directors. Sweden stands out in having the central bank directorate composed of parliamentarians. In all other cases, the highest officials are appointed either by heads of governments or by Finance Ministers.

Legal specification of roles in making monetary policy differs considerably. In Germany, the Bundesbank is required to support the general economic policy of government, but is legally not subject to instructions from the federal government. In the United States, monetary affairs are constitutionally assigned to Congress, but this power has largely been delegated to the Federal Reserve Board. There is no formal statement indicating how the Federal Reserve Board should relate to other policymaking institutions. In France, the Bank is legally subordinate to the National Credit Council, but its role in policy is not specified legally. In Britain, the Bank "may" be given directions by the Treasury when "necessary in the public interest," but there is no evidence that this authority has ever been used. In Sweden, the Riksbank is constitutionally responsible to Parliament and its Banking Committee and may not receive instructions from the executive—although in a parliamentary system it is not exactly clear what this distinction is supposed to mean.

It appears to be the case for all of these central banks that they are budgetarily independent[29] and have personnel systems completely separate from civil service systems in the countries involved. Since budgetary control is often seen as a key to the control of policy, this may be a critical factor.

While the legal status of the banks differs somewhat, it is certainly not obvious that the different policy roles of the various banks is adequately explained by these differences. While legal structures can be seen as tending to restrict bank autonomy in most cases, some observers have concluded that central banks are fairly autonomous on the whole.

Grove, for instance, concluded that central bank independence was greater than would appear to be the case from the statutes, explaining that a "deeply rooted reputation for the objectivity and technical competence of its views" allows a central bank to "defend itself from the pres-

29. All central banks derive income from assets they use for stabilization purposes.

sures of political expedience quite effectively."[30] Ralph Miliband also concludes that central banks are autonomous, but does not find that encouraging:

> Central bankers, enjoying a high degree of autonomy from their governments, have come to assume extraordinary importance as the guardians of [capitalist] orthodoxy, and as the representatives *par excellence* of "sound finance."[31]

In a publication summarizing the position and activities of central banks in member countries, the European Economic Community advised that actual autonomy relative to the statutes worked both ways. While some governments do not use statutory powers, the absence of statutory powers over the central bank does not prevent governments from requiring that their views "be considered."[32] In short, while the legal arrangements help give a richer picture of the bank-government relationship, the matter of accounting for differences in autonomy remains a problem.

POLICY INSTRUMENTATION: COMPLEXITY AND CONCENTRATION

Many economists in the United States have argued for the need to supplement more global policy measures with selective measures which may permit better control of the economy in a period in which economic disruption appears to come from specific sources, rather than some general imbalance in consumption or production.[33] This represents some change from the more familiar Keynesian view stressing global policy as a means of economic management which, in particular, preserves the accuracy of price-setting processes, and thus a more efficient economic process.

It is interesting, then, to examine current differences in instrumentation for monetary policy in these five countries, and to see what kinds of political differences may accompany differences in instrumentation. While the primary focus here is on central bank autonomy, other issues are touched on as well: possible political constraints on flexibility of policy response and different patterns of relations with interest groups.

Monetary policy involves manipulating basic policy instruments to affect the availability of money and credit. These instruments include open market operations (the buying and selling of securities in the money market), discount policy (including setting the rate at which the central bank lends to commercial banks), reserve requirement policy (setting the proportion of liabilities or assets that banks must hold in cash), and direct controls on credit (for instance, specifying the quantity of loans which banks may make for certain purposes).

Complexity/selectivity

One dimension along which monetary policy instrumentation can be compared is the degree of its

30. Grove, "Central Bank Independence," p. 19.

31. Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York. Basic Books, 1969), p 153.

32 European Communities, Monetary Committee, *Monetary Policies*, p 13.

33 Assar Lindbeck, "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," *American Economic Review*, vol. 6 (May 1976), pp. 1–19, Stuart Holland, *The State as Entrepreneur* (London. Weidenfeld and Nichonson, 1972); Sherman J Maisel, "Improving Our System of Credit Allocation," in *Credit Allocation Techniques and Monetary Policy*, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (September, 1973), pp. 15–30; Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," p. 188

complexity or simplicity. Complexity increases as the number of instruments and their frequency of adjustment increases. As the number of instruments used increases, selectivity increases (and thus, the number of separate discriminatory judgments required in policy).

From the policymaker's point of view, complexity may represent both blessings and burdens. Complex instrumentation may provide the more supple and subtle means needed for adapting to a complex world. Theoretically, with more complex instrumentation, a policymaker could cut right to the core of a problem rather than waiting for indirect mechanisms to have their more random effects. Beyond some point, complexity could become so great as to impair effectiveness due to the problems of maintaining consistency among instruments. Even modest levels of complexity would probably require greater efforts in achieving coordination and coherence. Many economists would warn against the danger that direct intervention risks creating distortions of one sort or another in the economy.

More complex instrumentation may present another problem as well. More directness and selectivity may present greater incentives to the private sector to innovate, creating new financial systems not currently regulated, thus evading policy control.[34] In short, complex regulation may require either continued policy innovation in order to respond to private sector innovation or a sense of cooperation and responsibility for policy by all affected.

If complexity presents the central banker with opportunities and hazards in achieving particular policy goals, politically, it presents hazards. Increasing complexity means that actions will be more precisely directed at a particular objective or group. Consequently, distributional consequences of policy should be obvious to all involved. For example, a policy setting limits on bank lending for housing construction is relatively unambiguous as to who gains or loses on the first round. By contrast, a policy involving buying or selling several million dollars of government securities in financial markets has far less clear consequences. By increasing the salience of policy for affected groups, complexity should increase the number and intensity of groups mobilized to influence policy choice. The resulting increase in conflict associated with monetary policy would be expected to involve elected officials and to increase the incentives for governments to take responsibility for monetary policy. Consequently, increasingly complex instrumentation would be expected to reduce the autonomy of central banks.

The same logic suggests that complex instrumentation should also be associated with more extensive and direct contacts between interest groups and central banks. While public comprehension of the separate policy actions should increase with complex policy, there is no reason to expect that policy as a whole will be more comprehensible. Thus, there would be no reason, as a result of the complexity of instrumentation alone, to expect that political coalitions would form spanning the whole range of activities involved in monetary policy. Policy coherence may be reduced in an objective sense, reducing

34. Hyman P. Minsky, "Central Banking and Money Market Changes," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 7 (May 1957), pp. 171–87.

the possibility of comprehending it. Complex instrumentation may tend to fragment interests rather than facilitate their coalescing. The degree of fragmentation or coalescence probably would be accounted for largely by the patterns of political competition in each society.

Complexity may present two further kinds of hazards to policymakers. By its very nature, complex policy tends to require more administrative bureaucracy than does simple policy, implying attendant risks of "bureaucratic dysfunction."[35] Further, the greater degree of group mobilization suggests that policy responsiveness may be reduced because of rigidity in the structures of interest groups which attach to particular policies. This leads to the paradoxical conclusion that the policies that are more precise and take effect more quickly may have those advantages undercut because of the lags associated with the process of decisionmaking.[36]

Simplicity should reverse these effects. Less direct policy tools may take longer to achieve desired effects, and the effects achieved may be less precisely guided than would ideally be preferred. On the other hand, simpler policy minimizes problems associated with large administrative bureaucracies, decreases the likelihood of internally inconsistent policies, and creates fewer opportunities and incentives for evasion of controls by the private sector.

Politically, the more simple monetary policy tools have important implications. Because of their in directness, there is much more dif ficulty in tracing their effects.[37] They are much less likely to attract atten tion or to become the object of in tense group mobilization. Their greater indirectness makes using simple instrumentation a more highly theoretical and abstract matter, restricted only to a highly trained elite. Simplicity helps increase bank autonomy from government, not only because of the effects of lower group mobilization, but also because the technical sophistication required to understand policy can be used by the central bank to help hold elected officials at arms length.[38] Since central bank operations under more simple instrument systems are less likely to be politically constrained by interest group preferences and the need for consultation, simple instrumentation should provide somewhat greater flexibility to act quickly in response to changing conditions.

This discussion is not meant to suggest that the current complexity or simplicity of a given set of monetary policy instruments is understood by their hypothesized political effects. On the contrary, explaining the current configuration of tools requires the examination of complex historical processes of interplay between political power and economic structures.

Solving the Political Problems of Complex Instrumentation

Two problems in particular seem to present challenges to complex in-

35. A useful statement of these problems is in James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), especially chap. 3.

36. E. S. Kirschen et al., *Economic Policy*, chap. 10.

37. There is an extensive literature on the United States case attempting to trace all the effects of monetary policy.

38. Keith Acheson and John F. Chant, "Mythology and Central Banking," *Kyklos*, vol. 2 (1973).

strumentation: (1) the lag in policy response due to rigid group alignments, and (2) the problem of evasion by an innovative private sector. A possible solution could come by way of adjustments in procedural instrumentation. A possible candidate is deliberately including the affected groups in the policy process to a greater extent. The logic of such inclusion has been extensively explored in Martin Heisler's discussion of what he calls the "European Polity Model."[39] In particular, response lag could be reduced because of a broader sharing of assumptions and greater readiness to compromise which might result from consultation. Innovative evasion might be reduced by creating a broader sense of shared responsibility for the success of policy. At the risk of anticipating conclusions to be presented later, it is true that in this sample of central banks, formal consultation procedures are available to a greater degree in the cases with the greatest degree of instrument complexity.

Concentration

The extent to which central banks formally control the tools of monetary policy is measured by the concentration dimension. The more tasks are shared with other institutions or assigned entirely to other institutions, the less instrumentation is concentrated in the central bank. As concentration increases, any conflicts associated with monetary policy will tend to have central bank actions as their object. Thus, the more concentrated the instrumentation, the more likely it is that monetary policy controversy will be central bank controversy. The effect of concentration on central bank autonomy is seen as conditional on the complexity or simplicity of instrumentation. Since complexity should increase politicization, the effect of concentration should be of more importance as complexity increases, and should further serve to lower autonomy. A low level of concentration in a quite complex system would lead us to expect greater autonomy than would be predicted by complexity alone—although there would be a question of the actual role performed by the central bank in the use of the instruments. Note that concentration does not test the operational independence of a central bank nor the influence of the central bank in advising governments.

Lower concentration should enhance central bank policy flexibility, since some controversy is presumably deflected from the bank. To the extent that actual decisionmaking is reflected by formal responsibilities, dispersion of instruments means that policy coordination is complicated further, that bureaucratic conflict may be a source of response lag, and that some available instruments may be rendered useless. This last possibility is illustrated by the case of the United States. The Federal Reserve Board shares responsibility for setting reserve requirements for banks with state governments, which may charter banks independently. As a result, the freedom of the Federal Reserve Board to change reserve requirements is seriously limited, since banks can sometimes receive more favorable regulation by becom-

39. Martin O. Heisler with Robert B. Kvavik, "Patterns of European Politics: The 'European Polity' Model," in *Politics in Europe* ed. Martin O. Heisler (New York. David McKay, 1974), especially pp. 42–71. The notion of "procedural instrumentation" is developed in Charles W Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

TABLE 1

COMPLEXITY OF TOOLS IN RECENT YEARS
FIVE WESTERN COUNTRIES*

TOOLS	UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE	GERMANY	SWEDEN
A. Discounting					
1. Rate change frequency	Medium	High	Low	Low	Low
2. Multiple rates	No	No	Yes	No	No
3 Significance in bank refinancing†	Very Low (S)	Low (S, I)	Medium (S)	Low (S, I)	Low
B. Direct and Selective Controls					
1. Discount quotas for each bank	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
2. Selective access to discounting (By "use")	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
3. Control of bank credit expansion totals	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
4 Guidance to banks on credit allocation	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
5 Interest rate controls					
(a) deposits	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
(b) loans	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
6. Controls on consumer credit (quantity, rates)	No	No	Yes	No	No
C Open Market Operations					
Scope and role in economic management‡	High, Broad Market	Low (B)	Medium (B)	Medium Growing Importance	Low
D. Reserve Requirements					
1 Frequency of change	Low	Medium	High	High	Low
2. Multiple categories	Low	No	Low	High	Low
3 Control of asset composition	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Complexity Index	.22	32	.65	.35	43

SOURCES: Same as in footnote 27. Also, consult International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, various editions.

Computation of the Complexity Index·

Each entry is assigned a score according to the following schemes

1 For yes/no entries.
   Yes = 1
   No = 0
2. For Low, Medium, High:
   No = 0
   Low = 1
   Medium = 1 5
   High = 2
3. Frequency of Change of Discount Rate. (on average)
   each 4 9–6 7 months: low = 1
   each 3 1–4.8 months: medium = 1.5
   each 1.2–3 0 months: high = 2
4 Frequency of change in Reserve Requirements: (on average)
   changes more frequent than once each six months high = 2
   changes between once each six months and once a year: medium = 1 5
   changes less frequent than once a year: low = 1
5. All entries in the "Direct Control" category are weighted by a factor of 1.5 as a means of reflecting their greater complexity.

ing a state bank, thereby escaping Federal reserve control.

ASSESSING COMPLEXITY AND CONCENTRATION

The complexity of monetary policy instrumentation in the five countries is summarized in table 1. The entries reflect the presence or absence of major monetary policy tools in these countries during the past few years[40] and gives some indication of the kind of use that has been made of the instruments. The greater the number of "yes" or "high" entries for a country, the more complex/selective is its monetary policy instrumentation. The "complexity index" at the bottom represents an attempt to reflect in a single number the complexity of policy instrumentation in these countries, thus facilitating comparisons among countries. The index can vary between zero (for the theoretically most simple system) and one (for the theoretically most complex system). While the precise index values should not be taken too seriously, they do reflect national differences which are interesting in light of the predicted effects of complex instrumentation. In rank order, from simple to complex, are the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and France.

While the concentration/dispersion of instruments cannot be so clearly assessed as complexity, rough rankings are possible. To begin with, consider the differences between the case of greatest concentration, the Bundesbank, and least concentration, the Bank of France. The Bundesbank has very broad statutory authority for all the monetary policy tools used in the country. As in all other cases, government debt management is a shared responsibility with the Ministry of Finance. Although supervisory power over banks is shared with one other office, the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, the range of institutions subject to Bundesbank control is extremely wide, reflecting the relatively low degree of legal discrimination between kinds of banking institutions. By way of contrast, in France, formal responsibility for decision on many policy issues is not given to the Bank of France, but to the National Credit Council, a large, broadly representative institution which oversees the Bank of France and links the Bank to other important economic actors—primarily the Minister of Finance.

40 Since sources varied in different time periods, somewhat different starting and ending points were used in different countries for evaluating the use of different tools. Typically, observations cover the time period since 1967, extending through 1976. Often instrumentation in a particular country changed markedly in this period, as for example, in Britain in 1971. In that case, the current instrumentation is reflected.

6 The complexity index is computed by summing the values for each entry, subtracting 4, which I believe to be the theoretical minimum score in almost any case, and dividing by 18.5 which is the theoretical maximum score minus 4. Thus the complexity index expresses a percentage of a theoretically maximum complexity for any given country

* Actual dates covered varied according to the availability of sources. Information for years 1967–76 is usually represented. Sometimes information reflects major changes in policy.

† S = Primary function as a signaling device. I = Other interest rates move closely with the discount rate

‡ B = Open Market Operations are primarily inter-bank transactions.

For example, regulation of interest rates and the terms of consumer credit are formally the responsibility of the National Credit Council. Responsibility for reserve requirements is shared between the National Credit Council and the Bank of France, while the National Credit Council makes the decisions on the composition of reserve assets which banks must hold. Rediscounting is largely controlled by the Bank of France, but often banks can rediscount paper through the "treasury circuit" (e.g., the Crédit National, Crédit Foncier, Crédit Agricole, etc.), controlled by the Ministry of Finance. Most banks involved in short-term credits are regulated formally by the National Credit Council, but there are some regulated by the Ministry of Finance (popular banks, savings banks, agricultural and professional credit associations). Of course, the public specialized credit institutions in the "treasury circuit" are outside the scope of the Bank of France.

In between the Bundesbank and the Bank of France, the differences are somewhat less marked. In the other three cases, the breadth of institutions subject to regulation as "banks" is far less broad than in Germany. The breadth is greatest in Sweden, probably the second most concentrated system after Germany. While some public financial institutions of importance are outside the scope of the Riksbank—the Swedish Investment Bank and the National Pension Fund are prominent examples—reserve requirement regulations of the Bank of Sweden extend to savings banks and insurance companies as well. In the United Kingdom, building societies and savings banks, as well as other institutions involved in longer term deposits and lending, are not regulated by the Bank of England under the current meaning of the word "bank."

Of the three central banks of Sweden, the United States, and England, monetary policy instruments are probably least concentrated in the Federal Reserve Board—although there is a significant gap between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of France. The Federal Reserve Board shares formal responsibility for setting the discount rate with district/branch banks of the Federal Reserve System. As mentioned above, state banks are not subject to all Federal Reserve regulations, and regulation of broad categories of financial institutions (insurance companies, savings and loan associations) are located in other agencies. Some specialized lending agencies (e.g. in agricultural loans) are also separate.

It is possible then, to array these five central banks along two dimensions—complexity/simplicity and dispersion/concentration of instrumentation (see figure 1). The two dimensions provide a baseline description of the kind of "politics" likely to characterize different central banks.

What follows are summaries of the expectations about the political relations of central banks located in the different quadrants of figure 1. These descriptions should be understood as referring most precisely to the ideal-typical banks represented by the areas near the farthest corners of the diagram.

a) Concentrated-Simple instrumentation: This central bank should be quite autonomous from government control, probably ranking second most autonomous according to our hypotheses. While the concentrated instrumentation suggests that any conflict will con-

FIGURE 1

COMPLEXITY-CONCENTRATION OF INSTRUMENTATION
FIVE WESTERN CENTRAL BANKS

verge more on the bank directly, simplicity suggests that the policy process is usually restricted to only the most technically sophisticated observers. Policy formulation should be quite flexible. (Example: Bundesbank).

b) Concentrated-complex instrumentation: This central bank should have the lowest degree of autonomy. Both complexity and concentration should work to "politicize" the central bank, minimizing its exclusive dominance by a narrow, technical elite. Both factors suggest that flexibility in policy change could be a problem. (Example, Riksbank).

c) Dispersed-simple instrumentation: This should be the most autonomous case. The range of mobilized groups should be narrow, but dispersion of instruments suggests the possibility that policy would involve more bargaining between different institutional actors. Central bank flexibility on policy would be limited largely by

the degree to which operational control of major policy instruments are "dispersed." (Examples: Federal Reserve Board, Bank of England).

d) Dispersed-complex instrumentation: This central bank should be second least autonomous, and relatively inflexible in policy changes. Participation is encouraged on a piecemeal basis, but mobilized groups should not converge on the central bank as the object of their concerns. (Example: France).

These hypotheses do not constitute a full explanation of central bank politics. A full explanation, in almost any of the senses used by social scientists, is well beyond what can be accomplished here. Still, we can evaluate the accuracy of the hypotheses with respect to the five banks considered here.

MEANINGS OF AUTONOMY

In relation to policymaking, there are three significant aspects of autonomy to be discussed here. First is the degree to which the central bank can pursue a course of action acknowledged to be inconsistent with the government's preferences. A second dimension is the degree to which central bank officials can publicly criticize the government's policy even though not taking actions to contradict it. Third is the extent to which central bankers play a significant role within government councils in deciding about preferred policy or in defining the terms within which policy developments will be analyzed. These need not be conceived of as necessarily hierarchical. Thus, a central bank capable of taking opposing policy actions might be quite ineffective in setting the terms of policy debate within government.

Opposing action

In all cases, the freedom of the central bank to take actions contrary to the preferences of government are fairly restricted. The most important examples have occurred in the United States and Germany, although in all cases it is possible for the central bank to take tactical actions in day-to-day economic management which will, in retrospect, appear to have been contrary to government policy. In the United States, the most dramatic recent split between the President and the Federal Reserve Board occurred in December 1965, when the Federal Reserve Board decided to tighten monetary policy by raising the discount rate, despite the wishes of the Johnson administration to the contrary.[41] The incident drew a great deal of public attention. Congressional hearings were held, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors, William McChesney Martin, was, as one economist put it to me, "hauled down to the LBJ ranch and branded." In recent years, the Federal Reserve has been involved in conflict with Congress over the extent to which it should be responsive to congressional directives. Perhaps the main policy disagreement between the Federal Reserve Board and the Congress has been on the issue of whether or not the Federal Reserve was letting the money supply grow at the appropriate rate.[42]

The Bundesbank has also occasionally refused, in dramatic fashion, to cooperate with announced government policy. Wadbrook cites

41. See the account in Maisel, *Managing the Dollar*, chap 4, Bach, *Making Monetary and Fiscal Policy*, chap 6.

42. For example, "Confrontation Time Again at the Fed," *New York Times*, 28 November, 1976.

Bundesbank opposition to the Keisinger government's earliest policy proposals, and, more recently, the bank's refusal to change the discount rate in January 1971.[43] Aside from these particular incidents, however, most observers have difficulty pointing to examples of times in which lack of complementarity in monetary and fiscal policy has been the result of open central bank refusal to cooperate. In fact, the consensus appears to be that in Germany, as elsewhere, it is highly unlikely that a central bank will openly refuse to cooperate with the general policy stance of a government for very long.

Public criticism

Central bankers in most countries engage in public criticism of government policies, roundly condemning deficit spending and urging the adoption of other policies (other than monetary) which are believed to have a chance of slowing inflation (notably, incomes policy). In Britain, Germany, and the United States, critical comments and analysis by top central bank officials are regularly published in bank reports and are discussed in the press. The freedom to criticize the government in public particularly distinguishes the Governor of the Bank of England from Ministers, who conventionally are expected to supported government policy publicly. In the United States and Germany, public criticism is often taken as a warning that central bank noncooperation could occur, and is consequently seen as an implicit threat.[44] In 1973, there occurred a sharp division between the Bundesbank and the Schmidt government over the general direction that policy should take and the extent to which inflation should be tolerated. The disagreement was eventually resolved when Schmidt altered his view of the inflation-unemployment tradeoff, coming to a position more consistent with that of the Bundesbank.

In France, public disagreement of any kind is much less likely than in other countries, but does occur occasionally in speeches by the Governor. Such disagreement is not typically reported in the general press—on the whole the salience of the Bank of France in the daily press is very low—although more restricted financial publications may report the incidents.

In government councils

The question remains as to how complete a picture of bank policies is to be drawn based on public conflict. It is reasonable to suspect that the most important demonstration of the power of a central bank (and its autonomy) is to be found in its ability to win its point in government councils. The capacity to take opposing policy actions almost certainly constitutes a resource relevant to central bank success in internal bargaining. But Bach's conclusion indicates that these are not the same thing.

> The power and influence of the Federal Reserve in over-all macroeconomic policy making has usually been greatest when its distance ("independence") from the administration has been least, and least when the distance has been the greatest.[45]

One might be mistaken, then, to conclude that the Riksbank and the Bank

43. Wadbrook, *West German Balance of Payments*, p. 90.
44. Ibid.
45. Bach, *Making Monetary and Fiscal Policy*, pp. 163–64

of France are insignificant forces in monetary policymaking just because the probability of their taking actions obviously in opposition to government is very small.

This is important because in almost all cases, central banks are perceived within their particular system to be relatively autonomous. For example, although no one disagrees that the Swedish Riksbank's policy is "part and parcel of the government's economic policy," Schnitzer could write seriously of the Riksbank as only recently "gaining autonomy" in its decisions.[46] Similarly, a distinguished group of French analysts have expressed the opinion that "the only service which appears, with respect to the department [Ministry of Finance] to have any respected autonomy, is, in fact, the Bank of France."[47]

An assessment of a central bank's role within government councils, then, requires some conception of the significance attached to the central bank's viewpoint. This is obviously a complicated evaluative problem and requires considerable inside knowledge. Among the experts whom this writer interviewed, there was little disagreement as to how they would rank the central banks, both as to the weight of the central bank in government councils and in overall autonomy. Ranked from high to low autonomy, are the Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of England, the Bank of France, and the Riksbank—with close placement of the top two and the bottom two. This ranking is consistent with the differences indicated with respect to public criticism and opposing policy.[48]

How do these rankings compare to the rankings which were based on the concentration/complexity dimensions? Based simply on the quadrants in which the banks are located (omitting, for the moment, their actual coordinates), the predicted ranking would appear to be similar: Federal Reserve Board, Bank of England, Bundesbank, Bank of France, Riksbank. These rankings are approximately the same as the ones made by the economists who were consulted.

CONCLUSION

This essay has attempted to provide an opening to the issue of central banking from a political perspective. It endeavors to find ways of organizing a somewhat inaccessible body of literature that would have both expository and explanatory value for political scientists. A

46. Vikbladh, "Monetary Policy in Sweden," pp. 382–83. Schnitzer, *The Economy of Sweden*, p. 187.

47. C. Alphandery, et al. *Pour Nationalizer l'Etat* (Paris: Editions du Sueil, 1968), p. 49.

48. The Bank of England is sufficiently less autonomous than the Federal Reserve Board that placement in another quadrant might be expected. What refinements in these hypotheses might result in better predictions? Consider the Bank of England first. The Bank of England reformed and simplified its monetary policy system in 1971, with the institution of a program called "competition and credit controls." Prior to that time, the complexity score for the Bank of England would have been higher, placing it in quadrant (d) with the Bank of France. By postulating that bank autonomy is decreased much more easily than it is increased, the case of the Bank of England can be handled without difficulty. It does seem to be accurate to say that, historically, central banks have much more tended to become less autonomous than vice versa. What this means for predictions using this scheme is that any movement toward quadrant (c) will result in predictions overstating central bank autonomy.

number of variables have been excluded which might be very productive in further efforts to explain the behavior of central banks and their relationships to government and groups. For instance, one might examine differences in the recruitment and socialization patterns of the central bankers themselves; the relationships of central banks to commercial banks; or, taking a somewhat different approach, one might inquire what basis exists for the formation of broad coalitions which might support or oppose a central bank.[49]

49. Tentative findings on some of these are reported in John T. Woolley, "The Politics of Central Banking: Comparisons from Recent Experience" (Paper read at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, 1977).

There is ample room for research on these issues and others relating to central banks and monetary policy.

The stakes of monetary policy are quite high. It is clear that central bankers tend to have a particular view of how the stakes should be managed. Yet, the extent to which central bankers are able to implement their preferences varies considerably across nations which seem to confront quite similar kinds of economic challenges. This analysis has focused on the extent to which the complexity and concentration of policy instrumentation provide a rationale for expecting to find differences in the autonomy of central banks from governments. The predictions achieved are encouraging in terms of providing useful dimensions for comparison.

Macro Theoretical Approaches to Public Policy Analysis: The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities

By HENRY TEUNE

ABSTRACT: Most empirical research on the consequences of public policy follow a mirco, "historical," and incremental approach. Thus, the validity of the predictions have limited generality. A macro, theoretical, and structural approach is presented as an alternative. Such a reorientation to public policy analysis will not only provide understanding of the context of policy predictions, but also opportunities for testing them both historically and comparatively. It would also bring together social science theory and policy research.

This approach is illustrated with three macro structural theories of the urban fiscal crisis in the U.S.—the conflict between political demand for welfare and capital for economic growth; the decline of the city as a political force in national politics of economic distribution; and the changing technological base of cities and their economic viability. Each of these theories provide for different interpretations and predictions of policies that are likely to be effective in achieving collective goals.

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AMONG the problems of policy analysis that is intended to increase knowledge for public choice are:

1) the predictions of outcomes have limited historical and cross-system validity; 2) the predictions do not discriminate between policy constraints and policy instrumentalities; and 3) the predictions are not formulated in a way that they can be tested outside of the specific context to which they are intended to be or have been applied.

Public policy, in this discussion, is distinguished from policy in general. The latter can be conceived as the total set of goals that are both explicitly and implicitly operative in a social system without regard to their origin (for instance, public or private institutions), their normative character (for instance, behavior inducing or behavior inhibiting), their manner of implementation (for instance, coercion or incentives), or their consequences. Public policy is defined here more narrowly: instrumentalities adopted by governments for the purpose of creating changes in the states of the social system, including changes in the "policy system" itself—the total set of actors and their relationships that determine governmental policy. Inducing change includes guiding, accelerating, or slowing down existing patterns of change, an example of which will be presented.

As public policy is purposeful, it involves choice. As it involves choice, it requires prediction, whether from projections, theory, or other sources. Theoretical or theoretically informed predictions are the point of convergence between policy and social science theory. It is toward the improvement of prediction by the use of social science theory, which is both historically (cross-time) and comparatively (cross-system) based, that this paper is directed.

PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS

Contemporary public policy analysis either is handicapped by or is the beneficiary of several types of paradigms—public choice theory, quasi-experimental analysis, normative evaluation, game theoretic models.[1] Whatever their relative merits, two empirical conditions for the application of any paradigm of public policy analysis are necessary, if the results of the analysis can be used for purpose, political purpose.

First, the subjective states, the purposes of the actors, must be different from, incongruent with, the states of the system. If this is not the case, then there is neither motivation for choice nor a basis for politics.

Second, the social system must, to some extent, be nondetermined yet sufficiently integrated to be determinable. To the extent that the system is not determined, there can be politics. The political system to some extent must be an independent variable.[2] Despite the necessity for politics being predictive, rather than predicted, a substantial amount of policy research assumes a language

1 For an example of an attempt to create a paradigm for policy analysis, *see* C. W. Anderson, "The Logic Public Problems: Evaluation in Comparative Policy Research." (Paper presented to the Conference on Comparative Public Policy, Cornell University, October 1976).

2. *See*, D E Ashford, "Policy as an Independent Variable or Institutions Really Do Matter" (Paper presented to the Conference on Comparative Public Policy, Cornell University, October 1976).

of analysis in which policy and policy outcomes are determined by the economy or society.[3]

Changes in contemporary political policy analysis are required in order to generate predictions that are testable across time and across systems[4] At the very least such tests have the practical advantage of reducing the costs of partial or whole "experiments." Such predictions will be derived from macro, theoretical, and structural paradigms rather than the micro, historical projections, and incremental approaches that tend to dominate empirical analysis of public policy.

A macro approach addresses the context, including the structure of the institutions that are making policy. For example, the urban centers of the United States are constrained by the macro system rule, indeed, the constitutional principle, that there ought to be free migration of capital and labor, or of economic enterprises and individuals. Such rules change over time; they certainly vary across systems. Although the United States imposes economic barriers to individual migration in the form of regional pricing differentials, Poland also imposes political barriers, including permits for residence. Because these macro-system conditions influence micro policy predictions, for example, the impact of housing subsidies on suburban migration, then policy impacts can only be assessed empirically with cross-county and cross-time data.

A theoretical orientation yields general propositions, which when interpreted, can predict specific cases. As relationships among the variables differ across systems and change over time, it is necessary to go beyond extrapolations of the immediate past (e.g., birth rates and school age population) to theories that explain relationships (e.g., level of development of the system, as it relates to birth rates, and as these relate to educational alternatives provided by the system). Theories are general, allowing for cross-system and cross-time generalization; extrapolation is system specific. Further, extrapolation is largely linear; polity changes "interrupt" and, consequently, are nonlinear.[5]

A structural approach requires knowing the basic relationships in a social system and how these relationships influence impact. Relationships, such as that between inflation and unemployment, are necessary for predicting the consequence of policy. Determining and assessing the impact of policy within the context of different structural rules, requires the study of structural variations across system and time; that is, comparatively and historically.

A macro, theoretical, structural approach to public policy analysis to harden and enhance policy prediction logically requires cross-time and cross-system analysis. Such an approach becomes compelling for highly developed systems, where there are, by definition, more

3 One stream of political science research on public policy took the view that the policy outcomes were the result of other variables. *See*, for example, T. R. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972)

4 *See*, H. Teune, "Comparative Policy Analysis" (Paper presented to the Conference on Comparative Public Policy, Cornell University, October 1976)

5. In this sense all policies can be viewed as an interrupted time series. A policy is adopted at some particular point in time, and the "before" and "after" effects can be, in principle at least, evaluated.

"things," or components, that are connected as well as more "things," and, as consequence greater complexity of policy results as well as more rapidly changing structures.[6]

There is an addition: levels within the system. Although "levels" or the organization of components is a general phenomenon and, therefore, should be taken into account in the study of social systems, for policy related to government, multiple levels are necessary for empirical analysis of policy. With the infrequent exception of direct or quasi-military rule, all modern states have a system of local government hierarchically organized but with some policy autonomy.[7]

Methodological considerations

The general assumption here is that social science theory can be used to obtain policy predictions. A corollary is that it also is possible to confirm predictions without the cost of applying policies experimentally to determine how they work.

One alternative is the empirical study of policies in force, after the fact, one ingredient of policy evaluation. At the micro level, testing predictions according to the standards of evidence of experimental design is described with the label, quasi-experimental design.[8] But quasi-experimental analysis of policy impact is micro because the logic of experimental design is biased toward the isolatable, and controllable; in this case, a specific policy, a specific policy target, and specific policy consequences. If experimental principles are carried to macro policies, those that take place at the system level and have the whole system as a target—the industrialization of the state—or a sector of the system—the poor—the necessary controls required for inference become impossible to attain.[9] It is one thing to determine the impact of reading instruction on a school population by controlling for class, age, community, family, etc.; it is an order of magnitude more difficult to test the consequences of national health insurance on the cost of medical care and its distribution by studying Sweden and the United States.

Since the principles of experimental design became accepted in policy analysis in the late 1960s, there have been few demonstratable successes.[10] The nonrandomization of policy treatment; that is, the fact

6. For an elaboration of the relationships between social complexity and policy problems, *see*, H. Teune, "Information, Control, and the Governability of Territorial Political Units" (Paper delivered to the 10th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, 1976).

7. For an explanation of the role of local government, see J. J. Wiatr, H. Teune, and Z. Mlinar, "Alternative Local Organizational Policies in Development," *Polish Round Table*, vol. VI (1974-75).

8. The parallelism between policy decisions and experiments was highlighted in D. T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," *The American Psychologist* (April 1969), pp 409-29 *See, also* J. A. Caporaso and L. L. Ross, eds, *Quasi Experimental Approaches* (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

9. This is discussed in detail in H Teune, "Public Policy: Macro Perspectives," in *Process and Phenomena of Social Change*, ed G Zaltman (New York: Wiley, 1973).

10 *See*, for example, J A Pechman and P M. Timpane eds, *Incentives and Income Guarantees: A New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975) The problem with this, as well as other experiments to evaluate policy consequences, is that a single experimental social context, for example, one school or city, cannot be representative of the system to which the policy is intended to apply

that the policies that are adopted are to a considerable extent determined by factors that also influence their results, and the nonisolatability of the target populations; that is, the fact that target populations are embedded in a complex social and policy environment which also affects the consequences of any particular policy, has limited the success of quasi-experimental assessments of policy predictions. For instance, did Headstart work?

The limited number of country cases, the similarities of policies emanating from industrialization, the attenuated linkages between a national or macro policy and local or micro effects are among the reasons that macro policy analysis serves primarily to sensitize awareness of alternatives and possible difficulties in implementation rather than to confirm predictions.

The lack of success of empirical analyses of public policy consequences argues for a theoretical approach as an alternative. A theoretical approach should allow for multiple time point predictions or predictions that look like point predictions.[11] If it is true, for example, that the costs of density accumulate in urban areas as a function of time (decay as a function of city's age) and if it is true that capitalistic enterprises are free to migrate; and if . . . , then what are the likely rates of migration from the aging cities to the new cities in the United States over time?

11 *See*, for example, P. Meehl, "Theory Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox," *Philosophy of Science*, (June 1967). *See, also* H. Teune, "Macro-Theory and Micro Analysis: An Interpretation of Comparative Social Research" (Paper presented to the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, February, 1976).

For policy analysis these point predictions, however, ought to be expressed in terms of some range of likelihood rather than as exact values. That is one purpose of policy analysis: to determine the constraints and alternatives. There will almost certainly be this much migration of industry from Pennsylvania to Texas, but if this policy is adopted or if this policy is strengthened, this will be the more likely migration rate. Strictly determined prediction points, of course, exclude policy, unless the policy is public affirmation of the inevitable.

The Urban Fiscal Crisis in the United States: An Example

Rather than presenting a suggestive inventory of theories, structures, and macro-systemic characteristics that control and define policy options, an example will be presented in some detail. The example of the urban crisis in the United States will illustrate one step in setting up a problem for macro, structural, and theoretical policy analysis. The next step, which is not pursued here, would be to specify some of the likely predictions that must be obtained if a theory is true. A third step would be to present data and analysis from several countries and for several points in time to show which of the theories is more probably true. A fourth step would be to interpret the theory for a specific case or country in which a particular policy is likely to be adopted.

The example of the urban crisis or the urban fiscal crisis is a significant one, at least for the United States. Three macro-structural theories will be presented with policy alternatives that may have an impact on the course of events.

The urban crisis as the crisis of capitalism

In Marxist writing, one of the dynamics of decline of the capitalist state is the contradiction inherent in the government's need to maintain legitimacy through the satisfaction of the material wants of the deprived classes and the private sector's need for capital accumulation to increase output. This deadly dynamic states that in order for the system to survive, the population must be placated through welfare or transfer payments which the government provides through taxation, and these increasing demands for material satisfaction can be met in the long run only by increased investment in the private sector.

The argument, made popular in James O'Conner's *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*,[12] requires clarification of some macro-structural conditions: (1) the presence of a democratic government which has competition for votes on the one man, one vote principle and toward which political demands can be effectively directed; (2) a weakening of social, institutional, or ideological constraints on political demands; (3) the presence of social conditions and the absence of political instrumentalities such that overt conflict and violence is not only possible but also a real threat to governmental stability; and (4) elasticity in the government's capacity to tax private economic institutions.

The critical theoretical dynamic is the race deriving from the relatively longer term time function between investment and increased economic output and the shorter term one between political demand for material satisfaction and governmental redistributive responses. The latter must accelerate in such a way that it overcomes increases in the production of material goods and at some point dampens any further increases in economic output as a result of investment. Characteristic of many policy problems, such as the race between the depletion of oil resources and the discovery of politically acceptable alternative sources of energy, will end up either with the incorporation of the private sector into the political one, in which case the state would have "transcended" the bourgeois class, or the abortion of democratic politics and its transformation into the tyranny of Aristotle, or the working class state of Lenin.

Most modern states do not have a government but several governments, local governments with autonomous resources and independent political power. The question for cities is: to what extent can this dynamic of the state be translated for cities and be used to explain the urban fiscal crisis? One necessary condition for this theoretical dynamic to become engaged in cities in capitalistic states is that they must have the possibility of behaving as if they were capitalistic governments with democratic participation or mass political movements; that is, they must be able to affect capital formation in the private sector, on the one hand, and to be responsive to political demands for increased transfer payments, on the other.

One macro-system result that can be derived from this is: to the extent that there is local autonomy to tax, especially to tax private economic organizations, is the extent to which the fiscal crisis of cities in capitalis-

12. J O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973).

tic countries will parallel those of the state. Conversely, to the extent that there are limited local powers to tax private economic organizations is the extent to which there will be less of a fiscal crisis in the cities relative to that of the central government.

In the United States, there is a fiscal crisis in the cities, but a lesser one at the national level. In comparison, Great Britain has relatively few fiscal crises in its cities, but a severe one nationally. The United States has both local autonomy and political power bases focused locally and independent of the central government. Britain has little of either. Both local autonomy and local political power are controlling macro-structural characteristics for the operation of this theoretical dynamic of capitalism within local governments.

A second macro-structural variable that is suggestive of predictions about the urban fiscal crisis, both within and across countries, as well as over time, is the extent to which there is local politics versus nationally focused politics. This is more than a matter of local autonomy; it is the scope, intensity, and frequency of political participation, in particular, that of the lower or relatively more deprived classes. As the level of political participation in cities increases over time, their financial condition will deteriorate—increased taxes for transfer payments, leading to the escape of industry, and a deterioration of the tax base, leading to even higher rates of taxes and further reduction of services, leading to popular dissatisfaction. Furthermore, any substantial increment in local autonomy, such as regionalization in Italy or devolution in Britain, should accelerate the fiscal crisis of cities.

A third prediction about the urban fiscal crisis derives from the class conflict origin of this deadly dynamic for cities. The extent to which there are class or income differences within cities should predict the rate of increase in the urban fiscal crisis, cross-nationally as well as within countries. One factor that will compound the increase in the fiscal crisis is internal migration of lower income population induced by better welfare opportunities to the cities, such as from the South in the United States or in Italy.

The foregoing are illustrations of general predictions from this theory. Specific, point predictions could be made concerning actual welfare expenditure rates and migration of industry out of the city or increased voting or political demonstrations and welfare expenditures.

The policy alternatives are less clear than the theoretical framework for prediction. One is the nationalization of welfare, which would depoliticize demands for welfare in cities, thus providing cities with time to search for other solutions. Another would be the imposition of restrictions on industrial migration, thus allowing those cities with more severe fiscal problems to buy time. Both of these alternatives, however, would only delay worsening the fiscal crisis of the city. The system is determined, at least in the long run.

Historically, of course, cities did not always have fiscal crises. Since the Depression, manifestations of this in the United States began in the late 1960s.[13] In the 1950s, cities experienced increasing revenues

13. This general problem was discussed earlier and formally modelled. *See* J. Forrester, *Urban Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970).

from an increasingly productive economy and, accordingly, increased their revenues. In the late 1960s, the cities began extensively to exercise their legal options to borrow. The present revenue crisis of the cities is that they no longer can tax without impairing their resource base. This deadly dynamic was engaged, of course, sooner for some cities than for others.

Comparatively, because the urban fiscal crisis is a consequence of advanced capitalism, the more advanced the capitalistic nature of the country, the more apparent should be this urban crisis. Also, urban fiscal crisis should not be found in socialist countries, no matter how advanced their economies. This conflict within the polity, between deprived groups seeking welfare and the private economic organizations pursuing investment, does not formally exist.

The urban crisis as a consequence of political power

Modern cities are one type of the urban political form; they are also, however, actors in national political systems. Accordingly, one theoretical interpretation of the urban crisis is that it is an outcome of political conflicts determined by the distribution of political power.[14] The distribution of power must be interpreted in the context of specific national political systems. Therefore, it is necessary to examine configurations of political power of specific countries. The fiscal crisis of cities is not an inevitable characteristic of capitalistic countries: the United States has such a crisis; Canada does not; Italy has; West Germany does not. Further, within the United States some cities have a fiscal crisis; others do not.

Politics bears conflict, and conflict brings bargains concerning collective allocations of resources among classes, groups, regions, special interests, and especially local governments. The urban fiscal crisis in the United States is the result of shifts in political power, following from a series of historical events and the response of the political system to them. For example, the development of the trolley car began after Boston elected an Irish mayor and Chicago experienced the Haymarket riots. The cities in the Northeast noticeably began to deteriorate when labor saving technologies were introduced by government-sponsored research to satisfy Southern agricultural interests. Congress became less interested in the cities when, after the 1960 census, over half of the members of the House of Representatives came from suburban areas. The South and Southwest became more powerful relative to Northeast, as a result of increments in military procurements that were regionally distributed by a seniority system in Congress based on incumbency. Add to this, the financial burdens that followed unionization of teachers and municipal employees in the mid-1960s in the older cities. Consider the costs of imposing federal regulations on cities, such as those for clean water.

The foregoing illustrates some of these "system specific," historical factors that converged on certain cities to produce their fiscal crisis. The general proposition underlying this theoretical explanation is that the fiscal crises of cities are the consequence of the political successes

14. This is a standard type of political science explanation in which the distribution of resources flows from configurations of political power. It takes the view that politics is a form of conflict.

of their competitors in obtaining politically allocated resources. To predict the future of cities, it is necessary to configurate the distribution of political power and probable changes in that distribution, and to chart, over time, the likely consequences for the distribution of resources.

Comparatively within countries, such a political explanation would account for the wide variations in the fiscal crisis of cities in the United States. Certain cities neither have nor foresee such problems. Cross-nationally, this theoretical approach would explain the relative freedom of British, Scandinavian, and Dutch cities from a fiscal confrontation. It also might explain the relatively poor state of some cities in Asian and South American countries, where political support for the central government comes largely from either rural-based masses or elites, and even perhaps the relative viability of Asian urban enclaves, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, where there is no competition from the countryside.

Historically, such a view of the urban fiscal crisis would explain the rise and decline of certain cities within countries without regard to their level of industrialization, development, social order, or political system. It could also help to explain why a rurally biased political system, such as the United States, continued, and to some extent continues, to have substantial subsidies for rural areas, despite the decline in the rural population.

The policy implications of this macro-historical analysis of cities as political actors are several. It allows wide latitude for choice, or politics, to redress the system in favor of urban areas and, indeed, for specific policies to offset the worst consequences of the urban fiscal crisis.

The urban crisis as a consequence of technological change

The large city, as it is known in Europe and North America, is a historical phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The great cities developed concomitantly with industrialization and the technology supporting it. As this technology has now been transformed, the large cities will decay. The urban fiscal crisis is one aspect of this decay.

This theoretical interpretation assumes that the modern city, as a local political organization, emerged as the consequence of an economic form of production defined by a technology, and its decline is a consequence of the replacement of its technological base. Just as the family farm, as a way of life in United States, has almost wholly vanished because of changes in the technology of agricultural production, which depreciated labor in favor of capital, so the large urban center, as a way of life, is disappearing. If the city continues to exist in the near future, it is only because of subsidies from the political system, primarily because of the residue, gradually receding, of party voting among unionized workers.

Urban centers must pay the high overhead costs of density. Density requires more expenditures per capita for fire protection, enforcement of regulations, and police protection. These costs of density compound with age; that is, the older the city, the greater the costs of density, if only because the resource of unused land diminishes.

Despite the costs of density, for

at least 50 years increases in productivity yielded from a coal-steam technology were greater than existing alternatives.[15] Further, the coal-steam technology for manufacturing created efficiencies that not only paid for the costs of necessary urban services, but also provided a surplus for investment in urban amenities—parks, museums, etc.[16]

Another dominant feature of the coal-steam technology is that its efficiency rapidly depreciates with physical distance, cooling the steam or straining the conveyor belt. The consequence of this was concentration of population around the center, configurating residence along class and occupational lines as described by the classical social ecologists.[17] Small, rurally-based factories, although able to discount their physical and social pollution at zero, were less efficient. The economic advantages of the city were not marginal, but decisive. Those advantages allowed for the construction of urban economic infrastructures and for the social investments necessary for the economic growth of the private sector.

Around 1930, electricity became a viable alternative to coal-steam. Its dominant characteristic is that it can be transported across considerable distances with little loss in efficiency. The compelling technological force for population concentration was weakened. Add to this the introduction of electrically powered trolley cars and the automobile. These technologies for dispersion contributed to the process of distributing the population over larger areas.

Although the rate of population dispersion around the cities decreased during World War II, with the full utilization of manufacturing capacity, it accelerated after the war. The economic base of the cities improved in the 1950s with the growth in the size of economic organizations and governments and the shift to service industries, which about 1952 began to employ more than half of the working force. Large size organizations require management, bureaucracy, and white collar workers. In the country as a whole there was a continual increase in white collar employment, whereas jobs in manufacturing remained relatively stable.

Bureaucracies deal largely in uncoded information or in categories of information that, even if standardized, are likely to change. Face-to-face interaction is required to provide high density communication. Thus the urban centers got a respite from their decline with the construction of office buildings for decision-making and management which began to replace manufacturing as the primary economic base of the cities.[18]

But, at the same time as the bureaucratic economy began to take shape in the cities, the computer, especially beginning around 1960 with the wide-scale introduc-

15. *See* O. P. Williams, *Metropolitan Politics* (New York. The Free Press, 1974).

16. For an example of an attempt to assess the relative productivity of cities, *see* R. Higgs, *The Transformation of the American Economy, 1865–1914* (New York. Wiley, 1971).

17. This is classical social ecology represented by the "Chicago" school. *See*, for example, R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *The City* (Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1925).

18. This face-to-face interaction factor in the tertiary sector in the center of the cities was pointed to in R. Vernon, *The Myth and Reality of our Urban Problems* (Cambridge, Mass. Center for Urban Studies, 1962).

tion of interchangeable languages, again challenged the just developed economic rationale of the large urban centers. Dispersion of bureaucratic activity became not only possible but also inexpensive. Payroll, inventory, and planning can be dispersed and then linked through a computer network. There is one constraint on this dispersion—the standardization of information. Where information cannot be standardized or the categories of information are unstable, population concentration for economic activity remains essential. Examples include art, publishing, banking, research, and politics. But, for unstandardized information, the need is for diversity and the available unstandardized information is likely to be aggregated in a very few national or, indeed, international centers.[19]

The foregoing takes a long-term, macro perspective to explain the rise and decline of large cities in industrialized countries. These macro trends can be offset by policies and other events for decades. The technological successions can take generations.

The fiscal crisis of the cities may be only one short-term indicator of these long-term processes. Short-term changes can also be expected, such as a shift in economic activities of the cities from one type of unstandardized information, such as banking, to another, such as research. Succession in economic activity in large urban centers will be determined by the standardization of information.

The policy implications of this theoretical approach, the nature of technology, and the structure of human settlements, are largely constraints on policy choice. It is unlikely that in the long run, policies can reverse these trends. Choices can be made to control these processes, to anticipate them, and to explore new urban forms, such as small towns linked to one another and to a few large, national urban centers.

The point predictions that can be made from this theoretical interpretation of the urban fiscal crisis in order to confirm it are several. They involve shifts in the economic activities within the large urban centers and the concentration and dispersion of economic organizations and population.

Historically, the growth of cities should be preceeded by the growth in manufacturing. This should be followed by white collar or tertiary occupations succeeding manufacturing, followed by activities requiring uncoded information. As this occurs, the low-skilled population should become increasingly unemployable, while, at the same time, the diversity of occupations within the cities should increase.

Comparatively, the theoretical dynamics of technology and density should take place regardless of the nature of the political system, whether capitalistic, socialistic, or military rule. Here the historical and comparative perspectives can be juxtaposed. If countries began to industrialize after World War II, for example Eastern European countries, then their dominant form of population concentration should be to the large urban centers for manufacturing. As the tertiary sector begins to develop, manufacturing should disperse in favor of white collar occupations. These, too, then will begin to disperse.

19. Of course, the development of a few major centers is now proceeding on an international scale and it is useful, perhaps, to examine the city as an international actor.

A CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The example of the fiscal crises of cities was presented to illustrate a macro, structural, and theoretical approach to public policy analysis. Such an approach will allow for predictions to specific conditions over time and across countries. The specific predictions will provide an empirical basis for confirming certain basic relationships, which, at the very least, will clarify the constraints on policy choice.

The three alternative theoretical interpretations are a first step. Perhaps, a more elaborate model for prediction can be constructed from all of these or, perhaps, one is the dominant dynamic for explanation. In testing theories, it is surely better to exclude alternatives than to examine one to establish its goodness of fit in general. If one can be excluded, the alternative becomes more credible. At the very least, it is helpful to understand the root causes of the problem in a policy area. These causes will be theoretical, and in so far as they are, social theory and public policy will be linked.

Some Observations on the Plan-Market Relationship in Centrally Planned Economies

By ARON KATSENELINBOIGEN AND HERBERT S. LEVINE

ABSTRACT: This paper is comprised of several sets of observations on the plan-market relationship in centrally planned economies, as reflected in the experience of the Soviet Union. The paper begins with a discussion of the division of economic relations into vertical and horizontal and a description of the extensive and varied role of horizontal relations in the Soviet economy. A second set of observations concerns the beginning of market type mechanisms in the centrally controlled horizontal relationships among enterprises. A third set relates to the differences between routine production processes and creative processes. A fourth and final set of observations concerns the centralization of appointment making power and other aspects of the role of the Party in the Soviet economy. The paper ends with two conclusions: one, plan and market are not substitutes, but are complements for each other; two, the key problem of balance between plan and market is related to the issue of power in the society.

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SINCE the end of World War II, there has been a growing interest in economic planning in advanced capitalist nations of the West. Elements of planning of one sort or another have been introduced into each of the advanced economies. And in some West European nations—France, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, for example—fairly well developed planning mechanisms and institutions have been introduced. The United States has lagged behind other developed nations in regard to serious interest in planning. But recently, interest here has also begun to grow. A group of prominent economists, labor leaders, and some representatives of the business and banking communities have formed an Initiative Committee for National Economic Planning, whose aim is the establishment of a U.S. Government office of national economic planning. And in the spring of 1975, Senators Humphrey and Javits introduced a bill in the Senate providing for a balanced economic growth plan and the agencies and procedures required for the development and adoption of such a plan.

In the West, these represent movements from the market pole of the plan-market spectrum in the direction of planning. They arise essentially because of certain market failures especially those associated with imperfections of competition, externalities, and public goods, and other areas of high public interest where social preferences are deemed significant, such as energy, housing, medical care, transportation.

At the same time, in the centrally planned economies, there has been a growing interest during the last ten to 15 years in market type mechanisms, that is, there has been movement away from the plan pole of the plan-market spectrum toward the market end.

One of the intriguing implications of these two types of movements that has been discussed in the Western literature, is that of convergence analysis, the analysis of the tendencies of both market and centrally planned economies to move toward each other, and what an ultimate, uniform system might be like. In this brief paper, however, we will not pursue the convergence issue. We have, instead, set for ourselves a rather narrow task—an analysis of the plan-market relationship in the centrally planned economy, as exemplified by the experience of the Soviet Union. Moreover, within the confines of this paper, we will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the issue, but will discuss a number of aspects relevant to it which we feel are potentially significant, and which have not been well covered in the general literature on centrally planned economies. Thus, our paper is more in the nature of some observations on a theme, rather than a full treatment of the theme.

HORIZONTAL RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

In the first set of observations, we discuss the division of economic relations into vertical and horizontal and remark upon the extensive and varied role of horizontal relations in the Soviet economy.[1]

Interactions among units in an economic system fall into two main categories: vertical and horizontal. Vertical interactions are those be-

1. This section is based on the authors' paper, "Market and Plan; Plan and Market: the Soviet Case," presented at the American Economic Association Meetings, September 17, 1976. It is to be published shortly in the *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*.

tween units in a hierarchy, wherin each unit possesses administrative authority over the units below it. Horizontal interactions are characterized by direct interrelations between units, in which neither unit has administrative authority over the other. There is not, however, one mechanism for vertical interactions and one for horizontal interaction; rather, there is a broad spectrum of vertical and horizontal mechanisms. Vertical relations can take different forms, varying in the degree of control, exercised by superior units and discretionary behavior exercised by subordinate units. Horizontal relations can also be organized in different ways, varying in the degree to which the direct interaction between participating units is controlled by the center or free from control by the center. Plan and market, as they are usually conceived, are the extreme cases of vertical and horizontal mechanisms.

In the literature on Soviet economic planning and centralized economic planning in general, it would appear that many hold the view that only vertical mechanisms and interactions matter, for it is there that the directions of resource allocation are set and the coordination of economic units established. Direct horizontal interactions are presumed to be of secondary, technical importance. Without prejudging the relative importance of vertical and horizontal mechanisms, it is our view that by focusing attention on the diverse horizontal interactions in the Soviet economy, some of the richness and complexity of the plan-market issue can be brought to light.

The horizontal relations, that we will discuss, take three forms: 1) rationing; 2) money exchange; and 3) unrestricted, free aquisition (*besplatnyi*). By the term "rationing," we mean the vertical control of horizontal transactions. This could include both the central assignment of inputs (labor, land, plant and equipment, and materials), to, and between, particular producing units, and the central assignment of consumers goods to individual consumers. The second term denotes a transaction involving a monetary payment and the absence of direct rationing (those transactions involving both rationing and monetary payment are included under rationing). The third term refers to transactions involving "free" goods and services.

There is, again, a tendency in analyses of the Soviet economic system, to associate rationing with central planning, monetary transactions with the market, and free goods with full communism. Although there is substance in these associations, they are vast oversimplifications which hide the great extent of diversity that exists within these classes and their relations to plan and market.

The sets of interactions observed in the Soviet economy which loosely and without striving for precise definitions may be referred to as market relations, vary in a number of ways, including the degree of their legality. There are not just legal markets and illegal black markets, but an entire spectrum of multicolored markets. Following a scheme, described by Katsenelinboigen,[2] the colors from bright to dark may be used to describe the range of markets from legal to illegal:

1. Legal Markets
   Red—Prices established centrally

2. Aron Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies*, vol. xxix, no. 1 (1977), pp. 62–85.

Pink—Participants in transactions have some freedom to alter prices
White—Participants set prices
2. Semilegal Markets
Gray—Transactions illegal, but tolerated by the authorities
3. Illegal Markets
Brown—Transactions illegal, but penalty less severe than criminal prosecution
Black—Transactions illegal, penalty is criminal prosecution

In figure 1, we present a summary matrix of horizontal interactions among the three major groups of units in the Soviet economy: state enterprises, collective farms, and households. The columns receive goods and services from the rows. The interactions in each of the nine cells are described elsewhere.[3] Let us here just note the wide range of market type mechanisms found in the Soviet economy. Even in the first cell, in the core element of Soviet command mechanisms, the centrally planned and controlled material supply system, there are elements of discretion in horizontal relations even though a user state enterprise must have a rationing document in order to acquire input materials produced by other state enterprises. The indicators in Soviet plans are, to a substantial extent, aggregated with respect to product and time detail. The participants in these horizontal interactions have the discretion to decide this detail, so long as they stay within the control aggregates established in the plan. Furthermore, in this centralized, rationing mechanism, there is also an embryonic market element in the form of money exchange. Soviet enterprises, operating under a system of financial accountability (*Khozraschet*), make monetary payments to producing enterprises for the goods they receive from these enterprises at centrally established prices. This system was introduced for its administrative rather than its economic decisionmaking contributions. Yet it does bring a touch of market atmosphere to the centrally planned, rationing interactions among state enterprises.

In the post-1965 period, there appear to have been some attempts to increase discretion among the participants in inter-enterprise transactions. There has been, for example, talk of developing wholesale trade mechanisms, (with state established prices), in place of the producers goods rationing system. But little has come of this, for many reasons, including shortages of producers goods in relation to the plan as constructed, and the very difficult problem of devising a set of evaluation and control indicators wherein the various indicators give mutually consistent results leading to the encouragement of desirable behavior and the discouragement of undesirable behavior.

In the absence of an efficient system of intermediate goods distribution and in the face of supply unreliability and pressure to fulfill output plan targets, Soviet enterprises are staffed with expediters who scour the economy in search of needed supplies, and who employ a variety of monetary and nonmonetary (including barter) means to acquire these supplies. This aspect of inter-enterprise relations is well detailed in the general literature on the Soviet economy; it has often been described as the grease in the horizontal relations that

3. Katsenelinboigen and Levine, "Market and Plan; Plan and Market."

FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 1. MATRIX OF HORIZONTAL INTERACTIONS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

PRODUCER \ USER	STATE ENTERPRISES	COLLECTIVE FARMS	HOUSEHOLDS
State Enterprises	a) Official state supply system (rationing) b) Limited redistribution of second-hand machinery and equipment (red market-primitive form, seller needs permission for sale) c) Unofficial redistribution of intermediate goods; extensive use of "expediters" (gray market)	a) Official state supply system (rationing) b) Illegal acquisition of spare parts, tools, etc. (brown market)	a) Most goods and services purchased from state stores at official prices (red market) b) Health and education services are primarily distributed free of charge (free goods) c) Housing; and, during times of crises, other consumer goods, distributed through direct allocation (rationing) d) Second-hand goods sold on commission by by state commission stores (pink market) e) Prevalence of "under-the-counter" sales of deficit goods (brown market) f) Strictly illegal sales (black market)
Collective Farms	a) Official state supply system for industrial crops, grain, meat; etc. (rationing) b) Sales, at negotiated prices, to the network of cooperative stores, mostly in countryside (white market) c) Unauthorized acquisition of industrial crops, etc. (brown market) d) Illegal acquisition of materials for production of black market goods (black market)	a) Redistribution of equipment and tools at freely negotiated prices (white market)	a) Food items sold through collective farm markets (similar to farmers' markets in the West), participants are (usually) free to set prices (white market)
Households	a) Workers normally sell labor services to state enterprises at established prices which vary with skills, occupation, industry (red market) b) some direct allocation of labor through compulsory means (rationing) c) Under pressure of labor shortage, some violation of established wage rates (gray market) d) Illegal kickbacks (black market)	a) A person born on a collective does not have right to leave without permission (rationing) b) Collectives sometimes purchase labor services from travelling, free-lance construction teams (white, gray markets)	a) Food items sold by individual collective farmers at collective farm markets (white market) b) A broad array of goods and services are sold semilegally: summer homes, building and repair services, tutoring, private medical services (gray market) c) Extensive illegal sale of stolen or illegally produced goods, for private gain (black market)

allows the Soviet command economy to function.

Finally, while this is not the place to discuss at length household to household relations, mention should be made of this part of the black market, which forms a major part of the growing "second economy" existing in the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say, that it is comprised of individuals who steal state property and sell it for private profit, and of individuals who illegally produce consumer goods, usually with state property as inputs and, with use of state machinery, and sell these goods for private profit. These producing units are often quite large and well organized. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that transactions in this black market in the Soviet Union usually involve legal goods which are in short supply, rather than illegal goods; there is, for example, little trade in narcotics.

Even this brief description of the terrain of horizontal interactions in the Soviet Union prompts the question why is there such broad use of market-type mechanisms is the Soviet economy? Why are not all the horizontal interactions of the rationing type? A full response to this question is not possible here, but such a response could involve the following elements. The market mechanisms that are observed in the Soviet economy, arise for three types of reasons. The first is related to the immense amount of information required for centralized planning in a large, developed economy. The Soviet leaders decided that, in regard to the distribution of goods among consumers with varying preferences, the computational costs involved in complete rationing vastly outweighed the benefits that might be gained from central control. In the producers goods markets, the decision was the reverse. Yet current discussions of wholesale trade in producers goods reflects the problem of computational costs. Markets, related to the diversity of needs and behavior of individual units in an economy, especially within the consumer sector, are observed in all large, nonprimitive economies. Therefore, they may be referred to as universal markets. These not only include the red and pink markets, but also those black markets that deal in goods prohibited in a society, for which a demand exists.

A second group of markets has resulted from the Soviet planning system itself and its operational deficiencies, especially the excessive tautness in Soviet plans and the resulting shortages and supply unreliability. Primary among these markets is the gray market in producers goods. Furthermore, due to shortages of consumers goods caused by planning deficiencies and government policies (high rate of investment, artificially low prices on consumers goods), and due to irresponsible attitudes toward state property (high level of theft of state property), the black market in consumers goods is extensive. This group of markets may be called Soviet planning markets.

A third group is comprised of the markets which have appeared in the Soviet Union in connection with the specific historical conditions in the development of an agrarian country with a low standard of living. In this group, which we may call low level of development markets, are the white and gray markets for consumers goods, and others.

The future of these markets depends on many things. But in any case, markets will change as the

Soviet economy develops. If we are *to assume that the Soviet standard of living will rise and that the planning system will be improved, especially in regard to the vertical mechanisms and their internal* consistency, then we would say that the role of universal markets will most likely increase, and the role of Soviet planning markets and low level of development markets will likely decrease.

CENTRALIZED HORIZONTAL RELATIONS AND RESTRICTED SECTORAL MONEY

A second set of observations concerns the beginning of market-type mechanisms, the use of money and prices, in the centrally controlled inter-enterprise horizontal relations. As was indicated above in the discussion of cell #1, there is not total centralization even in the official rationing system controlling inter-enterprise input flows. Intermediate product flows are stipulated in the plan with a fair degree of specificity. Nevertheless, with regard to the level of detail required in actual production, they are still highly aggregated with respect to technical characteristics and times of delivery. The enterprises participating in the horizontal exchange are given discretion to decide these details, within the control totals established in the plan.

With this mutual discretionary power, it is systemically desirable that there be mechanisms to strengthen the responsibility of each participant for the fulfillment of the agreement. It is also desirable that there be flexibility in arriving at and in fulfilling these agreements. The mechanisms that were developed in Soviet practice, first of all involved contracting procedures wherein the receiving enterprise had feedback influence over the producer-deliverer in that the receiver could refuse acceptance of the delivery if it did not meet contract specifications and could sue in court for damages. On the other hand, if the deliverer did meet his responsibilities, it was then the responsibility of the receiver to accept the delivery. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that as a consequence of the political leaders' pressure for economic growth, a continuous state of excess demand leading to goods' shortages ("sellers' markets") has existed. Under such conditions, receiving enterprises prefer not to antagonize the supplying enterprises on which they depend, and therefore do not pursue legal redress for contract violations. The Soviet literature refers to this as mutual amnesty.

Secondly, to add flexibility to these centralized horizontal relations, a system of money exchange was employed. Enterprises pay one another, at centrally established prices, for the goods delivered within the limits set by the state supply plan. That is, money payment and a ration ticket for that category of goods are necessary to acquire a centrally controlled input commodity. This gives the using enterprise flexibility in acquiring specific input. And it also constrains the enterprise. An invariant characteristic of money budgets, in all economic systems where they are found, is the function they serve as constraints on total expenditures; that is, the limits they place on the aggregate ability of an economic unit to acquire goods and services from other units.

Furthermore, in the Soviet Union, the money system is designed to serve an additional function. Prices,

especially producers goods prices, do not adequately measure relative scarcities in terms of the leaders' preferences. Generally speaking, when such situations arise in all systems, item budgeting approaches are used. That is, higher bodies do not use a single value measure to judge the performance of subordinate units, but use multiple measures of performances, including direct control of individual input categories. In the Soviet Union, this is done on a grand scale. Important input markets are balanced individually by a system of material balances. The money used in each market cannot be used in any other because of the presence of the supply rationing system. Thus money in the Soviet economy is restricted in its use to individual sectors.[4]

A significant aspect of this is the separation in the Soviet Union of the consumers and producers goods sectors. Money acquired in the consumers goods sector cannot be used to acquire producers goods. This insulates the high priority (in terms of leaders' preferences for growth) producers goods sector from profits generated in the consumers goods sector. What is especially important in this regard is that it insulates the producers goods sector from profits earned in the illegal consumers goods markets (black markets, etc.). As noted in the conclusion, this may have significant influence on future government policy toward these illegal markets.

ROUTINE AND CREATIVE ACTIVITIES

A third set of observations relates to the differentiation between routine production processes and creative processes, and the impact of this on the plan-market issue.

Uncertainty is present in both routine and creative processes, but of a different type and magnitude in each. In routine production processes there is a problem of forecasting outcomes because of uncertainties of environmental events and agent behavior. But to a large extent both of these are subject to statistical analysis in the sense that probabilities can be determined and, thus, risks measured. In creative processes, in science and technology, the uncertainty of outcomes is much greater, and usually the probabilities cannot be measured.

The importance of this for plan-market issues is that routine production processes are more amenable to vertical procedures and institutions. In the Soviet experience this was especially so because of the "catch-up" nature of Soviet growth strategy; that is, the aim was to catch up with the leading Western economies in volume, sectoral composition and technology of production. This emulation of existing models reduced even further the level of uncertainty in routine production processes. It should also be stated, however, that the uncertainties that remain, and other factors, such as computational complexity, call for flexibility and deconcentration in the planning and administration of routine production activities.

In creative processes, the promi-

4. Theoretically, restricted sectoral money could replace the physical rationing system. Overall balance within each product sector could be achieved through control of the size of the money supply in each sector and the legal restriction of money in each sector to only that sector Though this is not done on a complete product sector scale in the Soviet Union, there are multisectoral restrictions on the use of money.

nent role of uncertainty calls for the pursuit of parallel independent approaches, the extension of competitive elements in horizontal relations. Soviet leaders have not been very successful in fostering creative activities in science and technology despite the investment of substantial resources in these areas.[5] One reason for this is the use of vertical institutional organizations in Soviet science and technology. For example, in the United States, substantial scientific research is conducted in the universities, where scholars choose their own research areas and pursue their own methods and approaches. But in the Soviet Union, there is a sharp distinction between the universities and scientific institutes, with research predominantly conducted in the latter. This separation predates the Bolshevik Revolution. To a certain extent it reflects the autocratic nature of Russian society both before and after the Revolution. Political leaders were apparently fearful that the universities might become places where new ideas were generated and infect students with attitudes of change. Soviet research scholars are mostly found in research institutions, which are primarily organized vertically and operate according to preestablished plans, in which parallel research is reduced to a minimum by planners. Only in the military sector, is parallel, competitive research normally pursued in the framework of a vertical mechanism.

The different roles of vertical and horizontal mechanisms in routine and creative processes can be seen as a growing problem for Soviet leaders. In the early periods of economic growth and development with the major objective of catching up with the West, the reliance on vertical mechanisms of planning and control was not so inappropriate because of the low level of uncertainty involved in catch-up decisionmaking. But in the future, if Soviet leaders want to achieve and maintain a position of a leading industrial nation, operating on the frontier of technology, creative processes will have to be fostered. For this, forms of parallel, competitive relations appear to be necessary.[6] Furthermore, these should be of a horizontal nature; i.e., there should be more than one locus of decisionmaking and resource allocation for research and development so as to broaden the range of research projects that might be undertaken.

ECONOMIC APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES AND THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

A fourth and final set of observations concerns the centralization of appointment making power in Soviet economic administration and other aspects of the role of the Party in the Soviety economy.[7]

Major roles in Soviet economic decisionmaking are played by those who head the bureaucracy for plan construction and the plan fulfillment. The top echelons of this

5. Evidence of this is the low number of Nobel laureates in the USSR.

6. There is a further issue here in the public goods aspect of science and technology. Our argument is that horizontal relations of a parallel, competitive nature are necessary for successful creative processes. But since science and technology are essentially public goods, markets are not necessarily the most appropriate institutional form for their production and distribution.

7. For a useful source on this, see Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

bureaucracy include the heads of the state planning committees (*Gosplan* and *Gossnab*), the heads of the economic ministries and the vice-ministers, and the directors of the leading enterprises in the economy. The power to appoint (nominate and/or accept a nomination) is very heavily centralized in the highest body of the political leadership—the Politburo of the Communist Party. Furthermore, the leadership of the Party intervenes in economic decisionmaking to a substantial extent, and, in general, the top economic administrators make decisions for several levels below them. It may well be that in the beginning of the industrialization drive of the 1930s, the shortage of skilled managerial personnel in the country led the political leaders to centralize the appointment procedures and to keep careful watch over the decisions taken. But by the 1950s and 1960s the supply of capable managers greatly increased, as did the complexities of the economy. Both of these developments led to pressures for less centralization. Though reforms in economic administration have been extensively discussed, and as we have stated, there has been some movement away from the plan pole of the plan-market spectrum, there has not been significant deconcentration or decentralization, and specifically there has not been much change in the exercise of the power to appoint economic administrators by the top Party leadership. Why?

One explanation lies in the relationship between the power to appoint and the maintenance of political power. While the original reasons for the centralization of the appointment power may have been economic, in time they took on strong political aspects, and perhaps even increasingly so in the post-Stalin days of multiple leadership in uneasy equilibrium. The power to appoint the top levels of the economic bureaucracy gave the Party leaders the power to maintain their political support and thus their positions of political dominance.

Furthermore, the desire to retain the power of appointment had certain effects on the movements toward economic reform in information flows and loci of economic decisionmaking. The aim of the 1965 economic reforms (to some, at least) was to reduce the number of obligatory plan targets, increase the role of value parameters, and eventually have only one measure of plan performance—profit. This did not come to pass, and since the early 1970s, this set of reforms has been dormant. There are many reasons why this occurred, but in regard to the power to appoint, it may be added that if plan performance were measured by profit alone, or were even greatly simplified, the power of the political leaders to remove economic officials for political (rather than economic) reasons would be reduced. The power to remove officials is limited by the needs of legitimacy; even Stalin acknowledged this during the great purges when he staged the show trials. Thus, the higher the number of targets established in the plan, the more opportunity leaders have to justify, in economic terms, decisions to remove an official taken for political reasons. The desire to maintain the centralized system of appointments may have contributed toward the opposition of Party leaders to the simplification of performance measures in the reforms of 1965.

An additional aspect of the economic appointment system is the

complexity caused by the involvement of two hierarchies. For all economic administrative positions below the top level, down as far as shop foreman, appointments are made jointly by the economic administrative and Party bureaucracies. The two bureaucracies have different direct objectives, and economic administrators, who are the servants of two bosses, often face a confusing situation.

Furthermore, the Party bureaucracy plays an active role in coordination of horizontal interactions. The Party bureaucracy is organized on regional lines and Party officials at various regional levels are concerned with the well-being of economic units within their region. This is particularly true in regard to agriculture, but it is also true about industry and other nonagricultural sectors. In responding to the needs of their economic units (or in response to requests from Party officials in other regions), Party officials will give direct orders to managers of other enterprises within their regions, orders which often run counter to the orders managers have received from their superiors within their economic ministry. The formal lines of authority run within the economic ministry hierarchy. The Party officials, however, have their own source of power in the system of Party reprimands. If a manager refuses to comply with an order given by a Party official on the grounds that it conflicts with the efficient operation of his enterprise and with the orders given him by his ministry, the Party official can, for example, set up a Party commission to investigate the operation of some Party program at the enterprise. When the commission finds a deficiency, the manager is given an official Party reprimand, which may vary in degree of intensity. A certain number of reprimands in a manager's file will lead to his dismissal, and can, in extreme cases, lead to his removal from the Party, in which case he cannot be hired as a manager at any other enterprise.[8]

The Party thus has power over economic managers which it uses to coordinate horizontal interactions on a regional basis; that is it often aids enterprises within its regions acquire inputs from other enterprises within the region. Since the economic ministries run along product branch lines, this regional focus adds a useful supplement to the vertical mechanism. This is especially important, since existing governmental organs of economic administration do not coordinate the activities of all economic enterprises within a given region. It is also worth noting that the Party activity in the economy adds a nonmarket, horizontal supplement to the vertical mechanism of the ministerial system. At the same time, however, the Party, through its role in the command and appointment process, forms an additional vertical hierarchy which runs parallel to that of the ministerial system.

Finally, this sheds some additional light on the plan-market issue. The argument is frequently made in the West that members of the Party apparatus are not just interested in results; that is, in the efficient functioning of the economy, but they are also interested in their own exer-

8 In a generalized sense, the term liquid capital can be used to refer to command over resources. In this sense, the capital possessed by the Party is substantial. For the Party can purchase resources without the usual constraints of a capital budget There are, however, diminishing returns to the excessive use of the "money" represented by Party reprimands.

cise of power, and if forced to choose between the two, they might well choose the latter. That is, they might well oppose an economic reform that decreased the direct exercise of their power, even though it might lead to a more efficient operation of the economy. The survival of the Party as an active force in the system depends upon the Party's performance of important functions. What we have emphasized is that the Party does perform important economic functions and that in the interests of maintaining its position, the power to appoint and remove economic administrators is considered vital.

CONCLUSIONS

We will not attempt to present a summary of the observations, we have put forth above, but will instead end with two brief conclusions.

First, plan and market are frequently viewed as plan versus market; i.e., market as a substitute for plan and vice versa. However, it is better to view them as supplements to each other which aid in the effective functioning of the system. In the experience of the Soviet Union, the horizontal market mechanisms have functioned as supplements to the vertical planning mechanism. And though it is difficult to forecast the future course of plan-market relations in the Soviet economy, a possible development is an evolutionary movement through the spectrum of plan-market mechanisms with the increase of market mechanisms as supplements to the plan.

But, economic reformers in the Soviet Union, if they are to view realistically the possibilities of evolutionary movement in the direction of market mechanisms, must take into account the role of the Party and its requirement of performing a significant function. As Stalin created a role for the Party in the 1920s and 1930s, so realistic reformers today must find a new role for the Party which will permit the Party bureaucracy to preserve its privileges and position.[9] One may be skeptical that such a role exists, but if it is not found, then the evolutionary movement along the plan-market spectrum, from plan toward market, will have only limited possibilities of success.

Second, the key problem of balance between plan and market is related to the problem of power in the society; it is a function of the degree to which resource allocation is influenced by central planners and controllers and the degree to which it is affected by discretionary, free decisions of participants in horizontal relations. In a fuller treatment of the matter, the whole question of incentives and property rights needs to be examined in order to analyze the decisionmaking processes of peripheral units and direct participants in horizontal relations, the efficiency of these decisions, and their compatibility with societal objectives as interpreted by central leaders and planners.

One issue in this regard which is already of substantial importance, and which promises to grow more important in the future, is the presence of the second economy in the Soviet Union, particularly the role it plays in the sector of con-

9 For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Donald W. Green, "The Industrial Combine and the Post-Command Economy: the Political Economy of Reform in the USSR, Poland and Hungary" (Discussion paper no. 263, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, August 1973).

sumer goods and services. The vertical mechanisms of Soviet central planning are particularly ill-suited to the needs of an advanced consumer sector with a developed consumer durables industry and the range of services durables require. To a significant extent, the presence and growth of the second economy serves as a supplement to the plan. The dominant priorities of the political leaders relate to the dynamic path of the economy and thus concern primarily the producers goods sector. Due to the role of restricted sectoral money, the growth of the second economy in the consumer sector would only to a limited extent lead to the diversion of resources from the producers goods sector to the consumers goods sector. However, the toleration by the political leaders of a significant growth in the second economy would have substantial moral and ideological consequences.

Book Department

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

HEDLEY BULL. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Pp. ix, 335. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $20.00.

Professor Bull proceeds from the dictum that "thinking is also research" in his attempt to systematically think through and present an inquiry into the nature of order in world politics. He sets for himself a large task, one as much philosophical as political. Stating his quest in the introduction, he offers three basic questions: (1) What is order in world politics? (2) How is order maintained within the present system of sovereign states? (3) Does the system of sovereign states still provide a viable path to world order? Each question is developed in detail in the three sections of the study.

While the author believes that order is a desirable objective, certainly preferable to disorder, it is not always superior to other values. Justice is another desirable, increasingly necessary goal which can conflict with order. Developed countries stress order. Third World countries place a higher priority on justice even at the price of disorder. The debate over priorities involves value judgments. While not eschewing such controversies, Bull remains aloof, detached. He emphatically states that his purpose is not to prescribe solutions or offer practical advice. The search for these, he proclaims "a corrupting element in contemporary study of world politics." To Bull the process of inquiry is "an intellectual activity and not a practical one," pursuing a subject wherever the argument leads. He responds more as political philosopher than political scientist.

But his values and conclusions do emerge. The book is an implicit defense of the states system within the international community of nations. Within this system, order does exist and is maintained through established means such as balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great power politics, and even war. Bull examines alternatives to the existent system, but finds the contemporary model neither dysfunctional nor in decline. Reform, though, is possible. Here he discusses such proposed reforms as the "Kissinger Model" of a concert of great powers, the so-called radical global centralists represented by Richard Falk, new models of regionalism emerging from Third World thinkers, and the Marxist model. He notes problems of implementation inherent in all.

This is a tightly focused, contemplative work; but one questions how necessary, how valuable. Especially, one wonders to whom the book is di-

rected. For the scholar there is little new, albeit a new condensation of traditional matters in a different format. The study appears more in the vein of a text in international politics. In this category it has some merits, especially in format features with strong introduction and conclusion, which sum up the study, and good chapter development. But as text it has limitations: too narrow, specialized, and detached. While one can endorse the principle of scholarly detachment, Bull pursues it to an extreme. In a world desperately seeking alternatives to crises, can one smugly renounce the search for solutions? In his introduction, the author notes that value-free inquiry is sterile. His approach borders on that condemnation.

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WILLIAM EPSTEIN. *The Last Chance. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control.* Pp. 341. New York: The Free Press, 1976. $14.95.

William Epstein, who has been officially connected with the work of the United Nations in the field of arms control for 25 years, has written a very comprehensive and important book on the question of nuclear proliferation. The experiences of the author as an international civil servant are thoroughly reflected in the volume, and they make it a unique contribution to the growing literature in this area. Thus, his description of "the birth of a non-proliferation treaty . . . or, at least . . . its successful conception" (p. 102), is truly fascinating. On the other hand, the book is less useful in analyzing the perspective of individual countries on nuclear proliferation, the small near-nuclear states in particular.

The main objective of Mr. Epstein is to "analyze the effectiveness and adequacy of the non-proliferation regime and, in particular, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" (xxi). This objective is systematically achieved through an historical review of the developments prior to the signing of the NPT, a textual analysis of the treaty itself, and an assessment of its political implications. The historical review is critical of the role of both superpowers who, according to the author, did not work seriously to achieve control over proliferation prior to the early 1960s. The article-by-article analysis demonstrates the problems associated with almost every single aspect of the NPT. Taking a constructive approach, Epstein promotes a series of proposals, the goal of which is to create a tighter non-proliferation regime. Appendix VI—List of Proposed Measures to Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty—is extremely valuable in this respect. The volume is brought up-to-date by evaluating the May 1975 NPT Review Conference, which the author describes as a failure, as well as by dealing with timely issues, such as the danger of proliferation to terrorists and criminals.

As indicated by the book's title, Epstein sees the near future as crucial for preventing a global catastrophe. "Man is an endangered species," he warns, and if non-proliferation fails, "the prospect for humanity is not promising" (p. 274). In order to brighten that prospect, Epstein promotes a number of proposals, some of which are not very practical. Thus, he recommends that the nuclear powers undertake "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state that has no nuclear weapons in its territory" (p. 324). The result of this proposal, if adopted, might be the erosion of the deterrence posture in regions like the Korean Peninsula. The practicality of superpower cooperation in building international reactors is also questionable. On the other hand, the author refrains from developing the idea of punishing individuals (though he discusses sanctions against states) who violate the rules of the non-proliferation regime. The refusal of the author to deal with the "unthinkable"—a generally nuclearized world—though humanistically understood, is analytically damaging.

Finally, it is somewhat surprising that

the book includes so very few references to bibliographical sources. Moreover, lengthy quotes are left without accurate references, making the reader totally dependent on the author's interpretation of the quote. A relatively modest effort could have solved this problem, making this volume even more valuable.

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TED ROBERT GURR, PETER N. GRABOSKY, and RICHARD C. HULA. *The Politics of Crime and Conflict: A Comparative History of Four Cities.* Pp. xii, 792. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1977. $35.00.

Americans have long been fascinated with crime and criminals, but it has been an ambivalent interest. Some criminals (and even crime organizations) have achieved the status of folk heroes and millions of dollars have been garnered from television shows, films, and books about their exploits. At the same time, notably during the past decade, crime has become one of the nation's most prominent worries, so great in fact, that fear of being victimized is, itself, a social and psychological reality. From this concern has flowed a considerable quantity of research and debate concerning apparent increases in crime and concrete proposals as to what might be done. Some have stressed immediate remedies such as: improved police, more equipment; reinforcement or redirection of institutions (more prisons, mandatory sentences); and policies directed at assumed ultimate causes, such as racism, poverty.

As the debate about solutions has developed, many old approaches have surfaced in modern form and, while new research is multifaceted, one school of thought now stresses punitive measures, mostly harsher punishments, while another emphasizes meliorative policies.

Ted Robert Gurr—perhaps best known popularly for his work with the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence—Peter N. Grabosky, and Richard C. Hula have authored a massive, at times tedious, but worthwhile book that marks an important contribution to a large and burgeoning literature.

The Politics of Crime and Conflict is an historical comparison of crime, social strife, police, courts, and laws in London, Stockholm, Sydney, and Calcutta. Attempts are made to test hypotheses concerning permissive approaches as well as punitive ones and to assess the possibilities of constructing a theory of crime and conflict. This is done with a thorough, detailed explanation of the methods employed in the research and clear statements as to the assumptions and preferences that informed it.

Each of the city histories could no doubt be faulted by specialists, an almost inevitable circumstance since the modern past of four important metropolitan areas is presented in relatively short form. Brief as these accounts are, the data is often so massive and at times undigested that only the most determined readers are likely to find their way through it all (an abridged edition containing only the discussion and conclusions is available). Similarly, some social scientists will question use of such descriptions as "depraved" and "insane."

A major disappointment is the virtual absence of any discussion of firearms controls in the four cities discussed. Americans in particular would want to know if the long-term decline in criminal behavior from mid-nineteenth century to the 1930s in the three Western cities surveyed was in any way conditioned by the declining availability of weapons in those places. The authors' detailed survey of police, courts, laws, and crime statistics of London, for example, contain only two passing references to its evolution toward a disarmed populace and police.

More importantly, the comparative historical analysis presented here carefully and critically assesses crime statistics, their collection, methods of reporting, and evaluation; the meaning

of such data; problems and validity in comparison both spatially and in time; and, their significance for legislation and policy. Police organizations and behavior, courts, legal systems, and elite perceptions of other classes and activities variously defined as "criminal" are delineated.

The conclusions reached are, by the authors' admission, less than startling. The exceptionally wide range of policies reviewed make a single, conclusive statement impossible; indeed, none was promised. It is this, however, that is perhaps the book's most salient point.

Historically, various and different strategies have been employed to reduce criminal behavior. Almost always the groups supporting changed laws or procedures have felt they have contributed to a diminution of crime, while in reality no hard evidence existed (or exists) to prove the efficacy of their policies. In a time when there appears to be growing support for more Draconian measures to control crime (especially street crime, pornography, and sexual preferences), a study of *The Politics of Crime and Conflict* is certainly useful. After reviewing this immense collection of data, dogmatism about crime and its causes is impossible.

This is a valuable work.

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GERALD MISCHE and PATRICIA MISCHE. *Toward a Human World Order: Beyond the National Security Straitjacket*. Pp. vii, 339 New York: Paulist Press, 1977. $9.95.

Toward a Human World Order is a readable book, and it deserves a wide reading. In it, Gerald and Patricia Mische present a strong case for an analysis of our global impass, which holds that all nations are locked in competition for security through weapons, capital and physical resources. Efforts to deal with social and technical challenges of global dimension are vitiated by the nationalistic organization of the world. Moreover, and here the Misches make their most original contribution, priorities for human dignity, welfare, and development under all societal forms are doomed insofar as they remain wedded to a competitive national security orientation. Alternatives to the status quo are unrealistic unless they address the problem of creating a global security framework for social justice. Efforts for world order are realistic, as well as visionary, insofar as they begin with a close analysis of the national security organization of power in every society.

The Misches, who have worked closely with Institute for World Order projects, have translated the diverse and often technical strands of world order thinking into a common sense level. The authors make almost too explicit an effort to be clear—anticipating each step in their thought, presenting current problems in counterpoint to the alternatives of a preferred future, and recapitulating each link of their argument. All their cards are played face up and their hand becomes increasingly persuasive.

Three contributions of the book merit special mention.

Although they appreciate the cogency of liberation theology and analysis, the Misches find it inadequate. Too often do its proponents depend for solutions upon an act of will on the part of new leadership. The best intentioned liberation or revolutionary movement is compromised, the Misches argue, if it is constrained by the national security priorities of its world environment. Their conclusion is that the aim of liberation must become universal in order to be realistic.

Although they value realism and hard analysis, the Misches find so-called value-free social science to be inadequate. It belies the responsibility for choosing with which we are burdened; it disregards the role of values and paradigms in ordering science as well as society. The contribution of philosophy and religion is particularly important, therefore, because it introduces a person-centered, but holistic, worldview appropriate to the organic, interrelated, and ecological nature of science and society.

Although they stress the power of institutions and elites, the Misches argue that individuals in all walks of life can contribute to the creation of a more human world order. Their goal is visionary, but their strategy is not utopian. It is, rather, incremental and pragmatic, building upon existing transnational structures. Closing chapters in the book develop this approach and suggest ways in which citizens across varying cultures can contribute to the development of transnational linkages along functional lines, making social choices in the light of global and human priorities.

A bibliography and notes for further reading extend this unpretentious but important book. Standing simply, in the line of a great literature on the world order vision, this work makes the vision seem at once more urgent and more accessible than ever before.

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ALBERT PARRY. *Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat*. Pp. xi, 624. New York: Vanguard Press, Inc., 1976. $17.50.

Since World War II, the practice of political terrorism has undergone a frightful proliferation at the national and transnational levels. Although an intense study has ensued this proliferation, the political terrorism literature is primarily descriptive, prescriptive, and obliquely emotive in form rather than analytical, theoretical, and objective. Rigorous attempts to analyze the various forms terrorism has taken, to depict common linkages and specific differences, as well as develop flexible typologies and theories, remain scarce. Parry's study, an ambitious attempt to analyze terrorism in its historical and modern settings, follows this descriptive-emotive trend.

In the initial section, Parry links political terrorism throughout history to either left-wing revolutionary movements seeking "the overthrow of the existing government," or "to these very same terrorists" who, "having tasted victory . . . victimize their opponents." Such movements rely on "intimidation, systematic violence, continual bloodshed," and therefore are not a justifiable means of achieving social-political change. For Parry, "positive change" results only "through peaceful action. . . . The long term gradualism in England is proof enough. The bloody price does not have to be paid." Unfortunately, this generalization may not stand the test of history. The author next examines the personality of the terrorist, suggesting that those who resort to revolution are "abnormal . . . in the sense of being psychologically disturbed." He/she is a "sociopath," a "maladapted pathological isolate" who "lusts for violence." Evidence cited to support this is minimal, inferentially questionable, Parry himself noting that his primary reference "does not state on what information his theory is based." In addition, the author ignores a vast amount of literature concerning revolutionary movements and elites which casts serious doubts on his own thesis.

Part two of the study examines the history of political terrorism, part three its modern-day variations. While tracing its origins to Robespierre, part two primarily examines the views of Marx, Bakunin, Nechayev, and Kropotkin, and their impact on revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russia. Although thought-provoking, this reader would take issue with several points. For example, though reprehensible acts have been initiated in the name of Marxism, characterizing Marx as a prophet of indiscriminate terrorism is questionable. In Lenin's case, Parry correctly notes that Lenin would willingly resort to extreme violence when the revolution or its consolidation was at stake. However, to state that Lenin died "because he had exhausted his . . . emplacable mind by his self-inflicted burden of incessant hatreds and schemings . . . and the massacre of millions" is simply conjecture. This section concludes with an account of Nazi genocide.

In part three, Parry examines almost every revolutionary movement/sect since W W II. Again, while thought-provoking,

his ideological bent powerfully affects his analysis. For example, Che, a doctor, discovered "healing was not his passion. He would rather roam with a gun. He would kill, not cure." Similarly, he analyzes such diverse movements as the Viet Cong, PLO, Weathermen, SLA, and so on. The final few (17) pages examine right-wing regime terrorism. The final chapters are concerned with the transnational nature of modern terrorism and the impact of technology on it.

In sum, while thought-provoking, the scope of the study appears to be too ambitious, resulting, in part, in sketchy and unsubstantiated analyses. In addition, his own ideological perspective has a detrimental effect. Nevertheless, while one may argue with the author's interpretations, his study is well worth reading.

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OSCAR SCHACHTER. *Sharing the World's Resources*. Pp. v, 172. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $7.95.

Oscar Schachter's 1974 Rosenthal lectures at Northwestern's Law School, published as *Sharing the World's Resources*, focus on an issue of overwhelming interest in contemporary international politics. In the first lecture, he sets forth an ethico-legal rationale for, let me grossly oversimplify, the demands of the "have not" countries to share increasingly in the future economic welfare and satisfactions derivable from the world's productive capabilities. In Schachter's view, a consensual agreement has developed, among all participants in decision making about international resource allocations, that distributive justice, nowhere precisely defined, will be forwarded by an apportionment based on judgments of perceptions of national needs and of legitimate expectations and historic entitlements. Other allocative schemata, such as efficiency, autarky, or national security, have been at least downgrad[illegible] from their previous eminence in inte[illegible] national negotiations, if in fact they ha[illegible] not now been relegated to subsidia[illegible] status. This reordering has, of cour[illegible] not occurred without severe strains [illegible] the international body politic. Indee[illegible] in Schachter's opinion it has come abo[illegible] largely as a response by the "hav[illegible] nations to stresses and grievances whi[illegible] they judged would seriously jeopardi[illegible] international stability and equilibriu[illegible] were there inordinately long delays [illegible] restructuring the international val[illegible] system.

The remaining two lectures explo[illegible] how this heightened role of distributi[illegible] justice in world affairs has, or in son[illegible] cases should have, affected internation[illegible] bargaining processes and the structu[illegible] characteristics and procedures of inte[illegible] national institutions. Schachter delv[illegible] most aptly and deeply into the impa[illegible] of reordering on the changing conform[illegible] tions of the present Law of the S[illegible] negotiations; it is perhaps here th[illegible] effects of any recent widespread r[illegible] visions in value rankings of the all[illegible] cative criteria will be most manifest a[illegible] enduring. In less depth, he conside[illegible] how governmental deliberations on, a[illegible] institutional arrangements for, shari[illegible] technology, pricing systems for many i[illegible] ternationally-traded agricultural and mi[illegible] eral products, economic exploiting [illegible] river systems and lake basins that ove[illegible] lap national boundaries, and, mo[illegible] exotically, atmospheric and enviro[illegible] mental manipulations are being mold[illegible] by the upgrading of international equi[illegible] issues.

In each of these areas, the nov[illegible] insights provided by Schachter's pe[illegible] spective will, I suspect, be rewardi[illegible] and stimulating, even for expert schola[illegible] and international negotiators and ci[illegible] servants. One could reasonably ch[illegible] lenge his implicit, overall assessme[illegible] that equity considerations, at a mi[illegible] mum, have achieved a status in th[illegible] international value ordering on a p[illegible] with efficiency or political and economi[illegible] independence. But since the lecture[illegible] were intended primarily to elevate th[illegible] level of thinking about world affair[illegible]

and to add nuance to interpretations of international negotiations and procedures, rather than as a set of guidelines for international negotiators, this would be quibbling; beyond doubt, distributive justice has gained acceptability as a goal of international arrangements. Still, perceptions of others' national needs are no more than that, and they inevitably vary from country to country. Likewise, what are legitimate expectations and historic entitlements are only subjectively determinate. Schachter, too, is well aware of these difficulties, making his speculations and conclusions on the prospective international consequences of the emergence of equity concerns especially subtle and provocative.

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LAURENCE SHOUP and WILLIAM MINTER. *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy*. Pp. vii, 334. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. $17.50.

No questions about United States foreign policy are more important as who controls it, what do they think, and how do their actions, thoughts and bank accounts differ from those of the rest of us. A good place to begin study is to take a long hard look at the Council on Foreign Relations. Laurence Shoup, an historian, and William Minter, a sociologist, started their research into the Council in their separate doctoral dissertations, and they have now jointly produced a book which tries to examine critically the social background of the Council's membership and assess the influence of its intellectual output.

The result of their collaboration does not fulfill their hopes for a complete Marxist portrait of this fascinating and powerful organization. In fact, *Imperial Brain Trust*, succeeds best demonstrating once more the wisdom of not judging a book by its cover. In this case, a catchy title and an irreverent cartoon (depicting poor old Uncle Sam as a marionette moved by some invisible hand) introduce a dully written book with some insights but more gaps.

The first half of *Imperial Brain Trust* provides an all-too-brief general history of the Council, some adequate descriptions of the Council's membership, and its income. Unfortunately, the data in these chapters are not presented across time, and the prose, with its interminable lists of names in the text, is nearly unreadable. The second half of the book, in which the actual ideas of the Council get attention, surpasses the first, but it, too, leaves the reader begging for more. The treatment of the Council's work in the War-Peace Studies Project during the Second World War best demonstrates the intimate ties between the Council and the government, but the case studies of the last 30 years trail off into vagueness and generalities. The final chapter, on the Council's 1980s project, is especially weak because the publications from that effort are just now, in mid-1977, beginning to appear.

The most distressing shortcoming of the book is that Shoup and Minter completely neglected the extensive archives of the Council, up-to-date until 1952. Had they gone through these 35 volumes of reports, memoranda, and letters, they would have learned, for example, of the remarkable continuity of the Council's view of the dominant position of the United States from the twenties until the present. They would also have seen, more clearly than they do, how the question of the Soviet Union and Germany preoccupied the Council in the immediate post-World War II years. Shoup and Minter should also have paid more attention to the considerable differences between the Council and the more open, and perhaps more "democratic" Foreign Policy Association. They would have discovered how competitive the two groups have been, and they might even have sharpened their criticism of the inherent elitism of the Council.

Imperial Brain Trust is not a terrible book, only a mediocre one. The sub-

ject deserves livelier writing, more painstaking research, deeper analysis, and shrewder criticism.

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AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

G. POPE ATKINS. *Latin America in the International Political System*. Pp. ix, 448. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $11.95.

Highly informative, this detailed analysis of political processes in a region too little understood by many persons in the United States and elsewhere acceptably fills a gap in our scholarly literature. Going beyond the usual focus of attention on Latin American relations with the United States alone, Latin American diplomatic history, or an institutional or legal treatment of the Organization of American States or other pan-American entity, the author discusses the political behavior of Latin American nations toward each other and toward the principal nations of Europe and Asia, as well as the United States, and of these latter nations toward them.

A political scientist who has lived and worked in South America, the author realizes the ecological and cultural diversity of this immense region and that such diversity makes analysis difficult and generalizations tentative. Nevertheless, he discerns some common characteristics and continuities in the foreign policies of the several autonomous nations involved, and he raises questions regarding what shapes these policies, how they are formulated, and what means have been and are being selected and pursued to carry them out. Aware as well of the risk involved in dealing with such a large amount of factual data, he seeks to set these data in a framework of systems and subsystems in process of integration. He thus sees Latin America as not only an identifiable region but also "a coherent international subsystem," occupying "a unique place in political analysis" and deserving "attention on its own terms" (p. 382).

For one thing, a variant ecological and cultural base plus a longer history of independence has produced here a development different from that in other parts of the so-called underdeveloped world, so that Latin America does not fit easily into "any unilinear, inexorable movement from traditionalism to modernism" (p. 382). To assume so implies ethnocentrism and an unacceptable historicism. Theories derived from other national experiences are therefore "inappropriate in the Latin American context" and require reformulation.

Also considered are the policies and overt political acts of the more important nonstate institutions or groups which have influenced or are influencing Latin American nations, including the Roman Catholic church, multinational business enterprises, international labor organizations, and insurgent guerrillas as well as the collaboration of diplomatic, military, or economic character between the several Latin American states and between them and extraregional organizations; conflict involving territorial disputes, economic nationalism, Cold War rivalry, and the imperialist ambitions; the development of regional and subregional consciousness and integration; balances of power in the region and the roles of the various Latin American nations in a global balance of power.

The author has an orderly mind. Each chapter is briefly summarized before presentation and invariably terminated with extensive comments regarding sources of the analysis and supplementary readings. The table of contents, in addition to the usual chapter headings and similar to a form more common to works published in earlier centuries, provides a brief outline, by chapters, of the principal subheadings throughout. There is a political map of the Caribbean area, another of Latin America as a whole, and 9 statistical tables, including a list of the 41 Inter-American Conferences so far held (p. 314). Appended is a 50-page bibliography with official publications, learned journals, news accounts, and

other sources; books in English (predominantly), Spanish (about an eighth as often), Portuguese (occasionally), and French (a few citations); and aids in locating these and other materials.

Provocative is the suggestion that the vacillation in United States policy from time to time toward Latin American (and other) nations which often baffles our friends abroad is due to a shifting back and forth between two diverse points of view: a realistic Jeffersonian tradition of non-intervention, based on the conviction that every nation has the same right as our own was founded on, that is, to govern itself under any form it chooses; and an idealistic Wilsonian (and even earlier?) conviction that political instability in our hemisphere—which all recognize as a threat to our own security and other interests—is due to a lack of progress toward constitutional democracy, that constitutional democracy can be imposed by external pressures, and that the United States, being the most democratic as well as the most powerful nation in the region, has the duty to exercise a positive role in developing in Latin America (and the world) democracy and human rights (pp. 107–11).

A few questions might be raised, the first of which is directed to all of us, and not only to the author. What do we mean by "Latin America"? Although widely employed these days, that name is often imprecise, even ambiguous, in both usage and definition. It is defined here in geographical terms, namely, "that geopolitical portion of the Western Hemisphere south of the United States" (pp. xiii–xiv).

But is all that area logically Latin? Only three-fourths of the 27 autonomous states listed in Table A (pp. 24–5)—18 Spanish, 1 Portuguese, and 1 French (plus, of course, the remnants of French colonialism in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana)—are Latin in cultural derivation, with varying but sometimes generous intervention even here of Amerindian, African, East Indian, Japanese, and other social heritages. One of the autonomous nations (Surinam), plus six islands of the Netherlands Antilles, are of Dutch cultural origin; and six nations, plus the six "associated states," six crown colonies, and one territory also listed in Table B (p. 68), are British.

In relation to the Spanish-American nations, Brazil, or Portuguese-America, is of course outnumbered 18-to-1. Perhaps partially for this reason many intelligent persons in the United States and elsewhere tend to think, and often to act, as if the Sanish-speaking peoples constituted Latin America. Yet, Brazil's land surface is approximately half of the South American continent; and its population, being the seventh largest in the world, virtually equals that of all Spanish America, North and South. In land surface and population, then, but also by reason of an enormous store of natural resources now beginning to be tapped systematically, as well as industrial, agricultural, and other potentialities, Brazil is becoming more and more a world power. Although the author realizes at least some of these facts (for example, p. 11), the mention of Brazil in the text occurs only slightly more often than either Peru or Venezuela and less often than Argentina, Chile, Mexico, or Cuba. Is this an adequate balance?

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STANLEY D. BACHRACK. *The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953–1971*. Pp. x, 371. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $14.95.

More topical apparently than the author had foreseen, this book has appeared at a time of resurgence in China-lobbying during the first months of the new Carter administration. Efforts in this country to maintain American support for the Kuomintang government are clearly alive and well. For example, Marquis Childs reports in the *Washington Post* that Kaohsiung, a large city in southern Taiwan, has adopted Plains, Georgia, as a sister city promising to contribute a $25,000 oriental

garden to Plains to symbolize their close relationship. Meanwhile, familiar faces from the Cold War heyday of earlier China-lobbying are back in the news. Senators Barry Goldwater and John Sparkman have visited Taiwan, speaking in support of maintaining the security treaty with the Taipei government, as have verteran upholders of Kuomintang legitimacy David Nelson Rowe and Anthony Kubek—adroitly seizing on prominent themes in President Carter's foreign policy statements, they assert the importance of human rights in U.S. China policy and America's moral obligation to defend free China.

By the time this review is published, these renewed lobbying efforts may have been undone by a Carter administration decision finally to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Nonetheless, China lobbyists can take pride in the fact that for more than 20 years they helped keep China out of the United Nations and that for almost 30 years they succeeded in convincing American presidents and congressmen that the United States should continue its support for the defeated Kuomintang government on Taiwan and should accord it formal recognition as the sole legitimate government of all of China.

Stanley Bachrack tells the story of China-lobbying in the period from the end of the Korean War to the beginning of the Nixon-initiated American détente with Peking. His book is the successor to Ross Koen's *The China Lobby in American Politics*, printed for publication by Macmillan in 1960 but then withdrawn under pressure from the Committee of One Million. Building on the work of Koen (whose book was finally published by Harper and Row in 1974), Bachrack focuses specifically on the activities of the committee itself which, when founded in 1953 to stop China's admission to the United Nations, was endorsed by senators, congressmen, governors of states, retired generals and ambassadors, and even former President Herbert Hoover.

Bachrack's account provides an excellent case study in the manipulation of American public opinion by an organization including among its active collaborators high public officials (elected and appointed), the national communications media, and the Republic of China government. The most quotable passage in the book, a comment on the media, appears in Bachrack's opening chapter, which describes the political background to the committee's activities:

> For four full decades beginning in 1927—in what must be regarded as a truly remarkable example of American journalistic puffery on behalf of a foreign political leader—the Luce empire zealously promoted Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government. . By 1945 the Chinese leader had been honored by his sixth *Time* cover story, till then the largest number conferred on any mortal. Luce's adulation of Chiang, part of his own grand scheme for "Christianizing and Americanizing China," was personal and total (p. 17).

However, limited by incomplete information, Bachrack actually raises more interesting questions than he can answer in this study. One intriguing question has to do with the somewhat mysterious origins of the committee in 1953, which Bachrack suggests—but cannot prove—might have had something to do with the CIA (his Freedom of Information Act suit to obtain the relevant information was dismissed by a federal court). Another question has to do with funding. Bachrack demonstrates that the committee cooperated closely with Republic of China officials and that Taipei provided funds for junkets to Taiwan as well as financial help for committee educational functions; but he presents no proof of the influence-buying by the ROC government on the scale, for instance, of the current allegations against the South Korean government. Nonetheless, he concludes the study apparently wondering if he has uncovered the full story.

In sum, as Bachrack's own reservations imply, this book cannot yet be the final word on the China Lobby. It is, however, an impressive con-

tribution to understanding both the Committee of One Million and, more generally, the process of foreign policy making in our society.

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A. DOAK BARNETT. *China Policy*. Pp. ix, 131. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $8.95.

A book by A. Doak Barnett, a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program and a serious student of Chinese affairs for over 30 years, is always welcome. Though quite short in pages, it is indeed long in content. However, Barnett's views are neither novel nor startling. Since he rightly does not attempt to give definite answers to any specific problems, it all boils down to one implied cryptic piece of advice: "Play it by ear."

Since the People's Republic of China has displaced the Republic of China in the United Nations and the majority of nations have established full diplomatic relations with Peking, the thesis is that there is now no realistic basis on which the United States can pursue a two-China policy. Yet no viable solution is offered to the problem of Taiwan other than waiting for the Chinese parties themselves to compose their differences, or gradually downgrading United States political ties to Taipei to "non-official" status and abandoning American defense commitments *provided* Peking commits itself to strive for unification by peaceful rather than military means. Would not this solution mean reliance on what might prove to be another 1914 "scrap of paper," and the forsaking of one's friends?

The strengthening of American contacts with Communist China and the motives that may be behind each new "advance" are well discussed with reference to economic ties, cultural exchanges, military and security relations, and arms control. The general goals of United States policy in Asia, Barnett asserts, should be to decrease the dangers of conflict, support economic growth and development, promote both equity and stability, and enhance proposals for international cooperation. Communist China's present opposition to the SALT agreements, which it considers as merely perpetuating the superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union, is one example of the difficulties to be encountered. It is also proposed that the United States should not adopt any policy which would tend to destabilize the present equilibrium in Asia of the four great powers—China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union—even though the Chinese may try to manipulate the existing balance of power for anti-Soviet purposes.

There are so many hurdles to be surmounted before any substantial progress can be made in achieving these broad, general goals that even their partial attainment seems remote. Nonetheless, as Confucius would say, our efforts must be continuous so that beneficial results may occur, even if only slowly and at long last. Read this book.

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GORDON MARK BERGER. *Parties out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941*. Pp. xiii, 413. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. $20.00.

Japanese political parties—both historically in their present context—have evoked considerable interest and commentary on the part of Western observers. The tendency among many students, however, has been to either overemphasize their democratic nature or to condemn their elitist structure. Neither of these positions gives full cognizance to the effective roles that Japanese parties have played historically in managing political conflict and articulating critical interests for important segments of that society. The point of departure is too frequently a failure to recognize the means of linkage that elitist party groupings

provide for traditional social structures and the political process.

The most controversial period of Japanese political party history is the subject that the author seeks to reexamine and analyze in this study. He causes the reader to proceed step by step with him through the changing fortunes of the parties during that much studied but still inadequately understood decade preceding World War II. He convincingly demonstrates that political parties and, more particularly, party leaders continued to play vital roles in the governing process (including the fact that much of their support for Japanese expansionist activities was not coerced but happily given). He maintains that party leader effectiveness continued despite nearly overwhelming efforts to eliminate their influence.

Berger explores each phase and change during this period with fastidious care. He documents the inevitable interplay between domestic and international events. As insightful as anything else is his demonstrated assertion that the military leadership suffered greater restraint than is popularly assumed. Perhaps one unintended consequence of his study is the implication that one of Japan's greatest weaknesses during this period was the lack of "a man on a white horse." The personage of the emperor was too remote and Prince Konoe did not have enough of the qualities necessary to provide daring leadership. One is again left with the feeling that much of Japanese decision making was by default rather than intention.

The subject is well researched and the book is well written. The author has uncovered and pulled together an extraordinarily broad range of resources and develops a credible case for his contentions. Students of Japanese history and politics will profit considerably from this treatment of a rather controversial subject matter.

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KENNETH L. BROWN. *People of Salé: Tradition and Change in a Moroccan City 1830–1930.* Pp. vii, 265. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976. $18.00.

The Middle Eastern city, as described in most of the scholarly literature, was not a unitary, coherent entity with a corporate structure and collective identity. Rather, it was a collection of quasi-independent kinship, tribal, ethnic, religious, and commercial groupings, organized in separate quarters, orders, congregations, and firms. Larger encompassing institutions were highly restricted in content and almost never of a municipal nature, being offspring of the marketplace or the state.

Recently evidence has been brought to light, by Lapidus and others, which indicates that some Middle Eastern cities at certain periods did have greater coherence and unity than the fragmented collectivity of the conventional view. Brown's research in Morocco supports this revisionist position and goes farther: "This study of nineteenth-century Salé suggests that in the Muslim West the city tended to be an aggregative community, and that its inhabitants had a highly developed sense of urban solidarity and pride" (p. 211).

It is "the cohesiveness of the Moroccan city and its inherent cultural unity" (p. 212) that Brown stresses in this historical and ethnographic account of Salé (based upon 21 months of fieldwork in Morocco). Data and conclusions are presented on urban geography, urban-rural relations and ties between cities, the economic and social structures, and symbolic frameworks and ideologies. These are placed within the historical framework of increasing encroachment by the West and by France in particular. Changes in Salé's economic base, occupational structure, and resource distribution are traced. And the reactions of the Slawis (the people of Salé) to these intrusive forces and to the changing bases of their city are described.

The unity and cohesiveness of Salé

can be seen in both social structure and culture. The patterns of social relationship bound the Slawis together rather than fragmented them. Most characteristic were overlapping networks, including horizontal ties such as kinship and affinity and vertical ties reflecting patron-client relations.

> In theory each individual was related or tied to others by bonds of consanguinity, marriage, friendship, mutual interest or loyalty, and these relationships and ties overlapped and interconnected in such a way as to unite individuals into the fabric of a total, cohesive urban community. . . The basic social groupings within the town were networks, or coalitions formed around relatively powerful individuals who could and often did act as patrons to clients. (p. 213).

Discrete, corporate groupings, and the fragmentation generated by them, were lacking: there was no geographical organization into quarters (with the exception of the Jews), and no tribal representation per se, the guilds were informal and open, and religious orders did not divide Slawis one from another. Nor were class divisions great or rigid: in traditional Salé, there was a large middle class and productive resources were well distributed throughout the population; mobility based upon economic achievement and cultivation of the urban lifestyle was not unusual, especially over generations; and between status groups there were numerous vertical ties of loyalty and interest.

Cultural patterns supported unity by emphasizing Slawi identity. This was defined primarily in terms of the civilized, Islamic lifestyle, of which there were several elements: piety, learning, and religious commitment; an economic establishment that allowed gracious and refined patterns of daily living; a dependence upon intelligence, learning, and wit for success, as distinct from a dependence upon force of arms or brute labor; and a social life oriented toward relations and ties with other people. There was also considerable pride in the accomplishments of Slawi and of the status of Salé as a *hadariyya* city, a city of "wealthy and refined merchants and scholars . . . people of 'culture'" (p. 209), distinct from the rude primitives of the *makhzan* (administrative) city and the Bedouins and Arabs of the countryside.

Encroachment by the West and the final conquest by France led to cumulative and profound changes in Salé. Integration into the world market system undercut the stable productive base of the city and resulted in an "impoverishment of the many" and "the enrichment of the few." Productive activities declined as commerce and government service increased; the economic differential within the city increased. Social ties became more diffuse and widespread as the Slawi elite looked outside of the city for economic and political opportunity, an orientation which can be considered part of the tendency for increased influence by the urban elite within the *makhzan* (the government institution). At the same time, the plight of Morocco was seen as a disastrous decline in Islamic society and the influence of French culture over Slawi youth as the corruption of the future.

Slawi youth, however, opposed the foreign domination in their own fashion and for their own reasons. Having taken a secular nationalist position in order to secure their own access to the resources of the country, the youth of Salé found that they could not carry their elders along with them. They then turned to Islam as a symbolic idiom of nationalist assertion and were able to draw the generations together in opposition to the outsiders, using the *latif*, the prayer said in times of calamity, as an expression of their dissidence and their aspirations.

Brown's felicitously written and suggestive account of Salé struggles with but does not always overcome problems of conceptualization and documentation which seem common in social history. Data on the strength or weakness of corporate groups, for example, the relative significance of patron-client ties, or the rigidity of economic classes are some-

what inconclusive. Extended case study analysis and statistically based studies of social mobility could provide greater certainty, but the necessary documentation is seldom available. Reliance upon the memories of elderly informants is a necessary evil and severely limiting. Related to the somewhat ambiguous nature of the limited data is the conceptual problem of characterization. At what point can we say that a community is aggregative as opposed to nonaggregative or cohesive rather than fragmented? What criteria can tell us the relative importance of networks and corporate groupings? Working with data on a somewhat impressionistic basis, do we not compound the possibility of error by oversimplifying through characterization?

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I. M. DESTLER et al. *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations*. Pp. 209. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. $9.95.

EDWARD F. DENISON and WILLIAM K. CHUNG. *How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast: The Sources of Postwar Expansion*. Pp. vii, 267. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. $10.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

For too many years now students of international relations have been embarrassingly obsessed with the political science behavioral approach of fitting the actions of men into preconceived systems and models and therefrom drawing dogmatic conclusions and predictions. In forgetting that every person is a distinct entity, the assumption seems to be that human personality can be put into a computer which then turns out something meaningful.

In this context, *Managing an Alliance* is both refreshing and stimulating, because it tells a story of U.S.-Japanese relations in terms of the individuals involved, of the situations in which they found themselves, and of the intricate interrelationships between both—in other words, it tells a story as it happened, not as someone's rulebook said it should have happened. Anyone who has ever been personally involved as an actor in such a situation will instinctively recognize that this story is one part of the world as it really was, not the artificiality of an academic exercise.

The authors have selected three crises in post-occupation U.S.-Japanese relations to make their point: the revision of the security treaty, the reversion of Okinawa, and the dispute over textile quotas. None of these crises developed as might have been anticipated at the outset, each meant very different things to the various protagonists, and each in the end was satisfactorily resolved for very different reasons. To demonstrate all this, the authors have given detailed and perceptive analyses of the Japanese and American political systems, differences and similarities, as well as analyses of the two cultures, with insights into why various individuals behaved as they did.

The wonder is that two societies as fundamentally different as are the United States and Japan can ever reach agreement and understanding about anything. And the moral offered is that, although history never really repeats itself, it does have invaluable lessons and suggestions as to what to do and not to do, always bearing in mind that each future situation will have features unique to itself. Obviously the greater and broader the experience of any participant, the more effectively he will function; but even the most experienced must be prepared for a certain amount of improvisation—and even some gambling. The academic will no doubt view this conclusion with a certain disdain.

To me, the lesson of *How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast* is that if there is any one group more detached from reality than political scientists it is the economists. This book contains a staggering amount of statistical data on the growth patterns of the major industrial powers in the noncommunist world, plus explanations of where the

data came from and pointing out differences between the performances of the different countries. I cannot find where they have attempted to say what it all means, which is prudent of them. If I interpret the material correctly, which is almost certainly untrue, some of it says that Japan could not possibly have accomplished what it has except that it has done it rather better than have the others, although the figures can be turned to explain that away too. Little is what it seems. This presumably calls for additional statistical studies. A final tentative finding seems to be that although it has happened, it cannot be expected to continue for long.

Since economists seldom agree about anything and have an enviable record of being wrong, the prospect is for endless hours of happy, inconclusive wrangling. In the meantime, I would suggest that if the Japanese did not know it before, the Arab oil capers have now shown them how vulnerable they are and how irrelevant statistics are in coming to terms with something like that. No one told the computer about Arabs. I cannot resist a very broad paraphrase of a remark made long ago by Dorothy Parker in a totally different context: "If all the economists in the world were laid end to end, I would not be surprized."

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ALLEN F. ISAACMAN. *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambesi Valley 1850–1921*. Pp. xxiv, 256 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $13.75.

This exciting work overlaps, but does not duplicate, Isaacman's *Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution, the Zambezi Prazos 1750–1902*, which was awarded the African Studies Association's Herskovits Prize in 1973. The earlier study analyzed Africanized landed estates in the middle Zambezi area; this book deals with the entire valley and focuses on the non-*prazo* Barue state which, by uniting the region in concerted resistance, nearly expelled the Portuguese in 1917.

Isaacman describes precolonial Zambezia and its political cleavages in detail and then shows how exploiting these divisions enabled the Portuguese to make their paper claims real in the late nineteenth century. Thus Barue, which fell in 1902, was defeated, not by Portuguese troops, but by African auxiliaries recruited among Barue's enemies. Once conquered, the valley was turned over to concessionary companies to "administer" and, as in much of early twentieth-century Africa, the companies set about recouping their investment through intensive exploitation of the valley's only real resource: its people. Added wartime demands, especially for conscript porters who rarely returned home, induced Barue to issue a call for common resistance. Nearly all the Zambezi polities responded, and only the aid of the Ngoni—nineteenth-century immigrants from South Africa—enabled the Portuguese to reimpose the colonial order.

This is an heroic and important story, done full justice by the Isaacman's thorough research in European and African archives and in the valley itself, as well as by the crisp prose with which the tale is recounted. The great body of detail, although absolutely necessary if the case is to be made, will cause some difficulty to readers unfamiliar with southeastern Africa, but the aids—a glossary of names and terms and five unnumbered maps confusingly referred to in the text by number—are sufficiently good to guide one through. The effort will be richly rewarded, since the work is of interest to a broad audience, Isaacman having placed Zambezian resistance squarely in the context of modern research on New World slave and Old World peasant resistance. Although I remain unconvinced that the 1917 rising was an "anti-colonial revolution" (it seems instead to have been an anti-Portuguese *jacquerie* of a particularly impressive kind), I found Isaacman's application of typologies drawn from Blassingame, Hobsbawm, and Wolf stimulating indeed.

At the very least, the book shows once more just how much of a sham was Portugal's claim that her empire was a color-blind, paternalistic, civilizing enterprise.

The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique is a superb piece of engagé scholarship—and of scholarship tout court.

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CHARLES F. KEYES. *The Golden Peninsula: Culture and Adaptation in Mainland Southeast Asia*. Pp. 370. New York and London: Macmillan, Inc., 1977. $6.95. Paperbound.

One of the serious problems faced by anthropologists and other social scientists teaching courses on mainland Southeast Asia is the dearth of scholarly, interesting, and up-to-date sources and resources. It is heartening to note the publication of Charles F. Keyes's *The Golden Peninsula*. Before I elaborate on the three qualities (scholarly, interesting, and up-to-date) I attribute to this recent book, I would like first to summarize its contents.

The author's purpose in writing this volume is "to provide a general survey . . . of the ways in which cultural traditions in mainland Southeast Asia have emerged from and have guided the experiences of peoples as they have adapted themselves to a variety of circumstances in the history of the region . . ." (p. vii). Mainland Southeast Asia, in this context, refers to the countries of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In five well-written and well-organized chapters, Keyes has succeeded, in my view, in attaining his major purpose and rationale for publishing this volume.

The author's introduction, entitled "The Study of Sociocultural Diversity in Mainland Southeast Asia," deals mainly with models of sociocultural diversity, both indigenous and foreign. The indigenous models are basically derived from myth, legend, and traditional histories. Foreign models came mostly from colonial officials, missionaries, and anthropologists from Europe and the United States. Keyes elaborates on models by Western scholars dealing with cultural diffusion, social structure and adaptation, culture and personality, culture and adaptation to explain the sociocultural diversity in mainland Southeast Asia.

In chapter 1, the author explains the transformation of the so-called primitive and tribal cultures because, in his view, "the ways of life of these peoples represent an adaptation to conditions in areas peripheral to the major civilizations of mainland Southeast Asia" (p. 13). Specifically, the author amplifies on three ethnic groups: the Semang of the Malay peninsula, the Chin of northern Burma, and the Karens of Burma and Thailand.

The second chapter considers two primary types of civilization: the Theravada Buddhist civilization of Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia and the Sinitic civilization of Vietnam. Both civilizations have been given their proper historic contexts.

Chapter 3 describes rural life in the Theravada Buddhist societies. Keyes compares findings on different aspects of rural culture reported in researches done in the 1950s and 1960s in lower and upper Burma, central, northern, and northeastern Thailand, central Laos, and central Cambodia. Again, the author's interpretations have been made in appropriate historical perspectives.

Two of the most fascinating sections of the book deal with "Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam" (chapter 4) and "Cities in Changing Societies in Mainland Southeast Asia" (chapter 5). These chapters deal with contemporary issues and problems. Keyes considers the effective "adaptation of a Chinese-derived cultural tradition to a Southeast Asian environment that has given the Vietnamese tradition its distinctive cast." In his presentation of a wealth of data on the dynamics of urban life in mainland Southeast Asia, Keyes underscores the conflicts between different patterns of adaptation as well as the processes of socioeconomic and ideological change. The book includes two appendixes (language groupings in main-

land Southeast Asia and demographic data as well as sources). The book has two detailed indexes: by author and by subject.

This publication goes beyond ethnography (description). Keyes's thesis of "adaptation" to vast and varied ecological, sociocultural, and super-natural environments in time and space in mainland Southeast Asia serves as an effective framework of analysis. Students of anthropological theory will find this volume a veritable gold mine of information on the use and application of theory to area studies.

The book is also interesting reading. In most of the chapters, the author offers the benefit of his own field work experiences in the countries described; his use of photography and other illustrations as well as the clarity and coherence of his presentation sustain the reader's interest.

Finally, the book is up-to-date. The author's notes and documentation reveal his reliance on recent (1977) scholarship on mainland Southeast Asia. For example, serious students of the Vietnam story will profit greatly from reading chapter 4 where the Vietnam War is traced up to the American defeat in the area.

My only criticism of this book is the frequent use of the word "primitive" (to refer to certain ethnic groups) which as far as I know has already been expunged from the vocabulary of anthropologists. Except for this point, I feel that *The Golden Peninsula* is a scholarly, interesting, and current book of enduring quality. Charles F. Keyes and Macmillan are to be congratulated for this volume.

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RHOADS MURPHEY. *The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China*. Pp. xiv, 299. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977. $16.50.

This book is a perceptive study of the nature of the European impact on the East since 1500, with major attention focused on the nineteenth century. It incorporates material from the author's articles on the treaty-ports and reflects his greater familiarity with China, just as this review reflects the reviewer's greater familiarity with India. Ideally, such a work should be assessed by someone equally well versed in both China and India.

Approximately one-third of the space is devoted to India. After describing the development of "the Indian model of Western penetration" of Asia and the evolution of the Westernized indigenous elites which now dominate economic and political life in the Indian subcontinent and in Sri Lanka, the author proceeds to his analysis of the European impact on China. Here he draws on his own experience in China in the 1940s and his thorough knowledge of the growth of the treaty-port system since the 1840s. There are maps showing the treaty-ports in China and the commercially productive areas throughout southern and eastern Asia. There is a thorough discussion of those aspects of Chinese history, geography, politics, and economics which made the chronicle of China's contacts with the West one of confrontation rather than collaboration. Perhaps of most interest to specialists will be the chapter wholly devoted to the dangers and pitfalls to be avoided in interpreting the trade figures of the treaty-port era.

To imply, as the author does, that the Europeans were, from the days of Vasco da Gama, consciously pursuing in Asia a "grand colonial design" is liable to mislead the majority of present-day readers in whose minds the concepts of colonialism and imperialism merge into one picture of European dominion over "palm and pine." Until at least the mid-eighteenth century, the Europeans in Asia had no such thing in mind. The words "trade and commerce" were uppermost with them. The word "colony" was almost never used of their activities beyond the Cape of Good Hope.

The author speaks of the English as building the model of the European port-city in India with its Euro-

pean quarter, European fort (later "cantonment"), European club soon to be followed by bund and race-course, and exporting it all over the East. True enough, but India was not the center from which the European presence and European strength fanned out. That center, in the sense that there was one, was always on the sea—on the decks of ships, both the hundreds of "country" ships European-officered and lascar-manned plying the eastern seas and the scores of great "Europe" ships, the East Indiamen wholly European-manned. If that center was ever on land, it was not at Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, but at Batavia, the "Queen of the East," not superseded as the European metropolis in Asia until the 1780s.

It is indeed sad that, despite the full account of British efforts to establish a free emporium in Malaysia, more attention could not have been given to southeast Asia where European activities are as significant as in India or China. There are a few misleading statements about India which need revision. Members of the English East India Company's governing councils at its trading factories overseas were not styled "directors." European agency houses appeared in India at least as early as the 1760s and were numerous long before 1813. Warren Hastings was already governor in Bengal when appointed governor-general under Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773; he did not go out to India from home in 1774 to take up that appointment. No one will lay this book down without feeling that the author has accomplished his purpose in showing the reader why "The Outsiders," in their contacts with India and China, produced such strikingly different results.

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ALVIN ROSENFELD. *The Plot to Destroy Israel: The Road to Armageddon*. Pp. 256. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977. $8.95.

The Plot to Destroy Israel purports to tell the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1948, with some 150,000,000 Arabs lined up against tiny Israel (about 3,000,000) in a war of extermination. At the very outset, we are blandly told that the Arab states have been waging "a savage and genocidal war against Israel" (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973). Egypt, Syria, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and an assembly of satellite countries "share a single enduring goal: the elimination of Israel from the map and its replacement by an Arab, Islamic State."

The author proceeds chapter by chapter to illustrate his thesis, with discussions of the Holy War (*Jihad*), tactics and goals, the "useful refugees," the uses of terror, the Arab boycott, and blackmail. President Sadat is singled out for double-talk, double-dealing, and deception. In chapter 10 the author cites various individuals and institutions (Middle East Institute, Americans for Middle East Understanding) as working for the Arab cause. Chapter 12 is devoted to the shipment of arms, largely to the Arab world, with little said as to the supply of arms to Israel. Unless the civilized world moves to forestall it, Mr. Rosenfeld writes, "there will be another terrible bloodletting in the Middle East," fueled by concessions to the Arabs by sycophanting nations, implemented with arms supplied by France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and even the People's Republic of China, "but most of all by the United States." All of this will be financed "by billions made through the sale of oil; supported by boycott and blackmail." If it succeeds, we are advised," it will be because the West, which knew better, did not care enough" (pp. 241–42).

Students of the Arab-Israeli conflict will find the Rosenfeld diatribe interesting because of its flamboyant character. Mr. Rosenfeld, a journalist who has written, among others, for the *New York Post* and the *Washington Post*, provides little understanding of the problem. His book is sadly lacking in perception, background, and basic context. It makes little pretense to objectivity or balanced presentation. His work, unsupported by any bibliography, documentary or otherwise, or even footnote annotations, may mislead the un-

wary or uninformed, but it will hardly contribute to the knowledge of those who have read a book or two on the Middle East or to any rational consideration of the grave and complicated issues which now confront us.

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WILLIAM I. SHORROCK. *French Imperialism in the Middle East. The Failure of French Policy in Syria and Lebanon, 1900–1914*. Pp. ix, 214. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976. $17.50.

The brief history of the French mandate in Syria was marked by hatred, maladministration and the contradiction of France's assumption of her overwhelming popularity among the great mass of Syrian and Lebanese, and their growing sentiment for Arab nationalism. At issue was the conflict between Wilsonian ideals and the old diplomacy of secret bargains and territorial arrangements between the Great Powers. The debate, however, obscured the fact that France had solid claims to a special position in Syria and Lebanon resulting from the operation of the old diplomacy prior to 1914. French policy was based upon her traditional right as protector of Christians in the Levant; the establishment of an economic sphere of interest in the region; and political and diplomatic relationships with the Christians and Muslims in Syria and Lebanon, in which France posed as the patron of Arab nationalism.

Shorrock argues that the failure of French imperial policy in Syria and Lebanon between 1900 and 1914 not only laid the basis for France's claim to mandate but also cast the seeds of hatred and mistrust among local groups which resulted in the ultimate failure of French administration in the mandatory period. The 1913–1914 negotiations with Turkey and Germany over an Ottoman loan and the Baghdad railway was the keystone of France's prewar claims to Syria and Lebanon. The agreements established the areas as a French economic sphere for exploitation by an extensive railroad network and port facilities, and allowed France to reassert her traditional religious protectorate. However, the negotiations also contributed significantly to a growing suspicion of France among substantial segments of the Syrian population, as she abandoned efforts to urge reforms upon the Turks and asserted her imperialistic claims to Syria and Lebanon. This contributed significantly to growing nationalist sentiment among the Arabs of the Levant and its expression in the post-1920 turbulence of the mandatory period.

Shorrock's book, which is the first major work in English devoted to French policy in the Middle East prior to 1914, is a case study of the background to the classic dilemma with which Wilsonian ideals of self-determination confronted Great Power imperialism in the Middle East and North Africa prior to World War I. It is also further evidence of the source of imperialism's doom, as the Arabs of the Levant early understood the boast that European imperialism was the best and only path to independence was fraudulent. Shorrock skillfully uses unpublished French government documents and archives in delineating the complicated structure of imperial policy. Regardless, his is an analysis primarily of European perceptions of the course of events. A comparable analysis using Arab sources would provide an important, and necessary, contribution to such studies of imperial design.

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ARTURO VALENZUELA. *Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity*. Pp. ix, 272. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. $13.75.

ROBERT MOSS. *Chile's Marxist Experiment*. Pp. i, 225. New York: Halstead Press, 1974. $8.95.

The two books under review are both concerned with Chilean politics; otherwise there is little resemblance between them. The book by Robert Moss is a crit-

ical appraisal of the regime of the late Salvador Allende by a writer for the *Economist* of London; the Valenzuela volume is a study by a political scientist of local government and of center-local political relationships, focusing on the 1960s but done in historical perspective. The former is essentially an entry in the polemical wars over the nature and fate of the Allende regime; the latter is a permanently significant contribution to the literature on Chilean politics and to the comparative study of local government.

Arturo Valenzuela's book is an example of eclectic social science methodology at its best. Thus, he effectively combines the analysis of aggregate data on Chile's 276 communes in the first part of the book with an in-depth examination of 14 selected communes, based largely on extensive personal interviews, in the next with an historical examination of the roots of Chile's system of municipal governance in the final chapters. The scholarship in all three parts is scrupulous and thorough. I have just one reservation: since the communes the author chose to examine most closely did not include any of Chile's larger municipalities, one may wonder how differently the system might have functioned in such a context.

The core question of the book is why Chilean municipal politics was (prior to the coup of 1973) so very competitive when its local governments were so lacking in resources of their own and when, for most municipal officials, local politics would never prove a steppingstone to national political office. Valenzuela argues persuasively that the answer lies in the political brokerage role of local officials who acted essentially through particularistic means to achieve particularistic goals that were important to their individual constituents or to their municipalities. In so doing, the author distinguishes the system of political brokerage both from the classic patron-client relationship and from interest group politics. Such a highly competitive brokerage system becomes established, according to Valenzuela, where a high degree of governmental centralization coexists with scarce resources and with a party system (which interestingly is highly ideological on the national plane) that performs a key role in joining the center to the myriad localities. The causes, then, are structural rather than cultural.

Robert Moss's book is useful in some ways: for example in pointing up the ultimately equivocal commitment to pluralistic democracy on the part of many allendistas (although Moss exaggerates the threat to democracy during the actual three years of Allende's tenure in office). In the end, however, the author will convince only those already inclined to his interpretation. Thus, he is selective in his treatment and consistently in an anti-Allende direction. Much is made of the violence of the Left; little attention is paid to that of the Right. Every anti-Allende rumor or report tends to be accepted at face value. Even though the primary responsibility for Allende's fall may well rest with internal factors, Moss clearly underplays the role of the United States in Allende's "destabilization." And there is barely a hint of the tragic human cost of the military overthrow of Chile's "Marxist experiment."

As an entry in a debate, the Moss book has its uses; but for anyone who attempts a serious analysis of the Allende regime it is badly flawed. The Valenzuela book, however, is an impressive achievement, not gainsaid in any fundamental way by the at least temporary end of the democratic system in 1973.

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TONY BUNYAN. *The Political Police in Britain*. Pp. 320. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. $15.95.

Anyone approaching this book in the hope of reading the "authoritative" analysis promised on the dustjacket had better look elsewhere. Tony Bunyan has a huge ax to grind. His study is ostensibly about the maintenance of law and order

and the issue of internal security in Great Britain. In actuality, it is an exposé, a political tract, the theme of which is the growth of the repressive instruments of social control as capitalism reacts to the crisis caused by its own internal contradictions. The rhetoric is familiar. Liberal-democratic institutions are a facade masking the reality of the power of the ruling class. The police, the secret service, the military intelligence branches are turning increasingly inward against the people themselves. Control over those agencies by elected officials is as much nominal as real.

Since Bunyan makes his assumptions explicit, one is able to put his argument into focus and to separate the abundant data he has gathered from the conclusions that lace every paragraph of this tract. Thus, to illustrate, one can take in his description of the arrangements made by a cabinet committee in 1919 to deal with a possible national strike without accepting the implication that plans to ensure the maintenance of supplies were really less important than the intention to "subvert the efforts of the strikers by the use of state agencies operating under the umbrella of the law." Perhaps socialist governments might stand by while a national strike achieved its purposes, but one finds it difficult to discover the evidence that would lead to such a conclusion.

What we have in Bunyan's work is a good deal of information about British police, the Special Branch, MI5, private security organizations, and the techniques they have employed and are using to gather information in the interests of internal security. Without acknowledging that all of these agencies have deliberately increased their domestic role when the normal rule of law has been insufficient to contain political opposition, one can discern, as in the case of the American CIA or FBI, enough cases of abuse to raise serious questions about the adequacy of controls over such groups, public or private. The author's account of the uses of agents provocateurs, of telephone-tapping and mail-opening, and indeed sometimes of incitement to illegal activities is considerably more disturbing, because it can be more concretely documented, than in his exegesis of the state's preparations for action should a major internal challenge develop inside Britain.

A clue to Bunyan's method may be gleaned by studying his bibliography and footnotes. The former is a useful list of secondary materials, pamphlets, and government publications. The citations in the footnotes, interestingly, more often than not represent an extreme point of view when they are employed as authority to buttress the author's principal arguments. What we have, therefore, is a tendentious tract, sufficiently illuminating about insensitivity to civil liberties and due process to be extremely disturbing, but emphasizing an ideological thesis that strains the important data Bunyan has systematically organized. The heart of this book is its political theme. Its findings would have been more persuasive if the doctrine had been muted.

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VERA S. DUNHAM. *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction*. Pp. v, 283. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. $16.95.

Vera Dunham's study refocuses our attention from the story of Stalin's victims onto that of his would-be benefactors: the growing middle class with whom he proposed to build "the good life." Her book's main thesis is that postwar Stalinism maintained itself, not through repression alone, but through "The Big Deal," a tacit agreement formed by the Soviet leadership with the resilient middleclass, which alone could supply the technicians and organization men so desperately needed to rebuild the ravaged economy. Dunham views this alliance less as a calculated policy than as the natural culmination of two long-range, parallel processes. the development of a middleclass (defined in terms of a way of life, attachment to specific values) and the transformation of a revolutionary regime into a conservative one, intent, above all, on its own survival. The common desire of both

groups, according to Dunham, for stabilization, normalization, and material progress fostered the embourgeoisement of Soviet society. Thus, she adds to the list of explanations for "the betrayal of the revolution" the persistence of that peculiarly Russian brand of philistinism: *meshchanstvo*, "a middleclass mentality that is vulgar, imitative, greedy and ridden with prejudice." The author views this postwar mentality as a survival of prerevolutionary times (the "folk meshchanstvo" of the little people), strengthened and redirected by the "systematic meshchanstvo" engendered by Stalin's bureaucracy.

As evidence of these social changes, Dunham turns to the large body of postwar "middle-brow fiction," produced by subservient writers for a mass readership. Her claim that this topical literature, in addition to reflecting the regime's values, served as an "ersatz social forum," taken seriously by readers and evoking their sincere responses to current issues, is questionable in view of the guardedness pervading other areas of public life and the unengaging monotony of the novels themselves. The weight of her analysis, however, rests upon neither readers' nor critics' reactions, which are rarely cited, but upon her own shrewd, insightful readings of the texts. Successive chapters trace the simultaneous "deheroization" and "devillainization" of characters, the subtle shifts by which we recognize a new accommodation beneath the old language of socialist orthodoxy. Private and public values converge. The ascetic revolutionary idealist is eclipsed by the careerist, desirous of family happiness, material comfort, status—and its ubiquitous symbols: the canary, the pot of geraniums, orange scalloped lampshades, and polka-dot teacups. Dunham vividly recreates this paradigmatic decor of meshchanstvo and teaches us how to decode the language of Soviet household objects.

However, neither the author's fine instinct for detail nor her witty, highly readable prose wholly succeed in counteracting the tedium of the book's format, a series of textual explications involving plot summaries and extensive quotation. The problem lies not only in the simplistic, repetitious nature of the fiction itself, but also in Dunham's insistence upon a single theme, fleshed out and developed from a number of different angles.

Her explanation for the development of Soviet society, rooted in the persistent human urge for possessions, status, and security, seems most valuable when viewed as a partial one. When, as in her concluding chapter, she attempts to use it as a general prism for interpreting Soviet society today, insight treads precariously close to oversimplification.

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STEPHEN P. GIBERT. *Soviet Images of America*. Pp. 168. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977. $12.50.

Professor Gibert and his associates conducted the research for this book at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute, located in Virginia across the Key Bridge from Washington. The note on sources shows that they read articles in 23 Soviet publications and studied 34 monographs on international and strategic problems written by Soviet students.

The purpose of their research, as stated in a foreword by Richard B. Foster, director of the Strategic Studies Center, was to "further the understanding of present Soviet-American relations." They sought to understand Soviet attitudes toward America and especially toward détente from the point of view of Soviet leaders rather than from preconceptions which Americans might hold as a result of their own attitudes.

They conclude that Soviet leaders have surrendered none of their determination to forward world revolution and that they see the United States as the principal "imperialistic" power that stands in their way. The author sees Russians regarding détente and SALT as only necessary steps to prevent nuclear war while they strengthen their own position in relation to their enemy. And

the Soviet leaders, these researchers find, believe that they are gaining strength and that their final victory is inevitable. American withdrawal from Vietnam they regard as one of several indicators of American weakness.

The following sentences, taken from the last chapter, well state the book's conclusion: "... [T]he images Soviet leaders have of America and its role in world affairs should yield at least a few clues about the future. Unfortunately, the propositions which form the core of Soviet analyses of American society and government reflect unfavorably on the United States. Especially damaging to viable Soviet-American peaceful coexistence is the firm Soviet conviction that it was a change in the correlation of forces that compelled the United States to adopt the policy of détente. Thus Soviet leaders do not perceive the attempts of the American government to negotiate issues, to ameliorate the arms race, to encourage trade and so on as indicating any genuine desire for peace. On the contrary, these are involuntary acts forced on a still hostile and aggressive America. Accordingly, indications that the United States really would like to improve superpower relations do not induce reciprocal feelings on the part of Soviet leaders."

The reader gets the impression that Professor Gibert and his associates read hundreds of Soviet periodicals and monographs, selecting from them paragraphs which set out opinions on America, translating each into English, and then copying each onto a separate card. Then it seems that they planned the book and filed the cards in a sequence that they saw as substantiating their conclusions.

Therefore, most of the study consists of translated paragraphs from those Soviet sources, with short explanatory text by the author between the selections from the Russian. Careful footnotes give the Russian title of the original publication or monograph with the Cyrillic transposed into Roman letters. That is especially true of chapters II, III, and IV on "Soviet Images of America's Global Role," "The United States through Soviet Eyes," and "American Military Power Appraised." The last of these three quotes Russian writers who concede that, for the present, American military power is greater than theirs, but they see their forces growing and express confidence that they will become equal or superior to those of the United States.

The book presents little hope of real Soviet-American mutual understanding and cooperation and little hope for an end to the basic conflict between them. It is, however, a valuable compilation of certain Russian attitudes.

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DAVID IRVING. *Hitler's War*. Pp. vi, 926. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1977. $17.50.

"That is Himmler's affair and his alone," Hitler is said to have remarked on the Russians' discovery of piles of corpses at the Majdanek concentration camp near Lublin in October 1944. David Irving cites Hitler's press officer, Heinz Lorenz (p. 719), as the source of this alleged comment by Hitler on his campaign against the Jews, which took many forms—and many lives. The author depicts a remote Hitler, somehow unaware of what is going on around him (including the massacres of Jews), but when he is in charge, especially of military affairs, Irving's Hitler becomes a strategist-genius.

This is all very debatable, of course. In fact, a formidable Hitler expert in his own right, Alan Bullock (of the brilliant 700-page work, *Hitler—A Study in Tyranny* (1952), for some reason overlooked in Mr. Irving's comprehensive bibliography), took the author of the new, 900-page book on Hitler to task in the pages of *The New York Review* (May 26, 1977). Bullock finds Irving's thesis about Hitler's powerlessness (in certain areas) hard to swallow, debating this "revisionism" as a misunderstanding over the difference between Hitler's power and *administration*, the latter of which often fell short of effectiveness, a well-known fact to historians. When Irving confuses Hitler's administrative

oversight with alleged powerlessness or lack of leadership, Bullock finds the thesis "astonishing" and against which there is a "great volume of evidence."

As Bullock also points out, Mr. Irving evidently set as his goal to "de-demonize" or "normalize" Hitler in several ways. First, on the anti-Semitic policy, as pointed out above; here, the time frame of *Hitler's War* (only the last five and a half years of his political biography) divests Hitler's maniacal hatred of the Jews of its early motivations and expression—psychologically as well as ideologically. Second, depiction of Hitler as a military genius seems to hold up only as long as Hitler's *Blitz* advantage over the Allies was maintained, which was about three years, or until the winter of 1942–43, when the tide definitely began to turn against Hitler largely because of his own miscalculations (against the better advice of his generals). The "unorthodoxy" (p. 55) of Hitler's military tactics and strategy, and his immersion in every last detail of field operations (p. 86), worked well in the surprise phase of World War II, as the author tends, perhaps, to overemphasize. But the series of blunders by which the Führer landed himself into a fatal two-front war, East and West, so mitigates against him that the "genius" attribute loses most of its meaning. Just the opposite impression arises: the contrast between Hitler's recklessness and the futile cautiousness urged by many of his top military officers, reaching all the way up to the General Staff, many of whom resigned or were dismissed (or committed suicide).

Mr. Bullock commends Irving for at least one value: persistence in the pursuit of new evidence. But even here, a non-expert on Hitler is perplexed. Why, for example, are certain sources omitted from the bibliography of *Hitler's War*, including the book that inspired Irving's own title? *To the Bitter End*, written by the ex-Gestapo officer and German opposition leader, Bernd Gisevius, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1947) is a case in point. Perhaps Mr. Irving intended a bit of irony in omitting the controversial work by Gisevius since this cohort in the plot to assassinate the Führer catalogs the many arguments against Hitler's abilities, political as well as military. By failing to contend candidly with the several other authors of books about Hitler and their points of view, Irving apparently placed his own desires to make revisionist waves above his calling as a writer.

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New York City
New York

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third.* Pp. v, 255. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $12.95.

No scholar or layman interested in Roman imperial history should ignore this book. Having mastered the specialized aspects of the Roman military, Luttwak, a professional defense analyst, reveals their general strategic implications. Moreover, he does so in a clearly organized, well-written text supported by helpful diagrams and free of needless jargon and cant. Most impressively, although not a trained classicist or ancient historian, he has soundly utilized the ancient sources and a vast array of classical scholarship in English and foreign languages.

Luttwak discerns three basic defensive systems evolving over the time surveyed. The first, from Augustus to Nero, was based on the republic's hegemonic concept of empire and the use of clients to guarantee the security of the core areas This system permitted economical use of a few highly trained, inherently mobile units to police the less Romanized provinces within and overawe clients without. In general, this system guaranteed Roman power more than the optimum security of imperial territory and its populations. Small incursions could not be precluded and were tolerated.

From the Flavians through the Antonines, however, as the Romanization and prosperity of the provinces increased, even low-level incursions became intolerable. Therefore, a strategy of preclusive, perimeter defense was developed. It involved an elaborate network of

forward positions, fixed fortifications, military roads, and strategically located tactical and operational units. A few troops positioned along the border could prevent small incursions, while the bulk of the manpower in any sector could be quickly massed against more numerous attackers before the frontier was penetrated.

With the increased pressures after the Severi, Rome's resources were not sufficient to maintain a preclusive system, and there evolved a strategy of defense in depth. It relied on static militia forces manning fixed positions to defend vital locations and supplies. Under attack, the surrounding territory would be temporarily abandoned to the enemy until field armies in the rear could mount an offensive. While this system could protect the power of the soldier-emperors who controlled the field armies, it could not prevent ultimately fatal damage to imperial territory and the civilian population.

Unfortunately, this brief review cannot do justice to the richness of Luttwak's work. Whatever criticisms may be raised on particular points, it has placed the study of Roman military history on a new level. Future work will have to proceed from there.

ALLEN M. WARD
University of Connecticut
Storrs

J. SEARS MCGEE. *The Godly Man in Stuart England. Anglicans, Puritans, and the Two Tables*. Pp. ix, 299. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976. $17.50.

Fascination with the ideas, practices, and conflicts produced by Puritans has resulted in a voluminous and varied literature of the subject over the last three centuries. In the nineteenth century, writers liked to emphasize the contrasts between Puritan and Anglican and Roundhead and Cavalier. Recently there has been an attempt to show that these differences between Puritanism and Anglicanism have been much exaggerated and unduly emphasized. C. H. and Katherine George's *The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation, 1570–1640* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) is one of the leading examples of this school.

Dr. McGee in *The Godly Man in Stuart England* makes a fresh examination of this relationship between Anglicans and Puritans in which he argues that the key to their differences is in the relative stress each puts on the Two Tables of the Ten Commandments. Obviously both groups believe all Ten Commandments are obligatory for all Christians. However, he proceeds to show that the Puritans regard the First Table containing the first Four Commandments concerning man's relationship to God to be crucial in distinguishing the elect from the damned, and so the First Table becomes the basic concern for the Puritan. The Anglicans, on the other hand, regard the scrupulous observance of the Second Table, which contains the remaining Six Commandments governing the relationships among mankind, to be crucial for the individual Christian. In his relationship to God, he needs basically to follow the sacraments of the Church of England. Dr. McGee is very convincing in his thesis and is able to provide ample evidence that these distinctions were recognized by both Anglican and Puritan.

The period of Stuart England covered by this book is 1620 to 1670 according to the subtitle, but since the study is devoted to an analysis of the period as a whole there is no sense of movement. Indeed, this is one of the principal weaknesses of this work. There is no distinction made between the Anglicanism and the Puritanism of 1620 and those of 1670. This flaw does not prevent this Yale Historical Publications Miscellany, 110, from being a valuable contribution to the whole field of Stuart England.

There is an excellent bibliographical note and bibliography surveying the literature.

J. L. HAINES
Clarion State College
Pennsylvania

PETER F. SUGAR. *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804: A History of East Central Europe*. Vol. 4. Pp. ix, 365. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977. $16.95.

Giving us a brilliant overall picture of the least studied and most obscure part of Balkan history, the Ottoman period, Sugar's history is the most definite contribution to that historical period in the Balkans.

The book begins with the early history of the Ottomans and with their establishment in Europe, describing the basic Muslim and Turkish features of the Ottoman state. In the subsequent section, Sugar shows how these features influenced every aspect of life in the European lands administered directly by the Ottomans—the "core" provinces—and left a permanent mark on states that were vassals of or paid tribute to the Ottoman Empire.

Whether dealing with the core provinces of Rumelia or with the vassal and tribute-paying states (Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Dubrovnik), the author offers fresh insights and new interpretations, as well as a wealth of information on Balkan political, economic, and social history hardly available elsewhere. In fact, one wonders whether Sugar is actually acquainted with the numerous foreign sources cited in the impressive "Bibliographic Essay" (pp. 289–316) which is the best available survey of this type.

There is also an appendix which includes lists of dynasties and rulers with whom the Ottomans dealt as well as data for the House of Osman and some of the grand viziers, a chronology of major military campaigns, peace treaties, and territory gained and lost by the Ottoman Empire in Europe from 1354–1804, and glossaries of geographical names and foreign terms

JOSEPH S ROUCEK

Bridgeport
Connecticut

ADAM B. ULAM. *In the Name of the People Prophets and Conspirators in Prerevolutionary Russia*. Pp. ix, 418 New York: The Viking Press, 1977. $15.00.

In recent years Professor Adam B. Ulam of Harvard University [illegible] duced no less than seven [illegible] umes on Russian and Sovi[illegible] this staggering output, which does no even include a textbook history of the USSR and several works on non-Russiar themes, the present study, dealing witl the nineteenth-century Russian revolu tionary movement, adds still anothe substantial tome. Speaking generally, al of Ulam's works reflect the same essen tial strengths and weaknesses with, ir each case, the former clearly outweigh ing the latter.

In this latest of his efforts Ulam sur veys the revolutionary process in Russia from the accession of Tsar Alexander II in 1855 through the aftermath of the assassination of that unfortunate mon arch in 1881. In considering this crucia period, the author focuses on the activi ties of such "prophets and conspirators" of the revolutionary struggle as Alex ander Herzen, Nicholas Chernyshevsky and the activists of the nihilist and popu list movements whose exploits, he con tends, established the tradition of revo lutionary violence in Russia that finally culminated in the upheaval of 1917. Al though the story is by no means nove (compare Franco Venturi's definitive *Roots of Revolution*), Ulam nevertheless weaves a compelling narrative which draws the reader irresistibly through the various stages and styles of the revolu tionary drama from the early sophistica tion of Herzen and the rank amateurism of the nihilists to the murderous fana cism of the conspirators of the People Will who finally succeeded in assassina ing the tsar on their eighth spectacul attempt.

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style, particularly his witty asides and fascinating anecdotes, that constitutes one of the greatest assets of his work. Moreover, Ulam invariably brings to his subjects a keen and penetrating insight which more than compensates for his occasionally controversial opinions.

To conclude, Ulam's study of the mid-nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary movement can be read with profit by any reader but will probably enjoy its greatest success among interested laymen who will undoubtedly find it stimulating and engrossing fare.

JOHN W. LONG

Rider College
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UNITED STATES

WILLIAM E. AKIN. *Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900–1941*. Pp. xiii, 242. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $9.50.

PAUL N. GOLDSTENE. *The Collapse of Liberal Empire: Science and Revolution in the Twentieth Century*. Pp. xv, 139. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $10.00.

Current concerns with the impact of technology on the American society make these two volumes a welcome addition to the growing literature devoted to the examination of the role of applied science on our beliefs, practices, and customs. While the work by historian Akin is of a more limited nature, focusing upon the unfolding of a social movement within a restricted time frame, the volume by political scientist Goldstene concentrates on critical examination of the fundamental values and institutions of the American life. The authors acknowledge science as a major force in shaping much of what has come to be associated with the essence of the American civilization.

Author Akin presents a detailed historical analysis of the rise and fall of the Technocratic Movement which gained considerable popularity during the cataclysmic days of the thirties. The technocrats were a group of technicians and engineers who offered a seemingly viable alternative to the existing modes of social organization in a time of severe cultural dislocation. The proposal advanced by the technocrats articulated the centrality of scientific rationality in the production of goods and services and, indeed, in every aspect of human endeavor. In a chronological order, historian Akin vividly gives us the life sketches of the major proponents of the technocratic philosophy and shows how these ideas appealed to the masses during a period of great uncertainty.

At a time of chaos when old values and systems of thoughts were increasingly being questioned, it was almost natural for a group like the technocrats to emerge, suggests Akin, in order to offer a new set of values and new ways of viewing and organizing society. The duplication, waste, and inefficiency of the marketplace that had so dominated American life was to be displaced by the new scientific order. In it the mechanical rationality of the machines was to be the model in the creation of a new social order. According to Akin, the technocrats blamed the ills of the economy on an inefficient adjustment of the social order to modern high-energy technology in which the pricing mechanism determined the production of goods rather than technological efficiency. It was the urge to profit that prevented the rationalization necessary to adjust the process of production and distribution to the requirements of technological efficiency. The technicians, especially the engineers who heralded this movement, issued a clarion call to construct a new social order centered on rational modes of production scientifically guided by a technical elite. In that way, they hoped to eliminate inefficiency and provide the abundance of the American economy to create material prosperity of unlimited proportions.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

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In recent years Professor Adam B. Ulam of Harvard University has produced no less than seven weighty volumes on Russian and Soviet subjects. To this staggering output, which does not even include a textbook history of the USSR and several works on non-Russian themes, the present study, dealing with the nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary movement, adds still another substantial tome. Speaking generally, all of Ulam's works reflect the same essential strengths and weaknesses with, in each case, the former clearly outweighing the latter.

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As is the case with most of the author's recent studies, the shortcomings of his work are disturbing primarily to the specialist. Thus, such features as the lack of a bibliography, the annoying translation of Russian titles into English footnotes, and the use of awkward neologisms grate harshly on the scholar but will probably not greatly concern the layman. More serious is Ulam's frequent injection of caustic personal and political opinion into his work without sufficient documentary foundation, an element which often detracts from his otherwise sound historical judgments. On the other hand, it is precisely Ulam's engaging

style, particularly his witty asides and fascinating anecdotes, that constitutes one of the greatest assets of his work. Moreover, Ulam invariably brings to his subjects a keen and penetrating insight which more than compensates for his occasionally controversial opinions.

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JOHN W. LONG

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While the technocrats argued for the transformation of society, at times with evangelical enthusiasm, they unfortunately, did not develop a consistent

political philosophy to give their movement all-embracing justification, meaning, and coherence. It was this singular failure, argues the author, which led to the rapid decline of the movement.

Building on the theme of science as the central element, Goldstene attempts to formulate a theory of change through which the dynamics of American life could be explained. The basic concept in the theoretical structure developed by Goldstene is the phenomenon of power. The liberal ideology in America has been created on the Newtonian conception of balance—balance through the emergence of equal and opposite countervailing force. Unfortunately, the galloping and uncontrolled development of science and technology has set in motion a crisis of immense magnitude so that the foundation of liberal ideology is endangered. Fueled by the technology of the marketplace, the corporate world has brought about a transformation so drastic that American liberalism is in despair—if indeed it be liberalism at all—because there is no countervailing force to challenge the hegemony of the modern corporation.

The essential features of the theory articulated by Goldstene bear some resemblance to the work of historian Akin, in that science, technology, and economics are seen as the determinant forces of social process. Technology in both instances decidedly is the instrument of power. Akin perceives it as the tool of the technocrats in their efforts to produce the material abundance as a promise of American life and as a means for the eradication of poverty, injustice, superstition, and class conflict. For Goldstene technology in the hands of corporations spells the demise of liberalism as traditionally understood, with its emphasis on the notion of the countervailance. In reading these books, it quickly becomes apparent that science is seen as the foundation of America and each of the authors discusses the political ramification of it within the confines of his subject matter.

The interconnections between science, technology, and capitalism are certainly worth exploring whether it is done in an historical context, as by Akin, or within a theoretical scheme, as by Goldstene. If we are to understand the course of our destiny, it certainly behooves us to subject ourselves to more analysis of the type undertaken by these authors. Technology has not given us utopia. Perhaps it never can. The important issues for humans to resolve are the political ones. On this score, both the authors seem to agree.

Of the two, I would judge the Akin volume to be more readable. His narrative style is easy to follow, and in most instances his work reads like a lucid novel. The Goldstene volume is complex, it certainly is not for the light reader, although it is written with a staccato precision. As a politically perceptive odyssey, it is also much more intellectually demanding. However, both books are highly stimulating though a somewhat specialized reading audience is demanded.

GHULAM M. HANIFF
St. Cloud State University
Minnesota

HAROLD A. FEIVESON, FRANK W. SINDEN, and ROBERT H. SOCOLOW, eds. *Boundaries of Analysis: An Inquiry into the Tocks Island Dam Controversy.* Pp. xiii, 417. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976. $17.50.

This collection of essays is a product of the Center for Environmental Studies set up at Princeton University in 1970. The project was sponsored by the National Science Foundation, "Research Needs concerning the Incorporation of Human Values into Environmental Decision-Making." The nine essayists include an economist, a civil engineer, a biologist, a physicist, a research mathematician, a professor of aerospace and mechanical sciences, and, happily, a graduate student in politics. "The impact of technical analysis on the political process" is presented through a "detailed study of the Tocks Island Dam controversy over the past four years."

Mr. Reich, the student of politics, offers a history of the patterns of use

of the Delaware River since the seventeenth century and the conflicts over the allocation of waters among four states. Massive floods in 1955 led to the creation of a Delaware River Basin Commission in 1961, which Mr. Reich considers a "unique concept of interstate-federal cooperation." The proposal for a dam at Tocks Island, five miles above the Delaware Water Gap, seemed to have widespread support. A citizens' association was formed to support the scheme, representative of important civic interests. Their bulletins reached me for some years. The pressure for regulation of flow by a dam was accentuated by four years of drought in the 1960s. It was always obvious that the small town of East Stroudsburg and the local property owners would be seriously affected by the dam.

Mr. Reich gives a footnote reference to the "detailed history of water management before 1955" by the late Professor Roscoe C. Martin and others of the Public Administration program at Syracuse University. By limiting his scope to the past four years, Mr. Reich limits the usefulness of his study. One comes away from this set of essays with the sense that the true concern of the National Science Foundation was the applicability of recent developments in analytic processes to political decision making, of which these authors are doubtful, and that their interest in the Delaware River and Tocks Island was almost accidental.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
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PHILIP S. FONER. *Labor and the American Revolution*. Pp. xi, 257. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977. $14.95.

This book is primarily concerned with urban wage earners and the coming of the American Revolution. The author, a specialist in labor and black history, starts with a good survey of previous writings about workers on the eve of the Revolution and continues with ample documentation throughout the book. Most of the attention is centered around the activities of the Sons of Liberty organizations in the major colonial cities but without much attention to their development before 1760. General opposition to the Stamp Act of 1765 aroused urban workers in all cities except Philadelphia and brought them to the verge of combined military opposition. Repeal of the Stamp Act caused only a short reduction of protest before the Townshend Acts revived the Liberty boys. The clashes at Golden Hill in New York and the Boston Massacre were probably due to moonlighting by British soldiers at a time when Americans could not get jobs and occurred after mutual insults were exchanged between workers and troops. The workers strongly supported non-importation of British goods and often almost came to blows with merchants who wanted open trade.

The more radical of the leaders of the mechanics and artisans originated the call for a colonial congress as a means of bypassing local merchant opposition and pushed the First Continental Congress into non-importation as a policy for the budding nation. Artisan groups took charge of enforcement of the new policy and used their work as an experiment in popular control following the ideas of Tom Paine.

Professor Foner emphasizes the economic factors leading to revolution and finds that the struggle was as much over who would rule at home as over home rule. He presents this volume as "history from the bottom up" but, while there is some attention to the role of slaves, it is really from the viewpoint of the leaders of the wage earners rather than the wage earners themselves. This may be as close to the bottom as the researcher can get, but it misses much of the role of the farmer, the indentured servant, and the common laborer. It is clear that the leaders of the workers were usually workingmen, except in Boston. At the end of the book, the reader wishes that the author had used his obvious familiarity with the workers of the colonial period to deal with their activity during the Revolution in a more complete manner in-

stead of jumping into some relatively disconnected references to organized labor during the nineteenth century.

GEORGE B. ENGBERG
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CHARLES RAPHAEL FRANK, JR. *Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid*. Pp. vii, 180. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $9.95.

This book reviews experience with two pieces of legislation that sought to aid U.S. workers and firms adversely affected by competition from imports. It also carries a set of options for public policy.

Mr. Charles Raphael Frank, Jr., currently a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, wrote this book as a senior Fellow in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy program with the assistance of Miss Stephanie Levinson, a research assistant in the same program.

Although consumers realize enormous benefits from free trade, import competition creates unemployment and curtails the profit margins of domestic entrepreneurs. Thus, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was passed to provide assistance to workers and firms "injured by or threatened with injury from import competition." (p. 1). The assistance guaranteed included unemployment benefits, retraining and placement services, and relocation allowances to workers. It offered loans, technical assistance, and tax relief to firms crippled by import competition. But the stringent criteria of eligibility which the 1962 act carried made it impossible for its intended beneficiaries to secure their benefits. The Trade Act of 1974 was, therefore, passed to supersede the 1962 act and to make it easier for workers and firms to receive assistance whenever import competition threatened their equilibrium. Yet a liberal criteria of eligibility falls short of Mr. Frank's prescriptions for public policy. The author proposes that adjustment assistance should not be given merely to offset losses from import competition but should be part of a national policy of assistance to workers, firms, and communities that suffer loss for any reason.

The book is heavily documented with figures derived from authentic sources. Its policy options, however, represent the tendency of liberals to conceive of public goals in ideal terms. The author seems quite oblivious to the particular weakness of the federal government of the United States to play the role of an activist in an area such as the administration of welfare policy. Another important weakness of the book is that it fails to deal with the philosophical basis of U.S. interest in the promotion of free trade, at least within the non-Communist world.

Organized labor will no doubt be delighted with this book. Scholars, however, will do no more than use its references as a rich source for further research.

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Howard University
Washington, D.C.

LEO HERSHKOWITZ. *Tweed's New York: Another Look*. Pp. xx, 409. $12.50. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1977.

This book attempts to rehabilitate William M. Tweed's reputation by exonerating him from the most serious charges leveled against him. The author claims he has exposed as "myths" allegations that (1) Tweed plundered New York City after (2) gaining public office by fraud and deceit, and that (3) the "Tammany tiger" was a mere "paper tiger."

The first proposition appears to be the most difficult to sustain. Professor Hershkowitz believes Tweed was victimized by self-seeking politicians and "yellow" journals, then convicted in a court of law by improper judicial proceedings. In actual fact, Tweed was bankrupt in 1861, then became head of Tammany Hall in 1867. By 1869, when his daughter was married, a single item of expense relating to that marriage, a reception and dinner at Delmonico's Restaurant, cost $13,000. The following

year he bought $79,455 worth of bonds in a single transaction. Tweed also built a four-story mansion in the city's most fashionable section and invested $65,500 in Connecticut real estate. Finally, he maintained two yachts. If Tweed was not a "boodler," what financial wizardry enabled him to accomplish all this on a salary of $7,500 a year?

At his trial, the jury never seriously believed he was innocent, and it brought in a verdict of guilty on 204 counts. Finally, following a fruitless escape from jail, Tweed made a free, detailed confession.

The facts relating to the second "myth," fraud in elections, are scarcely mysteries. In some areas of the city, violence and fraud were regularly employed in elections, not only in Tweed's day, but for a long time afterwards. The real question is not whether these means were actually employed, but to what extent Tweed needed them to secure and maintain Tammany's power. (We shall consider the real key to Tweed's control below.)

The "Tammany tiger" did not fall apart when Tweed left. It simply booted him out. As the pages of *Tweed's New York* repeatedly show, Tammany was faction-ridden in Tweed's day: it had not attained the high degree of organization achieved a half century later. Each of Tweed's successors, John Kelley (1872–86), Richard Croker (1886–1902), and Charles F. Murphy (1902–24), gained greater control over the organization than his predecesors. At the same time, they acquired more sophistication in accumulating personal wealth. George Washington Plunkitt, who begun his political career when Tweed's was ending, called his modus operandi "honest graft," and the change in style suggested by Plunkitt's expression speaks volumes.

No one who rises from obscurity can maintain his power without satisfying the public. That was the real secret of Tweed's success. He championed the cause of the city's growing ethnic groups by reforming education and social welfare, constructed boulevards, gave an impetus to the consolidation of the Greater City by encouraging the construction of the Brooklyn Bridge, and initiated countless innovative programs. Years later reformers discovered underlying principles behind his pragmatic concerns and articulated them as philosophies of urban planning. Hershkowitz does present evidence of this aspect of Tweed's public life, but it is fragmentary and diffused. Someday, an historian will follow the trail Professor Hershkowitz has blazed and trace the development of municipal policy, Tweed's included, in efforts to resolve the problems of urbanization during the American Industrial Revolution In time, this may prove the most constructive outcome of *Tweed's New York*.

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JAMES E. HEWES, JR. *From Root to McNamara. Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1953*. Pp. 452. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. $11.45.

Sponsored by the Center of Military History, this volume is intended as the first in a series of special interest to the U.S. Army. The focus is on changes in army departmental organization starting with the reforms of 1900 begun by Secretary of War Elihu Root. Throughout American life there has been a trend toward increasingly centralized authority over individual and corporate activities. American traditionalists throughout history opposed such centralization while reformists wanted greater centralized authority as the nation itself changed. In industry the process of advocating and accomplishing such rational order and regulation from the top down was termed rationalization, and in the War Department there were rationalists (modernists).

In the 1890s there were 10 military departments, each with its own budget, and with no direct, vertical, integrated chain of command. Bureau chiefs usually held office for life, so they frequently had greater influence

over policy making than the secretary of war himself, whose position was only temporarily granted. Upon assuming the secretary position in 1899, Root interested President McKinley in the military organization problems, and reforms were made. The role of commanding general was abolished since the president was already commander-in-chief and the position of chief of staff was created advisory to the president. Also the Army War College was instituted. But the new secretary of war in 1904, William Howard Taft, chose not to continue the reforms. The loose-knit organization style caused problems during the First World War. For example, over 150 War Department purchasing committees were competing with each other for scarce supplies in the open market.

When the war was over, the need for reform was easily forgotten until 1940 when General Marshall instituted a vertical chain of military command for the traditional horizontal pattern of bureaucratic coordination. After the Second World War, the nation's foreign policy became one of active global involvement, which required further reform. The War Department became the Defense Department headed by a secretary of defense. The military moved toward functional responsibility, though some functional overlap continued. The nation evolved from a loose-joined agrarian federation into a highly industrialized, urban nation, and the military of the country has also had to change toward McNamara's goal of applying pure reason and scientific method to military organization.

Hewes has well presented the need for continuing reorganization of the nation's military structure to adapt to changing times and conditions in the nation and world. His citations of parallel trends in industrial and governmental organization have been useful reference points.

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Tennessee

MICHAEL J. HOGAN. *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918–1928.* Pp. viii, 254. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977. $12.50.

American economic policy makers after World War I sought cooperation rather than unregulated competition between multinational corporations. In keeping with American economic values, they conceived that the corporations involved, engineered by those Veblenian symbols of a new age and managed in the best scientific tradition of Frederick Taylor, would operate without government ownership or control. Professor Hogan represents his work as a departure from earlier revisionism in so far as it emphasizes the cooperative rather than competitive aspects in the development of commercial policy between America and Great Britain in the postwar era. While he admits to emphasizing those areas where cooperation proved greatest (such as cable, radio, and petroleum) and excluding those where competition proved preeminent (such as tariffs), his argument is persuasive.

He begins by detailing the economic programs, policies, and problems of the Wilson administration. While Wilson himself aligned with cooperationists, challenges from home and abroad in the form of opposing allied proposals proved frustrating. Failure to secure needed support meant that problems of European recovery would remain for Republican administrations to solve. Subsequent chapters deal with the successes and the ultimate failure of Republican policy makers to develop a consistent and total cooperative program with Great Britain. Not surprisingly, considering the recent interpretations of Herbert Hoover's contributions as Secretary of Commerce, the author convincingly demonstrates Hoover's pivotal role in developing and initiating American economic policy.

Professor Hogan's scholarship impresses, particularly by the meticulous research shown in the chapters on the

development of cable, radio, and petroleum policy (a version of the latter chapter appearing earlier in article form). He makes excellent use of sources unfamiliar to me, the Owen Young and Thomas Lamont papers, and extensive use of the Hoover collection at West Branch. Doubtlessly, the author benefitted from his close proximity to the Hoover material and to Hoover scholars while in residence at the University of Iowa. His review of existing significant literature on many of the topics with which his chapters deal will be of special help to the reader interested in further study on the subject.

Hogan's introductory use of the term "Americans" is not clearly defined as certain government policy makers and its use suggests a degree of elitism and ethnocentrism. His remarks on a few other authors' works seem overly condescending at times. However, Professor Hogan amply compensates for the above by providing a clearly stated, well-organized, and scholarly addition to his field

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STEVEN F. LAWSON. *Black Ballots. Voting Rights in the South, 1944–1969*. Pp. viii, 474 New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $20.00. Paperbound, $6.95

Black Ballots adds to the growing body of scholarly literature on the black political experience in American life. Although the issue of voting rights presently lacks the topicality it enjoyed a few years ago, this is a useful historical study of the most dramatic years in the black struggle for the franchise. With 75 pages of notes and a bibliography of 28 pages, Professor Lawson has given scholars, and the general public, a valuable source of information. Moreover, for the current generation of college students who may wonder what the controversy was about, *Black Ballots* will help them to gain an understanding. This is especially true of the period prior to the emergence of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Most of the discussion in this volume focuses on the behaviors and goals of the activists, especially the legal strategies of the NAACP and its allies in the political arena. But substantial attention is also given to the activities of the relevant departments of government. Unlike a number of earlier studies of the voting rights issue, Lawson's provides some discussion of the role played by the Department of Justice. Inasmuch as voting rights was cast as a legal question by most of the actors concerned, the Department of Justice was naturally a critical participant. However, the author is careful to point out that the department's involvement frequently lacked the aggressiveness which the proponents of unfettered voting rights believed to have been necessary. The department was, of course, acting at the behest of the various presidents concerned. And they in turn had to cope with the Congress. Thus, the study does give us some insight into the politics of gaining legislative support From the perspective of those seeking change in the South's restrictive practices, the price for that support was usually exorbitant.

Black Ballots contains little that is new for those who are already acquainted with the field. In addition, because the work gives only limited attention to the expansion of voting rights concerns into a broader range of civil rights issues, a number of readers will be somewhat disappointed. That feeling will be heightened because the author acknowledges the limitations of voting in redressing the grievances which black Americans began to express in the middle 1960s. Admittedly, that was not Dr. Lawson's intention in preparing this study. Still, one cannot help but think that he could have done more to show the relationship between the struggle for the ballot in the South and the emergence of a new, less "sedate" form of black political par-

ticipation. The author also does not include a discussion of the controversy surrounding the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 during the early years of the Nixon administration. This matter was surely within the purview of a study published in 1976 and it would have shown that blacks still have to be attentive to protect newly won political gains. Passage of the 1965 legislation did not usher in the millenium that some expected to come from the right to vote. Blacks, with significant nonblack support, had simply brought to a successful conclusion a phase in their continuing effort to secure a meaningful place in American life.

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MURRAY B. NESBITT. *Labor Relations in the Federal Government Service*. Pp. ix, 545. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1976. $17.50.

Professor Nesbitt, who teaches political science at Queens College, City University of New York, and who is also a lawyer and a member of the National Labor Panel of the American Arbitration Association, is the author of this substantial study of an important aspect of American labor relations dealing with those who work for the nation's largest employer, the federal government. He spells out in painstaking and often bewildering detail the history of trade unionism in the federal service which began in the 1830s during Andrew Jackson's administration. The postal employees, who have been in the vanguard of the drive toward collective bargaining, began to organize in the late 1880s and 1890s, in the teeth of governmental opposition. Nesbitt tells the whole story, often in almost incredible detail, and indeed he overwhelms the reader with historical facts one piled on another. I suspect that this would have been a better, and certainly a more readable, book if it spared the reader such a mountainous accumulation of facts and devoted more attention to broad summaries and interpretations. To use a well-worn phrase, there are so many trees one can hardly see the forest.

While trade union activity among federal employees began about a century and a half ago and had notable successes in the postal service and TVA—to which the author devotes a great deal of attention—a major turning point was the promulgation of a basic executive order by President Kennedy in 1962, an order which was modified later by Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Thus, according to the author, there were, in 1961, only 29 exclusive units in TVA and the Interior Department, including about 19,000 employees. By the end of 1974 there were 3,483 exclusive units in over 50 different agencies, and the Postal Service recognized four national bargaining units and about 25,000 exclusive local units. To put it differently, of the 2 million nonpostal employees, 1,142,419 were in exclusive units, and 51 percent did not work under collective bargaining agreements.

There is a body of national legislation on the subject, and a few federal agencies exercise some general authority, notably the Civil Service Commission Office of Labor-Management Relations, the Federal Labor Relations Council, and the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations. The postal system became subject to the National Labor Relations Act on July 1, 1971. While Nesbitt believes that there are persuasive reasons for creating a separate regulatory agency for federal labor relations, the fact is that for the most part collective bargaining agreements among employees of the federal government are negotiated and administered locally. Thus, there is a separate contract for the employees of the VA center in Reno, another for the Atlanta Army Depot, another for the Meat Inspection Division of the Agricultural Research Service of the Department of Agriculture, and still another for the National Association of Internal Revenue Employees in Newark, and so forth.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter

in this hefty volume is that dealing with the right to strike. No president has ever condoned strikes by government employees, and Congress has often written anti-strike provisions into its legislation. Even so, there have been a few strikes at the federal level, notably the great postal strike of March 1970, and the author points out how many strikes there have been at the state and local levels in spite of legislation purporting to make such strikes illegal. Furthermore, Nesbitt points out that federal employees have other weapons in their arsenal, including picketing, "work-to-rule" slowdowns, demonstrations, "stay-at-home sick" work stoppages, and intensive lobbying, to mention only a few. The author believes that "the American public has not yet reached the point where it will accept public strikes." He also stresses the availability of other techniques for dealing with the resolution of impasses, such as various forms of fact-finding and arbitration.

This is a scholarly book on an important subject. Collective bargaining is designed to give the worker some measure of control over the basic conditions of his employment. With about 2,500,000 employees in the federal service, collective bargaining issues simply will not go away through some sort of benign neglect. Nesbitt has performed a valuable service in describing the many facets of the problem.

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STUART I. ROCHESTER. *American Liberal Disillusionment: In the Wake of World War I.* Pp. ix, 172. University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. $13.50.

In this slim volume, Professor Rochester attempts modest counter-revisionism. From the 1920s to the late 1950s historians "exaggerated the watershed impact" of the World War I experience upon the U.S. liberal community. Then Professors Henry May, Christopher Lasch, and others put "the war in longer perspective": reformers had begun to lose illusions and innocence before the war; there was more continuity than change between the 1910s and 1920s. Rochester argues that the revisionists overcompensated. World War I *was* a watershed. Even among the Liberal intelligentsia whom Rochester concedes prewar disillusionment, the noble war/bad peace experience dramatically compounded the process.

"Liberal" here means anything left of center, "from members of the insurgent Socialist and Communist parties to the editors of respectable reformist journals like the *Nation* and the *New Republic*" (p. 5). "Disillusionment" means primarily loss of faith in human perfectability; sometimes it means much the same as "alienation." Rochester is aware of the dangers inherent in such nebulous terms, and he struggles valiantly to contain them with both carefully stated contexts and implicit appeals to readers' forebearance.

Yet like so much of "intellectual history," this study is impressionistic and argumentative. Rochester is persuasive in arguing that Walter Lippmann and Walter Weyl had begun to lose progressive faith before 1917 but were devastated by the war and Versailles. But his argument circles and finally backlashes as he traces other "liberal journeys" after 1920. One group exemplified by Lincoln Steffens continued on the far left, cheering Lenin. Rochester's contention that they, too, were disillusioned seems precious if not simply wrong. Yet another group of liberals (Upton Sinclair, John Dewey, and others) was shaken by the war but did not substantially alter ideologies. Rochester is honest enough to devote eight pages to them under the heading, "No Disillusionment," despite the apparent contradiction of his thesis.

I have but two caveats concerning Rochester's writing style: He consistently employs "like" when he should use "such as." (See, for example, the quotation from page 5 cited above.) And he fallaciously pluralizes individuals, creating phantom groups—for

example, "the Deweys and the Russells" (p. 117) and "the Hemingways and Fitzgeralds" (p. 136). Generally, this book is written with such felicity that readers will be surprized to learn that it is a revised dissertation.

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SOCIOLOGY

MARY JO BANE. *Here to Stay: American Families in the Twentieth Century*. Pp. 195. New York. Basic Books, 1976. $11.50.

The appearance of Mary Jo Bane's *Here to Stay* coincides with the emergence of a renewed interest in family policy. The concern among reform professionals in family matters should be seen as a reflection of disillusionment with service interventions. Because of questions about the effectiveness of services and the willingness of the public to bear the cost of services at full level needed to address needs, reformers have come back to the family as the institution with most immediate responsibilities for mediating the status of individuals in society. Mary Jo Bane is very much a part of this line of contemporary thought. She participated in the research group headed by Christopher Jencks which argued that intellectual development of youngsters is more a result of family influences than a contribution of schools. *Here to Stay* carries the theme further in celebrating the basic strength of the American family.

Within a text of just 143 pages, Bane attempts comprehensive coverage of a highly complex institutional configuration. The first half of the book is devoted to a review of historical developments concerning the family. Most of her material is American and the greatest emphasis is on developments in the past 100 years. Particular emphasis is placed on demographic trends. The historical review is cast as a rebuttal to those who might argue that the family is in decline because of lower birth rates and higher divorce rates. Bane argues to the contrary that the family is a robust institution. She argues that marriage and remarriage are highly popular. Although there has been a decline in the average size of families, most married persons continue to desire to have children. Some of the information which Bane organizes is interesting and perhaps surprising. She points out, for example, that among women in their middle years who have ever been married, there has been almost no change between 1910 and 1970 in the percentage living with their first husband. In effect, the increase in divorce rates has been offset by declining mortality rates. The historical review includes treatment of living patterns among young unmarried adults and that among older persons. Information is presented on kinship contact plus more general data on community life. On the balance, Bane contends that domestic circumstances—that is, family relationships, employment, and community life—are in good shape in the contemporary United States.

Following from her conclusion that family life is fundamentally sound, Bane sees only limited need for public intervention to bolster family life. Family policy matters are discussed in the second half of the book. Equality in work for women and more equitable sharing of child care responsibilities are recognized as important sources of policy concern. Day care receives attention, but Bane is skeptical about organized day care as a general solution for employed women. She regards the cost to be excessively high for the limited number of families likely to be served.

Bane devotes a good deal of her attention to the income needs of families with children. She is particularly impressed with the financial problems of female-headed households with young children. Over half of the children in such families could be considered poor compared to only 16 percent of children in families generally. Bane suggests an insurance approach to lifetime income needs and protection of family members against the financial problems which

result from divorce. At the same time, she acknowledges that there will be problems in applying insurance concepts to the income maintenance problems she discusses. How, for example, can income needs resulting from divorce be protected through an insurance approach which at the same time is not a structural incentive for divorce for families who experience financial difficulties? More generally, questions can be raised whether insurance approaches are viable in the situations where the receipt of benefits tend to precede in time the payment of premiums.

The book is valuable for the extensive data it summarizes, its overview of the contemporary domestic scene, and the policy ideas which are introduced. On the other hand, in emphasizing the continuing viability of the family as an institution, Bane understates the problems which confront family life. The complexity of family life is such that data could be assembled to support a less cheerful picture. Further, her policy preference for income strategies are as vulnerable as the service strategies which she tends to discount.

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SUZANN R. THOMAS BUCKLE and LEONARD G. BUCKLE. *Bargaining for Justice: Case Disposition and Reform in the Criminal Courts*. Pp. v, 181. New York. Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1977. $17.50.

Contemporary social scientists generally accept a framework depicting the criminal justice process as an institutionalized setting (analogous to a market) in which participants (police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, corrections officials, probation and parole officers) occupy boundary-spanning roles exchanging cues, recommendations, refusals, bargains, threats, and resources between agencies and affecting the achievement of goals. Their conclusion is that most criminal justice decisions result from this type of exchange relationship. The authors of *Bargaining for Justice* adopt this theme, setting their study of case disposition in the Massachusetts district courts upon a social exchange model which they contend borders on total theory. "—[S]ocial exchange is such a basic concept that, when fleshed out, it borders on a total theory—one that explains so much of life that it cannot be disapproved at all" (p. 1.)

Most of the book focuses sharply on plea-bargaining—dealing carefully with its legality, function, and necessity. In a broader sense, though, this book is about the great discretion possessed by each participant in the criminal justice process and which marks its every stage. Indeed, the book might be better titled "Discretionary Justice." The authors, however, do retain the plea-bargaining focus and make a good case that it should be viewed as a routine, if not necessary, social function and not as an abnormality, wrongdoing, or social problem. "The fact that plea-bargaining has become an issue for observers of the court and that it is seen as a pervasive problem is in good part due to no more evidence than the rate of guilty pleas. Certainly, however, guilty pleas can also be indicators of a number of other transactions between the defendant and the court, not the least of which is the defendant's insistence that he is guilty. Other informal arrangements between members of the court might also produce a guilty plea without any agreement as to the outcome of the case having been made" (p. 3).

The authors are at their best when discussing the methodological problems with measuring and describing plea bargains. They recognize that imprecise data and inappropriate statistical techniques are only a part of the difficulty because even the best court statistics can do little more than show that a defendant pleaded guilty and that negotiations preceded this decision. They, thus, suggest going beyond aggregate statistics to look empirically at the bargaining stages of the criminal justice process.

The findings are illuminating. Bar-

gaining is the dominant mode by which cases are processed at *all* stages. The plea bargain, which takes place between prosecution and defense immediately prior to trial, is but one example. And each stage of the bargaining process "is characterized by a distinct mode of bargaining—a unique configuration of actors, strategies, currencies, and interests" (pp. 64–5). The authors succeed in showing bargaining to be cumulative, building from a chaotic situation at arrest "toward a highly structured understanding of reality and a settled prescription for professional action at the end of the criminal trial" (p. 65).

My sense is that this is a very good book. It treats a controversial topic objectively; it generates new data that appears useful; and it discusses reform proposals in light of objective data. Its only shortcoming might be that it is *too* objective—that the authors are too easily persuaded that, objectively, bargaining is an administrative necessity rather than merely an administrative reality.

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ANN M. CLARKE and A. D. B. CLARKE. *Early Experience. Myth and Evidence*. Pp. ix, 314. New York. The Free Press, 1977. $13.95

Early Experience: Myth and Evidence by Ann and A. D. B. Clarke is not an examination of the nature versus nurture conflict, but an attempt to see how deprivation or acceleration of nurturance and environmental opportunities in early childhood may affect later development. The editors' avowed intention is to demonstrate that the early childhood years are not the critical period of learning but that all stages of childhood are important and that great personal resiliency may be a response to early childhood deprivation.

The editors have chosen a selection of readings which emphasize the cognitive developmental view that there are stages of learning (which can be delayed or slightly accelerated), through which every child must pass. The child does not need to learn skills at any crucial age for their acquisition to be possible; however, the child usually acquires skills in stages and must have a certain degree of physical maturity to master them.

The first section of the book discusses some of the classic cases of children isolated in early years from nurturance and having only minimal sensory stimulation during that time. The material presented leads one to the conclusion that, even in extreme cases of deprivation, a child can make up deficiencies with an unusually warm and stimulating later environment. Unfortunately, the selections chosen are well known to child-developmental specialists and do not add a great deal to our knowledge of early deprivation.

In the second section the editors deal with various types of continued cognitive development after less severe isolation, often after institutionalization. In these reports of naturally occurring situations, the effects shown by early institutionalization are not consistent across the studies, but overcoming an early deficit seems to depend again on the nature of life experiences. However, the adoption data showing the rapid fading of the detrimental effects of early adversity may be suspect. Some studies show a "sleeper" effect of early deprivation which may not show up until later years (Lewis, 1954). While the editors comment on the Lewis study and others in their introduction, the discordant studies are not included in the selections to be read. In general, the editors' interpretation of the data about adoption shows bias. All of the studies included agree that children adopted later in life have a poorer outcome than those adopted earlier. The editors, however, explain away these findings by discussing sample differences, possible personality "unadoptability" differences in the subjects, and the like. These cautions may be justified, but the editors seem too eager to dismiss the studies which do not totally support their theory of continuous development.

The final section reports upon experimentally improved environments for deprived children. For institutionalized children with low I.Q.s, such an improved environment stimulated a marked increase in I.Q. and later high-normal occupational achievement, in contrast to a control group which showed neither increment. The importance of the continuation of an improved environment is stressed in the reprint of Kirk's classic experiment with preschool training of children from inadequate homes. Such children showed immediate positive I.Q. gains from a short time-period of exposure to an enriched environment, but the effect faded over time, if no continuous environmental improvement occurred. In this section, the editors do note that such a decline in the effect of an enriched environment may be due to unusual environmental factors or picking the wrong critical period for intervention. Thus, they seem to imply that certain ages of childhood development may indeed be more critical than others.

Throughout, the Clarkes caution against the assumption that the early years are not important *at all* and stress that their aim is to establish a balance, not a counterbalance, to previous theories which stress early childhood development. The balance they hope to achieve is in the form of an interactional model of development, where reaction to a crisis is as important as the early deprivation. They, themselves, point out, however, that options for personal change are likely to narrow as the child enters the teen years and approaches adulthood. For these reasons, the careful reader would certainly question their blanket statement, "it appears that there is virtually no psychological adversity to which some children have not been subjected, yet later *recovered*" (p. 260). We should be very careful to define and limit that word "recovered."

The book is a refreshing antidote to Freudian and extreme Social Learning theory positions. Its selections, however, tend to rebut these theories and not to achieve the balance which is the editors' aim. It is important that these newly compiled insights do not become reified into another rigid view of development until they are fully substantiated. Certainly more careful empirical research and analysis is needed before a new model for childhood development can be realized.

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A. J. CULYER. *Need and the National Health Service: Economics and Social Choice.* Pp. vii, 163. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1976. $11.50.

This book is designed to provide a rationale and plan of action for the British National Health Service, based on economic analysis, but written for the layman. The NHS is to minimize unmet medical need for a given budget.

"Need" is defined as "some third party's (voter's) view as to what a particular individual or class of individuals *ought* to receive." But readers are told that "the greater becomes the cost of meeting a given need, the less that need will be met." And we are required to "trade off one need against another."

Two definitions of need are confused here. The first is simply the amount of medical care demanded for an individual by voters, based on interdependent preferences among consumers. This idea has been much better developed by Mark Pauly in his important book *Medical Care at Public Expense*, 1971. Alternatively, need is ill health, an economic bad in the eyes of external observers and the (here neglected) consumer.

In most of the book, the operational content of need is objectively measured low health status. But numerous studies have shown that large variations in health care make virtually no difference in health. Beyond a low basic level of care, its main benefits are alleviation of symptoms and changes in risk. These are fundamentally sub-

jective and accurately known only by the consumer.

Given this situation, health care can apparently be reasonably allocated by (as suggested by Martin Feldstein and Mark Pauly) a rational price system for the nonpoor. This requires large deductibles and consumer copayment with relatively complete insurance reserved for catastrophic health events.

Or government can provide care giving physicians wide discretion to sympathetically judge consumer preferences. For the developed countries, maximizing objectively measurable health seems as sensible as maximizing an objective index of music output.

Fortunately, Culyer retreats from his own argument—by including "pain and mental anguish" in measures of need. But the result is to make need subjective and nonoperational.

The book's real achievements are its chapters on health status indices and medical technology. The former is the best general treatment I have seen. Its stress on the necessity of value judgments in forming indices is most welcome. The latter's exposition of the fuzziness of diagnosis and treatment decisions and the wide range of substitution possible in health care also deserves wide reading.

But the chapter on rationing of health care is marred by curious slips in the economic reasoning. Examples include the statements that "to work effectively, it [rationing by price] would need . . . to be accompanied by *no* insurance" and that the influence of doctors on consumption precludes supply and demand analysis.

The book is unlikely to be useful to laymen after all, because of its conceptual and technical weaknesses. But it should find a ready market among professionals, especially those concerned with the problems and uses of health status indices.

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TORSTEN ERIKSSON. *The Reformers: An Historical Survey of Pioneer Experiments in the Treatment of Criminals.* Pp. 310. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1976. $17.50.

This is the most thoughtful, comprehensive, and carefully documented history of correctional innovation to appear in several decades. By covering most of Europe, Australia, and the United States from the sixteenth century to the mid-1970s, it is less insular than any recent work available in English, although—like others—it neglects Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many approaches in recent years hailed as though new—for example, token economies, contract parole, collective responsibility, shock penalties, and family simulations—are shown to have been espoused and practiced (under diverse labels) many decades or even centuries ago. Also, the demagogic and unfair reactions they encounter today destroyed them in the past. The book is dedicated "To those who tried, even if they failed."

The first half-dozen chapters describe early architecture (such as the Bridewell) and the advocacy of reform, notably by John Howard. Each of the next 15 chapters is on a correctional concept, from "penance in solitary confinement" to "the therapeutic community," tracing each idea from its origins through its major extensions or renewals. A chapter on international organizations for the exchange of penological thought and experience touches somewhat on Asia and Latin America, by noting that the best survivors of recent efforts in this field are the regional institutes sponsored by the Japanese and Costa Rican governments. A concluding chapter, called "the heart of the matter," notes the lack of rigorous proof of recidivism reduction by most of the innovations, but it argues that this fact does not absolve us from being humane to offenders and trying to aid in their rehabilitation.

This book is distinctive for its organization around correctional concepts.

What is still needed, however, for guidance from study of the past, is the analysis of experience in terms of behavioral science principles. Thus, ideas of differential association, though not so labeled, were the rationale for "solitary confinement," "silent community," and "separate" systems of incarceration; concepts of differential reinforcement were implicit in what Eriksson calls the "task sentence" and in the "mark" system; the sociological laws of coalition formation and of conflict explain the objectives of "collective responsibility" —rewarding or punishing whole groups of offenders for the behavior of any of their members, rather than applying sanctions only to individuals. We would learn more from both history and current research if we tried to determine which principle is most effective, in what circumstances, and for whom.

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JULIAN JAYNES. *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.* Pp. 467. Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977, $12.95.

Psychologist Carl Duncan said this about Julian Jaynes's monumental work: "Jaynes is extremely clever to think up this thing. I only wish he would put that cleverness to some serviceable use." The ego is on you, Mr. Duncan.

Jaynes states that, around 1200 B.C. cataclysmic events occurred which forced the breakdown of the bicameral mind of man—comprised of (for all righthanders) the left cerebral hemisphere, having language, rational, linear, terminal mind processes; and the right side, containing spatial, visual, exhaustive, Jungian archtypical processes.

Arising from the breakdown came the age of consciousness. In Yoga it is known as the "sun sign," in between the eyes and slightly elevated from the bridge of the nose—a third lobe?

We have been into "consciousness" for some 3,100 years. Jaynes says bicamerality didn't occur until between 10 000 and 5 000 B.C. Before that, man had mostly an instinctive (old brain stem) orientation.

Consciousness is defined as the "analog I (eye)" (alter ego), which uses metaphors to speak to us. Moreover, learning and thinking are not consciousness.

So what? It seems that the bicameral mind "heard" voices from the gods (God), created by (input?) the right side of the brain, and transmitted through the corpus collosum to the left side in terms of "thou shalt" or "thou shalt not." The cataclysmic events (also verified by Immanuel Velikovsky, another scientific rebel), coming at a time when there were too many voices, created, revolutionarily, the "analog-I." Jaynes refers to Greek, Hebrew, and other works to prove his point.

Is it the "ultimate proof" of the nonexistence of God? Hume put this to an end in his "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion." I don't think Jaynes has this in mind. There can be no doubt that, before Jaynes, nobody viewed consciousness as having originated at some specific time. Jaynes admits to many gaps in scientific proof. He is a humble egotist. He is really saying, "Let's explore these things together. I know there is something here."

Since Jaynes unabashedly admits that his book represents the ultimate development of consciousness, some new stage may be waiting around the corner (the fourth dimension?). There are other authors and researchers who also may be pointing the way, such as Szasz, Weil, Casteneda, Grof, Kopp, and so on.

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ROBERT JEWETT and JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE. *The American Monomyth.* Pp. v, 263. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1977. $8.95.

The American Monomyth is an ambitious attempt to meld recent studies

of popular culture into the serious efforts of Joseph Campbell, Carl Jung, Mircea Eliade, and others to identify the guiding ethos of a given personality or culture—a controlling "myth," if you will. The myth of America is Edenic and Messianic: "A community in a harmonious paradise is threatened by evil: normal institutions fail to contend with this threat: a selfless superhero emerges to renounce temptations and carry out the redemptive task: aided by fate, his decisive victory restores the community to its paradisal condition: the superhero then recedes into obscurity" (p. xx). By this reckoning, *The Bionic Woman*, *Star Trek*, *Death Wish*, *Playboy*, *Walking Tall*, *Little House on the Prairie*, Disney's denizens, and the disaster craze let loose by *Jaws*—plus, by implication if not demonstration, high culture and historical and political interpretation—are of a piece: "Redeemer wreaks retribution," more or less. Even *Zap Comics*, the writ of the counterculture, conforms at this mythic level. In the archetypal depths, Americans high and low, left and right speak the same symbolic language. McLuhan is thus explicitly refuted: The myth, not the medium, is the message.

Were this all, it would be much—as Isaac Asimov points out in his introduction, contrasting the Greek myth of Hercules with the American update. But Jewett and Lawrence, who teach religion and philosophy, go further. Leaning on giants of philosophy and psychology, especially Plato and Whitehead, and on the Judeo-Christian mythos, they search for the "magical" elements in the technological society—and find the monomythic savior, technology: "The intricately crafted message of paradise redeemed by heroes larger than life has appeals far deeper than reason, particularly to a culture believing itself besieged by ruthless foes. To borrow words from the unbelieving J. H. Plumb, the world of the American monomyth is truly '. . . fearsome . . . magical . . . full of wonders and portents. . . .' Can it be that the technomythic portraits in radio, film, television, and comics are so artful that even highly sophisticated minds fail to detect the new heroic presences? Are the dramas of redemption so true to our most earnest hopes that they acquire the semblance of reality? Perhaps if the monomyth is truly alive and well, it reveals a side to scientific, modern man seldom imagined in the dreams of reason that stirred the century in which the American nation was founded. It is surely appropriate now, as we enter our third century of national life, to cope with this pervasive mythic legacy" (pp. 196–97). And before technology there was FDR, and before that . . .

And then the fateful final step of the Jewett-Lawrence argument: the American monomyth is potentially Orwellian. The longing for the lost Eden of Henry Nash Smith's *The Virgin Land* breeds discontent, while the anxious but passive yearning for the pristine savior of Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* undermines democracy. Richard Hofstadter is not cited, but his arguments concerning the rise of the paranoid style of American politics in the face of depression and war are paralleled, with the emergence of the superhero comics in the 1929–41 decade taken as evidence that the "national mythology" had become an "escapist fantasy." Hence, the imperial presidency, global reach—and even international terrorism and crime in the streets, since the "technomythic media" spread the mythos outward and downward. This is probably a step too far; the language is so specialized as to require a glossary à la the philosophy journals; the portrait of the female and of minorities in American popular imagination is perhaps a bit askew; and there are a dozen other matters large and small. Some incorrigibly optimistic patriot might even insist that the American myth could be set on its feet: "Noble character struggles against seemingly insuperable odds toward a worthy goal—and succeeds."

Yet for all its faults, *The American Monomyth* is still an exciting work.

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ECONOMICS

J. W. DEVANNEY, C. ASHE, and B. PARKHURST. *Parable Beach: A Primer in Coastal Zone Economics*. Pp. 99. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1976. $12.50.

DAVID HARRISON, JR. *Who Pays for Clean Air: The Cost and Benefit Distribution of Federal Automobile Emission Standards*. Pp. vii, 167. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975. $15.00.

Investment is a problem in resource allocation. Scarce resources which have a variety of uses must be allocated among these many uses. But, in addition, investment involves diverting resources from production for current use to activities whose benefits are to be realized in the future. In the United States, investment decisions are generally made by the private sector. In many cases, however, government at some level becomes the decision maker. These two books deal with such cases. The Devanney et al. book is concerned with a municipality which must decide whether to grant a zoning variance to a builder who proposes to develop a tract of high-rise apartments in an area not currently zoned for it. The Harrison piece evaluates the distributional pattern of costs and benefits of Federal Automobile Emission Standards.

Devanney et al. set up a fictitious community, Parable Beach, complete with socioeconomic characteristics and historical context. The book is entitled *Parable Beach: A Primer in Coastal Zone Economics*. In fact, the only reason for the coastal zone description is that Parable Beach is on the coast. The problem dealt with, a decision on land-use in the community, and the techniques used could apply to any community. Basically what is presented is a "cookbook" for community officials who must make decisions on investment projects. How to define the relevant unit, the benefits, the costs, and the time horizon are carefully illustrated using the specific example. The main weakness of the book is that pitfalls in the approach are not made as clear as they should be. In a small community, for example, it is extremely difficult to estimate how much money invested in the community will be recycled in the community and how much will be spent on goods and services provided by "foreigners," or those outside the community. On the other hand, the importance of a good accounting framework, the interaction between costs and benefits, and the spatial definition of the relevant population are highlighted. The book serves a quite useful purpose for policy makers not familiar with cost-benefit analysis. It makes very clear that the approach is a very inexact art, rather than an exact science.

Harrison has a much more ambitious objective than Devanney and his coauthors. He estimates the benefits and costs of the federal auto emission program. He investigates the distribution of costs across rural and urban areas. The costs include increased automobile ownership costs, increased operating costs, reduced automobile company stockholder profits, and reduced federal tax receipts. The benefits are measured as reductions in the concentrations of three air pollutants, CO, NO_x, and O_x. No dollar values are placed on the benefits because of the uncertainty attached to such aspects as health improvements and aesthetic improvements. The methodology is carefully outlined; the assumptions made clear.

Harrison found that control costs were a larger fraction of income for households in lower income groups. Further, households in suburban areas, small urban areas, and nonurban areas gain quite modest air quality benefits while paying large costs. Harrison then examines alternative strategies for con-

trolling automobile emissions. His analysis indicates that the automobile emission control program can be made both less costly and less burdensome on the poor by adopting a multicar strategy. One policy might be a two-car strategy. The 1973 emission standards would apply to all cars sold in the United States, while the 1977 emission standards would apply to all cars sole in 43 polluted SMSAs.

It is clearly important to look at the distributional consequences of federal programs and not solely their overall effectiveness. Harrison's empirical study is worthy of attention by policy makers.

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BRIAN LOVEMAN. *Struggle in the Country: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919–1973.* International Development Research Center, Studies in Development No. 10 Pp vi, 439. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976 $12.50.

Brian Loveman has produced what may well turn out to be the authoritative account of the Chilean peasant movement in the twentieth century. Basing his analysis on a study of the archives of the Chilean Labor Department, Loveman seeks to document the ways in which the landowning class responded to steadily increasing pressures for a redefinition of rural property rights. He argues that the political power of the landlords was based on elite connections at the summit of the state which had the effect of maintaining an historical compromise between the large landowners and the urban middle classes (and to some extent, organized labor).

The key feature was the agreement by urban middle classes (who were during this period in control of the state apparatus) to refrain from using state political power to penetrate the rural power domains of the landowning class. This class, which began to experience a secular decline in the first quarter of the twentieth century, sought to contain the pressure of rural labor by using its access to the elite positions of the state to ensure that this hands-off agreement was kept and that potential encroachments by the state on property rights within rural power domains were restricted as much as possible. This historic compromise, according to Loveman, provided the structural support for the operation of a democratic political system. Chilean democracy rested on the systematic, pervasive, and conscious repression of the rural work force. Once a serious and sustained attack on the property rights of the landowners took effect with the advent of the Christian Democratic and Popular Unity governments, the structural bases for formal democracy were eroded. This was a contributory factor leading to the period of military rule beginning in 1973

Loveman's argument is a plausible one, though his focus on rural class relations does inevitably entail a rather cursory analysis of the interplay of political forces in Chilean society as a whole.

Moreover, the author's concentration on conflicts between landowners and workers may perhaps have led him to give insufficient attention to the heterogeneity of the rural work force and the importance of conflicts between the various different strata However, there can be little doubt that this book fills a serious gap in studies of the Chilean peasantry, giving historical depth to a peasant movement which has generally been regarded as being of recent origin.

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FRITZ MACHLUP. *A History of Thought on Economic Integration*. Pp. ix, 323. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $20.00.

Professor Machlup has produced an odd book, a mixture of the very useful and the frustrating. There are three main divisions in the text: a short,

typically Machlupian semantic analysis of economic integration; a 59-page essay on the economic theory of integration; and nearly 200 pages of classified bibliography which includes a brief description of the contents of each item cited. This bibliography is the feature which will send students flocking to the book. It is divided into the writings of historians, political economists, statesmen, committees and organizations, and economic theorists. Although extensive, the listings are not intended to be exhaustive. The researcher interested in a complete coverage of some aspect of integration will be able to start with Machlup and find most of the literature, but he should not expect to end there.

These days, "economic integration" tends to call up visions of some sort of regional free trade area, customs union, or the like. Professor Machlup casts a wider net; to him, "complete integration implies the *actual* utilization of all *potential* opportunities of efficient division of labour." This, together with the fact that analysis of integration requires the resources of the theory of international trade, explains why the first two-thirds of the chapter on theory is devoted to a review of trade theory on a worldwide, nondiscriminatory basis. Only the last 20 pages or so of the chapter deal with the concerns of the writings on customs union theory since 1950.

The chapter on theory is a marvel of lucid compression of complicated technical material into plain English, unencumbered by diagrams or equations. It is also going to be the source of much frustration because of Machlup's resolute refusal to provide footnote guidance to the literature. Readers in many cases will want to go to original sources or commentaries for more development or for contrary points of view. The index sometimes provides a bridge between the chapter on ideas and the bibliography; sometimes by leafing through the bibliography the citation for an idea may be found, but there is always the cost of time and sometimes the result of failure. This is simply poor historical writing, and Professor Machlup deserves to feel the displeasure of anyone inconvenienced by his decision to survey ideas without naming authors. His stated reasons for this approach are that his sources are in no small part outside the domain of professional economics and that it helps make the book a good instrument for open-book examinations. Neither reason justifies his decision. A much more helpful essay, exemplifying what scholarly historical writing in this field should be, is Denis O'Brien, "Customs Unions: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in Historical Perspective," (*History of Political Economy*, vol. 8, no. 4 [Winter 1976], pp. 540–63). This article, which appeared too late to be covered in Machlup's bibliography, should be referred to by readers baffled by Machlup's technique.

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DAVID H. MCKAY: *Housing and Race in Industrial Society*. pp. 193 London: Croom Helm. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowan & Littlefield, 1977 $13.50.

In Britain, as in the United States, black households tend to be confined to the least desirable portions of the urban housing inventory. *Housing and Race in Industrial Society* by David McKay describes housing discrimination in these two countries and evaluates legislation that was intended to end the practice. It is a scholarly book—at least in the sense that it grew out of a doctoral dissertation—but quite readable. Author McKay is identified as a Lecturer in Government at the University of Essex.

Britain's housing discrimination issue is comparatively recent, most of the racial minority population having arrived since 1950 It is also smaller in terms of numbers involved than that of the United States; blacks make up little more than one percent of the United Kingdom's population but eleven percent in the United States. Though other ethnic groups are affected by housing discrimination in both coun-

tries, this book is concerned primarily with blacks.

The author is commendably clear about what is meant by discrimination, and that is important because anti-discrimination laws in both countries have run up against an inherent contradiction. One concept of discrimination is the refusal to lend money for housing or to sell or rent on equal terms regardless of the other party's race. The other concept is segregation—creation of all black enclaves. Programs to end segregation must apparently be discriminatory, giving preferential accommodation to minority households in order to achieve dispersal into the better or newer homes. The contradiction arises because in both countries the established system of allocating residences tends to place minorities in obsolete portions of the inventory, an inventory which tends to be located in clusters On the rock of the established system, good intentions of new laws founder.

Author McKay impatiently cites the results of discrimination complaint procedures provided by the basic 1968 legislation in both countries. In the United States, during the early 18-month period, a total of only 105 complaints were resolved; in 47 cases the complainant got nothing for his or her troubles, 22 received a cash award and only 21 got to move directly into the dwelling in question (p. 66) This does little to improve matters for the five million-odd black households in the nation. In Britain, 404 complaints were disposed of over a four-year period, with findings of no discrimination or lack of jurisdiction in 314 cases (p. 99). McKay believes the reason for these negligible results is the legislative misconception that discrimination is an explicit private offense easily provable by an individual complainant. The reality is that minorities end up in undesirable housing through the workings of a complex and basically impersonal mechanism which legislation does not touch.

The mechanism differs between the two countries. In Britain, 31 percent of all housing consists of publicly-owned rental units allocated by local authorities among a waiting list of eligible families by a set of rules, which seem to have nothing to do with race, but which happen to work against blacks in particular —because they are not citizens, or have not been long in the community, or have low income, or happen to be emergency cases for whom acquired slums awaiting demolition are deemed good enough. There is discrimination in the private market but little is known about it; the relevant inventory is publicly controlled. In the United States public housing makes up only 1.5 percent of the inventory—occupied overwhelmingly by black families—so that discrimination refers to practices in the private market.

McKay's description of these American practices is the weakest portion of an otherwise carefully written book. Taking some biased and unsystematic literature at face value he states that real estate brokers and lenders profit from creating and maintaining a dual market. No economic rationale is provided, as though the point were obvious, and his credibility is further impaired by several extreme charges against the National Association of Real Estate Boards—an organization which changed its name at least two years before this book was completed. The unfortunate result is that a thread runs through the book distinguishing the source of discrimination in Britain as bumbling administration by myopic but kind-hearted bureaucrats, while in America it is hate, pure and simple, made and sold for profit. This position is maintained despite meaningful evidence that racism is an important political fact in Britain today; a 1968 poll showed 95 percent in favor of restrictions on immigration—the source of black population increase (p. 94)—for example. It is not unreasonable to interpret this book as an apologia for housing discrimination in Britain.

Overlooking that fault, *Housing and Race in Industrial Society* gives useful perspective to the domain and philosophy of governmental intervention in race relations, the more so because it is a comparative study. The conclusion is that government can or will do little. What other means there might be to save

society from demeaning fear and conflict this book leaves for others to explore.

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RAYMOND VERNON. *Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issues*. Pp v, 260. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. $12.50.

This book is well written and is a good summary discussion of the major issues surrounding multinational business enterprises. The author is director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. His writing style is not wry or engaging like that of his recently retired colleague John Kenneth Galbraith, but it is eminently readable. Moreover, the issues discussed will be important ones for years to come, so that this book will make a useful addition to many personal libraries.

The point of departure for Vernon's study is from the view, now widely held, that multinationals threaten the autonomy of nation-states. In addition, transnational corporations have been a part of the process of "global homogenization" —the worldwide use of standardized goods and services. At the same time, and a part of the same process, the world's economies have grown increasingly interdependent. These developments are also linked to economic hegemony and dependence; it is easy to suggest that U.S. support for an international order in which multinationals can prosper is evidence of a policy of hegemony and economic dependence.

To what extent are these concerns legitimate? What are the likely consequences of the further growth of multinationals? Is the nation-state really inviolate? Should it be? Issues such as these are addressed.

In part, multinationals are of concern due to their average size. In 1974, the 179 largest multinationals with headquarters in the United States had average sales of more than $3 billion each, more than one-third of which was derived from foreign operations. Forty-one of those corporations had manufacturing subsidiaries in more than 20 countries; another 86 had subsidiaries in 11 to 20 nations.

A number of policy proposals to restrain multinational enterprises have been made worldwide. This marks a major shift in attitude toward multinationals. The author cites the shrinkage of international space—the result of jet travel, the radio telephone, and the computer—as the source of new international interdependence. Indeed, the author points out that increased bargaining power of nations to restrain multinationals' activities flows from this interdependence. However, up to the present, the collective demands of developing countries have been "exceedingly general" (p. 198) and not of the consequence which they may in the future.

These issues will foster major changes. In Raymond Vernon's words: "In the end, some nations, even developing nations, may be persuaded to face the problem of uncoupling and remeshing their national jurisdictions in order to handle multinational-enterprise problems" (p. 215).

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JOHN ZYSMAN. *Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France*. Pp. 239. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $12.75.

The political deal which undergirded the Third Republic in France made the bourgeoisie and the peasantry the twin pillars of the new regime and nurtured the interests of both at the expense of more rapid growth. This premise has been developed by Stanley Hoffman, and John Zysman attempts to carry it forward with the thesis that the French have continued to short-circuit the capitalist spirit. Zysman's evidence is presented in an analysis of the postwar French electronics industry. The author details both the connection of the state to the industry and its internal transformation. These relationships are structured for purposes of carving out a pro-

tected reserve for French technology and enterprise in the wilderness of international competition.

Of course, electronics is the key to the present-day expansion of communications, and thus it has important political implications. Electronics has enormous military significance. It is also a key industry in relation to other large-scale technological systems. During the 1960s, Gaullist-sponsored government intervention in the electronics industry was directed at protecting it from international competition. But results did not match the comparable Japanese electronics miracle—alas, Zysman does not offer any explanations in an explicitly comparative framework. He shows how massive subsidies notwithstanding, the Fifth Republic efforts to shape the growth of the industry were ineffective. The writer emphasizes that traditional French business practices followed by individual industries were not well adapted to the rapidly changing technology in this field nor to intensive international competition. In this analysis, readers interested in "theories of the firm" will find plenty of grist for their economic mills.

But political scientists as well will stand to gain by reading this slim volume. For the dynamics of international business—trading upon advanced technology—is aptly examined in the context of the impact of government policy. In a sophisticated market such as that involved in electronics, any failure to modernize will trigger lost sales and rapid obsolescence. Thus the industry must be organized so that changes in technology will be quickly reflected in new products. But what happens when government protectionism enters this picture? "Tant pis!" says our television version of Molière with a note of twentieth-century irony. "So much the worse": the state subsidies actually inhibited many electronics firms from revising their business practices. The politician in spite of himself thus found that there are outer limits on political prospects for shaping the growth of a technologically rapid-paced industry.

John Zysman has written a meticulous case study on modern French industrial development. It has a multidisciplinary patina which is fairly well polished. He gives an indepth view of organizational behavior, wearing his social psychology hat. And wearing a political science hat, he clarifies the dynamic interaction between international markets and political policy. But, tant pis, the book shows little of the economist's appreciation for and no reliance upon recently developed international trade models or inter-industry studies that would give the French electronics case larger theoretical implications. On the one hand, the volume has some of the vices of a revised dissertation, on the other, it has many of the virtues of a skillfully researched and carefully analyzed case study. For example, some important behavioral propositions are offered, interconnecting external and internal organizational constraints. Thus, the author takes issue with Crozier's interpretation of French organizations, considering them not in isolation, but in continuous adjustment to their environment. In so doing, John Zysman makes a contribution to the literature on political and technological modernization.

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